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
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THE SO-CALLED TRIVANDRUM PLAYS ATTRIBUTED TO BHĀSA

*By Herman Tieken, Leiden**

Introduction

The basic problem in the study of the thirteen so-called Trivandrum plays¹ is the lack of any reliable starting-point. The plays are anonymous and in some cases even their titles are uncertain². Furthermore, there are no certain references to and quotations from the plays³. In fact, the first direct references are found only in such relatively late South Indian texts as the Śākuntalacarcā and

* I would like to thank Professor F. B. J. Kuiper for his valuable comments on an earlier version of this article.

¹ The plays concerned are: Madhyamavyāyoga, Dūtavākya, Bālacarita, Dūtaghaṭotkaca, Karmabhāra, Ūrubhaṅga and Pañcarātra (themes based on the Mahābhārata), Pratimānātaka and Abhiṣekanātaka (Rāmāyaṇa), Pratiññāyugandharāyaṇa and Svapnavāsavadatta (Kathā), and Avimāraka and Cārudatta (invented plots; on the possible sources of the Avimāraka, see MASSON 1969). These thirteen plays are commonly known as the Trivandrum plays, after the place of publication of the first editions. So far, no manuscripts of these plays have been found outside Kerala or which are not of Kerala origin (see UNNI 1978).

² In the short prologues the usual references to author and title are lacking. The present titles (see n. 1) have been based on the colophons of the manuscripts. However, in the manuscripts available for the Karmabhāra at least three other titles occur, namely Kavacāṅka, Karmakavacaharaṇa and Karmabhārata. The same text has also been quoted under the title Kavacāḍāna (UNNI 1978: 67).

³ Two of the thirteen titles figure elsewhere in Sanskrit literature (leaving aside the Śākuntalacarcā and the Naṭāṅkuṣa, for which, see n. 4), namely the Svapnavāsavadatta and (Daridra-)Cārudatta. Their case is complicated by the fact that both plays are adaptations of earlier texts. The quotations, including those that could be identified in the Trivandrum versions, most likely derive from the respective 'mother' texts. For the Svapnavāsavadatta, see below, and for the (Daridra-)Cārudatta, see in particular SCHOKKER 1968.

Naṭāṅkuśa⁴. As a result the plays have become the object of numerous speculations and controversies⁵.

In the introduction to the first edition of the Svapnavāsavadatta (1912), GAṆAPATI ŚĀSTRĪ ascribed all thirteen plays en bloc to Bhāsa, the legendary predecessor of Kālidāsa⁶. His evidence consists of the following argumentation. On the basis of a number of similarities found in the plays, he assumed that they are the work of one and the same author.⁷ One of the plays bears the title Svapnavāsavadatta. An anthology verse ascribed to Rājaśekhara (first half of the tenth century) mentions a Svapnavāsavadatta by Bhāsa⁸. Ergo, all

⁴ On the Śākuntalacarcā (also known as Śākuntalavyākhyā or Abhi-jñānaśākuntalacarcā), see SHARMA 1929, PUSALKER 1968: 34, esp. n. 5, and UNNI 1978: 224–231. According to the information provided by UNNI 1978 the Śākuntalacarcā has been published as no. 195 of the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series. Unfortunately this publication has not been available to me. The commentary is probably not earlier than the fourteenth or fifteenth century. On the Naṭāṅkuśa, anonymous, undated and as yet unpublished, see UNNI 1978: 36 and passim. The Naṭāṅkuśa is specifically concerned with the Kūṭiyāṭṭam performance.

⁵ The most complete survey of the literature on the Trivandrum plays is PUSALKER 1968, the usefulness of which, however, is considerably diminished by the author's partiality for one particular theory. In this respect the introduction to SUKTHANKAR's bibliographical note (SUKTHANKAR 1923b) is to be preferred. For a neat, well-balanced overview of the main theories concerning the plays, see DE 1941 and MASSON 1970: 3–26.

⁶ Bhāsa is mentioned by Kālidāsa in the prologue of the Mālavikāgnimitra (p. 328, l. 6 f.): *prathitayaśasām bhāsaśaumillakaviputrādīnām prabandhān atikramya vartamānakaveḥ kālidāsasya kriyāyām katham bahumānaḥ*.

⁷ GAṆAPATI ŚĀSTRĪ distinguishes so-called structural similarities (e.g. *nāndyante tataḥ praviśati sūtradhārāḥ, sthāpanā* instead of *prastāvanā*) and mutual resemblances (e.g. common sentences, identical *bharatavākya*s). This aspect was further investigated by SUKTHANKAR 1921 (preponderance of *śloka*s) and 1923a (a complete concordance). For a summary of the relevant material, see PUSALKER (1968: 6–23), who gives a list of items under altogether twenty separate headings. For a recent appreciation of the material, with particular reference to SUKTHANKAR's Concordance, note MASSON (1970: 19 n. 13): "When all is said and done this [i.e. the concordance] is the single strongest argument in favour of Bhāsa's authorship".

⁸ Jalhana, Sūktimuktāvalī (1258 A.D.) IV 48 *bhāsanāṭakacakra 'pi chekaiḥ kṣipte parīkṣitum / svapnavāsavadattasya dāhako 'bhūn na pāvakaḥ* || (quoted by MASSON 1970: 13 n. 2). The verse is attributed to Rājaśekhara (tenth century). Subsequently, to this reference the following quotation, found in the Nāṭyadarpaṇavivarṇa of Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra (end of the twelfth century), has been added (LÉVI 1923: 197 n. 1): *yathā bhāsaḥ svapnavāsavadatte śephalikāmaṇḍapaśīlātalam avalokya vatsarājah – pādākrāntāni puṣpāni soṣma cedam śīlāsanam / nūnaṁ kā cid ihāsīnā mām drṣ-*

the plays concerned are by that author and must therefore be dated before the fifth century A.D. This dating would agree with the occurrence in the plays of certain supposedly archaic features, among which the absence of Māhārāṣṭrī Prakrit.

While subsequent discoveries and investigations have made it abundantly clear that GAṆAPATI ŚĀSTRĪ's conclusion was, to say the least, premature, it still lingers on in Sanskrit studies, either as a holy fact, an hypothesis or as a source of scepticism.

New light was thrown on the problem by the discovery in South India of more plays showing the very same peculiarities which till then were held to be typical exclusively of the Trivandrum plays. These discoveries include the Āścaryacūḍāmaṇi by Śaktibhadra (SASTRI 1926). Moreover, recently a manuscript of the Avimāraka has been found, in the colophon of which a certain Kātyāyana is mentioned as the author (UNNI 1977b and 1978: 101 and 104–107). However, there has been nobody so far who has suggested in all earnest that the Trivandrum plays must then be the work of Śaktibhadra or, for that matter, of the unknown playwright Kātyāyana.

A completely new line of research has been opened by the recognition that the Trivandrum plays were part of the repertoire of Kūṭiyāṭṭam, a living tradition in Kerala of performing Sanskrit drama. In combination with the fact that the Trivandrum plays included a few adaptations or abridgements, this has led to the theory that we have to do with relatively recent texts, i.e. compilations, recasts, adaptations as well as original plays, made for the Kerala stage⁹. This would explain, among other things, the absence of the author's name, the closely resembling prologues, the common technical aspects and the large number of repetitions and parallels in the plays.

As suggested by DE (1941: 422 and 429), research should be focused, for each play individually, on such questions as whether it is

tvā sahasā gatā (MS reads *natā*) // (*ad* Nāṭyadarpaṇa 53c, edd. G. K. SHRI-GONDEKAR – L. BH. GANDHI, p. 84, l. 6–9). Neither the verse nor the context could be traced back in the Trivandrum Svapnavāsavadatta.

⁹ The recognition of the importance of Kūṭiyāṭṭam for the study of the Trivandrum plays is in the first place due to the works of A. K. and K. R. PISHAROTI. See also, among others, KUNHAN RAJA 1923 (e.g. p. 259) and DE 1941. While PISHAROTI (1925: 111) conclude that the plays "are the result of compilation and adaptation, undertaken to meet the large demands made by the flourishing stage of Kerala", DE (1941: 421) is much more careful in making such a direct link: "The Trivandrum plays . . . are of the nature of adaptations or abridgments made for the stage, and they have in fact been regularly used as stage-plays in the Kerala country".

an original play or a recast, and if it is a recast, to what extent the older material has been worked up or worked over. Most of the work done in this area so far concerns the Cārudatta, but this case is exceptional because of the availability of its twin-brother, the Mṛcchakaṭika¹⁰. For the other plays the material available for such an investigation is often little more than a few stray verses or brief references, or is lacking altogether.

After all is said and done, there still is no single, generally accepted theory concerning the Trivandrum plays. Characteristic of the present situation is MASSON's dating of the Avimārika before Kālidāsa, in which he relied entirely on his own intuitions (MASSON 1970: 7).

In the present article three points will be discussed relating to the Trivandrum plays, which, it is hoped, will together serve to give these plays a more exact position in the history of Sanskrit literature: In the first place I will try to show that a scene from the third act of the Pratijñāyugandharāyaṇa (henceforth Pratijñā) contains an inconsistency, which could be explained by assuming that the idea for this scene was taken from the Mattavilāsa. The latter is a short farce by the South Indian Pallava king Mahendravarman I (610–630 A.D.). It would follow that the Pratijñā in its present form must be later than the beginning of the seventh century and originates from South India.

In the second place I will re-examine the evidence, or arguments, for the conclusion that the plays as we now have them were composed in Kerala within the Kūṭiyāṭṭam tradition. On closer consideration there is no hard evidence which would support this particular conclusion. In fact, it will appear equally possible to argue that we have to do with existing plays selected or received by Kūṭiyāṭṭam from an older dramatic or literary tradition. Against this background the case of the identification of Rājasimha is reopened. A king by that name is mentioned in the *bharataavākya* of a number of the plays concerned, including the Pratijñā, as the reigning monarch.

Finally, in the third place, a new interpretation will be forwarded for the phrase *sūtradhāraḥkṛtārambha*, which the poet Bāṇa has given as a characteristic of the legendary Bhāsa's plays. One of the conclusions is that, contrary to what is generally assumed, the phrase has no bearing on the typical opening found in the Trivandrum plays at all (*nāndyante tataḥ praviśati sūtradhāraḥ*). With this the supposed

¹⁰ See the pioneering work by MORGENSTIERNE (1920). Subsequent studies are SUKTHANKAR 1922, BUITENEN 1963 and SCHOKKER 1968.

archaic nature of the South Indian opening, compared to the situation in the North Indian texts, can no longer be taken for granted. Some other features will be discussed, which would show that, instead, we have to reckon with the possibility of an innovation due to a (renewed) concern with the dramatic theory in South India.

I. The Pratijñā and its Relation to the Mattavilāsa

The plot of the Pratijñā¹¹ is, in a way, a travesty of that of the classical *nāṭikā*. Being a prisoner of the king of Ujjayinī, Udayana falls in love with the king's daughter, Vāsavadattā. Assisted by his loyal minister Yaugandharāyaṇa, the hero manages to escape, taking Vāsavadattā with him. Their elopement is afterwards recognized by the girl's parents as a marriage.

The story is well known and has come down to us in several versions. It is part of a larger cycle of adventures of Udayana, which formed the main part of the now lost Bṛhatkathā (see ADAVAL 1970). In fact, the Svapnavāsavadatta, in which Udayana acquires his second wife, forms an immediate sequel to the Pratijñā (PUSALKER 1968: 279 ff.).

Typical of the Pratijñā is that the principal characters of the story, Udayana and Vāsavadattā, do not themselves appear on stage. Instead, the play is focused entirely on the activities of Udayana's minister and his plans for Udayana's escape. DE (1941: 423) has in this connection drawn attention to the resemblance of the Pratijñā to Viśākhadatta's *Mudrārākṣasa*. To this point I will come back below.

At present we are mainly concerned with the third act of the play and in particular with the first scene of that act. Earlier, Udayana was captured and taken to Ujjayinī, where he is kept imprisoned as a valuable hostage by King Pradyota. Having heard of this disaster, Udayana's minister Yaugandharāyaṇa pledged a solemn oath (his first *pratijñā*) that he would personally liberate his master. We also have been informed, in a curious final scene to the first act, how the minister acquired the clothes originally belonging to an idiot, which were to serve him later as a disguise.

The third act is, then, mainly concerned with the activities of Yaugandharāyaṇa, Rumaṇvan, yet another minister of Udayana, and Vasantaka, the king's *vidūṣaka*. Disguised as an idiot (*unmat-taka*), a buddhist mendicant (*śramaṇaka*) and a *ḍiṇḍika*, yet another

¹¹ The Pratijñā has been translated into English by WOOLNER and SARUP (1930: 1-35). A synopsis of the play is found in PUSALKER 1968: 265-278.

type of religious beggar¹², the three roam about in Ujjayinī, planning and organizing Udayana's escape.

The situation and most details are traditional, that is to say, are found in one or more of the other versions of the story (discussed by ADAVAL 1970: 71 ff.). This is the case with, for instance, the ministers roaming around in disguise in Ujjayinī (absent, however, from the Pāli version) and the respective schemes for Udayana's liberation. This is also the case with the figure of the idiot, though in some versions this role is played not by Yaugandharāyaṇa but by Vasantaka¹³.

The first scene of the third act, however, is unique for the Pratijñā. In this scene the three secret agents have a seemingly accidental meeting, which culminates in a quarrel in public. However, as I intend to show, this quarrel presents a serious problem. It would mark the scene as an (in origin) alien element in the spy-story presented in the Pratijñā.

In this connection reference may be made to Arthaśāstra I 11 and 12¹⁴, in which some rules have been laid down for the behaviour of

¹² For the term *ḍiṇḍika*, referring to a member of a religious sect, see SCHOKKER 1966: 143f. For the idiot as an ascetic, comparable to the *śramaṇaka* and *ḍiṇḍika*, see below.

¹³ In the Kashmirian versions of the Brhatkathā, the Brhatkathāmañjarī and the Kathāsaritsāgara, it is Vasantaka who figures as the idiot. Yaugandharāyaṇa is disguised as a hunchback. In the Priyadarśikā Udayana does not arrive in time for Vāsavadattā's music lessons. Her maid Kāñcanamālā reports that she has seen him talking and joking with a certain fool. This must have been either Yaugandharāyaṇa or Vasantaka. In the Kumārapāla-pratibodha Yaugandharāyaṇa is hanging around in Ujjayinī as a madman, filling pots with the elephant Bhadravati's urine. In the Tibetan version Yaugandharāyaṇa enters Ujjayinī as a madman. Kāñcanamālā, his sister here, has managed to be admitted into the palace as a begging woman. The above information has been drawn from ADAVAL 1970, in particular p. 68–134. See also VIJAYALAKSHMY (1981: 140f. and 1982: 27), who refers to a passage in the Maṇimēkalai (Tamil, circa eighth century), in which Yaugandharāyaṇa enters Ujjayinī as a person afflicted by some dreadful disease (*nōy*; see below). Finally, mention may be made of the Vīṇāvāsavadatta (WARDER 1977: 5–21). In this play it is, again, Vasantaka, who plays the mad beggar. In this role he has assumed the name Mattavilāsa, a name obviously taken from Mahendravarman's play Mattavilāsa. On the patchwork nature of the Vīṇāvāsavadatta, see below.

¹⁴ UNNI (1978: 213–217) has collected some evidence showing that the author of the Pratijñā must have been familiar with the Arthaśāstra. The influence of the latter text and of the Nīti literature in general on Kāvya literature has been considerable and is well known.

spies in circumstances comparable to those in the Pratijñā¹⁵. AŚ I 11 and 12 provide some details on the conduct of spies and on the precautions they have to take to avoid raising suspicion and being found out. One such measure is that spies should avoid being seen together: *saṁsthānām antevāsinah* (i.e. the *saṁcāra* or 'roving spies') *saṁjñālīpibhiḥ cārasaṁcāraṁ kuryuḥ | na cānyonyam saṁsthās te vā vidyuḥ* (I 12,11–12), and *kaṇṭakaśodhanoktāś cāpasarpāḥ pareṣu kṛtavetanā vaseyur asaṁpātinaś cārārtham* (ib. 17).

Communication is the weak spot, also in the system of the AŚ. If spies want to communicate with one another they should do so in an indirect way. Mention is made of 'coded letters' or of 'signs and letters' (*saṁjñālīpibhiḥ*; see above). A complicating factor is that the spies generally do not know each other, as the king should be allowed to check and double-check the information he receives (*trayāṇām ekavākye saṁpratyaḥ* [AŚ I 12,15]). For this reason they have to find out in a subtle way in the case of each and every person they meet if he belongs to their own party or is a counter-spy belonging to the enemy. Spies quarrelling in public, as seen in the Pratijñā, are definitely not consistent with the picture given in the AŚ.

THE FIRST SCENE OF THE THIRD ACT OF THE PRATIJÑĀ

The action takes us to the steps of a temple (*devaulapīṭhiā*) in Ujjayinī, where we meet Vasantaka, Udayana's *vidūṣaka*, disguised as a *ḍiṇḍika*. He has just discovered that his begging bowl, filled with delicious sweetmeats, has vanished. It must have been stolen, he concludes, while he sat down with his back turned towards it, counting the day's takings. While considering who might have stolen it (a dog, a traveller or Śiva in the painting on the temple wall?), he hears the voice of an idiot (*unmattaka*, actually Yaugandharāyaṇa in disguise), exulting over some sweetmeats. Those must be his very own sweets! The *ḍiṇḍika* stops the idiot and demands the return of his sweets. True to his role, the idiot does not understand what the holy man is talking about and answers back with nonsense. In this connection reference may be made to an anonymous commentary on the third act (see Appendix I of GAṆAPATI ŚĀSTRĪ's edition) in which an attempt has been made to interpret this foolish exchange as coded messages referring to Udayana's fate. However, the attempt covers

¹⁵ It should be noted that the relevant rules in the AŚ refer in the first place to the internal spy-system, i.e. for use inside the king's own realm. However, as argued by KANGLE (1965: 205) they would equally apply to the external spy-system.

only part of the conversation and is in some cases rather far-fetched. The idea, however, would be that if from the very beginning they did not know who the other really was, they must have come to realize it by then.

Whatever is the case here, their subsequent behaviour shows little of their initial carefulness and, in fact, seems to put the whole mission into jeopardy. When the idiot is not quick enough in handing over the begging bowl, the *ḍiṇḍika* threatens to scream for help. The idiot, undaunted, advises him to do as he pleases and starts to scream for help himself as well. Attracted by this noise a third person approaches, a buddhist monk, a *śramaṇaka*, who, as is to become clear later, is yet another insider, namely minister Rumaṇvan. However, this is of course nothing more than a lucky coincidence. It may be assumed that Rumaṇvan had been standing by, waiting for an excuse to enter upon the scene. The point I wish to make, though, is that anybody could have approached, from a single person to a whole crowd.

In certain respects the figure of the fool is a liability in the affairs of spies. On the one hand, madness makes it possible to enter, and to escape from, places without being questioned¹⁶. On the other hand, the madman attracts attention. When at the end of the third act Yaugandharāyaṇa leaves the fire-shrine in which the deliberations of the spies took place, he is immediately surrounded and pestered by street-urchins. In the Tamil text Maṇimēkalai (XV 61–66) the crowd surrounding Maṇimēkalai is compared to the crowd “which had collected around Yaugandharāyaṇa when he assumed the disgusting disguise of a man suffering from a disease, and entered the streets of Ujjayinī” (VIJAYALAKSHMY 1981: 140f.).

The problem does not, however, lie in the figure of the madman but in the quarrel he has with the *ḍiṇḍika* and their screaming for help. As said above, anybody could have approached, and with various motives, ranging from simple curiosity to the intention to interfere. In particular one may ask what would have happened to Yaugandharāyaṇa and Vasantaka and to their mission if some righteous man (or a practical joker) had suggested to settle the dispute in court. This question is, in fact, not at all arbitrary, as will become clear from a comparison with the Mattavilāsa. For this is precisely what happens in practically the same circumstances in the latter farce.

In order to make this clear the plot of the Mattavilāsa will be

¹⁶ See AŚ I 12,14 *dīrgharogonmādāgnirasavisargeṇa vā gūḍhanirgama-nam*.

considered more closely. The similarity of the scene from the Pratijñā and the plot of the Mattavilāsa, which so far has gone unnoticed, at least, explicitly¹⁷, will indeed appear striking. In this connection the question will arise whether we have to do with a case of borrowing here and, if so, what the direction of the borrowing was.

THE MATTAVILĀSA

The action of this short farce¹⁸ by the Pallava king Mahendravikramavarman I, or, for short, Mahendravarman I¹⁹, takes place in the capital of that dynasty, the South Indian town Kāñcī. At the

¹⁷ Note, for instance, BARNETT, who discussed the Mattavilāsa twice in relation to the Trivandrum plays (1919 and 1920) without making any comment on the agreement of the plot of the Mattavilāsa and the scene from the Pratijñā.

¹⁸ The Mattavilāsa has been translated by BARNETT (1930), UNNI (1974) and LOCKWOOD – BHAT (1981) into English, by J. HERTEL into German (this translation has not been available to me) and by TIEKEN (1991: 69–93) into Dutch.

¹⁹ Mahendravarman I's authorship of the Mattavilāsa is exceptionally well documented. Mahendravikramavarman, son of Siṃhaviṣṇuvarman, is mentioned in the prologue of the Mattavilāsa as its author. In the play itself, at various significant places, some of the *birudas* of this king are found: *avanibhājana* in the so-called *maṅgalaśloka*, *guṇabhara* in the prologue in a pun on the title of the play and its author, and *śatrumalla* in the *bharata-vākya*. The title of the play figures, in turn, among the king's *birudas* (see LOCKWOOD – BHAT 1981: 128 f.). All this dropping of names was in fact highly characteristic of the early Pallavas in Tamil Nad. These kings left their signatures on practically everything they made. Furthermore, the Mattavilāsa is situated not in Ujjain or Pāṭaliputra, but in Kāñcī, the seat of the Pallava dynasty. The play seems to refer to the Ekāmra-temple (p. 51), the present Ekambaranatha-temple, at which site pillars have been discovered showing the typical Mahendra-style and bearing inscriptions containing that king's names (MAHALINGAM 1969: 72). The Mattavilāsa is mentioned in the Māmaṇḍūr-inscription which lists the many accomplishments of a king generally believed to be Mahendravarman I (see e.g. MAHALINGAM 1988: 114 ff.). Several lines refer specifically to the king's literary interests and achievements, e.g. the fragmentary line 6, in which 'excellent farces' are referred to, including the Mattavilāsa and Bhagavadajjuka. It should be noted that the Bhagavadajjuka as we now have it is anonymous. LOCKWOOD – BHAT (1978: IX ff.) have tried to show that the two farces are actually by the same author, which, however, seems doubtful (see below n. 53). Whatever is the case, the Mattavilāsa and Bhagavadajjuka are, incidentally, both interesting specimens of court literature. In the Mattavilāsa a milieu is depicted of holy men, mendicants and ascetics. It is the most abstruse among them, the completely unpredictable – and unpredicted – idiot, who restores the order which had been disrupted. His position and role are comparable to those of the king in the 'ordinary' world (more elaborately in TIEKEN 1991: 12 and

opening of the play we meet a drunken *kapālin*, Satyasoma, and his 'pupil', the barber's daughter Devasomā. On a begging tour along the local pubs the *kapālin* discovers, like the *ḍiṇḍika* in the *Pratijñā*, that his begging bowl has vanished. The *kapālin* is faced with a problem of an almost existential nature, for without his *kapāla*, literally 'skull', he is no longer recognizable for what he is²⁰. In this respect the character of the *kapālin* is much more dramatic than that of the *ḍiṇḍika* in the *Pratijñā*, i.e. for what we know of the latter figure (see n. 12).

After a fruitless search for the bowl the *kapālin* comes to the conclusion that it must have been stolen, and, as it contained delicious roasted meat, that the thief must have been a buddhist friar or a dog. (Note that in the *Pratijñā*, too, a dog is mentioned as a possible thief; see above. In the *Pratijñā*, however, the bowl was filled with sweetmeats!) With these speculations regarding the identity of the thief the incidents which immediately follow are in a way anticipated. Not so, however, the solution, which is, again, completely unexpected.

The *kapālin* and his pupil start a search for the thief. Almost immediately they spot in the crowd in the street a Buddhist friar who is visibly hiding something under his long robes. This is Nāgasena, on his way to the monastery to savour the delicacies he has collected, hiding his bowl under his robes. The *kapālins* stop the Buddhist and try to force him into showing them the begging bowl. When the Buddhist persists in refusing to do so, the *kapālin* threatens to cut off his head and make it into a *kapāla*. Fearing for his life, the monk starts screaming for help. At once he is joined by the *kapālin*, who is outraged at what he considers the Buddhist's hypocrisy. At this point, attracted by the screaming, a third ascetic enters upon the scene²¹. It is the *pāśupata* Babhrukalpa. This intervention turns out

61–67). The chief characters in the *Bhagavadajjuka* are a pedantic *yoga*-teacher and his recalcitrant pupil. The pair resembles the king and his *vidūṣaka* in other Sanskrit plays. The *yoga*-teacher gets into serious problems when he lets himself be seduced to assuage his pupil's anxieties about a beautiful dead courtesan. As such the play seems to contain a warning to the king not to leave his isolated unassailable height and not to get involved personally in the problems of his subjects. This theme is set out in the so-called *maṅgalaśloka*, which refers to Śiva who interrupted his meditations in order to calm Pārvatī (TIEKEN 1991: 25–31).

²⁰ *hā hato 'smi | bhraṣṭam me tapaḥ | kenāham idānīm kapālī bhaviṣyāmi | bho kaṣṭam* (p. 47). On the sect of the *kapālins*, see LORENZEN 1972.

²¹ *kapālī – idānīm tava śiraḥkapālaṃ mama bhikṣākapālaṃ bhaviṣyati | sarve kalahaṃ rūpayanti | śākyabhikṣuḥ – duḥkham duḥkham | kapālī – paś-*

to be troublesome. It transpires that Babhrukalpa has fallen in love with Devasomā, who precisely at that moment is holding the hand of the Buddhist, the latter having helped her to her feet. Resenting the apparent success of this playboy (*gandharva*) of a Buddhist, the *pāśupata* starts to play the two opponents, *kapālin* and Buddhist, off against each other still further²², hoping that in the end he will be left alone with Devasomā.

Finally the Buddhist gives in and shows the bowl. When the *kapālin* refuses to accept that it is the Buddhist's own bowl, the *pāśupata* suggests to put the matter before the court. The *kapālin* is

yantu paśyantu maheśvarāḥ | eṣa duṣṭabhikṣuṇāmādhārako mama bhikṣāka-pālaṃ muṣitvā svayam evākrandati | bhavatu | aham apy ākroṣayiṣye | abrahmaṇyam abrahmaṇyam | tataḥ praviśati pāśupataḥ (p. 55f.).

²² The phrase used here is: *tad idānīm pratiḥastiprotsāhanena śatrupakṣam dhvaṃsayāmi* (p. 56). The rare expression *pratiḥastiprotsāhana* calls for an explanation. The only other instance is found in the *Daśakumāracarita* (p. 42), in which case *pratiḥasti*^o, clearly as an *ad hoc* solution, has been translated as 'the lord of the nextdoor courtesan(s)' (*pratiḥasty āsannagrhaveśā-patīḥ | pratiḥastī prātiveśya iti vaijayantī*; see Notes, p. 205 and cf. MW s.v.: "the keeper of a brothel"). In my opinion, however, *pratiḥastin* is simply a synonym of *pratigaja* or *pratikuñjara* (for which, see MW s.vv.). The exact translation of the expression *pratiḥastiprotsāhana* is still somewhat of a problem. There are several possibilities, such as, in paraphrase, 'stirring up (the one party) by introducing, or by encouraging, a competitor' or 'stirring up a fight between two fighting parties'. The two known instances of the expression allow no definite decision on this point. The case of the *Mattavilāsa* would at first sight appear quite clear. There are two quarrelling parties. As a result the *pāśupata* finds himself in the unique position to be able to deal with his competitor, while keeping his own hands clean. The passage quoted above may be translated as follows: 'This is my chance to destroy my enemy (i.e. the Buddhist). I only have to stir up his opponent-elephant (i.e. the *kapālin*)'. At the same time, the other possible translation, 'by stirring up the two fighting elephants', cannot be excluded. In the passage of the *Daśakumāracarita* there is no question of two already jealous competitors, at least not explicitly. It describes the various tricks of a madam (*gaṇikāmātā*); by introducing (or encouraging) a competitor she would be able to raise the price for her daughter: *adadatā lubdhapṛāyeṇa ca viṅrhyāsanam | pratiḥastiprotsāhanena lubdhasya rāgiṇas tyāgaśaktisamdhukṣanam* | 'A customer who does not yet give presents but (*ca*) is almost won over, she should treat in a hostile way. In the case of a customer who is completely won over and full of desire, she should take care that he pays to the limit of his capabilities by introducing or encouraging a competitor'. But here, too, the other possibility, 'by stirring up a fight between him and all other potential suitors', cannot be excluded. The occurrence of the expression *pratiḥastiprotsāhana*, which is otherwise unknown, in the *Mattavilāsa* of Mahendravarman I and in *Daṇḍin's Daśakumāracarita* is a not unimportant piece of evidence in the identification of this *Daṇḍin* with the author by that same name of the

dismayed, as he fears a verdict in favour of the rich Buddhist, but realizes that he cannot refuse. However, on their way to the court-house the company is approached by an idiot (*unmattaka*) clothed in rags and talking nonsense. This idiot lives on leftovers and has to fight for his food with the dogs in the streets. He appears to be carrying a *kapāla* filled with roasted meat he has just managed to wrangle away from a mangy dog. This happens to be the *kapālin's* *kapāla*. In this way the lost bowl is finally returned to its rightful owner, after which everyone sets out on their own way.²³

It may be argued that beggars quarelling over a begging bowl must have formed a common spectacle in Indian towns, thus presenting itself to any writer as a potential theme. However, the similarity between the two plays, *Pratijñā* and *Mattavilāsa*, is such (take, for instance, the figure of the *unmattaka*) that the assumption of an independent origin would seem highly unlikely. Rather, one should assume a case of borrowing here, in which case the question is whether Mahendravarman I borrowed the idea for his play from the *Pratijñā* or vice versa²⁴.

In order to determine the direction of the borrowing we may go back again to the screaming incident in the *Pratijñā*. It has been

Kāvyaśāstra (see LIENHARD 1984: 234f.). This latter Daṇḍin has been identified as a South Indian and has been associated with the Pallavas (JACOBI 1922: 214), the dynasty to which Mahendravarman I belonged. On the occurrence of South Indian colloquial expressions in the *Daśakumāracarita*, see KUIPER 1957: 125.

²³ The *prahasana*s form no exception in Sanskrit literature, in that they, too, end happily. This is obvious for the *kapālin*s, as they have recovered their bowl, the Buddhist, who has escaped unharmed with the delicacies he had collected, and the idiot, who is happily chasing after some phantom. The case of the *pāśūpata* is less clear, but his reward could well lie precisely in his unfulfilled desires. Part of the discipline of the *pāśūpata*s is to wander around in a state of sexual excitement (*śṛṅgāraṇa*; see HARA 1958: 28). This excitement is obviously not meant to be gratified. Apart from this, his role as defender of the legal authorities must be meant as a joke too, but I have been unable to find any clue for this in what is known about the *pāśūpata* doctrine.

²⁴ Theoretically, there is a possibility that both the *Mattavilāsa* and the *Pratijñā* borrowed from a third source now lost. I believe that in the light of the following this possibility need not be seriously explored any further. I refer here in particular to the discussion below on the patchwork-like nature of the *Pratijñā* and the identification of Rājasimha mentioned in the *bharata-vākya* of the *Pratijñā*. Admittedly, a kind of circular argumentation is introduced here, as the identification of Rājasimha rests, at least in part, on the conclusion to be reached presently with regard to the relation between the *Mattavilāsa* and *Pratijñā*.

argued that the screaming of the frustrated *diṇḍika* and subsequently that of the mocking idiot is in fact incompatible with their role of undercover agents in enemy territory. This particular line of development of the plot in the text is in my opinion explained by assuming that the author of the Pratijñā derived the idea for this scene from the Mattavilāsa. In doing so he reduced the plot to the size of a subplot, but maintained its characters and basic outline.²⁵ The starting-point for the 'insertion' in the Pratijñā of the particular scene adapted from the Mattavilāsa may well have been the figure of the idiot, who is found in almost all other versions of the Udayana and Vāsavadattā episode (see above, p. 10 and n. 13).

If the above argumentation concerning the direction of the borrowing is accepted, it follows that the Pratijñā in its present form cannot be earlier than Mahendravarman I's reign, which is generally taken to begin around 610 A.D. (see, e.g., MAHALINGAM 1969: 64 ff.). It should be noted that this, then, is the first reliable date for any of the Trivandrum plays, and should as such form a starting-point or a working hypothesis in any future study of these plays as a group. This would also be the case with the second conclusion which can be drawn in this connection, namely that the Pratijñā as we now have it was written in South India.²⁶ This conclusion is based on the fact that

²⁵ The first thing to be observed in this connection is the absence of any significant verbal agreement between the two 'versions'. In the Pratijñā we would have to do with a completely new and free rendering of the plot of the Mattavilāsa. The borrowing concerns the basic outline of the plot and the type of characters of the play. In both versions all persons belong to the category of ascetics or religious beggars. This also pertains to the idiot, whose idiocy is part of a religious vow. For the idiot in the Mattavilāsa reference may be made to the possessed or mad devotee known from the South Indian Bhakti movement (see YOCUM 1982: 180–194). This makes the Mattavilāsa the only *prahasana* of the so-called pure, or *suddha* type, i.e. one in which only holy men and their likes appear (see below). Peculiar to the Mattavilāsa is the *kapālin*. As already observed the choice of this figure considerably enhances the drama of the situation. It is not clear why the author of the Pratijñā did not maintain the *kapālin*. Possibly this would have turned the scene too much into a story by itself. The Buddhist in the Pratijñā seems to combine elements of both the Buddhist and the *pāśūpata*. In the Mattavilāsa the dog plays an important role, if only behind the stage. In the Pratijñā it is only mentioned among the possible suspects. Strangely enough, the dog in the Pratijñā is credited with a taste for sweetmeats.

²⁶ In this connection reference may be made to KUNHAN RAJA's attempt (1927: 220–222) to identify some Malayalam words in another Trivandrum play, namely the Cārudatta. Most of his interpretations are, however, questionable. He assumes, for instance, a special meaning for *pucchianti*, which would otherwise be found only in Malayalam. The usual meaning of

the Mattavilāsa has remained of local, i.e. South Indian, interest: no manuscripts of it have been found in North India.

THE PRATIJÑĀ AS A PATCHWORK

The Mattavilāsa-scene is not the only outside influence which can be identified in the Pratijñā. The element of competition between Udayana's minister Yaugandharāyaṇa and Bharatarohaka, the minister of King Pradyota, strongly resembles that between Kauṭilya and Rākṣasa in Viśākhadatta's Mudrārākṣasa²⁷. A more concrete example of this resemblance may be found in the dialogue between the two ministers at the end of the play.

As far as I can see this influence is significantly better integrated in the play than was the case with the Mattavilāsa-scene. As such it may already have been part of the earlier play, i.e. the version without the Mattavilāsa-scene, if such an earlier play indeed existed. In this connection it should be noted, however, that as far as the references and quotations collected by UNNI (1978: 211–213; see also PUSALKER 1968: 74f.) are concerned, these do not necessarily presuppose a dramatic version of the episode.

As to the latter question it will be observed below that the part of the Pratijñā that remains after the play is stripped of the traces of the Mattavilāsa and the Mudrārākṣasa, is itself, too, a recast or a compilation, and as such shows traces of having been pieced together rather carelessly. All the evidence taken together would mark the Pratijñā as we now have it as a pastiche, i.e. as the product of a

prach would suffice. The word occurs, moreover, also in the Bhagavadajjuka (e.g. p. 23, l. 1 and p. 40, l. 2), which makes it impossible to characterize the word as typically Malayalam. *aṇṭhi* 'stone' may stand for *aṭṭhi*, skt. *asthi*. The interpretation of *ṇāye* 'dog' is doubtful, but, admittedly, I do not know of an acceptable alternative. The expression *neyyubbhāmaṇa* is interesting. It is to be analysed as *neyy* + *ubbhāmaṇa*, in which *ney(y)*, the Malayalam word for 'ghee', might be an innovation for *neh(u)*, skt. *sneha*, which, probably due to a textual corruption or a misreading, had been misunderstood. In this connection reference may be made to TRAUTMANN (1974, esp. p. 71–74), who characterized the kinship system found in the Avimāraka as Dravidian, a fact which according to him "ought to be taken into account in the continuing debate over the ascription of this and its accompanying plays to Bhāsa" (p. 71). On the author of the Avimāraka, a certain Kātyāyana, see above, p. 7. Finally, I refer to HARDY (1983: 590), who queries the possibility that the word *resuka* in the Bālacarita, for *pesuka* (?), has been derived from Tamil *pēcuka*, 'roaring, making a loud noise'.

²⁷ See DE (1941: 423), who, unfortunately, does not further elaborate this point.

particular way of composition rather than as the result of a gradual process of additions, insertions and alterations.

In this connection two peculiarities in the main part of the text will be discussed²⁸. The first concerns Yaugandharāyaṇa's second oath, uttered after the unexpected news that Udayana is reluctant to leave his prison because of Vāsavadattā. It is not only his second oath but it also comes into two separate verses, III 8 and 9. The second verse the Pratijñā has in common, with minor variations, with Somaprabha's Kumārapālpratibodha (1184 A.D.; see UNNI 1978: 213). It should be noted that this verse, with its enumeration, originally seems to have belonged to a slightly different context. GAṆAPATĪ ŚĀSTRĪ's attempt to identify the items enumerated only illustrates his embarrassment, as they do not play any role in the preceding passage:

yadī tām caiva tam caiva tām caivāyatalocanām |
nāharāmi nṛpaṃ caiva nāsmi yaugandharāyaṇaḥ ||9||

[GAṆAPATĪ ŚĀSTRĪ's commentary *ad pādas ab: tām caiva ghoṣavatīm ca | tam caiva nalāgiriṃ ca | āyatalocanām tām caiva vāsavadattām* (p. 98)].

The very fact that the verse does not agree with the context

²⁸ Yet another problem in the text, the supposed misplacement of verses 2 and 3 of Act III, most probably rests on a misunderstanding of the text. The two verses, which are found at the beginning of the deliberations of the three spies in the fire-shrine, would according to WOOLNER – SARUP (1930: 25 n. 1) fit better at the end of that scene where the three spies break up their meeting. It is not clear to me, however, how the two verses would fit better there. The first verse is introduced by Yaugandharāyaṇa by saying, according to WOOLNER – SARUP, something to the effect that as night is unsafe, they had better wait for the day (*atīkrāntayogakṣemā rātriḥ | divasa idānīm pratipālyate* [p. 87]). The verses seem to elaborate on this idea. Indeed, at the end of the scene that follows the day has come to an end (*bho paḍiuttadivasa-vissambheṇa aviraḷaṃ sañcaranto jaṇo dīśai kiṃ dāṇi karamha* [p. 99]). If the passage concerned would indeed mean that the three men had come to the conclusion that they had better wait inside the shrine until dawn, they belie their own words, as they immediately leave the shrine to go into the dark. Note that the idiot is jabbering about the moon, which has been swallowed by Rāhu. It is clear that it cannot have been night at the beginning of their meeting. This would mean that an altogether different interpretation is required for the verses. Rather, in these verses Yaugandharāyaṇa and Rumaṇvan express their frustration at having to wait yet another night before they can carry out the plan to liberate Udayana. Note especially stanza 3: *vyavahāreṣv asādhyānām . . . rajantī bhayam ||* (p. 88). They are hardly able to restrain themselves and are too impatient to listen to what Vasantaka has to say about Udayana's situation. In fact, this makes the story that Vasantaka tells them all the more unexpected.

makes it difficult to explain it as a later addition. The fact that it is also found in the *Kumārapālpratibodha* supports the conclusion that it is original²⁹. This leads to the conclusion that in the *Pratijñā* two versions of the story have been combined or, at least, collated.

The second point concerns the description of the circumstances in which Udayana fell in love with *Vāsavadattā*³⁰. In Act IV it becomes clear that Udayana has acted as *Vāsavadattā*'s music teacher. He is being accused of a breach of faith, having eloped with the girl who had been entrusted to him as a pupil. Earlier, in the second act, *Vāsavadattā*'s desire to learn to play the lute has been mentioned by her mother the queen. Remembering this, the king presented her with Udayana's lute *Ghoṣavatī*, as he assumed that his sons would not be interested in it anyhow.

In the third act *Vasantaka* relates to the other two spies how Udayana, who is being kept in prison, accidentally obtained a good view of *Vāsavadattā* while her palanquin halted in front of the prison. The sight of her turned the prison for him into a garden of delight. Apparently this was the first time he actually saw her, which is at first sight hard to reconcile with the fact that he was her music teacher. This inconsistency could, however, be removed by assuming that during these lessons the two were kept apart by a curtain, a situation which is actually found in several other versions of the episode (ADAVAL 1970: 86–88).

The omission of such an essential detail would show the hand of a sloppy author. In fact, it is not the only oversight of its kind in the text. The other one has already been discussed above in connection with the insertion of the *Mattavilāsa*-scene. As already observed by LACÔTE (1919: 496) and DE (1941: 423f., particularly n. 25) the omission also gives an indication of the popularity of the story at that time. The play apparently did not suffer from the allusive or elliptic treatment given to the story.

As already indicated above, the *Pratijñā* in its present form answers to all the qualifications of a pastiche. This means that it is not the result of a gradual accumulation of additions, insertions and alterations, but the product of a particular way of composition. It was pieced together, so to say, in one go and possibly also by one single author, on the basis of scenes, themes and motifs taken from

²⁹ Unfortunately, the *Kumārapālpratibodha* has not been available to me, so that I have been unable to check the context. For the Udayana-story in this text, see ADAVAL 1970: xxxv and 81–83.

³⁰ The problem has been noted earlier by, among others, DE (1941: 423f., n. 25) and ADAVAL (1970: 87).

other – popular – texts.³¹ In doing so the author also relied on a stereotyped style and technique (see above, n. 7). This literary craftsman clearly catered to the tastes of a contemporary audience and worked within a popular tradition. According to some this was the Kūṭiyāṭṭam-tradition. In the following section I will therefore go into the relation between the Trivandrum plays and this theatrical tradition.

II. The Trivandrum Plays and Kūṭiyāṭṭam

As already indicated above, some scholars see in the Trivandrum plays, as popular, anonymous adaptations, late South Indian compilations for performance in Kūṭiyāṭṭam (e.g. KUNHAN RAJA 1923: 259 and PISHAROTI 1925: 111; see also n. 9). However, the sole basis for this assumption is the fact that the plays were part of the repertoire of Kūṭiyāṭṭam. Even then, the implications of this are unclear; furthermore, this is only one part of the story.

To begin with the second point, the manuscripts of the Trivandrum plays, though indeed restricted to Kerala or else of Kerala origin, have been available in much wider circles than those families of temple servants, or *ambalavāsis*, directly connected with the performance of Kūṭiyāṭṭam, i.e. the *cākyār*, their wives the *nāṇ-nyār*, and the *nāmbiyār*³². In this connection I need only to refer to GAṆAPATI ŚĀSTRĪ's manuscript Ka, which belonged to the Maṇalik-kara Maṭhom, a Sanskrit college near Padmanabhapuram. The new manuscript material described by UNNI (1978) shows an even wider range of persons and institutions interested in the plays. Apparently the plays were also part of a 'literary' tradition. This conclusion is corroborated by the Śākuntalacarcā, which refers to several Trivandrum plays as literary specimens. In contrast, the Naṭāṅkuśa (see n. 4) refers to the performance of the plays by the *cākyār*.

For the present purpose it is important to note that the Trivandrum plays have not come down exclusively as private scripts

³¹ The Pratijñā in its composition may be compared to, among other plays, the Vīṇāvāsavadatta, a South Indian play on the same theme. The Vīṇāvāsavadatta contains references to the Priyadarśikā (a play within a play in Act VI), the Pratijñā (a meeting of two *dīṇḍikas* in the introductory scene to Act IV) and the Mattavilāsa (the *vidūṣaka* is called Mattavilāsa p. 104, 109, 112 and 117). Moreover, its author seems to have taken good notice of Bhāmaha's criticism on the elephant-scene, which he has completely 'corrected accordingly' (cf. WARDER 1977: [5–]21 and SHARMA in his edition of the play).

³² For their respective functions in Kūṭiyāṭṭam, see ENROS 1981: 275.

jealously guarded within certain families of actors³³, as has often been assumed, explicitly or implicitly. (The case of the so-called stage manuals, for which, see below, is an entirely different matter.) It follows that the fact that, apart from the evidence of the manuscripts, the plays are almost completely unknown and have not been quoted from or mentioned, cannot be explained by referring to the actors' secrecy about their scripts. Whatever the explanation, the situation itself is not restricted to the Trivandrum plays only, but applies equally to, for instance, the Caturbhānī.

The other point raised above concerns the function of the text of the play in Kūṭiyāṭṭam. A. K. and K. R. PISHAROTI have assumed a direct link between the performance of a play by the *cākyār* and the nature of the texts as compilations or adaptations: "But, if we may theorize from tradition and from practice, as current here [my spacing], and from the unique nature of the Cārudatta, our answer is that they [i.e. the Trivandrum plays] are the result of compilation and adaptation" (1925: 114). As far as I can see the PISHAROTIS have fallen into a (verbal) trap here. The *cākyār*'s performance of a play might indeed be characterized as an adaptation of the text, but they certainly did not adapt the text.

In Kūṭiyāṭṭam the text and the performance live, so to say, two completely separate lives. The performance of one single act (in Kūṭiyāṭṭam the acts are performed individually) consisting of, say, ten pages of printed text, may last up to thirty consecutive nights. This is the result of the elaborate introductory rituals and the highly stylized and repetitious mode of performance, on the one hand, and of the constant interruptions of the plot (the written text) by stories concerning the chief characters and by the pranks of the *vidūṣaka*, on the other (see ENROS 1981). Somewhere underneath lies the original Sanskrit text, virtually unaffected and unaltered.

The details of the performance, including such external matter as the height of the fees due to the actors, are codified in a separate class of text, the so-called *āṭṭaparakāras* and *kramadīpikās*, stage or acting manuals. These manuals were indeed jealously kept by the *cākyār* families (PISHAROTI 1922: 290). Only recently two such texts have been published, namely of the Āścaryacūḍāmaṇi and of the first act

³³ It remains striking that the Trivandrum plays are regularly found together or with one or more other plays of the Kūṭiyāṭṭam repertoire. Only very rarely do they occur with a different text in a single manuscript (see UNNI 1978, *passim*). They are never found in combination with, for instance, the Caturbhānī.

of the Abhiṣekanāṭaka (see the bibliography s. vv.). In the case of the Āścaryacūdāmaṇi, ENROS (1981: 294 f.) has drawn attention to a few instances where the particular stage manual he had at his disposal deviates from the text. The differences – it concerns only small details – would make the performance both logically and visually more dramatic. The implications of these few instances are at present difficult to assess in the absence of a critical edition of the text of the Āścaryacūdāmaṇi and because we still know very little about the manuals in general, of which every family of actors seems to have possessed its own version. In any case, the conclusion that the Kūṭiyāṭṭam actors made large-scale adaptations of the texts would still have to be demonstrated.

To all this one more point should be added. UNNI, in his study of the plays by Kulaśekharaavarman, which are supposed to have been written for performance in Kūṭiyāṭṭam, has noted (1977a: 86) that, apart from some technical peculiarities (*sthāpanā* for *prastāvanā* and the like), these plays conform in a strikingly close manner to the classical model. It should be noted that the Nāgānanda, which is included in the repertoire as well, has apparently been transmitted in the form in which it is otherwise known; that is to say, so far nobody has given any indication of major alterations in the South Indian version compared to the classical text³⁴.

There is, then, no evidence that the performers of Kūṭiyāṭṭam themselves were interested in adapting, or felt any need to adapt, the texts of their plays. The repertoire is, instead, to be treated either as a selection from existing, 'classical', plays or as a corpus inherited directly from an older theatrical tradition. In this connection it should be noted that in the Kūṭiyāṭṭam repertoire³⁵ the better-known classical dramas are represented by only one example, namely Harṣa's Nāgānanda. By extending the definition of a classical play to a recast we may include in this category the Cārudatta and the Svapnavāsavadatta (for the latter, see also below)³⁶. The majority of

³⁴ The only scholar to have raised the question at all, albeit in a different context, is HAHN (1981: 136), but he excused himself for an unfamiliarity with the South Indian manuscripts of the Nāgānanda. Apparently the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series edition (no. 59), which has not been available to me, was not yet published at the time. Neither PISHAROTI (1925: 112 f. and 1955: 202 f.) nor ENROS (1981: 276 with n. 4), the latter referring to a stage manual of the Nāgānanda, make mention of any significantly deviating text.

³⁵ For the repertoire, see PISHAROTI 1925: 111 f. and 1955: 201–204.

³⁶ To this category may be added the Bhagavadajjuka as well, which is mentioned in the North Indian Nāṭakalakṣaṇaratnaśā; see below, n. 53.

plays, however, are otherwise unknown or only of local, South Indian origin. An example of the latter category is the *Mattavilāsa* by the Pallava king Mahendravarman I.

The Pallavas are important here for yet another reason. They are generally believed to have introduced Sanskrit Kāvya literature into Tamil Nad, which from there spread to Kerala³⁷. This included the Sanskrit drama, in which field Mahendravarman I was personally active as an author. The name Raṅgapatākā, "Banner of the stage", of a queen of one of Mahendravarman's successors, namely Paramēśvaravarman I, suggests a royal interest in the actual performance as well³⁸. Kūṭiyāṭṭam in some way or other should be related to the dramatic and theatrical tradition of the Pallavas. In fact, the inclusion of the *Mattavilāsa* in its repertoire shows that this is indeed the case.

The question I intend to go into presently is whether with the *Mattavilāsa* the list of such plays is complete. For in the *bharata-vākya* of no less than seven of the thirteen Trivandrum plays a patron is mentioned called Rājasimha, which happens to be the *biruda* of yet another Pallava king, namely Mahendravarman I's great-great-grandson Narasimhavarman II (690–720 A.D.)³⁹.

The identification of Rājasimha, as so much in the study of the Trivandrum plays, has been a kind of free for all. The result is a list of kings from various periods and regions (see PUSALKER 1968: 101–103). These identifications were based solely on the name Rājasimha, and in some cases even that minimal requirement is not met. In the latter cases the problem was circumvented by arguing that Rājasimha was just a descriptive epithet.

In what follows I will, on the basis of one of the plays concerned, *in casu* the *Pratijñā*, try to construe a case for the identification of Rājasimha with the Pallava king mentioned above. The argument, which consists of a string of coincidences, will be that it would be

³⁷ On poets and scholars travelling, and emigrating, from Tamil Nad to Kerala, via, among other routes, Palghat, see KUNJUNNI RAJA 1958: xivf.

³⁸ On the question whose wife she was opinions differ. According to LOCKWOOD (1982: 56–61) she was one of the queens of Paramēśvaravarman I (669–690 A.D.). According to MAHALINGAM (1969: 120 and 1988: lvii) she was the wife of the latter's son Narasimhavarman II. An inscription of this Raṅgapatākā is found on the Kailasanatha temple. This inscription is discussed by LOCKWOOD (loc. cit.).

³⁹ I have not been able to find out in the literature concerned to what Rājasimha owes its special status among all Narasimhavarman II's titles. According to MINAKSHI (1938: 39) Rājasimha would be his 'real' name and Narasimhavarman II his so-called *abhiṣekanāma*.

fitting if the Rājasimha mentioned in the Pratijñā is indeed Nara-simhavarman II⁴⁰.

Before going any further into this matter two other points should be noted. The first concerns the *bharataavākya*. As indicated above (p. 8), Rājasimha is mentioned in altogether seven plays, namely, besides the Pratijñā, the Svapna, Avimāraka, Pañcarātra, Dūta-vākya, Abhiṣeka and the Bālacarita. However, in all these plays it is the very same *bharataavākya*⁴¹. This had led scholars to deny the *bharataavākya* any topical value. To quote SUKTHANKAR: "The ex-

⁴⁰ BARNETT (1919) identified the Rājasimha of the Trivandrum plays with the Pandya king Tēr Māraṇ Rājasimha, who in the later literature (e.g. SASTRI 1929: 51) is known as Māravarman Rājasimha I (740–770 A.D.). The Pandya line includes at least one other Rājasimha, namely Māravarman Rājasimha II (900–920 A.D.). The patronage of the Pandyas seems, however, to have been extended in the first place to Tamil literature, not Sanskrit, which would, in a general way, speak against the identification. As to Rājasimha I, his – successful – campaigns against the Pallavas, which earned him the epithet *pallavabhañjana*, almost certainly disqualifies him as patron of the Pratijñā with its 'reference' to Mahendravarman I's Mattavilāsa. The identification with Rājasimha II is unlikely for another reason. This king seems to have been constantly on the run for the Cholas. PUSALKER (1968: 102 n. 1) refers to an article (in Marathi) by RADDI, in which the latter apparently puts forward a Kerala Rājasimha. The article has, unfortunately, not been available to me. With these three Rājasimhas, beside Nara-simhavarman II, the possibilities for an identification seem to be exhausted.

⁴¹ The *bharataavākya* in the Pratijñā, Avimāraka and Abhiṣekanātaka reads: *bhavantv arajaso gāvaḥ paracakram praśāmyatu | imām api mahīm kṛtsnām rājasimhaḥ praśāstu naḥ ||*. In the Pañcarātra the first line reads instead: *hanta sarve prasannāḥ smaḥ pravṛddhakulasamgrahāḥ |*. Svapnavāsa-vadatta, Bālacarita and Dūtavākya have: *imām sāgaraparyantām himavad-vindhyakuṇḍalām | mahīm ekātapatrāṅkām rājasimhaḥ praśāstu naḥ ||*. In the Bālacarita pāda a reads: *catussāgaraparyantām*. In the Karpabhāra and Pratimānātaka the king's name is missing: *sarvatra sampadaḥ santu naśyantu vipadaḥ sadā | rājā rājaguṇopeto bhūmim ekaḥ praśāstu naḥ ||* and *yathā rāmaś ca jānakyaḥ bandhubhīś ca samāgataḥ | tathā lakṣmyā samāyukto rājā bhūmim praśāstu naḥ ||*. In the Ūrubhaṅga there is only one short line: *gām pātu narapatih śamīlapakṣaḥ*. The Dūtaghaṭotkaca ends with a verse (a kind of *ita missa est*) of Ghaṭotkaca. The Madhyamavyāyoga ends with a verse praising god: *yathā nadīnām prabhavaḥ samudro, yathāhutīnām prabhavo hutāśaḥ | yathendriyāṇām prabhavaṃ mano 'pi, tathā prabhur no bhagavān upendraḥ ||*. In the Cārudatta something like a *bharataavākya* is missing altogether. – SUKTHANKAR (1925: 149) compares the second line of the *bharataavākya* of the Pratijñā and the other texts to MBh XII 308,134ab: *ya imām prthivīm kṛtsnām ekacchatrām praśāsti ha |*. See also the line *praśāstv imām mahārājaḥ prthivīm ca sasāgarām ||*, quoted by DAVE (1941: 360 n. 6) from the Nāṭyaśāstra (V 111cd), where, however, it is found among the illustrations of the *nāṇḍī*.

pression seems to have been held intentionally vague⁴² so that the stanza could be conveniently used on any occasion and at the court of any king'' (1925: 139f.). KUNHAN RAJA (1923: 258) suggested that the *bharatavākya* was not the mark of the authors of the plays but a kind of motto of a group of actors. According to these scholars 'Rājasimha' was a kind of passe-partout which could be used for any king.

At this point I wish to note that the repeated use of one and the same verse as *bharatavākya* is not so unknown as has been suggested. For instance, Harṣa used the same verse in his *Priyadarśikā* and in his *Ratnāvalī* (see NARIMAN 1923: 131 n. 79).

The second point is that we may indeed have to reckon with instances among these seven plays of a secondary extension of the use of the *bharatavākya*. Such a phenomenon can be seen in the *Dāmakaprahasana*. The *bharatavākya* of this play is completely identical to the one found in the *Karṇabhāra*. It is all the same doubtful if the undatable *Dāmakaprahasana* is contemporary with the latter text. The short farce, which, by the way, is not farcical at all, has been pieced together with large fragments taken from, among other plays, the *Karṇabhāra*, *Mattavilāsa* and *Bhagavadajjuka* (see JOLLY 1927). If anything, it is this which would account for the occurrence of the *bharatavākya* from the *Karṇabhāra* in the *Dāmakaprahasana*.

These considerations, however, do not rule out the possibility that *Rājasimha* in origin refers to a historical king and that some of the plays have indeed been composed during that king's reign. As indicated above, the identification is based on a number of coincidental details. These could be presented in the form of an equation in which, as far as the *Pratijñā* is concerned, *Narasimhavarman II* would seem to fit nicely into the slot filled by the unknown entity 'Rājasimha'.

Above (p. 9 ff.) I have tried to show that the first scene of the third act of the *Pratijñā* was based on the *Mattavilāsa* of *Mahendrarvarman I*. *Narasimhavarman II*, alias *Rājasimha*, the supposed patron of the *Pratijñā*, is this king's great-great-grandson. But there is something more than this which ties these two kings together. This

⁴² SUKTHANKAR referred here, among other things, to the name *Rājasimha*, which could be any king. He probably also had in mind the fact that the *bharatavākya* does not refer to a specific region but to the whole earth. This, however, is just a stereotyped convention, as noted by SASTRI (1929: 172). The fact that the *bharatavākya* is but a simple *śloka* is completely in agreement with the versification seen in these plays, for which, see SUKTHANKAR 1921.

becomes clear when considering their respective activities in the field of temple building. It has been argued by, among other scholars, HIRSH (1987) that most of the temples at Mahabalipuram date from the period of Mahendravarman I. This king is, moreover, credited with the idea itself of this temple area, a veritable exhibition ground where various styles of temple building are on show side by side. The buildings ordered, and signed, by Mahendravarman I include at least one signal innovation or novelty in Tamil Nad, namely the free-standing rockcut temple.

Mahendravarman I's immediate successors have for various reasons failed to leave a similar mark in this field of the arts. The thread is taken up again by Narasimhavarman II, who left several perfect examples of yet another innovation, namely the free-standing structural temple. One example, the Shore Temple, is found at Mahabalipuram itself, another, the Kailasanatha temple, in nearby Kāñcī.

This picture, of two kings rising well above a succession of seemingly mediocre kings, is undoubtedly a distortion of the actual situation. But even then it is a distortion only of degree⁴³. The Mattavilāsa and the Pratijñā as 'products' of these two kings, as author and as patron respectively, would, however, corroborate the picture.

The second point concerns the evidence of an increasing popularity in South India in Narasimhavarman II's time of the Udayana stories⁴⁴, one of which forms the subject of the Pratijñā. The evidence may be found among the *birudas* of Narasimhavarman II.

The Pallava kings starting from Mahendravarman I are noted for the increasing number of titles they assumed for themselves in their inscriptions. The tendency culminated with Narasimhavarman II, on whose Kailasanatha temple no fewer than 244 titles have been traced (see LOCKWOOD 1982: 104–118). The *birudas* are, as has been noted

⁴³ For instance, the introduction in Tamil Nad of the free-standing structural temple can be traced back to Narasimhavarman II's father, Paramēśvaravarman I (669–690/1 A.D. [see MAHALINGAM (1969: 106f.), who refers to the *Cirrapākkam* and *Kūram* inscriptions, for which, see MAHALINGAM 1988: 146f. and 152–161 respectively]). However, no such large temples have survived which can with certainty be ascribed to Paramēśvaravarman. For that we have to wait for his son.

⁴⁴ VIJAYALAKSHMY (1981), who dates the *Perunkatai*, the Tamil version of the *Bṛhatkathā*, between 600 and 1000 A.D., was mainly interested in the evidence showing the existence of the text. She did not consider the evidence to be found in, for instance, inscriptions, which showed the familiarity in South India with the stories about Udayana. Some such instances will be treated below.

by HIRSH (1987: 117 n. 25), rather commonplace. The majority refer to the king's martial valour and royal omnipotence, while in reality his reign was relatively peaceful. In contrast, his artistic achievements are greatly undervalued with a mere seven *birudas*, among which, notably, *kaviprabodha*. (Of course, his *birudas* are found on his temples!) The frame of reference is, as is generally the case, the world of the gods and of the epic heroes. In this respect at least one *biruda* stands out, namely *ibhavatsarāja*, "(resembling) the king of the Vatsas (in the knowledge of) elephants". The king is here compared with a figure from the *kathā*-literature, namely Udayana, which, if not exceptional for this period (see below), is at least new.

The Udayana stories were almost certainly known before this time. Thus, the words *va[tsā]pahāra* in the Māmaṇḍūr inscription of Mahendravarman I (for which, see n. 19), occurring in a list of literary works, almost certainly refer to these stories, if not to the *Bṛhatkathā* itself. However, the point I wish to make here concerns the new role in Narasiṃhavarman II's time of these stories in the creation of the king's titles. The only other and similar type of reference to Udayana I have been able to trace is found in an inscription of Narasiṃhavarman II's contemporary, the Cālukya king Vijayāditya, who "was imprisoned and ... without any help from outside escaped from the peril unlike the king Vatsarāja" (MAHALINGAM 1988: lv).

Thus, on the one hand, we have a play, the *Pratijñā*, on Udayana, an expert on elephants, a play in which a scene has been inserted based on the *Mattavilāsa* by the Pallava king Mahendravarman I, and which is dedicated to a certain Rājasimha; on the other hand, we have a Pallava king known as Rājasimha, who is the great-great-grandson of, and worthy heir to, the author of the *Mattavilāsa* and who is literally compared to Udayana in his capacity of being an expert on elephants.

This second section may be summarized as follows. At the outset it has been argued that the theory that the Trivandrum plays are compilations and adaptations made for *Kūṭiyāṭṭam* cannot be proved. Instead we have to reckon with the possibility that *Kūṭiyāṭṭam*, which goes back in Kerala at least to the tenth century⁴⁵, may well have adopted or inherited these texts, as scripts or as literary texts, from an earlier tradition. As such there is a *prima facie* case to point to the dramatic tradition brought to Tamil Nad by

⁴⁵ See, e.g., ENROS 1981: 275.

the Pallavas at the end of the sixth century A.D. There is clear evidence of a continuing interest within the royal family in the Sanskrit theatre. This would, finally, suggest a solution for the nagging problem of the identification of Rājasiṃha or, rather, for the origin of that name.

Whatever is exactly the case here, the plays as we now have them seem to be part of a kind of Sanskrit renaissance, either in Kerala or, earlier, in Tamil Nad. In what follows there will be occasion to discuss several peculiarities in the plays which may well have their explanation in precisely such a context.

III. *sūtradhāraḥṛtārambha*

Most Sanskrit dramas open with one or two benedictory verses followed by the words *nāndyante | tataḥ praviśati sūtradhāraḥ*. By contrast the Sanskrit dramas in South Indian manuscripts read this formula before the first benedictory verse(s). It is generally assumed that the South Indian manuscripts have preserved an old dramaturgical practice. The situation found in the North Indian manuscripts would represent a later phase in the development⁴⁶.

This conclusion has been based on the fact that the situation in the South Indian manuscripts could on the basis of a verse from Bāṇa's *Harṣacarita* be traced back to Kālidāsa's predecessor Bhāsa.⁴⁷ Furthermore, the South Indian opening agrees literally with the rules found in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, which in many other cases, and possibly here as well, reflects a tradition older than the oldest known dramatic texts⁴⁸.

⁴⁶ SCHOKKER 1966: 62–64 and FEISTEL 1969, for instance p. 134: "Sie [i.e. the peculiar opening] muß – wenn sie zumindest in ihrem Ursprung sinnvoll gewesen sein soll – aus einer Zeit stammen, wo die Nāndī vom Sūtradhāra hinter dem Vorhang gesprochen wurde, sie aber noch [my spacing] nicht in den Aufgabenbereich des Schauspieldichters übergegangen war".

⁴⁷ Usually the argument is the other way around: because their opening fits the description given by Bāṇa of the plays by Bhāsa, the Trivandrum plays can be attributed to that author who lived before Kālidāsa.

⁴⁸ According to the *Nāṭyaśāstra* the *nāndī* is part of the *pūrvaraṅga*, or the preliminary rituals, not of the play proper, which, it should be noted, in origin are two entirely different things. On the *pūrvaraṅga*, treated in NS V, see FEISTEL 1969, KUIPER 1979: 110ff., and, lately, THIEME 1987: 296ff. By way of illustration reference may be made to the clear statement found in the first chapter of the NS (I 56c–57d): *pūrvam kṛtā mayā nāndī hy āśīrvacanasamyutā || aṣṭāṅgapadasamyuktā vicitrā vedanirmītā | tadante 'nukṛtir baddhā yathā daityāḥ surair jītāḥ ||* 'First I performed a *nāndī* . . . At the end of the (*nāndī*) I organized an imitation . . .'. The situation found in the North

In what follows I intend to show in the first place that Bāṇa's *sūtradhāraḥṛtārambha* bears no relation at all to the opening found in the South Indian manuscripts. The interpretation I will suggest instead is exemplified in a quotation from a Svapnavāsavadatta, which passage may, then, on Bāṇa's authority be traced back to the famous but now lost Svapnavāsavadatta by Bhāsa.

The next point to be discussed concerns the implications of the close agreement which has been observed between the South Indian opening and the relevant rules of the Nāṭyaśāstra, when the South Indian opening can no longer be traced back to such an early playwright as Bhāsa.

In Harṣacarita I 15 Bāṇa enumerates several distinguishing features of the plays by Bhāsa:

sūtradhāraḥṛtārambhaiḥ nāṭakair bahubhūmikaiḥ |
sapatākair yaśo lebhe bhāso devakulair iva ||

"Bhāsa gained as much splendour by his plays with introductions spoken by the manager, full of various characters, and furnished with startling episodes, as he would have done by the erection of temples, created by architects, adorned with several stories and decorated with banners" (COWELL – THOMAS 1897: 3).

The assumption that the word *sūtradhāraḥṛtārambha* describes in particular the opening as found in, among other plays, those from Trivandrum has been questioned by, among others, SUKTHANKAR and KUNHAN RAJA. SUKTHANKAR (1925: 129–131); rather ingeniously, argued that in the North Indian plays, too, it is the *sūtradhāra* who opens the play, in that case with the recitation of the *nāndī*. He passes Bāṇa's verse off as an instance of meaningless verbiage (similarly KEITH 1924: 91 and PUSALKER 1968: 42). According to KUNHAN RAJA (1923: 255) the word *sūtradhāraḥṛtārambha* describes the situation as found in the prologue of Bhavabhūti's Uttararāma-carita. Instead of merely announcing the play, the *sūtradhāra* has here literally moved himself over to the time and place of the story of the play. In a later article (1927: 236f.) he refers again to this interpretation in connection with a quotation from a Svapnavāsavadatta found in Sāgaranandin's Nāṭakalakṣaṇaratnakośa. This quotation,

Indian manuscripts is generally explained as the result of the gradual reduction of the *pūrvarāṅga* to a short formality (KUIPER 1979: 122) and of the tendency to consider those elements that remained as part of the play (ib. 171). For subsequent attempts in the handbooks to account for, and accommodate, the actual practice of later times, see KUIPER 1978: 178–183.

which would indeed seem relevant here but not for the reasons assumed by KUNHAN RAJA, will be discussed below.

However, what has been overlooked so far is that *ārambha*, like *bhūmika* and *patākā*, is a technical term. *ārambha* is the first of a series of five *avasthās*, mentioned in, among other texts, Nāṭyaśāstra XIX 9ff. In this first *avasthā*, called *ārambha* or *prārambha*, the desire or interest (*autsukya*) of the hero is awakened. The leading motive behind the hero's actions is communicated to the audience⁴⁹. It is important to note that the *ārambha* is by definition part of the play proper, not of the prologue. In the verse given above Bāṇa would, then, describe a situation in which the *ārambha* is moved backwards to the prologue, which is the field of action of the *sūtradhāra*.

An illustration of what might be meant here is in my opinion to be found in the quotation, referred to above, from the prologue of a Svapnavāsavadatta found in the Nāṭakalakṣaṇaratnakośa (first half of the thirteenth century). The prologue is quoted as an instance of the *prayogātīśaya* type of the *āmukha*, but a closer examination of the passage (p. 122) should make it clear that more is the matter here: *yathā svapnavāsavadatte – nepathye sūtradhāra utsāraṇām śrutvā paṭhati | aye katham tapovane 'py utsāraṇā | vilokya | katham mantrī yaugandharāyaṇaḥ vatsarājasya rājyapratyānayanam kartukāmaḥ padmāvatīyajananotsāryate | ity utsāraṇaśabdo 'tra pūrvaprayogam udghāṭya nāṭakārthasūcaka iti prayogātīśayaḥ ||* "For example, in Svapnavāsavadatta, the *sūtradhāra*, hearing in the wings the order to move aside, says: What! Even in a hermitage one is told to move aside! (Looking around) What! It is the minister Yaugandharāyaṇa. He is trying to restore the king of Vatsa to the throne, and Padmāvatī's people are pushing him aside. Thus the order to move on here, broaching the action in advance, is an indicator of the plot of the play. This is *prayogātīśaya*." (DILLON 1960: 28).

The *sūtradhāra* reveals here Yaugandharāyaṇa's intentions, which form the leading motif of the play: *vatsarājasya rājyapratyānayanam kartukāmaḥ*. Compare, incidentally, the expression *kartukāma* with *autsukya* in the definition of the *ārambha* in the Nāṭyaśāstra, for which, see n. 49.

⁴⁹ Nāṭyaśāstra XIX 9: *autsukyamātrabandhas tu yadbījasya nibadhyate | mahataḥ phalayogasya sa phalārambha iṣyate ||* 'Because that part of the composition is mainly concerned with creating an interest in the final result of the seed, it is known as the beginning of the fruit'. – The *avasthās* refer to the respective attitudes or mental states the *kāraka*, or hero, goes through in the course of the play; see LÉVI 1963: 32–34 and LIENHARD 1974, esp. p. 135.

In the interpretation of the quotation, given just now, one minor, theoretical, problem remains. The *ārambha* should refer to the desire or anxiety of the *kāraka*, or the hero of the play, and though Yaugandharāyaṇa in actual practice is the leading character, it is not at all certain if according to the dramatic theory a 'mere' minister might indeed be considered the *kāraka*.

The exceptional nature of the prologue in the above quotation is brought out all the more clearly by a comparison with the Svapnavāsavadatta from Trivandrum, where the same elements occur again but have been divided over the prologue and the beginning of the play proper. The *sūtradhāra*, on the point of announcing the play, hears from behind the curtain the order to disperse. A peep through the curtain tells him what is going on. The servants of the daughter of the king of Magadha are dispersing the inhabitants of the hermitage. The play then begins with the very same scene witnessed by the *sūtradhāra*, as two servants are ordering the people out of the way. After this Yaugandharāyaṇa and Vāsavadattā enter, lamenting the outrage committed in this quiet place. This prologue is an example of the so-called *prayogātisaya* type of the *āmukha*, which is in fact quite common in the Trivandrum plays (see PUSALKER 1968: 6 and FEISTEL 1969: 132). Any reference to the motif of the play is, however, absent from this prologue.

Of the legendary Bhāsa we know, basically, only two things, namely that he wrote a play called Svapnavāsavadatta (see above, p. 6 with n. 8) and, which must have been quite exceptional, that in his plays (but not necessarily in all) the *ārambha* is revealed by the *sūtradhāra*, i.e. in the prologue⁵⁰. The quotation in the Nāṭa-kalakṣaṇaratnakośa from an anonymous Svapnavāsavadatta seems to provide an example of what is meant by the word *sūtradhāra-kr̥tārambha*. As such the passage may be traced back to the famous but now lost Svapnavāsavadatta by Bhāsa. It is in fact also one of the few quotations which can actually be traced back to the Trivandrum Svapnavāsavadatta and gives some insight into the effects of the process of adaptation that went in the making of the latter text. This corroborates the findings of MORGENSTIERNE on the relation between the Mṛcchakaṭīka and the Cārudatta.

If the opening in the South Indian manuscripts can no longer be

⁵⁰ The same exceptional status must be assumed for the two other characteristics mentioned by Bāṇa, namely their having many characters (*bahubhūmika*) and episodes (*sapatāka*). The attempts to assess these two characteristics have failed to convince so far.

traced back to Bhāsa the only evidence left for its supposed authenticity is its close agreement to the rules of the Nāṭyaśāstra.⁵¹ This agreement could, however, equally well be turned into evidence against its authentic nature.

In this connection it should be noted that the introduction of Sanskrit literature in Tamil Nad by the Pallavas was part of a larger process of the spread of Hindu culture from North and Central India to the eastern and south-eastern coastal areas. KULKE (1990: 30) has suggested that the spread of Hindu temple architecture to these areas may have been facilitated by architectural manuals (*śilpaśāstras*), which coincidentally appeared for the first time in the same period. The Kāvyaadarśa by Daṇḍin may be mentioned here as precisely such a 'facilitating' text, in this case for the composition of Sanskrit Kāvya literature. In fact its author has been associated with the Pallavas (see n. 22).

Evidence of a particular handbook on Sanskrit drama available to the Pallavas is lacking. At the same time, it is possible in the South Indian plays themselves, including those from Trivandrum, to identify elements that betray a familiarity, if not a direct concern, with the tenets of the dramatic theory in general. It is not unlikely to assume that some of the peculiarities in these plays, including the so-called archaisms, have been introduced as corrections or improvements.

One of the archaisms concerns the absence of Māhārāṣṭrī (M.) Prakrit. The absence of this dialect has, explicitly or implicitly, been an argument to situate the Trivandrum plays between Aśvaghoṣa, who did not use M., and Kālidāsa, the first playwright known to have used this dialect in the verses of his dramas (see, e.g. HINÜBER

⁵¹ The present discussion is restricted to one particular feature of the opening, namely the absence or presence of the *nāndī*. In fact, the prologue shows a concentration of differences between North and South. One of these concerns the very terms used for the prologue, *prastāvanā* and *sthāpanā* respectively. Another peculiar feature of the South Indian plays (e.g. the Trivandrum plays and the Mattavilāsa) is the so-called *maṅgalaśloka* (this is the term used in the Śākuntalacarcā; see UNNI 1978: 225) which immediately follows the words *nāndyante* . . . FEISTEL (1969: 129) has noted that some of these verses in the Trivandrum plays answer to the description of the *prarocanā*. In this connection he refers in particular to those verses (e.g. in the Pratijñā) in which the names of the chief characters have been incorporated. It should be noted that this is apparently only one of the ways in which the allusion to the plot was realized. Another, even more subtle way, can be seen in the *maṅgalaśloka* in the Bhagavadajjuka, already briefly referred to in n. 19.

1986: 49). It should be noted, however, that this dialect is also absent from such an originally South Indian play as the *Mattavilāsa* (see also BARNETT 1925: 519). This means that the non-use of M. was also part of a South Indian tradition of writing Sanskrit plays. As such, it may have been the result of an imitation of plays dating from the period before *Kālidāsa*. As I have tried to show above, there is evidence that the *Svapnavāsavadatta* by *Bhāsa* was actually known to the author of the *Svapnavāsavadatta* from Trivandrum. However, apart from the fact that it is not at all certain that *Bhāsa* did not use M., his plays were not the only ones known in South India. For instance, the *Māmaṇḍūr* inscription in line 5 probably refers to the *Vikramorvaśīya*, in which M. does occur: ... *ma[kṛta]* ... *ndhacera* ... [*muda*] *sārtham urvvaśī sarvvaśobhanā*, in a passage dealing with Mahendravarman I's literary accomplishments (cf. above, n. 19). It is in any case hard to maintain that the absence of M. in the South Indian plays is due to the fact that the dialect was not yet in use. The question would rather be why M. was avoided or neglected. An explanation may be found in assuming a strict application of the dramatic theory, which ignores this particular dialect.

Thus, in the seventeenth *adhyāya* of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* a short grammar of the Prakrits is given, followed by a classification of the different dialects and their speakers. It has been observed by, among others, NITTI-DOLCI (1938: 61–88) that M. is completely absent from the grammar as well as from the classification. It may be the very fact that the theory makes no provision for the use of M. in Sanskrit drama which accounts for the non-use of that dialect in the plays from South India.

In this connection I would also like to refer to another feature of the South Indian dramatic tradition, namely the great variety of types of Sanskrit dramas found. In this respect the *Mattavilāsa* and *Bhagavadajjuka* seem to deserve special attention, not only as the earliest traces of a successful attempt by the Pallavas to introduce the Sanskrit drama in Tamil Nad or as the earliest known *prahasanas*, but precisely as examples of this type of drama. *Nāṭyaśāstra* XVIII 101ff. distinguishes two types of *prahasanas*, namely the *śuddha*, which is exclusively set in the milieu of holy men and ascetics, and the *saṃkīrṇa*, or miscellaneous type, which seems set mainly in the courtesans' quarter. In later texts a third type has been distinguished, the definitions of which seem to vary.

The cast of the *Mattavilāsa* consists entirely of religious beggars. It is the purest type imaginable of the *śuddha prahasana*. It is so far the

only example of this type that has survived⁵². It is tempting to conclude that we have here to do with an attempt to revive the type on the basis of the definitions found in some handbook on Sanskrit drama. In any case, its preservation in South India testifies to a continuing interest not only in the main types but also in the lesser types of Sanskrit drama.

The classification of the Bhagavadajjuka as a *prahasana* is a problem, partly because the definitions of the other type lack the exactness as seen in the case of the *śuddha prahasana*. The chief motif of the plot, however, is the blending, in the literal sense of the word, of the worlds of holy men and of courtesans. As such, it looks almost like an experiment, a blending of the two main types of the *prahasana*. It is not unlikely that it is this 'contrast' between the Mattavilāsa and the Bhagavadajjuka which lies behind their juxtaposition in the Māmaṇḍūr inscription (see n. 19).⁵³

Another kind of play known only from South India is the *bhāṇa*. At least one of the *bhāṇas* concerned, namely the Pādatāḍitaka by Śyāmilaka, originates almost certainly from Kashmir in North India, where, however, all traces of it have been lost. Yet another rare type of play preserved in South India is the *vyāyoga*, which is represented

⁵² The Nāṭakalakṣaṇaratnakośa, p. 176, mentions a Śaśivilāsa (referred to under the name Śaśikalā in Bahurūpa's gloss on the Daśarūpa; see DILLON 1960: 67 [2902]), which is otherwise unknown.

⁵³ LOCKWOOD – BHAT (1978: ixff.) have suggested that the Bhagavadajjuka is by the same author as the Mattavilāsa, that is, by Mahendravarman I. They failed to note, however, that the Bhagavadajjuka has been mentioned in the Nāṭakalakṣaṇaratnakośa (p. 176; see also DILLON 1960: 55A) as an example of the *saṃkīrṇa* type of the *prahasana*. It has happened that Sanskrit works from South India have become known in the North as well. A case in point is Daṇḍin's Daśakumāracarita (see also n. 22). In this case, however, the question arises why, while the Bhagavadajjuka did become known in North India, the Mattavilāsa didn't. Most likely the Bhagavadajjuka as we now have it is a South Indian version (or adaptation) of an originally North Indian play by that name. Whatever is the case, Mahendravarman I's preference for the minor types of drama is an interesting feature. In the context of the present discussion the prologue of the Bhagavadajjuka is interesting in itself. There the *sūtradhāra* gives a list of ten types of dramas, from which he finally chooses the *prahasana* as his favourite type – *atha tu nāṭakaprakaraṇodbhāvāsu vāreḥāmrgaḍīmasamavakāravyāyogabhāṇasallāpavīṭhyutsrṣṭikāṅkaprahasanādiṣu daśajātiṣu nāṭyaraseṣu hāsyam eva pradhānam iti paśyami* (p. 4f.). The contents of this list deviates from the more common *daśarūpaka*-list (e.g. Nāṭyaśāstra XVIII; see KEITH 1924: 345ff.), which includes the *nāṭaka* and the *prakaraṇa*. In the Bhagavadajjuka the latter two types are mentioned as the sources of the ten particular types of plays (see WINTERNITZ's preface to the edition, p. viiif.).

by the Madhyamavyāyoga, belonging to it at least in name (but on the titles of the Trivandrum plays, see n. 2). Finally the Cārudatta should be mentioned, which is an example of the otherwise rare type of the *prakaraṇa*.

We are concerned here not so much with the possible reasons for the disappearance of much of this variety in North India as with the reasons behind its preservation, if not its revival, in South India. The point I wish to make is that all this coincides, if not perhaps in time (Pallava), at least in place (South India), with the same concern with the dramatic theory as visible in the typical opening and the absence of Māhārāṣṭrī Prakrit in the South Indian plays.

Concluding Remarks

At the centre of the preceding investigation stood the Pratijñā-yaugandharāyaṇa. The conclusions regarding its date (not older than the Mattavilāsa), provenance (South India, Tamil Nad) and patronage (Pallavas, Narasiṃhavarman II) have provisionally been extended to the other Trivandrum plays. The fact that the Trivandrum plays form a separate group within the classical Sanskrit tradition seems indeed well established. At the same time, however, much is still unclear on this point. For instance: were the plays written within a short period of time or are they the result of a long-established literary tradition? A further study of the Trivandrum plays should in any case also include those other South Indian plays discovered more recently, e.g. the Mattavilāsa, Āścaryacūḍāmaṇi and the plays attributed to the Kerala king Kulaśekhavarman.

In the course of the present article the archaic nature of the opening of the South Indian plays (*nāndyante* ...) has been questioned. I have suggested that the opening might represent a learned restoration of the practice as described in, e.g., the Nāṭyaśāstra. This explanation, which is no more than a hypothesis, might in turn also be used to account for the absence or, rather, the avoidance of Māhārāṣṭrī Prakrit in these same plays.

The conclusions regarding the transmission of the texts within the Kūṭiyāṭṭam tradition have been based mainly on negative evidence, that is to say, so far there is no evidence of a process of adaptation of the texts by the directors or actors for the performance in Kūṭiyāṭṭam. Kūṭiyāṭṭam is first and foremost a performance technique. Above (p. 21 ff.), a few of its characteristics have been mentioned, among which the performance of the individual acts as plays in their own right. It would seem that in this way Kūṭiyāṭṭam does but little

justice to the plays as stories, with their often ingenious plots, their punned verses and witty dialogues. The emphasis seems to be mainly on the spectacle. On the other hand, with this emphasis on dance, mime, voice modulations and costume, Kūṭiyāṭṭam may give us some general idea as to how a performance according to the Nāṭyaśāstra would actually look like (see TIEKEN 1993). In this connection it may be interesting to note that certain aspects of the Kūṭiyāṭṭam performance can be traced back to approximately the eighth century in North India.

A case in point is the performance of the individual acts. A similar situation is described in Dāmodaragupta's Kuṭṭanīmata (eighth century, Kashmir). The description concerns the performance (*saṃgīta*, 770d) of Harṣa's Ratnāvalī⁵⁴. The director asks the king to sit out at least one act, so that his efforts would not have been in vain (856cd *avalokayāṅkam ekaṃ mā bhavatu mama śramo vandhyaḥ* ||). The reason for the director's modesty is the king's supposed restlessness. See in this connection stanza 907, in which the king apologizes for his initial lack of interest: *nāṭyaprayogatattve matayo na viśanti mādrśam prāyaḥ* | *vāhanayānapadātigrāmādīkakāryadattahrd-ayānām* || 'People like me generally do not take to the performance of a play. Our hearts lie with chariots, horses, infantry and such like things'. The king's excitement at the end of the performance of this one act would show that, as in the case of Kūṭiyāṭṭam, the role of the story of the play was secondary to the spectacle: *aṅke jāta-samāptau gītātodyadhvanau ca viśrānte* | *prekṣaṇakagunāgrahaṇam nrpaśūnuḥ pravavṛte kartum* ||906|| 'After the act had come to an end and the music and singing had stopped the king started to praise the spectacle'.

It would seem that the performance of one act only formed a complete programme already. The same situation is implied by Abhinavagupta in his commentary on Nāṭyaśāstra XVIII 21. This verse reads:

ekadivasappravṛttaṃ kāryas tv aṅko 'rthabījaṃ adhikṛtya |
āvaśyakakāryāṇām avirodhena prayogeṣu ||

According to Abhinavagupta the verse warns against the performance of an act exceeding the duration of one day. For the actors it would be physically impossible to be on stage any longer. The same would apply to the audience in the hall. *āvaśyakakārya* is supposed

⁵⁴ Descriptions of the performance of a Sanskrit drama are rare. See LÉVI 1963: 182f., 319f., 326–329 and 389–392. On the testimony of the Harivaṃśa (ib., p. 326), see KUIPER 1979: 123 n. 56.

to refer to such necessary activities as eating and drinking⁵⁵. Whatever the exact meaning of the word *āvaśyakakārya*, the verse is not concerned with the length of the performance, but with the unity of the actions brought together in one act. They should all take place in a single day, that is to say, leaps in time, such as provided by a long journey or by living in exile, should be dealt with in the entr'acts.

The point I wish to make is that, irrespective of the question whether Abhinavagupta in this case based himself on personal experience or on conclusions derived from a vaguely understood text, as far as he was concerned (ninth century, Kashmir) such a warning addressed to the playwright or director was not superfluous or out of order.

The difference in the aims of the performance, on the one hand, and the text, i.e. the story of the play, on the other, as noted for *Kūṭiyāṭṭam*, is apparently already quite old and may be traced back to at least the eighth century in North Indian Kashmir. However, rather than explaining in genealogical terms these similarities between the classical tradition in Kashmir and the one in Kerala, I venture to suggest that they have their origin, at least in part, in identical responses to the handbooks on the dramatic technique.

Bibliography and Abbreviations

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⁵⁵ Abhinavabhāratī ad NŚ XVIII 21: *athāṅkasya prayogakālaparimāṇam iyaḍ iti darśayati ekadivasapavṛttam iti | ... yatas tāvantaṁ kālā āvaśya-kāni bhojanādīni āśakyanirodhanāni tataḥ parantu prayogakālāś cet tatprekṣakaprayoktṛṇām tadāpy āvaśyakasya sandhyāvandanabhojanāder avirodhenety evaṁ kāryānekavatām ekatrāṅke niṣiddham |*.

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COMPOUNDS IN THE PROLOGUE OF THE PAÑCAVIMŚATISĀHASRIKĀ

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Contents

In section I the reader will be informed about the motives of this study and about several versions of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (henceforth: Pañca). In all of these versions, at the very beginning, we find two series of terms, nearly all compounds, in which qualities of excellent monks and *bodhisattvas* are described.

In II, for the first time a diplomatic edition in roman letters will be given of the two series, together with surrounding sentences, as they occur in a Gilgit manuscript of the Pañca (henceforth: PañcaG).

III contains a synoptic edition of the aforementioned text (slightly adjusted) and another Sanskrit version, and indications of the reflection of terms in three early Chinese translations.

In IV, a synoptic chart indicates parallels, variant readings and omissions in twelve versions of the two series.

V describes how the compounds in these series will be analysed and what kind of abbreviations are employed for this purpose.

In VI, the PañcaG version will be translated and its compounds analysed.

In VII, some statistics of the analysis are presented, and the main compounds divided into four categories.

Finally, in VIII, suggestions are made about (a) how to proceed when confronted with lengthy and intricate compounds of the kind the two series contain, (b) how some observations may be of interest for the history of ideas and attitudes, and (c) how to explain the excessive use of compounds in the passage.

* I wish to thank the following colleagues and friends: H. Isaacson for looking over the English in this essay, adducing parallels in PañcaK and KP and questioning some statements in an earlier draft; K. Matsuda for drawing my attention to a few inaccuracies in the edition presented in section II; L. Schmithausen for challenging some statements in an earlier draft; P. Schreiner for asking questions on compound analysis which led me to explicate some assumptions; Ch. H. Werba for his careful editing of my manuscript; M. Pemwieser for her help in reading the proofs.

Appended are an index of Sanskrit words in the two series, and abbreviations of texts and dictionaries.

I

Supervision of a Ph. D. thesis, recently led me to read large parts of the Pañca corresponding to the first chapter of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā. They had to be read in two versions: the facsimile edition of the Gilgit manuscript¹ and N. DUTT's edition (London 1934) of four narrowly related Nepalese manuscripts (henceforth: PañcaD)².

In connection with another study to be supervised, on long and intricate compounds in the Lankāvatārasūtra, I also paid attention to the formation of compounds in the Pañca and, therefore, included the Nidānaparivarta³ in my reading.

The parts I read of the Pañca were not marked by long and intricate compounds. There were a few exceptions of long, but not intricate compounds, e.g. a *dvandva* of 10 members in PañcaD 11,3: *divyāḥ puṣpadhūpagandhamālyavilepanacūrṇacāvaracchatrapatākāvaijayantīr grhītvā* (not as a compound in PañcaG f. 4b, 7-8: *divyāni puṣpāṇy ādāya divyāni mālyāni divyān gandhān . . .*)⁴.

Only at the very beginning, in two series of terms describing monks and *bodhisattvas* who are said to have listened to the Pañca dialogues, some long and intricate compounds occur. PañcaG contains more of these compounds than PañcaD, and sometimes employs more words, where both intend the same quality. Not all of these long compounds are easy to understand. Besides comparing the two Sanskrit versions

¹ Gilgit Buddhist Manuscripts, Part 3, Śatapitaka vol. 10 (3), ed. RAGHU VIRA and LOKESH CHANDRA, New Delhi 1966.

² I am referring to the Ph. D. Thesis of Mr. A. Verboom. He has nearly finished a reconstruction of the Sanskrit text of the 1st chapter of the Aṣṭa as it probably was available to Kumārajīva about 400 C. E. Besides T 227, he also consulted PañcaG, PañcaD, ŚataGh and, sporadically, earlier Chinese translations of the Aṣṭa, and Kumārajīva's Chinese translation of the Pañca (T 223).

³ This is the introductory part (in PañcaD, p. 4-17) of the long section (PañcaD 4,1-98,5) which precedes the sections corresponding with AṣṭaV, p. 2,2ff.

⁴ Nearly the same compound can be found on several pages of AṣṭaV, e.g. p. 29, l. 2, 20 and 31 (not as a compound on the following pages, e.g. 30,27, but again as a compound in p. 34,16) or p. 250, l. 22, 26 and 28 (not as a compound p. 246,28). Precisely corresponding is the compound in SP, p. 330, l. 3, 8 and 10, nearly the same on p. 286,17 or 348,27, also in SR 218,10+23. The compound often occurs, with a few minimal variants, in PañcaK from p. 57,1 onwards.

already mentioned⁵, one can consult four Chinese⁶ and two Tibetan translations⁷ of the Pañca, and some related texts such as ŚataGh, T 220 (1&3), and DaśaK⁸.

This results in better understanding (see section VI), but also shows how all these versions vary. As to these differences some examples:

The last quality of the monks in PañcaG, occurring also in PañcaD, does not appear in two early Chinese Pañca translations (see the synoptic chart below); incidentally, this is the longest compound of the first series and the only one that cannot be found with all its members in Pāli canonical literature⁹, though its nucleus is there.

The *bodhisattva* qualities nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16 of PañcaG (and of its corresponding Tibetan translation in the Kanjur) are all missing in the early Chinese translations, but two of them appear in PañcaD (and its corresponding Tibetan translation in the Tanjur) and three in T 220 [2] (four in T 220 [1&3]).

Sometimes a member of a compound is omitted: when viewed from PañcaG, no. 41 of its second series, *sarvasatvāpratihatacittair*, appears in PañcaD only as *apratihatacittair*.

Members of a compound can also change place: no. 5 of the second series in PañcaG, *akalpitapraṇidhānaiḥ*, appears as *praṇidhānākalpitaiḥ* in PañcaD.

With regard to the opening passage, one could try to explain differences by assuming that there were two redactions: a shorter one, represented in Sanskrit by PañcaD, in Chinese by T 221, 222, 223,

⁵ The Sanskrit version in O. v. HINÜBER, *Sieben Goldblätter einer Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāparamitā aus Anurādhapura*, Göttingen 1984, is, in this passage, substantially the same as PañcaD. A variant will be quoted in n. 56 below.

⁶ T. 222 (according to MaPL, p. 2: 286 C. E., by Dharmarakṣa), T 221 (MaPL, p. 2f.: 291 C. E., by Muśara/Muraśa [Mokṣala?], revised by Jakuran [Saṅgharakṣa?] in 303 C. E.), T 223 (MaPL, p. 3: 403–404 C. E., by Kumārajīva) and T 220 [2] (MaPL, p. 3: 660–663 C. E., by Hsüan-tsang). Cf. CoPL, p. 34f.

⁷ One belonging to the Kanjur, the other to the Tanjur and transmitted in connection with the Abhisamayālaṃkāra. See abbreviations ñi and ga.

⁸ Aṣṭa does not contain series II. T 224 (vol. 8, p. 425c) and 225 (vol. 8, p. 508b) only mention innumerable monks and *bodhisattvas* as the audience, but do not describe them. T 220 [5] (vol. 7, p. 865c) introduces 2000 monks who are *arhats* and innumerable *bodhisattvas* who are *asaṅgapratibhāṇa*. In T 226, 227, 228, 220 (4), and AṣṭaV there are no *bodhisattvas* in the audience, which consists of only 1250 monks who are endowed with all or most of the qualities mentioned in PañcaG (see n. 36).

⁹ For *anuprāptasvakārtha* see n. 49 below.

220 [2] and in Tibetan by the Tanjur translation, and a longer one, represented by PañcaG and ŚataGh, T 220 [1&3] and the Kanjur translation (see synoptic chart). But there are many variant readings within these 'redactions'. It is true that most of them, especially in the early Chinese translations, could be explained by the observation that Buddhist texts have not often been rigidly fixed¹⁰. However, it seems advisable to look always for the possibility that variants are due to views prevailing in different monasteries, schools and/or regions. As long as this possibility is not clearly excluded, I am not ready to adhere to the idea of two redactions, and only speak of versions without distinguishing them from redactions.

Of the Indian versions of the passage, PañcaG mentions 24 more *bodhisattva* qualities than PañcaD¹¹. Other parts of the Pañca (see above) also gave me the impression that PañcaD has fewer expansions than PañcaG. But it has some expansions of its own. In the opening passage it has more to say about the high number of *bodhisattvas* listening to the dialogues. Moreover, variant readings of the opening passage in PañcaD (see the synoptic edition) suggest that it is not just a former stage of PañcaG in all the instances where PañcaG is more expanded¹².

In terms of expansion the early Chinese translations are near to PañcaD, but none can be said to be an earlier stage of it. Each of them contains items not present in PañcaD. Nor can one of the early

¹⁰ Cf. O. v. HINÜBER, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 5.

¹¹ Nos. 2, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 21, 24, 25, 26, 32, 43–54, 58, 62 of the PañcaG series. A parallel to no. 39 can be found in the PañcaD series between what corresponds to no. 33 and no. 34 in PañcaG. Otherwise the order in both versions is the same. – PañcaD was connected with the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* and as such perhaps prevented from new accretions. There are no indications in the opening passage that it is abridged or has variant readings depending on that text, as some scholarly descriptions (e.g. CoPL, p. 36f.) of this version as "recast", "revised", "rearranged", and "adjusted" might suggest. In this connection an article by N. R. ЛЕТНОВ may be mentioned: *Some Notes on the Relationship between the Abhisamayālaṅkāra, the Revised Pañca-viṃśatisāhasrikā, and the Chinese Translations of the Unrevised Pañca-viṃśatisāhasrikā*. JAOS 96 (1976) 499–511. Besides its very useful indications of sections in the early Chinese translations, it raises doubts whether the distinction used in the title (originating from CONZE?) between the unrevised and the revised Pañca still serves any purpose.

¹² In the opening passage ŚataGh has essentially the same text as PañcaG, but, like PañcaD, it omits *bodhisattva* quality no. 2. There are some interesting variants which shall be mentioned in footnotes, and quite a few obvious errors and idiosyncrasies in the manuscript or misreadings by the editor which will not be quoted.

Chinese translations be said to represent an earlier stage of another Indian or Chinese version as they are known to us today. T 221 (C. E. 291/303), though dated a little later than T 222 (C. E. 286), omits nos. 5, 6, 10 and 15 of the qualities of monks, the remark on Ānanda, and *bodhisattva* qualities nos. 15, 27 and 39, which all can be found in T 222 (p. 147a,7–10). It is, in this respect, less expanded and could, therefore, be considered as representing an earlier stage of the text which was the basis of T 222. But T 221 seems to be based on an Indian version already slightly different from that of T 222. T 221 mentions *bodhisattva* qualities nos. 23 and 32 of PañcaG (no. 32 not in PañcaD) and a quality occurring in PañcaD between nos. 6 and 7 of PañcaG (see synoptical edition below) which do not occur in T 222.

The Tibetan translation in the Peking Edition of the Bka'-gyur, Śer-phyin űi 1aff. (ed. SUZUKI, vol. 18), which I also consulted in connection with the above-mentioned thesis, seems to be a continuation of the PañcaG tradition, with more expansions. In the beginning passage it closely follows this tradition, but mentions three more *bodhisattva* qualities (one between nos. 6 and 7 of the PañcaG series, two between 51 and 52). Of the translation in the Bstan-'gyur, Śer-phyin ga 2b2ff., in the same edition (ed. SUZUKI, vol. 88) only the first three folios were consulted. They reflect the shorter PañcaD redaction including the one expansion on the high number of *bodhisattvas* (ga 2b8, absent in űi 2a3). Of the *bodhisattva* qualities not mentioned in PañcaD it includes one, viz. no. 62 of the PañcaG series (ga 3b4). Moreover, it contains two clauses which can only be found in PañcaG, not in PañcaD: about Ānanda as the one exception of the *bhikṣus* who was still no *arhat* (ga 2b6f., PañcaG f. 1a3f.) and about Yaśodharā and Mahāprajāpatī as leading the assembly of nuns (ga 2b7, PañcaG f. 1a4).

II. EDITION OF THE PAÑCAG PASSAGE¹³

<f. 1a1> om namaḥ sarvajñāya evaṃ may[ā] śrutam ekasamaye
bha[gavān rājagṛhe viharati sma grḍhrakūṭa¹⁴pa]rvat[e mahatā
bhikṣusamḡhena sārḍhaṃ paṃca]=

¹³ Where the facsimile is difficult to read, or where it is evident that the text was carelessly copied (in II 51, 54, 60, and 62), brackets, [. . .], are used. They enclose what is suggested by parts of the word, PañcaD, ŚataGh and/or űi. By parentheses, (. . .), the two series of compounds (I and II) and the place of a compound belonging to them (1, 2, 3, etc.) are indicated.

¹⁴ Here I follow ŚataGh, p. 2,9 (cf. *ekapudgalaṃ* in PañcaG, f. 1a3–4 and ŚataGh, p. 4,1), not PañcaD, p. 4,2 °*kūṭe parvate*.

(I)

<2> mātair bhikṣusahasraiḥ sarvai[r (1) a]rhadbhiḥ (2) kṣīṇāsra-vair (3) niṣkleśair (4) vaśībhūtai[h] (5) suvimukta[cittai]h (6) su[vimuktaprajñair (7) ājāney]air (8) mahānāgaiḥ (9) kṛtakṛty[aiḥ (10) kṛtakaraṇī] =

<3> yair (11) apahr̥tabhārair (12) anuprāptasvakārthaiḥ (13) parikṣīṇabhavasamyojanaiḥ (14) samyagājñāsuvimuktacittaiḥ (15) sarvacetovaśitāparamapāramiprāptair ekapu =

<4> dgalaṃ sthāpayitvā yad utāyuṣmantam ānandam* śaikṣaṃ srotāpannaṃ pañcamātraiś ca-r-bhikṣuṇīśatair yaśodharāmahāprajāpatīpramukhaiḥ sambahulaś copā =

<5> [sa]kair upāsikābhiś ca sarvair dr̥ṣṭadharmabhiḥ mahatā ca bodhisat[tvasa]ṃghena sā[r̥dha]ṃ aprameyāsaṃkhyeyair =

(II)

bodhisattvair mahāsattvaiḥ sarvair (1) dhāraṇīpra =

<6> [ti]labdhaiḥ (2) samādhipratilabdhaiḥ (3) śūnyatāvihāribhir (4) ānimittagocarair (5) aka[lpi]tapraṇidhānaiḥ (6) sarvadharmasamatākṣāntipratilabdhaiḥ (7) asaṅgapraṇidhāna =

<7> [sa]manvāgataiḥ (8) akṣayanirdeśapratisaṃvinnayapratividdhair (9) mahābhiññāvikrīḍitair (10) atyantācyutābhijñaiḥ (11) ādeyavacanair (12) akuśidair (13) ārabdhavīryaiḥ

<8> (14) kāyajīvitānirapekṣair (15) akuhakair (16) alapakair (17) apagatajñātilābhacittaiḥ (18) nirāmiṣadharmadeśakaiḥ (19) gambhīradharmakṣāntiparamagatīṃgataiḥ (20) mahāvaiśāradya =

<9> prāptaiḥ (21) asaṃkucitamānasaiḥ (22) sarvamārakarmasamatikrāntaiḥ (23) karmāvaraṇapratiprasrabdhaiḥ (24) nihatakarmakleśapratyarthikaiḥ (25) sarvaprapravādyanabhi =

<f. 1b1> [bhūtaiḥ] (26) [sarvaśrāvaka]pratye[kabuddhadu[ravag]ā-hair (27) dharmapracicaya vibhaktinirdeśakuśalaiḥ (28) asaṃkhye-yakalpasusamārabdhapraṇidhānaiḥ (29) smitamukhaiḥ (30) pūrvā-lāpibhiḥ

<2> (31) [vyapagata]bhṛkuṭikaiḥ¹⁵ (32) ślakṣṇamadhuvacanaiḥ (33) gāthābhigītapaṇālapanakuśalaiḥ (34) anācchedyapratibhānair (35) anantapaṇṣadabhibhavanair (36) vaiśāradyasamanvāgatair (37) anantakalpa =

<3> [k]oṭīnirdeśajñānaniḥsaraṇakuśalaiḥ (38) māyāmaṛcidagacandrasvapnapratīśrutka¹⁶prati[bh]ā[s]agaganagandharvanagarapratibimbanirmāṇopamadharmādhimu =

¹⁵ Cf. ŚataGh, p. 5.6. PañcaD, p. 4.13: *vigatabhṛkuṭīmukhair*.

¹⁶ Sic! Cf. *pratiśrutkā* in f. 1b7. PañcaD, p. 4.15: *pratiśrutkā*.

- <4> [cyamānair¹⁷] (39) asaṃlīnacittaiḥ (40) sarvasatvacittagati-
 sūkṣmajñānacaryādhimuktyavatārakuśalaiḥ (41) sarvasatvāprati-
 hatacittair (42) adhimātrakṣāntisamanvāgataiḥ (43) sarva =
 <5> [dha]rmatāprativedhajñānakuśalair (44) gaṃbhīradharmatā-
 duravagāhaiḥ (45) svacittavaśitāpratilabdhaiḥ (46) sarva[dharma]-
 vaśitāprāptaiḥ (47) sarvakarmakleśadrṣṭyāvaraṇavimu =
 <6> ktaiḥ (48) pratītya¹⁸nirdeśakuśalair (49) gaṃbhīrapratītya-
 samutpādākṣayanayāvatīrṇaiḥ (50) sarvadrṣṭyanuśayaparyutthāna-
 vigataiḥ (51) sarvasaṃyojana[pra]hīnai[h] (52) satya =
 <7> prativedhajñānakuśalaiḥ (53) satatasamitapratīśrutkāsa-
 sarvadharmādhimuktaiḥ (54) apramāṇadharmanayanirdeśaviśāra-
 d[ai]r (55) ya¹⁹thātmyāvatāraṇakuśalair (56) anantabuddhakṣetra-
 vyū =
 <8> hapraṇidhānaprasthānapariḡhītair (57) asaṃkhyeyalokadhātu-
 gatabuddhānusmṛtisamādhisatatasamitamābhīmukhībhūtaiḥ (58)
 sarvabuddhotpāḍopasaṃkramaṇakuśalair (59) aparimi =
 <9> tabuddhādhyeṣaṇakuśalair (60) nānādrṣṭiparyutthānasatva-
 kleśapraśamanakuśalai[h] (61) samādhisatasahasrābhinirhāra[vi]krīḍ-
 aṇajñānapraveśakuśalair (62) aparyantakalp[ā]kṣīṇagu =
 <10> ṇavarṇasamanvāgata[ih] tad yathā bhadrapālena (...)

III. SYNOPTIC EDITION²⁰

G	<f. 1a1>	evaṃ	mayā	śrutam	ekasamaye		bhagavān	rājagṛhe
D	<p. 4,1>	evaṃ	mayā	śrutam	ekasmin	samaye	bhagavān	rājagṛhe
K	<5>	x	x	x	x	x	x	x x
M	<6>	x		x	x	x	x	x x
F	<5>	x		x	x	x	x	x x

¹⁷ Cf. GV 369,16+21. PañcaD 4,14–5,1 and Śata 5,9: *adhimuktaiḥ*, ñi 2b4: *khōñ du chud pa*, ga 3a7: *mos pa*.

¹⁸ Two *akṣaras* have been made illegible here. *rtogs par* in ñi 2b7 might be a translation of these syllables. ŚataGh 5,13f.: *pratītyanirdeśakuśalair*. See below.

¹⁹ Sic! *yathātmya* is registered in BHSD, with only one reference: *yathāt-myāvatārakuśala* in Mvy 858.

²⁰ G = the above edition of PañcaG, D = PañcaD (compared with Add. Ms. 1628 University Library, Cambridge), K = Kumārajīva, T 223, p. 217a, M = *Mokṣala, T 221, p. 1a, F = Fa-hu/*Dharmarakṣa, T 222, p. 147a; x = the Sanskrit word straight above is represented by one or more Chinese characters. – The first three words of the above edition, and all brackets and notes have been removed; *hr* in II 10/17 and *mm* in II 57 have been reduced to *r* and *m*, respectively; *ca-r-bhi-* in f. 1a4 is now *ca bhi-*. At other places the Sandhi has not been adjusted. It is regular in the sense that final *r* never appears before surds, though final *h* is not always replaced by *r* before sonants.

G	viharati sma	gr̥dhrakūṭaparvate	mahatā bhikṣusaṃghena
D	viharati sma <2>	gr̥dhrakūṭe	parvate mahatā bhikṣusaṃghena
K	x	x x	x <6> x x
M	x	x x	x <7> x x
F	x	x x	x <6> x x

G	sārdhaṃ pañca <2>	mātrair bhikṣusahasraiḥ sarvair
D	sārdhaṃ pañcamātrair	bhikṣusahasraiḥ sarvair
K	x x x	x x
M	x x x	x x
F	x x x	x x

(I)

G	(1) arhadbhiḥ (2) kṣīṇāsraṇair (3) niṣ-	-kleśair
D	arhadbhiḥ <3> kṣīṇāsraṇair	niṣ-
K	x <7> x x	x x
M	x x x <8> x	x
F	x x x	x <7> x

G	(4) vaśībhūtaiḥ (5) suvimuktacittaiḥ
D	vaśībhūtaiḥ suvimuktacittaiḥ
K	x x x
M	x x
F	x x x x

G	(6) suvimuktaprajñair (7) ājāneyair (8) mahānāgaiḥ
D	suvimuktaprajñair ājāneyai <4> r mahānāgaiḥ
K	x x x <8> x x x
M	x x x?
F	x x x? <8> x?

G	(9) kṛtakṛtyaiḥ (10) kṛtakaraṇī <3> yair
D	kṛtakṛtyaiḥ kṛtakaraṇīyair
K	x x
M	x x
F	x x x x

G	(11) apahr̥tabhārair (12) anuprāptasvakārthaiḥ
D	apahr̥tabhārair anuprāptasvakārthaiḥ
K	x x <9> x x x
M	<9> x x x x
F	x <9> x x x x

G	(13) parikṣīṇabhavasamyojanaiḥ (14) samyagājñāsuvimuktacittaiḥ
D	parikṣīṇa <5> bhavasamyojanaiḥ samyagājñāsuvimuktacittaiḥ
K	x x x x x
M	x (three dhātus) x x x
F	x x? x (samatā?) x

G (15) sarva- -ceto- -vaśitāparamapāramiprāptair
 D sarva- -ceto- -vaśi- -paramapāramitāpraptaiḥ
 F x <10> x <9> x <10> x x x

G ekapu <4> dgalaṃ sthāpayitvā yad utāyusmantam ānandam
 K x x
 F x x x x x

G śaikṣaṃ srotāpannam pañcamātraiś ca bhikṣuṇīśatair
 D <6> pañcamātrair bhikṣuṇīśatair
 K x x x x x x <11>
 M <10> x x x
 F x x <11> x x²¹ x x x

G yaśodharāmahāprajāpatīpramukhaiḥ sambahulaiś

G copā <5> sakair upāsikābhiś ca sarvair dṛṣṭadharmabhiḥ
 D upāsakair upāsikābhiś ca sārddhaṃ sarvair dṛṣṭadharmair
 K x x x x x (-satyair)
 M x x
 F x x x <12> x x?

G mahatā ca bodhisattvasaṃghena
 D apari <7> māṇaiś ca bodhisattvakoṭīniyutaśatasahasraiḥ

G sārddhaṃ aprameyāsaṃkhyeyair bodhisattvair mahāsattvair sarvair
 D sārddhaṃ sarvair
 K x <12> x x
 M x <11> x
 F x x

(II)

G (1) dhāraṇīpra <6> tilabdhaiḥ (2) samādhipratilabdhaiḥ
 D dhāraṇīpratilabdhaiḥ
 K x x x
 M x x x
 F x x x x

²¹ In l. 11, after the number 500, again (cf. a6: 5000 *bhikṣus*) a transliteration of the term *bhikṣu* appears. Then follow, but not directly connected with the number 500, transliterations of the terms *bhikṣuṇī*, *upāsaka* and *upāsikā*.

G (3)	śūnyatāvihāribhir	(4) ānimittagocarair	(5) akalpitapraṇidhānaiḥ
D <8>	śūnyatāvihāribhir	ānimittagocaraiḥ ²²	praṇidhānākālpitaiḥ
K	x	x	xx
M	x	x	x
F <13>	x	x	xx

G (6)	sarvadharmaśāntipratilabdhaiḥ
D	śāntisamatāprati <9> labdhair
K	<13> (śānti)x
M	<12> (śānti)x
F	<14> (śānti) <13> x <14>

G (7)	asaṅgapraṇidhāna <7> samanvāgataiḥ
D	asaṅgadhāraṇīpratilabdhaiḥ
K	xx x x
M	xx x ²³ x

G (8)	akṣayanirdeśapratisaṃvinnayapratividdhair
F	(ananta?) x(?) x(?)

G (9) mahābhijñāvikrīḍitair

G (10)	atyantācyutābhijñair	(11) ādeyavacanair	(12) akusīdair
D	acyutābhijñair	ādeyavacanair	
K	(pañca-) x <14>	x x	xx
M	(pañca-) x <13>	x x	xx
F	(pañca-) x	x x	xx

G (13)	ārabdhavīryaiḥ <8>	(14) kāyajīvitānirapekṣair	(15) akuhakair
D			akuhakair

G (16)	alapakair
D	alapakair

G (17)	apagatajñātilābhacittaiḥ	(18)	nirāmiśadharmadeśakaiḥ
D	apagata <10> jñātralābhacittair		nirāmiśadharmadeśakair
K	x (jñātra)x <15>	x	x <14> x x <15>
M	x x	x	x x
F <15>	x (jñāti)x x	x x	x x x

G (19)	gambhīradharmakṣāntiparamagatimṅgataiḥ
D	gambhīradharmakṣāntipāragatair ²⁴
K	x x x x
M <14>	x x x (having seized)
F <16>	x x x(?) x

²² PañcaD: *animitta*°, Add. Ms. 1628: *ānimitta*° (f. 9a6). This term occurs as an adjective and as a substantive. That the initial *a* generally is lengthened could perhaps be explained by assuming it originally functioned mainly as an abstract noun (cf. *kauśala* as an abstract noun of *kuśala*). Rhythm might also have played a role.

²³ *dhāraṇīmukha*.

²⁴ PañcaD: °*pāraṅgatair*, Add. Ms. 1628: °*pāragatair* (f. 9a7).

G (20)	mahāvaiśāradya <9> prāptaiḥ			(21)	asaṃkucitamānasaiḥ		
D	vaiśāradya <11> prāptair						
K	x (-bala-) x						
M <14>	(vīryabalaprāptair)						
F <16>	(vaiśāradyaprāptair)						
G (22)	sarvamāraḥkarmasamatikrāntaiḥ			(23)	karmāvaraṇapratiprasrabdhaiḥ		
D	māraḥkarmasamatikrāntaiḥ				karmāvaraṇapratiprasrabdhair ²⁵		
K <16>	x	x	x		x	x	x
M	x	x	x				
F <17>	x	x	x		x		x
G (24)	niḥataḥkarmakleśapratyarthikaiḥ			(25)	sarvaparapravādyanabhi- <f. 1b1>		
G	bhūtaiḥ			(26)	sarvaśrāvakaḥpratyekabuddhaduravagāhaiḥ		
G (27)	dharmapṛavicayavibhaktinirdeśakuśalaiḥ						
D	dharmapṛavicayavibhakti <12>				nirdeśakuśalair		
K	(hetupratyayadharmas ²⁶ nirdeśakuśalair)						
F	(hetupratyayanirdeśakair)						
G (28)	asaṃkhyeyakalpasusamārabdhapraṇidhānaiḥ						
D	asaṃkhyeyakalpapraṇidhānasusamārabdhaiḥ						
K	x <17>	x	x		x		
M <15>	xx	x	x?		x x		
F	xx	x	x		x		
G (29)	smitamukhaiḥ			(30)	pūrvālāpibhiḥ <2>		
D	smitamukhaiḥ				pūrvālāpibhi <13> r		
K	x	x			x x		
M	x	<16>			x x		
F <18>	x	x			x x		
G (31)	vyapagatabhṛṇkuṭikaiḥ ²⁷			(32)	ślakṣṇamadhuvacanaiḥ		
D	vigatabhṛṇkuṭimukhair						
K	<18>				(not coarse)	x	
M					(not coarse)	x	
F <19>	x	x(?)					
G (33)	gāthābhigītāparāḥkarmakleśakuśalaiḥ						
D	gāthābhigītāparāḥkarmakleśakuśalair				apagatalīnacittair		
G (34)	anācchedyapratibhānair						
D	anācchedyapratibhānair				<14> bhānair		
G (35)	anantapaṇḍitadabhibhavanair			(36)	vaiśāradyasamanvāgatair		
D	anantapaṇḍitadabhibhavana-				-vaiśāradyasamanvāgatair		
K	(in a large assembly having no fear)						
M	(in a large assembly, what he thinks [remains] complete)						
F	(anantapaṇḍitadabhibhavana <20> -				-vaiśāradyasamanvāgatair)		

²⁵ PañcaD: °bdhaiḥ, Add. Ms. 1628: °bdhair (f. 9a7).

²⁶ T 1509, p. 100b12: The *dharma* of the origination of 12 *hetus* and *pratyayas*, i.e. the *dharma* of the twelvefold [chain of] dependent origination. Traité, p. 349: *pratītyasamutpannadharma*.

²⁷ Cf. ŚataGh, p. 5,6.

G (37)	anantakaipa <3>	koṭīnirdeśajñānanihsaraṇakuśalaiḥ
D	anantakalpakoṭī-	-nihsaraṇakuśalair
K	x x <19> x x	x x x
M <17>	x x x	(able to transform by instruction)
F	x x x x	(remembering affairs of . . .)

G (38)	māyāmarīcidagacandrasvapnapraṭiśrutkapratibhāsa-	gagana-
D	māyāmarīcidakacandrasvapnapraṭiśrutkāpratibhāsa-	
K	x x x x <20> x x	x <21> (chāyā) <20> x
M	x <19> x x x <17> x <18> x	x ²⁸
F <21>	x x x x x	x ²⁹

G	-gandharvanagara	pratibimbanirmāṇopamadharmādhimu <4>	cyamānair
D		-pratibimbanirmāṇopamadharmā <5,1>	dhimuktaiḥ
K x	<21>	x x x <19> x	(understanding)
M		x x ³⁰ x <19> x	(apprehending)
F		x x <20> x	(speaking of)

G (39)	asaṃlīnacittaiḥ (40)	sarvasatvacittagatisūkṣmajñānacaryādhimukty-
D		satva ³¹ - gaticaritasūkṣmanānādhimukty-
K <21>	x ³² <22>	x x x x (sūkṣmajñānamukty)
M	<20>	x x x x (sūkṣmajñānamukty)
F <22>	(brave without companions)	x x x x (sūkṣmajñāna)

G	-avatārakuśalaiḥ
D	-avatārakuśalair
K	x x
M	x x

G (41)	sarvasatvāpratihatacittair (42)	adhimātrakṣāntisamanvāgataiḥ
D	apratihatacittai <2> r	adhimātrakṣāntisamanvāgatair
K	xx <23> <22> x <23>	x x x
M <21>	xx x	x x x
F <23>	xx x	x x

G (43)	sarva <5>	dharmatāprativedhajñānakuśalair (44)	gaṃbhīradharma-
G	tāduravagāhaiḥ (45)	svacittavaśitāpratilabdhaiḥ (46)	sarvadharmavaśi-
G	tāprāptaiḥ (47)	sarvakarmakleśadrṣṭyāvaraṇavimu <6>	ktaiḥ (48) pratī-
G	ya...nirdeśakuśalair (49)	gaṃbhīrapratītyasamutpādākṣayanayāvatiṇaiḥ	
G (50)	sarvadrṣṭyanuśayaparyutthānavigataiḥ (51)	sarvasaṃyojanaprahī-	
G	naiḥ (52) satya <7>	prativedhajñānakuśalaiḥ (53)	satatasamitapratīśrut-
G	kāsamasarvadharmādhimuktaiḥ (54)	apramāṇadharmanayanirdeśaviśā-	radair

²⁸ *pratibhāsa + chāyā*.

²⁹ Perhaps: *chāyā + pratiśrutkā*.

³⁰ *nirmāna + budbuda*.

³¹ PañcaD: *sattva*°, Add. Ms. 1628: *satva*° (f. 9a9).

³² Traité, p. 387: *asaṅgavaiśāradyapratilabdhaiḥ*.

G (55)	yathātmyāvātāraṇakuśalair	(56)	anantabuddhakṣetravyū <8> ha-
D	yāthātmyāvātāraṇakuśalaiḥ	sarvabuddhakṣetrānantavyūha <3> -	
K	x	x	x (ananta) x x
M	x	x	<22> (ananta) x x
F	x	x	<24> x x x x

G	-praṇidhānaprasthānapariṅhītair	(57)	asaṃkhyeyalokadhātugata-
D	-praṇidhānaprasthānapariṅhītair	asaṃkhyeyalokadhātu-	
K	x	x	<24> xx x x
M	x <21>	x	<22> xx
F	x	x	<25> xx x x

G	-buddhānusmṛtisamādhisatatasamitamabhimukhībhūtair	
D	-buddhānusmṛtisamāhita <4> satatasamitābhimukhībhūtair	
K	x x x x x	
M	x x x x	
F	x ³³ x x x	

G (58) sarvabuddhotpādopasaṃkramaṇakuśalair

G (59)	aparimi <9> tabuddhādhyeṣaṇakuśalair
D	aparimitabuddhādhyeṣaṇakuśalair
K	<25> xx x x <24> x <25>
M	<23> x x x
F	<26> xx x x <25> x <26>

G (60)	nānādr̥ṣṭiparyutthānasatvakleśaprasāmanakuśalaiḥ
D	nānādr̥ṣṭyanuśayaparyava <5> sthānakleśaprasāmanakuśalaiḥ
K	x x x x x x
M	x x x x x
F	x x ? ? ? x x

G (61)	samādhisatasahasrābhīnirhāravikrīḍaṇajñānapraveśakuśalair
D	samādhivikrīḍitaśatasahasranirhārakuśalaiḥ
K	<26> x x x x x <24> x <26>
M	<24> x x x x x
F	<27> x x x x x

G (62)	aparyantakalpākṣīṇagu <10> ṇavarṇasamanvāgataiḥ
K	xx <27> x x

G	tad yathā	bhadrapālena ...
D	tad yathā <6>	bhadrapālena ...
K	x	x x
M	<25> x	x? x
F	x <c1>	x x?

³³ F might have read: °buddhalokadhātu°.

IV. SYNOPTIC CHART OF THE ATTRIBUTES OF
(I) MONKS AND (II) BODHISATTVAS

(in different versions of Pañca, Śata, Ad, Daśa and Aṣṭa)

In the first column the numbers appear which were added to the attributes in the above edition of the passage in PañcaG (here: Gi). Other abbreviations employed in this chart are:

- Gh = ŚataGh (page, line)
 H1 = T 220 (1) [vol.5], p. 1b6-c16³⁴
 H3 = T 220 (3) [vol.7], p. 427b6-c14
 Ko = DaśaK, p. 93 (line)
 Du = PañcaD (page, line)
 H2 = T 220 (2) [vol.7], p. 1b5-c3
 23 = T 223 [vol.8], p. 217a (line)³⁵
 21 = T 221 [vol.8], p. 1a
 22 = T 222 [vol.8], p. 147a
 # = substantial variant of Gi.

The attributes of the first series can also be found in Mvy 1075–1088 (except *arhat*) / MvyN 1078–1091.

As to the attributes of the second series cf. Mvy 811, 813, 814, 817–820, 831, 834, 838–863 / MvyN 813, 815, 816, 819–821, 833, 836, 840–865.

³⁴ In series II, H1 and H3 considerably deviate from the order given in Gi. H1: ... 10, 9, 11, 13, 12, 17, 14, 15, 16, 18, ... 26, 45, 46, ... 52, 28, 29, ... 39, 54, 40, 41, 43, 44, 55, 48 (the second time!), 56 ... H3: ... 11, 13, 12, 17, 14, 15, 16, 18, ... 22, 24, 23, 25, 26, 46, 45, 47, ... 52, 28, 29, ... 38, 54, 39, 40, x, 42, 55, 56, ... H1 and H3 also differ somewhat in their order. The terminological differences between them, and also H2, lead one to suspect that in this case Hsüan-tsang did little or nothing to coordinate the different teams of translators he had to direct.

³⁵ T. 223 corresponds with T. 1509 [vol.25], p. 80b3 (I 1), 80b8 (2), 80b10 (3), 80b12 (5–6), 81c29 (7), 81b13 (8), 81b28 (9), 81c19 (11), 82a8 (12), 82a23 (13) and 82b16 (14), 95c2–3 (II 1–3, 6), 97c5 (cf. ñi 2a4), 97c21 (10), 98b11 (11), 98b20 (12), 98b26 (17), 98c13 (18), 99a3 (19), 99a25 (20), 99b11 (22), 100a9 (23), 100b12 (27), 100c11 (28), 100c20 (29,30,32), 101a6 (35, 36), 101a28 (37), 101c8f. (38), 105c19 (39), 106a10 (40), 106b10 (41), 106c16 (42), 107a17 (55), 108a25 (56), 108c21 (57), 109b6 (59), 110a11 (60), 110b22 (61). Cf. Traité, p. 198–427.

(I)³⁶

Gi	ñi	Gh	H1	H3	ga	Ko	Du	H2	23	21	22
1	1a5	3,1	b6	b6	2b3	3	4,2	b5	6	7	6
2	1a5	3,1	b6	b6	2b4	3	4,3	b5	7	7	6
3	1a6	3,1	b7	b7	2b4	3	4,3	b6	7	8	6
4	1a6	3,1	b7	b7	2b4	3	4,3	b6		8	7
5	1a6	3,1	b7	b7	2b4	3	4,3	b6	7		7
6	1a6	3,2	b7	b7	2b4	4	4,3	b6	7		7
7	1a7	3,2	b8	b8	2b4	4	4,3	b6	8	8?	7?
8	1a7	3,2	b8	b8	2b4	4	4,4	b7	8	8	8?
9	1a7	3,2	b8	b8	2b5	4	4,4	b7	8	8	8
10	1a7	3,2	b8	b8	2b5	4	4,4	b7			8
11	1a7	3,3	b9	b8	2b5	5	4,4	b7	8	9	8
12	1a8	3,3	b9	b9	2b5	5	4,4	b8	9	9	9
13	1a8	3,3	b9	b9	2b5	5	4,4	b8	9	9	9#
14	1a8	3,3	b9	b9	2b5	6	4,5	b8	9	9	9
15	1a8	4,1	b10	b9	2b6	6	4,5	b8			9

(II)

Gi	ñi	Gh	H1	H3	ga	Ko	Du	H2	23	21	22
1	2a3	4,5#	b14	b14	2b8	10	4,7	b13	12	11	12
2	2a3		b14	b15	2b8	10		b13	12	11	12
3	2a3	5#	b15	b15	3a1	11	8	b14	12#	11	13
4	2a3	6	b15	b15	3a1	11	8	b14		11	13
5	2a3	6	b15	b15	3a1	11	8	b14		11	13
6	2a4 2a4	6	b15	b16	3a1 3a2	11	8 9	b14	13 13	12 12	13

³⁶ Series I can also be found in T 226 [vol. 8], p. 508b20–23 (without nos. 4, 10, 12, and 15), T 227 [vol. 8], p. 537a24–26 (without nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 10), T 228 [vol. 8], p. 587a8–11 (without nos. 7, 10 and 15 [what appears in the last place corresponds with no. 4]), T 220 (4) [vol. 7], p. 763b6–10 (complete), and AṣṭaV, p. 1,5–6 and p. 230,2–4 (complete), p. 69,15f. and p. 71,24f. (nos. 11–15); furthermore, Samādhiraṇṇa, p. 44,17–19 (complete); cf. L'Enseignement de Vimalakīrti, traduit et annoté par É. LAMOTTE, Louvain-Leuven 1962, p. 97f. – A complete series I + *abhijñānābhijñānāir mahāśrāvakaīḥ* can be found in SP, p. 1,7–12 (and KP II, p. 1,6–2,1). However, T 262 [vol. 9], p. 1c17–19 only mentions nos. 1, 2, 3, 12, 13, 4/15, T 263, p. 63a6–8 no. 1 ('without attachment') and nos. 2, 3, 4, 12, 13, 15, and T 264, p. 135a1f. nos. 1, 2, 3, 12, 13, 4/15.

Gi	ñi	Gh	H1	H3	ga	Ko	Du	H2	23	21	22
7	2a4#	7#	b16#	b16#		12#		b15#			
8	2a4	7	b16	b16							
9	2a5	8	b17	b17							
10	2a5	4,9	b17	b17	3a2	12#	4,9	b15	13#	12#	14#
11	2a5	9	b18	b18	3a2	13	9	b15	14	13	14
12	2a6	9	b18	b18				b16	14	13	14
13	2a6	9	b18	b18				b16 ³⁷			
14	2a6	9	b19	b19							
15	2a6	1	b19	b19	3a2	13	9	b17			
16	2a6	1	b19	b19	3a3		9	b17			
17	2a6	1	b18	b18	3a3	13#	9		14	13	15
18	2a6	1	b19	b19	3a3	13	10	b16	14	13	15
19	2a7	1	b20	b20	3a3	14	10	b17	15	14	16
20	2a7	5,2	b20	b20	3a3	14	4,10	b17	15	14	16
21	2a7	2	b21	b21							
22	2a7	2	b21	b21	3a4	15	11	b18	15	14	16
23	2a7	3	b21	b22	3a4	15#	11	b18	16	14?	
24	2a8	3	b21	b21							
25	2a8	3	b22	b22							
26	2a8	4	b22	b22							
27	2b1	4			3a4	15#	11	b18	16#		17
28	2b1	5	b26	b26	3a4	16	12	b19	16	15	17
29	2b1	6#	b26	b26	3a5	16	12	b19	17	15	18
30	2b2	5,5	b26	b26	3a5	16	4,12	b19	17	16	18
31	2b2	5	b26	b26	3a5	17	13	b19			
32	2b2	6	c1	b26				b20	18	16	
33	2b2	6	c1	c4	3a5 3a5		13 13				
34	2b2	6	c1	b27	3a6		13	b20			
35	2b2	7	c1	b27	3a6	17	14	b20	18	16	19
36	2b2	7	c2	c1	3a6	17	14	b20	18	16	20
37	2b3	7	c2	c1	3a6	18	14	b21	18	17	20#
38	2b3	8	c3	c1	3a7	18	15	b22	19	17	20
39	2b4	5,9	c5	c4		20#		b24	21#		22
40	2b4	10	c6	c5	3a7#	20	5,1	b25	21	19	22
41	2b5	11	c7		3a8	21	1	b25	22	21	23
42	2b5	11	c8	c6	3a8	21	2	b26	23	21	23
43	2b5	11	c8								

³⁷ 13 precedes 12.

Gi	ñi	Gh	H1	H3	ga	Ko	Du	H2	23	21	22
44	2b6	12	c9								
45	2b6	12	b23	b23							
46	2b6	13	b23	b23							
47	2b6	13	b23	b23							
48	2b7	13	24 ³⁸	b24							
49	2b7	5,14	b24	b24							
50	2b7	14	b25	b25							
51	2b8 2b8 2b8	15	b25	b25							
52	2b8	15	b25	b25							
53	3a1	15									
54	3a1	16	c6	c4							
55	3a1	16	c9	c7	3b1	22	5,2	b26	23	21	24
56	3a2	16	c10	c7	3b1	22#	2	b26	23	21	24
57	3a2	6,1	c11	c7	3b1	23	5,3	b27	24	22	25
58	3a3	2	c12	c8							
59	3a3	2	c12	c9	3b2	24	4	c1	24	23	25
60	3a3	2	c13	c10	3b3	24	4	c2	25	23	26
61	3a4	3	c14	c11	3b3	25	5	c2	25	24	27
62	3a4	4	c14	c12	3b4			c3			

V. COMPOUND-ANALYSIS

As the preceding synoptic edition and chart show, the compounds in the passage grew in length and number. We can now focus on the question of what kind the compounds in the PañcaG passage are. The combination of words which could have a separate place in a sentence is of main concern here. So it seems appropriate to concentrate on what, at that time, could have been an independent part of speech, not on all elements which form a word. But not all compounds of this kind were dissected. Some, e.g. *bodhisattva*, clearly function as one word. The analysis of others, e.g. *nirapekṣa* or *abhimukhībhūta*, would have led to a disproportionately complicated structure in describing a greater compound; which could be taken as an argument that such a combination was felt as an integral word. The compounds not dissected are: *abhimukhībhūta*, *gandharvanagara*, *dakacandra*,

³⁸ Cf. c10.

nirapekṣa, *nirāmiṣa*, *niṣkleśa*³⁹, *pratītyasamutpāda*, *pratyekabuddha*, *buddhakṣetra*, *lokadhātu*, *vaśībhūta*, and *satatasamitam*. Here a hyphen will be added to indicate that the word consists of elements which are able to function as, or to be represented by (e.g. *nis-* by *na*), independent parts of speech: *gandharva-nagara* etc.

We do not need all distinctions of compounds old and modern grammarians have made. Dvigus and Āmreḍitas do not occur, nor what is called irregular combination by WACKERNAGEL⁴⁰ and syntactical compound by DAVANE⁴¹. Depending on the above remarks on integral words Avyayībhāvas need not be registered. Three terms of traditional grammar suffice for a basic distinction of all compounds in the passage:

1. Dvandva (= **D**), copulative compound
2. Tatpuruṣa (= **T**), determinative compound (including Karmadhāraya)
3. Bahuvrīhi (= **B**), possessive compound.

In the below analysis of compounds in both series, added to the translation of the PañcaG passage, I shall put either **D**, or **T** or **B** between two Sanskrit words, thereby indicating that they form either a Dvandva or a Tatpuruṣa or a Bahuvrīhi compound.

Furthermore, I want to indicate to which category of words the two members themselves belong. If the final member of a Tatpuruṣa is an adjective (= **a**) I shall write **Ta**, if it is a substantive (= **s**) **Ts**, and if it is a verbal adjective (= **v**) **Tv**. With the last distinction I follow WACKERNAGEL⁴².

³⁹ *nirāmiṣa* and *niṣkleśa* are exempted from analysis because of their analogy with *nirapekṣa*. On the other hand, combinations with *a(n)-* never cause problems in the PañcaG version. *prañidhānākālpita* of the PañcaD version (see Synoptic Edition II 5), which seems to have a rhythmic motive (cf. Section VIII), would have been problematic. But it was not accepted by the editors of PañcaG.

⁴⁰ W II/1, p. 321–329.

⁴¹ G. V. DAVANE, Nominal Composition in Middle Indo-Aryan, Poona (Deccan College Dissertation Series 11) 1956, p. 33f., 135–139.

⁴² Cf. W II/1, p. 141: “Die Scheidung zwischen Tatpuruṣa im engeren Sinne und Karmadhāraya ist zwar logisch berechtigt, aber für die Genesis und Form der Determinativkomposita ohne Belang. Entscheidend ist vielmehr, ob das Hinterglied ein Verbale ist, dessen Verhältnis zum Vorderglied dem Verhältnis entspricht, worin das zu Grunde liegende Verbum zum Vordergliedsworte steht oder stehen würde, oder ob es ein beliebiges anderes Nomen ist oder auch zwar ein Verbale, aber hinter einem Vorderglied, das nicht als Bestimmung des zu Grunde liegenden Verbs dienen könnte”. The analysis will show 33 verbal adjectives in main compounds which accord with the above definition. Though WACKERNAGEL made the remark only with

With one exception in II 32, where two adjectives are combined⁴³, all Dvandvas are aggregates of substantives and need no further indication either of the final member or of the initial one. The final member of a Bahuvrīhi is always a substantive and also needs no indication. Only substantives occur as the initial member of a Tatpuruṣa in the sense of a dependent compound.

Here I want to give an indication of the case-relation in which very likely – sometimes alternatives are possible – the prior member would stand to the other member if it were an independent part of speech. I use numbers which represent the different noun-cases according to the traditional system: **2** = accusative, **3** = instrumental, dative not occurring, **5** = ablative, **6** = genitive, and **7** = locative. For example, in both series Tatpuruṣas can be found the final member of which is a verbal adjective in *-ta* with an active meaning. If it governs a word, which as an independent part of speech would show the inflection of the accusative case, the compound can be indicated as **2Tv**⁴⁴. Where a case-relation is difficult to determine, the Tibetan translations were consulted, assuming that the translators tried, as much as possible, to represent the different noun-cases⁴⁵ which would appear if the compound were analysed in Sanskrit. However, I always attempted to find a Sanskrit parallel for such a suggestion. One can, e.g., find many passages where *vīharati* or *vihārin*, when meaning '(is) dwelling in a spiritual state' is combined with a substantive in the instrumental case, as suggested by *ñi* and *ga* at II 3 (*śūṇyatāvihāribhir*), contrary to the locative case which is employed, when '(is) living at a certain place' is meant.

A descriptive Tatpuruṣa compound, i.e. Karmadhāraya, could be indicated by the number 0 or 1 before **T**. However, as a former

regard to the final member of Tatpuruṣas, I shall also indicate the verbal adjective that is a prior member in Bahuvrīhis (22 instances, all in main compounds, 9 of them also acting as final member of a subordinate Tatpuruṣa). These compounds, too, can be analysed by a verbal sentence (see VII).

⁴³ In calling this combination of adjectives a Dvandva I follow W II/1, p. 170.

⁴⁴ By its range, this is a striking feature of the passage. Limited to a few verbal adjectives such as *prāpta*, it also occurs in earlier and other streams of Sanskrit and Middle Indo-Aryan literature (allowed by Pāṇini II 1,24); see J. S. SPEYER, *Sanskrit Syntax*, Leiden 1886 (repr. Delhi 1973), p. 157, and W II/1, p. 194f. and 198. As to the possibilities of the verbal adjective in *-ta* see H. BECHERT, *Eine eigentümliche Partizipialkonstruktion*. MSS 10 (1957) 54–58 (with more references).

⁴⁵ Keeping to such patterns as can be found in Mvy 4738–4744 / MvyN 4725–4745.

member more categories of words are employed than only substantives. Instead of OT or IT I register **aT** when the prior member is an adjective, **bT** when it is an adjective in the form of a Bahuvrīhi, **vT** when it is a verbal adjective, **sT** when it is a substantive, **iT** when it is an indeclinable (i.e. an adverb [even if the word is otherwise declinable], a gerund or a particle other than a negative), and **nT** when it is a negative.

As to Bahuvrīhis, initial members are a verbal adjective: **vB**, or an adjective: **aB**, or a substantive: **sB**, or a negative: **nB**. Once (II 60) a substantive in the instrumental case seems to occur: **3B**.

Some relations between words have preference. The words which act as a unit towards their neighbors are sometimes enclosed by <...> brackets. Members of a Dvandva compound always act so and need not be marked in such a way. The same holds for **i/nT** and **i/nB** combinations. An exception can be found in II 53.

Before translating the passage and analysing the compounds in the two series let me briefly focus on the compound *ekasamaye* in the introductory sentence of PañcaG.

Descriptive Tatpuruṣa compounds beginning with *eka-* are old, and allowed by Pāṇ. II 1,49. In them *eka-* has, as registered by MONIER-WILLIAMS, such emphasized meanings as “the only or chief”, “unique”, “eminent”, “single”, “alone”, “one and the same”, etc. *ekasamaya*, however, contains an unemphasized *eka-* coming close to an indefinite article.

That such an *eka-* enters a descriptive compound seems to be a new development of some Buddhist texts registered in SWTF 437 and of PañcaG. Versification of the introductory sentence might have had some influence on this development. In the *Suvarṇaprabhāṣottama-sūtra* (edd. B. NANJIO – H. IDZUMI, Kyoto 1931, p. 1,9f. = ed. J. NOBEL, Leipzig 1937, p. 1,5f.) we read: *śrutam mayaīkasamaye gṛdhrakūṭe tathāgataḥ | vijahāra dharmadhātau gambhīre buddhagocare* //. Though most parts of this Sūtra (including the introduction) are apparently of a much later date than most parts of the Pañca, they need not be later than the PañcaG version and the Turfan fragments indicated. The PañcaD version, reading *ekasmin samaye*, seems to have preserved an older, though not the oldest (see below, n. 48), stage of the expression.

A descriptive compound with *eka-* can also be found in lines 3 and 4 of folio 1a of PañcaG: *ekapudgalam*⁴⁶ *sthāpayitvā*, where AṣṭaV 1,7f.

⁴⁶ So, too, ŚataGh, Pt. I, Fasc. I, p. 4,1.

reads: *ekaṃ pudgalaṃ sthāpayitvā* (no corresponding phrase in PañcaD). But here *eka-* has a stronger meaning.

VI. TRANSLATION OF THE PAÑCAḠ PASSAGE⁴⁷

(together with an analysis of the compounds contained therein)

On the one occasion when I heard the following⁴⁸, the Lord dwelt at Rājagṛha, on mount Ġṛdhrakūṭa, together with a great assembly of monks, 5000 monks, all of whom were⁴⁹

⁴⁷ A translation of the corresponding (shorter) passages in PañcaD and in T 223 can be found in LSC, p. 1 f. and Traité, p. 198–427, respectively.

⁴⁸ Here I literally follow P. HARRISON (PrasH, p. 5) who (in n. 3) suggests that this is an *από κοινού* construction and that *ekasmin samaye* (here: *ekasamaye*) has to be linked both to the verb that precedes it (*śrutam*) and to the one that follows it (*viharati sma*). B. GALLOWAY, in his recent article “Thus Have I Heard: At One Time . . .” (IJ 34 [1991] 87–104), could obviously not yet take into account this idea. For him, there are only two possibilities: “Thus have I heard: at one time the Lord . . .” or “Thus have I heard at one time: the Lord . . .”, of which, for him, the first is the correct one. Indeed, he convincingly shows that A. VON STAEL-HOLSTEIN’s and J. BROUGH’s arguments for their view that only the second alternative is correct are weak. But this does not justify the opinion that the first alternative is the right one at every place. GALLOWAY also convincingly shows that some Indian commentators considered the first alternative as correct. But he has to concede that other Indian commentators regarded both as correct. A solution, apparently, will not come from an either-or-question, but from observing historical developments. As it seems to me, the problem has already substantially been solved by O. VON HINÜBER in his *Studien zur Kasussyntax des Pāli, besonders des Vinaya-Piṭaka* (München 1968), a work which GALLOWAY fails to mention among his many references. According to HINÜBER (p. 84–87) the accusative *ekaṃ samayaṃ* of the Pali texts, indicating some duration, cannot easily be connected with *evaṃ mayā sutam*, while the locative, which appears in many Sanskrit texts, can, in the Avadānas even showing the tendency to be more connected with the former clause than with the following one. I would suggest that the accusative was the older expression and was replaced by the locative in order to repair a long felt shortcoming, viz. that hearing the tenets a text contained was not sufficiently marked as also having happened at the time when the Lord dwelt there and there and met this or that person etc. The translation of HARRISON (who does not discuss the accusative version of the opening) explicates the complexity of the locative indication of time as probably present in the minds of those who used it in Avadānas and a few Sūtras.

⁴⁹ To all attributes of the following series (I) an equivalent can be found in Pāli canonical literature. Only *anupattasaddattha* is problematic: it does not show the intention of contrasting monks to *bodhisattvas* as clearly (cf. CPD s.v.) as *anuprāptasvakārtha* does (*svaka* is not yet represented in T 221; in the late Aṣṭa translation T 228 [p. 587a10] it is replaced by “great” and “good”).

(I)

(1) Arhats (*arhadbhiḥ*), (2) in whom the cankers were extinguished (*kṣīṇa[vB]āsravair*), (3) who were free of the defilements (*niṣ-kleśair*), (4) had become controlled⁵⁰ (*vaśī-bhūtaiḥ*), (5) their minds well freed (*su[iTv]vimukta[vB]cittaiḥ*), (6) their insights well freed (*su[iTv]vimukta[vB]prajñair*)⁵¹, (7) thoroughbreds (*ājāneyair*),

– There are more Pāli attributes of excellent monks than have entered this series, but nowhere are they gathered in such a long list. A smaller Pāli series seems to have the same origin: *arahaṃ khīṇāsavo vusitavā katakaraṇīyo ohitabhāro anupattasattho parikkhīṇabhavasāññojano sammadaññāvimutto* (for passages see CPD s.v. *araha[t]*). Passages where equivalents of other terms in series (I) occur can be found in The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary s.vv. *nikkilesa*, *vaśin*/ī, *cetovimutti*, *paññāvimutta/i*, *ājāniya*, *mahānāga*, *kataicca*, *cetovasippatta*. A smaller Sanskrit series is quoted in SWTF, p. 151a: *arhadbhiḥ kṣīṇāsravaiḥ kṛtakṛtyaiḥ kṛtakaraṇīyaiḥ avahr-tabhārair anuprāptasvākārthai(h) parikṣīṇabhavasamyojanaiḥ samyagājñāyā suvimuktacittair*; cf. Śrāvakabhūmi, ed. K. SHUKLA (Patna 1973), p. 508, l. 5f. (= ed. L. SCHMITHAUSEN [Die letzten Seiten der Śrāvakabhūmi. In: Indological and Buddhist Studies. Volume in Honour of Professor J. W. de Jong. Canberra 1982, p. 457–489], p. 462, § 4 [without *avahr-tabhāra*]).

⁵⁰ This translation depends on my analysis of the word as originally being a compound and seems to be supported by *ñi* and *ga*. I am aware that Harihadrā (AṣṭaV 273.8) considered *vaśībhūta* as consisting of *vaśin* and *bhūta*, and ready to admit that “become possessed of control” (BHSD) correctly conveys the understanding of some commentaries and Tibetan translations. However, here this meaning is not forced upon us. On the contrary, the word is surrounded by expressions avoiding to point to an agent of any activity (no. 15 is the only exception in series I). And when analysed as a compound, *vaśa* (as an adjective) and *bhūta* seem to be the elements, the change of *a* to *ī* indicating becoming. “Having become possessed of control” (BHSD) would either depend on assuming a combination of *vaśin* and *bhūta* in which the meaning of becoming is absent, or presuppose “possessed of control” as a meaning of *vaśa* as an adjective, for which I could not find any convincing evidence. *ñi* 1a6 and *ga* 2b4 translate *vaśībhūta* by *dbañ du gyur pa*. On it H. JÄSCHKE (A Tibetan-English Dictionary, repr. 1949, p. 386b) remarks: “*dbañ-du gyur-pa* seems also sometimes to mean: he who has brought every thing into his power(?)”, by the questionmark indicating his doubt about this scholastic interpretation, because *dbañ du 'gyur ba* normally means “to get into another's power, to be overpowered”. Translators who considered *vaśībhūta* to mean “become possessed of control” clearly said so, by using the words *dbañ dañ ldan par gyur pa* as is the case in e.g. RketuT 5,4 and PraST 1,16.

⁵¹ LSC translates: “well freed and wise” (p. 1), which seems possible. However, the Tibetan translations (*ñi* 1a6 and *ga* 2b4) construe the compound in the same way (*śes rab śin tu rnam par grol ba*) as the preceding *suvimuktacitta* (*sems śin tu rnam par grol ba*), so do T 220 (2) [vol. 7], p. 1b6 and T 223, p. 217a7. Cf. Lañk 255,17: *suvimuktacittaprajñāḥ*. Some of the following qualities have been translated in accordance with LSC.

(8) [like] great elephants⁵² (*mahā[aTs]nāgaiḥ*), (9) their work done (*krta[vB]kṛtyaiḥ*), (10) their task accomplished (*krta[vB]karaṇīyair*), (11) their burden laid down (*apahrta[vB]bhārair*), (12) their own aim obtained (*anuprāpta[vB]svaka[aTs]arthaiḥ*), (13) in whom the fetters [that bound them to] existence were extinguished (*parikṣiṇa-[vB]bhava[6Ts]saṃyojanaiḥ*), (14) their minds well freed by right understanding⁵³ (*saṃyag[iTs]ājñā[3Tv]su[iTv]vimukta[vB]cittaiḥ*), (15) who had obtained the highest perfection in possessing complete control of their heart⁵⁴ (*sarva[aTs]ceto[6Ts]vaśitā[7Ts]*⁵⁵ *parama[aTs]pārami[2Tv]prāptair*)⁵⁶, with the exception of one person, i.e. the venerable Ānanda, who [still] was undergoing training [and only] had entered the stream (*srotāpannam*), [together with] 500 nuns, Yaśodharā, Mahāprajāpatī and others, and many laymen and laywomen who had seen the Dharmas (*drṣṭadharmabhiḥ*)⁵⁷,

⁵² Cf. ñi 1a7 and ga 2b4: *glañ po chen po*. Most of the Chinese translations which have this item, e.g. T 220 (2), p. 1b7, employ the character for dragon. So “Great Serpents” (LSC, p. 1) would be justified. T 1509, p. 81b15 (Traitē, p. 212) mentions both possibilities.

⁵³ ñi 1a8 deviates from the translation of this compound as it is given in Mvy 1087 / MvyN 1090 (*yañ dag pa'i śes pas ...*) by saying: *bka' yañ dag pas ...* (cf. Mvy 1116 / MvyN 1119); ga 2b5: *yañ dag par kun śes pas ...* (cf. Lhasa Kanjur, vol. 33, p. 2b2).

⁵⁴ ñi 2a1 and ga 2b6 (*sems kyi dbaṅ thams cad la ...*; cf. Mvy 1088 / MvyN 1091: *sems kyi dbaṅ thams cad kyi ...*) connect *sarva*^o with *vaśitā*, not with *cetas* (as LSC, p. 83 does by saying: “in perfect control of their whole minds”). Instead of the 6Ts relation between *cetas* and *vaśitā*, 7Ts also seems possible (cf. BHSD s.v. *vaśitā*, a quotation from the Mahavāstu: *citte vaśī ...*).

⁵⁵ As to the 7Ts relation, cf. SR, p. 286,16: *ṛddhiprātihārye paramapāramiprāpto bhavati*.

⁵⁶ ŚataGh 4,1 and PañcaD 4,5 have instead: *sarvacetovaśiparamapāramitāprāptaiḥ*; in O. von HINÜBER's Sieben Goldblätter (s. n. 5) one reads (p. 193 = 7 [a2]): *sarvacetovaśiparamapāramiprāptaiḥ*.

⁵⁷ T 223, p. 217a11 (cf. T 1509, p. 84a29, b5–7), 220 (1), p. 1b13 and 220 (2), p. 1b12: “who had realized the [four] noble truths” (implying: but had not yet ‘destroyed all cankers by *bhāvanā*). Less seems to be claimed in PañcaD 4,6 and T 222 (3), p. 427b13: “who had realized the Dharmas”. This might correspond with AṣṭaV, p. 139,27 (*ṣaṣṭeś copāsakaśatānām virājo vīgatamalaṃ dharmesū dharmacakṣur viśuddhaṃ trīṃśateś copāsikānām*) and mean: “who had realized that all Dharmas, having come into existence by causes and conditions, will necessarily be destroyed”. *drṣṭadharmabhiḥ* (also in ŚataGh 4,4) need not signify another thing than *drṣṭadharmaiḥ* (cf. W II/1, p. 94). In AṣṭaV, p. 255,20–22 the *dharmacakṣu* is mentioned as the result of a special teaching which originated in a third group of living beings; the first group got the *anutpattikadharmakṣānti* and the second got, for the first time,

and together with a great assembly of Bodhisattvas, immeasurable, innumerable Bodhisattvas, great beings, all of whom

(II)

(1) had acquired the Dhāraṇīs (*dhāraṇī*[2Tv]pratilabdhaiḥ)⁵⁸, (2) had acquired the Samādhis (*samādhi*[2Tv]pratilabdhaiḥ), (3) were diverting themselves with emptiness⁵⁹ (*sūnyatā*[3Tv]vihāribhir)⁶⁰, (4) had the transphenomenal as their sphere of activity (*ānimitta*[sB]-*gocarair*), (5) in whom the vows were spontaneous (*a*[nTv]*kal-pita*[vB]prañidhānaiḥ)⁶¹, (6) who had acquired patient acceptance by [the idea of] the sameness with regard to all Dharmas (*sar-va*[aTs]*dharma*[7Ts]⁶²*amatā*[3Tv]⁶³*kṣānti*[2Tv]pratilabdhaiḥ), (7)⁶⁴ were

the idea to become a fully enlightened Buddha (as to the classification implied by this statement, cf. Akṣayamatisūtra in ŚS, p. 212,12–14).

⁵⁸ ŚataGh 4.5: *dhāraṇīmukhapratilabdhaiḥ*. – Cf. PañcaK 71,28: *sarva-dhāraṇīmukhāni ca pratilabhate*; AṣṭaV 244,10 and 252,5f.: *āryo dharmodgato bodhisattvo mahāsattvo dhāraṇīpratilabdhaiḥ pañcābhijñāḥ* ...; SP 295,24: ... *dhāraṇīpratilabdhair bodhisattvaiḥ sārddham* ...; KP II 2,18: *dhāraṇīpratilabdhair*. SP 279,12 (*dhāraṇyāḥ pratilambho bhūṭ*) suggests that only one Dhāraṇī has been acquired. Different kinds of Dhāraṇīs can be found in SP 335–337 and 387,7. See also PañcaD 212,8–213,6 and KP II 21,17–25,17.

⁵⁹ *vihārin* with instr. is suggested by *ñi* 2a3 and *ga* 3a1 (*stoṇ pa ñid kyis rnam par spyod pa*) and confirmed by AṣṭaV 183,16 (*bodhisattvena* ... *ānimit-tena ca samādhinā vihartavyam*; cf. 215,21 and 227,1f.), but is also possible with loc., parallel to *rājagṛhe viharati sma*, as *sūnyatāyām ca viharati* (185,21) shows.

⁶⁰ ŚataGh 4,5f.: *sūnyatānimittāprāṇihitair vihāribhir*.

⁶¹ ŚataGh 4,6: *avikalpikaprañidhānaiḥ*, PañcaD: *prañidhānākalpitaiḥ*. As to the meaning, cf. GV, p. 371,14: *sarvaprāñidhānavigatās ca bodhisattva-prāñidhānavyavacchinnās ca* (according to T 278, p. 770c5f. read: °*avyavacchinnās*), which might be interpreted as follows: though mastering the three *vimokṣas* (*sūnyatā*, *ānimitta* and *aprañihita*), he does not totally give way to them as a *śrāvaka* does (cf. GV 371,21), but spontaneously acts in accordance with his earlier intentions. But maybe the compound simply means: “in whom no longer [egoistic] wishes [with regard to rebirth] were produced” (cf. Dbh 34,1).

⁶² *chos thams cad la mñam pa ñid* (*ñi* 2a4 = *ga* 3a1) suggest 7Ts at this place.

⁶³ *ga* 3a1 (*mñam pa ñid kyis bzod pa*) suggests 3Ts at this place. In *ñi* 2a4 we find *mñam pa ñid kyī bzod pa*. LAMOTTE's translation (Traité, p. 325) of *samatākṣānti* (“... ont obtenu les égalités et les patiences”, analysing the compound as a Dvandva) might be supported by the fact that in PañcaD the order is reversed: *kṣāntisamatā*, but less by T 1509. It is true that the commentary (95a25) starts by speaking about two kinds of *samatā* and two kinds of *kṣānti*, thereby placing the terms on the same level. Furtheron, however, only a distinction between *sattvasamatākṣānti* and *dharmasa-*

endowed with unimpeded vows⁶⁵ (*a[nB]saṅga[bTs]praṇidhāna[3Tv]-samanvāgataiḥ*), (8) had penetrated the [four] principles of special knowledge with regard to the imperishable teaching⁶⁶ (*a[nB]kṣaya-[bTs]nirdeśa[6Ts]pratisaṃvin[6Ts]naya[2Tv]pratividdhair*)⁶⁷, (9) were sporting in the great extraordinary faculties (*mahā[aTs]abhijñā-[7Tv]*)⁶⁸*vikrīḍitair*)⁶⁹, (10) their extraordinary faculties absolutely stable (*atyanta[iTv]a[nTv]cyuta[vB]abhijñair*), (11) their words to be [faithfully] received (*ādeya[vB]vacanair*)⁷⁰, (12) diligent (*a[nTa]kusīdair*), (13) their energy activated (*ārabdha[vB]vīryaiḥ*), (14) without regard to their body and life (*kāya[D]jīvita[7Ta]nir-apekṣair*)⁷¹, (15) not hypocritical (*a[nTa]kuhakair*)⁷², (16) not boasting (*a[nTv]-lapakair*), (17) freed of thoughts of reputation⁷³ and profit (*apagata[vB]jñātra[D]lābha[6Ts]cittaiḥ*), (18) disinterestedly preaching

matākṣānti remains. While both could have been meant by the shorter expression in T 223, PañcaG has chosen for the latter by adding *sarvadharma*. That here *amatā* is not identical with the fact that things never arise, which has to be accepted patiently, but a manner of looking at them in order to realize this acceptance is suggested by T 1509.

⁶⁴ Between the translations of nos. 6 and 7 *ñi* 2a4 and ga 3a2 mention another quality: *chags pa med pa'i gzuñs rab tu thob pa*, which suggests *asaṅgadhāraṇīpratīlabdhaiḥ*. Cf. PañcaD, p. 4,9 and SR 218,14.

⁶⁵ *ñi* 2a4 (*thogs pa med pa'i spobs pa dan ldan pa*) suggests *asaṅgapratībhānasamanvāgataiḥ* “provided with unimpeded eloquence” (cf. PañcaK 18,26 and SP 279,9); so does T 220 (2), p. 1b25. ŚataGh 4,7 has both possibilities: *asaṅgapraṇidhānair asaṅgapratībhānasamanvāgatair*. A third possibility can be found in PañcaD 4,9: *asaṅgadhāraṇīpratīlabdhair* (reflected in ga 3a2 by *chags pa med pa'i gzuñs rab tu thob pa*).

⁶⁶ Following *ñi* 2a4f.: *bstan pa zad mi śes pa la so so yañ dag par rig pa'i tshul khoñ du chud pa*. From Dbh, p. 51,7: *tasya satatasamitam asaṃbhinnāś catasro bodhisattvapratīsaṃvīdo 'nupravartante*, one would rather expect *a-kṣaya* belonging to *pratisaṃvid*.

⁶⁷ ŚataGh 4,7f.: *akṣayapratīnirdeśāpratīnirdeśaiḥ pratisaṃvinnayapratīvidhair*.

⁶⁸ The 7Tv relation is suggested by GV 361,15: *sa vikrīḍitaḥ sarvabodhisattvavimokṣeṣu*.

⁶⁹ In SR 171,2ff. this is described in detail. Cf. Lañk 1,10.

⁷⁰ Cf. AṣṭaV 27,7: *sa ādeyavacanaś ca bhaviṣyati*. Cf. ŚS 351,7: *ādeyavacanaś ca bhavati*, and SR 289,15: *ādeyavākyatām pratīlabhate*.

⁷¹ Cf. AṣṭaV 238,7: *kāye 'narthikena jīvitānirapekṣeṇa*, and SR 126,21: *ārabdhavīro nirapekṣu jīvite*, 143,2: *kāye 'nadhyaवासitena jīvite nirapekṣeṇa bhavitavyam*, 221,6: *tyajante kāyajīvitam*, and 274,17: *jīvita kāya apekṣi prahāyā*.

⁷² Cf. SR 170,20: *akuḥako alapaku bhoti pañḍito*.

⁷³ I could only find *jñātra* (PañcaD 4,10), not *jñāti* (PañcaG), in parallel passages (e.g. SR 104,11; 151,22+29; 152,1; 156,10; 170,6+12+18). Moreover, *jñātra* is much more to the point. As to *lābha* cf. SR 170,7+13+27.

the Dharma⁷⁴ (*nir-āmiṣa*[iTv]*dharmā*[2Tv]*deśakaiḥ*), (19) who had obtained the highest skill in the patient acceptance of profound tenets (*gambhīra*[aTs]*dharmā*[6Ts]*kṣānti*[7Ts]⁷⁵*parama*[aTs]*gatim*[2Tv]-*gataiḥ*), (20) had obtained the great assurances (*mahā*[aTs]*vaiśāradya*[2Tv]*prāptaiḥ*), (21) their minds confident (*a*[nTv]*saṃkucita*-[vB]*mānasaiḥ*)⁷⁶, (22) who had overcome all deeds of Māra (*sarva*-[aTs]*māra*[6Ts]*karmā*[2Tv]*saṃatīkrāntaiḥ*)⁷⁷, (23) had put an end to the hindrance which consists of Karma⁷⁸ (*karma*[sTs]*āvaraṇa*-[2Tv]*pratiprasrabdhaiḥ*), (24) whose Karma, defilements and opponents were destroyed (*nīhata*[vB]*karma*[D]*kleśa*[D]*pratyarthikaiḥ*)⁷⁹, (25) who were not overpowered by all teachers [belonging to] other [schools] (*sarva*[aTs]*para*[aTs]*pravādi*:[3Tv]*an*[nTv]*abhibhūtaiḥ*)⁸⁰, (26) were difficult to be fathomed by all Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas (*sarva*[aTs]*śrāvaka*[D]*pratyeka-buddha*[3Tv]*dur-avagāhair*)⁸¹, (27) were, by the discrimination of Dharmas⁸², skilled in making [all kinds of] distinctions and pointing [them] out (*dharmā*[6Ts]-*pravīcaya*[3Ta]*vibhakti*[D]*nirdeśa*[7Ta]*kuśalaiḥ*)⁸³, (28) their vows

⁷⁴ Cf. SR 170,8: *nirāmiṣaṃ ca dharmadānaṃ dadāti*; 170,16: *dharmam deṣī nirāmiṣaṃ* (the latter word obviously to be related with *deṣī* as an adverb, the Dharma does not need such an attribute), 170,26: *nirāmiṣaṃ deti ca dharmadānam. deśaka* as an agent-noun takes a position between verbal adjective and substantive. It is possible that *nirāmiṣa* was joined to *dharmadeśaka* as an adjective ("disinterested demonstrators of the Dharma"). But that the compound *dharmadeśaka*, originally, is an instance of a 6Ts relation is less likely. It would be the only instance of such a relation in the passage.

⁷⁵ Cf. SR 282,8: *gatiṃgatāḥ sūrata śūnyatāyām*.

⁷⁶ Cf. SR 158,11: *viśāradaś cāsaṃkucitāḥ parśadam avagāhate*.

⁷⁷ Cf. GV 254,10: *sarvamārakarmakleśāvaranaparvatavikiraṇaprayuktasya*; 45,9: *sarvamāraparavādimardanam*.

⁷⁸ LSC, p. 1: "were free from obstacles caused by their (past) deeds". However, *karma* itself is called an obstacle here, if we follow T 1509, p. 100a9ff. (Traité, p. 346). It is an obstacle for enlightenment, or, as Lank 240,12–14 indicates by mentioning *karmāvaraṇa* in connexion with Cīñcāmānavikā and Sundarikā, a cause of difficulties for an enlightened one.

⁷⁹ Following ñi 2a8: *las daṇṇaṃ non maṇṇa pa daṇṇa | phiyir rgoḷ ba rab tu bcom pa*. Perhaps better: "whose opponents consisting of Karma and defilements were destroyed". Cf. SP 356,18: *nīhatamārapratyarthikā*.

⁸⁰ Cf. SR 96,18: *anabhibhūto 'si parapravādidbhiḥ* (cf. 224,13; 229,16; 258,20); 164,2: *aparakampyaś ca bhavati sarvapaparavādidbhiḥ* (cf. 164,25; 258,10 + 19).

⁸¹ Cf. GV 371,1: *sarvaśrāvakapratyekabuddhaduravagāhavihāravihāriṇām*; SR 171,14: *yatrābhūmiḥ sarvaśrāvakapratyekabuddhānām kaḥ punar vādaḥ sarvapaparavādinām*. – According to W II/1, p. 176 (§ 75e), *duravagāha* is not considered as a Bahuvrīhi, but as a synthetical compound.

⁸² Cf. Saṃyuttanikaya (PTS) V, p. 104: *ko ca ... āhāro ... dhammavīcayasambojjhaṅgassa uppādāya ... bhāvanāya pāripūriyā | atthi ... kuśalā-*

well activated during innumerable Kalpas (*a[nTv]samkhyeya[vTs]-kalpa[2Tv]su[iTv]samārabdhā[vB]praṇidhānaiḥ*)⁸⁴, (29) who had smiling faces (*smita[vB]mukhaiḥ*)⁸⁵, (30) were greeting first (*pūrva[iTv]-ālāpibhiḥ*), (31) not frowning (*vyapagata[vB]bhṛkūṭikaiḥ*)⁸⁶, (32) their words gentle and mild (*ślakṣṇa[aDa]madhura⁸⁷[aB]vacanaiḥ*), (33) who were skilled in speaking to others by reciting verses (*gāthā[6Ts]-abhiḡitā[3Ts]para[7Ts]ālapana[7Ta]kuśalaiḥ*)⁸⁸, (34) their inspired eloquence not to be cut off (*an[nTv]ācchedya[vB]pratibhānair*)⁸⁹, (35)

kusalā dhammā sāvaḡjānavaḡjā dhammā hīnapaṇṇitā dhammā, and SR 298.7: *dharmapracicayaḥ | yad idam skandhadhātūyatanānām prabhedah samkleśavyavadānapakṣasya prabhedas teṣām cānupalabdhiḥ*. In Lañk 122,1–14 *pravicayaabuddhiḥ* is related to the four positions (*catuṣkoṭikā*) including the distinctions between being and non-being and perishable and imperishable, while all worldly distinctions are due to the *vikalpalakṣaṇagrāhābhīniveśa-pratiṣṭhāpikā buddhiḥ* (note however that in Lañk 52,6; 53,1; 205,12; 207,15 *pravicaya* has the atoms as its object).

⁸³ Following ñi 2b1 and ga 3a4: *chos rab tu rtogs pas rnam par dbye žiñ bstan pa la mkhas pa*.

⁸⁴ LSC, p. 1: “who had formed their vows incalculable aeons ago”. However, according to T 222, p. 147a18 (“pursuing the vows with energy”) this is not just one act long ago. Cf. SR 126,15: *mayā kalpasahasrakotayo ārabdhavīryeṇa*, where *ārabdhavīrya* is obviously determined by an accusative of duration. ñi 2b1 (ga 3a4f.) *bskal pa graṇs med pa nas* might be interpreted as representing an ablative of origin. But until now I have not been able to find any instance of *kalpa* or *kalpakoti* (or similar compounds) in the ablative case. Employed are either the accusative (e.g. AṣṭaV 228,25), the instrumental (e.g. AṣṭaV 24,23) or the locative (e.g. SP 266,16).

⁸⁵ As to nos. 29–32 cf. ŚS, p. 183,15 (Akṣayamatisūtra): *smitamukhatā bhṛkūṭivigatatā pūrvābhilāpitā*; SR 112,27: *na jātu kuryād bhṛkūṭim ... smitam mukhaṃ ca*; 188,19: *ślakṣṇavācā ... apagatabhṛkūṭiś co pūrvāālāpibhoti | satatasmitamukhaś co*; 224,12: *pūrvābhilāpī smitamukhaḥ apagatabhṛkūṭimukho*; 296,23: *apagatabhṛkūṭitā | yad idam dosaprahāṇam | ... pūrvāālāpitā | yad idam ehisvāgatavacanatā laghūttāhānatā |*. T 1509 fails to mention no. 32, though it is represented in T 223, p. 217a18, and to comment on *pūrvābhilāpin*, though it is mentioned p. 100b20. LAMOTTE’s contraction of nos. 29 and 30 (Traité, p. 352): “Ils parlaient avec un visage souriant (*smitamukhapūrvābhilāpibhiḥ*)” is supported neither by PañcaD nor by T 1509.

⁸⁶ Suffix *-ka* explicates that the compound is an adjective; see W II/1, p. 101–104.

⁸⁷ Though *madhu* of PañcaG would be possible as an adjective, I could not find it in similar passages, while *madhura* frequently occurs. A direct parallel would be GV 302,27: *ślakṣṇamadhuravacanasamudācārāṇām*.

⁸⁸ Cf. SR 220,6: *bodhisattvaṃ gāthābhiḡitena prābhāṣata*; cf. 280,10 and GV 212,10. *gāthābhīr gītābhīr lāpanaḥ* in Mvy 849 and MvyN 851 has to be emended to **gāthābhiḡitābhīr lāpanaḥ*.

⁸⁹ Cf. SR 191,27: *no cāsyu pratibhānu cchidyate*.

were overcoming an endless assembly (*an[nB]anta[bTs]parṣad[2Tv]-abhibhavanair*)⁹⁰, (36) were endowed with the assurances (*vaiśāradya[3Tv]samanvāgatair*), (37) were, since infinite crores of Kalpas, skilful in [leading people to] salvation by⁹¹ knowing how to instruct (*an[nB]anta[bTs]kalpa[6Ts]koṭi[2Ta]*⁹²*nirdeśa[6Ts]jñāna[3Ta]nihsaraṇa[7Ta]kuśalaiḥ*), (38) who were concentrating on⁹³ [all]⁹⁴ Dharmas as similar to (a) a magic trick, (b) a mirage, (c) the moon in water,

⁹⁰ I have not been able to find another instance of *abhibhavana* as a verbal adjective. It is not very likely that here it has the meaning of a substantive and that the compound is a Bahuvrīhi. One could emend to *abhibhāvana*; cf. BHSD s.v., referring to Mvy 852. The Petersburger Wörterbuch knows of one instance of *abhibhavana* as a substantive, in Manu VI 62c (here metre would not allow *abhibhāv*^o). *abhibhavana* as a substantive makes good sense in PañcaD, p. 4,14, translation and analysis of the combined items 35 and 36 running as follows: “endowed with overcoming an endless assembly and with the assurances” (*an[iB]anta[bTs]parṣad[6Ts]abhibhavana[D]vaiśāradya[3Tv]-samanvāgatair*), or: “whith regard to overcoming an endless assembly [always] endowed with the assurances” (*°abhibhavana[7Ts]vaiśāradya[3Tv]-samanvāgatair*).

⁹¹ Following ñi 2b3: ... *bstan pa'i ye śes kyis* ...

⁹² 3Ta also seems to be possible. Cf. n. 84.

⁹³ According to BHSD *adhimucyate* normally means “is actively interested in, zealous for, earnestly devoted to, intent upon”. At some places *adhimucyate* is best translated with “concentrates on” (see G. VON SIMSON, Zur Diktion einiger Lehrtexte des buddhistischen Sanskritkanons, München 1965, p. 110; cf. the first of three meanings of *adhi-muc* given in SWTF 37a: “seine Willenskraft oder Aufmerksamkeit richten oder konzentrieren auf”). The aspect of concentration was elaborated by L. SCHMITHAUSEN in Epiphanie des Heils, ed. G. OBERHAMMER, Wien 1982, p. 65 n. 33: “sich auf ein bestimmtes Objekt in einer bestimmten Weise konzentrieren, etwas willentlich (manchmal auch: willkürlich) in einer bestimmten Weise in der Vorstellung vergegenwärtigen oder visualisieren”. Though the meaning of concentration seems to be appropriate in the above compound, it is not unlikely that “being convinced of the truth of what one concentrates on” is connoted, the object not being things, but assertions. That *adhimukti* can mean “(intellektuelles) Überzeugtsein” was shown by L. SCHMITHAUSEN (Der Nirvāṇa-Abschnitt in der Vinīśayaśaṃgrahaṇī der Yogācārabhūmiḥ, Wien 1969, p. 179f.). All these meanings could be brought in agreement with a passage in AṣṭaV 223,18 (... *sarvadharmā anutpattikā ity adhimuñcanti | na ca tāvad anutpattikadharmakṣāntipratilabdā bhavanti*) where *adhi-muc* points to a preliminary state of spiritual development, while *prati-labh* denotes the final state; see E. LAMOTTE, Enseignement (s. n. 36), p. 412. However, “admettaient que” used by LAMOTTE, Traité 357, for CHIAI LIAO (which he equates with *adhimukta*) seems to undervalue the intention. Maybe sometimes the emotional and volitive connotations of *adhi-muc* are weak. But the early Chinese translations of the Pañca tend to adapt this predicate to the

(d) a dream, (e) an echo, (f) an illusion, (g) the sky, (h) a Fata Morgana, (i) an image [in a mirror], (j) a magical being (*māyā*[D]*marīci*-[D]*daga*⁹⁵-*candra*[D]*svapna*[D]*pratiśrutka*[D]*pratibhāsa*[D]*gagana*[D]*gandharva-nagara*[D]*pratibimba*[D]*nirmāṇa*⁹⁶[sB]*upama*[bTs]*dharmā*[2Tv]⁹⁷*adhimucyāmānair*)⁹⁸, (39) their minds confident (*a*[nTv]*saṃlīna*[vB]-*cittaiḥ*)⁹⁹, (40) who were skilled in comprehending the states of mind, the subtle knowledge, behaviour and attachment of all beings (*sarva*-[aTs]*sattva*¹⁰⁰[6Ts]<*citta*[6Ts]<*gati*>[D]<*sūkṣma*[aTs]<*jñāna*>[D]<*caryā*[D]<*adhimukti*[6Ts]<*avatāra*[7Ta]<*kuśalaiḥ*)¹⁰¹, (41) their minds not obstructed

high accomplishments of *bodhisattvas* mentioned elsewhere in the list. So *adhimuc* is understood by them as “really knowing” without the implication of further development. This would correspond with what seems to be indicated by *adhi-muc* when it occurs in a series of words for knowing (but also of concentration!) in GV 13,20f.: *na budhyanti nāvataranti nādhimucyante nādhiḡacchanti na samanvāharanti na nirīkṣante na nidhyāyanti nopanidhyāyanti*.

⁹⁴ ñi 2b3 / ga 3a7: *chos thams cad*.

⁹⁵ *daga*, instead of (u)*daka*, can also be found in Rketu 20,3 (*māyāmarīci-dagacandrasannibhe*), 29,5 and 74,1. As to *pratiśrutka*, which is normally *pratisrutkā* (see also no. 53), cf. Lañk 20,17 *pratiśrutkāni*.

⁹⁶ ñi 2b4 suggests the order °*nirmāṇa-pratibimba*°. The order in ga 3a7 is the same as in PañcaG, but no translation of the terms *gagana* and *gandharvanagara* can be found. This corresponds to PañcaD, p. 4,15, where the two terms do not occur. ŚātaGh 5,9 omits *gagana*.

⁹⁷ *adhimucyate* generally has an object in the accusative, *adhimukta* (see no. 53) in the locative (BHSD, p. 13f.).

⁹⁸ As to magic, mirage and dream see AṣṭaV, p. 253. *māyā*, *marīci*, *svapna*, *pratiśrutkā*, *pratibhāsa* and *nirmīta* occur SR 289,28 (cf. 292,27 and 295,5). Cf. DaśaK, p. 88: “Just as some person sees an army created through magic, . . . , but does not enter into the notion that it is an army, in the same way the Bodhisattvas, . . . , though seeing all the elements separately, do not enter into them (. . .) just as some person, tormented by heat, sees a manifold mirage, moving like waves, but does not enter into the notion that it is water, in the same way, etc. (. . .) just as some person in his dream sees various forms, but does not, when he has waked up [sic], enter into the notion that they have material form, in the same way, etc. (. . .) just as a man sees the moon (reflected) in water, but does not enter into the notion that the moon is there, . . . (. . .) just as some person sees jugglery, but does not enter into the idea that there is reality in it, . . . (. . .) etc.”

⁹⁹ Literally: “their minds not being depressed”; cf. no. 21. In ñi 2a7 *yoñs su žum pa med pa* translates *asaṃkucita*, and in ñi 2b *asaṃlīna*.

¹⁰⁰ *satva* (PañcaG) is now written *sattva*, in nos. 40, 41 and 60.

¹⁰¹ Following ñi 2b4f.: *sems can thams cad kyi sems kyi rgyud dañ | śes pa phra* [2b5] *ba dañ | spyod pa dañ | mos pa khoñ du chud par bya ba la mkhas pa* | .

by all beings (*sarva*[**aTs**]*sattva*[**3Tv**]*a*[**nTv**]*pratihata*[**vB**]*cittair*)¹⁰², (42) endowed with extreme patient acceptance (*adhimātra*[**aTs**]-*kṣānti*[**3Tv**]*samanvāgataiḥ*), (43) skilled in knowing how to penetrate the sameness¹⁰³ of all Dharmas (*sarva*[**aTs**]*dharmā*[**6Ts**]*amatā*[**6Ts**]-*pravedha*[**6Ts**]*jñāna*[**7Ta**]*kuśalair*), (44) difficult to be fathomed because of their being endowed with deep tenets (*gambhīra*[**aB**]-*dharmatā*[**3Tv**]*dur-avagāhaiḥ*), (45) who had acquired control over their own minds (*sva*[**aTs**]*citta*[**7Ts**]*vaśitā*[**2Tv**]*pratilabdhaiḥ*), (46) had obtained control over all Dharmas (*sarva*[**aTs**]*dharmā*[**7Ts**]-*vaśitā*[**2Tv**]*prāptaiḥ*), (47) had been released from all hindrances consisting of Karma, defilements and opinions (*sarva*[**aTs**]*karma*-[**D**]*kleśa*[**D**]*drṣṭy*[**sTs**]*āvaraṇa*[**5Tv**]*vimuktaiḥ*), (48) skilled in teaching dependent on [the audience] (*pratītya*¹⁰⁴[**iTs**]*nirdeśa*[**7Ta**]*kuśalair*), (49) who had comprehended the imperishable principle of deep origination in dependence (*gambhīra*[**aTs**]*pratītya*[**iTs**]*samutpāda*[**6Ts**]-*a*[**nB**]*kṣaya*[**bTs**]*naya*[**7Tv**])¹⁰⁵*avatīrṇaiḥ*)¹⁰⁶, (50) had freed themselves from all opinions, propensities and possession [by vices]

¹⁰² T 221, 223, 220 (1, 1b25) and 220 (2, 1c7) take *apratihata* in a passive sense: “not obstructed”, *ñi* 2b5 and *ga* 3a8 (*sdaṇ ba med pa*), and probably also T 222, in an active one: “not hostile”. This makes good sense, but the analysis of the full compound in PañcaG would become very difficult. As one can see in the Synoptic Edition *apratihatacitta* is an old Bahuvrīhi, to which only by PañcaG *sarvasattva* was added. There is no other **vB** relation in the passage, of which the verbal adjective enters a **2Tv** or **7Tv** relation, or a **3Tv** relation with an active meaning. Moreover, as the discussion of II 5 shows, PañcaG apparently considered a **2Tv** relation with a negated verbal adjective as awkward.

¹⁰³ Only *sarvadharmatā* can, in my view, be reconstructed from the facsimile. But *dharmatā* preceded by *sarva* sounds strange, and both *ñi* 2b5 and ŚataGh 5,11 read *sarvadharmasamatā*°. I follow this reading. If *sarvadharmatā* is no scribal error, the same as *sarvadharmasamatā* seems to be intended.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. the above edition of the PañcaG passage. Referring to T 220 (1), p. 1c10 (cf. 1b24f.) one could perhaps supply *pratītyasamutpādanayanirdeśa-kuśalair*, and translate: “skilled in teaching aspects of dependent origination”. The word *naya* might first have been written after *pratītya*° in PañcaG. That it has been deleted might, then, be interpreted as the creation of a new compound in the process of copying a manuscript.

¹⁰⁵ **7Tv** according to GV 418,21: *avatīrṇaḥ samantabhadrabodhisattvacar-āyāṃ*.

¹⁰⁶ ŚataGh, p. 5,14 and T 220 (1) [vol. 5, p. 1b24] read °*samutpādakṣaya*°: “who had comprehended [all] aspects of the deep origination in dependence and the [unavoidable] destruction [of all] dharmas which have originated” (*gambhīra*[**aTs**]*pratītya*[**iTs**]*samutpāda*[**D**]*kṣaya*[**6Ts**]*naya*[**7Tv**]*avatīrṇaiḥ*). On the other hand, T 220 (3) [vol. 7, p. 427b24] confirms °*samutpādakṣaya*°.

(*sarva*[aTs]dr̥ṣṭy[**D**]anuśaya[**D**]paryutthāna[**3Tv**]vigataiḥ), (51) had abandoned all fetters (*sarva*[aTs]saṃyojana[**2Tv**]prahīṇaiḥ), (52) were skilled in knowing how to penetrate the [four noble] truths (*satya*[**6Ts**]prativedha[**6Ts**]jñāna[**7Ta**]kuśalaiḥ), (53) had uninterruptedly concentrated on all Dharmas as similar to an echo (*satata-samita*[**iTv**]pratiśrutkā[**3Ta**]sama[aTs]sarva[aTs]dharma[**7Tv**]adhimuktaiḥ), (54) experienced in¹⁰⁷ teaching immeasurable principles of the Dharma (*a*[**nB**]pramāṇa[**bTs**]dharma[**6Ts**]naya[**6Ts**]nirdeśa[**7Ta**]viśāradair), (55) skilled in causing [people] to comprehend the real nature [of things] (*yathātmya*[**6Ts**]avatāraṇa[**7Ta**]kuśalair), (56) who had embraced the setting-out [in the Great Vehicle] by means of a vow [to contribute to] the marvelous arrangement of endless Buddha-fields¹⁰⁸ (*an*[**nB**]anta[**bTs**]buddha-kṣetra[**6Ts**]vyūha[**6Ts**]praṇidhāna[**3Tv**]prasthāna[**2Tv**]parigrhītair), (57) had become uninterruptedly turned to a concentrated calling to mind of the Buddhas staying in innumerable world-regions (*a*[**nTv**]saṃkhyeya[**vTs**]loka-dhātu[**2Tv**]gata[**vTs**]buddha[**6Ts**]anusmṛti[**6Ts**]samādhi[**2Ta**]satata-samitam[**iTa**]abhimukhī-bhūtaiḥ), (58) skilled in going to all [places where] a Buddha has appeared (*sarva*[aTs]buddha[**6Ts**]utpāda[**3Ts**]¹⁰⁹upasaṃkramaṇa[**7Ta**]kuśalair), (59) skilled in requesting immeasurable Buddhas [for preaching the Dharma] (*a*[**nTv**]parimita[**vTs**]buddha[**6Ts**]adhyeṣaṇa[**7Ta**]kuśalair), (60) skilled in tranquilizing [other] beings' defilements when they have been activated through various opinions (*nānā*[**iTs**]dr̥ṣṭi[**3Bv**]paryutthāna[**bTs**]sattva[**6Ts**]kleśa[**6Ts**]praśamana[**7Ta**]kuśalair)¹¹⁰, (61) skilled in entering the knowledge of how to sport with the effectuation of hundreds of thousands of Samādhis¹¹¹ (*samādhi*[**6Ts**]śata[**6Ts**]sahasra[**6Ts**]abhinirhāra[**6Ts**]vikrīḍa-

¹⁰⁷ The meaning "assured of" is less likely here; cf. the 12 compounds ending with *kuśala*. Moreover, with "assured of" the compound is less easy to construe, needing the supplementation of "[a good performance in] teaching . . .".

¹⁰⁸ This translation tries to follow ñi 3a2: *saṅs rgyas kyi zin mtha' yas pa rnam par dgod pa'i smon lam gyis 'gro ba yoṅs su zin pa*. LSC, p. 2: "acquiring through their vows and their setting-out the endless harmonies of all the Buddha-fields"; cf. ga 3b1: *saṅs rgyas kyi zin thams cad tu bkod pa mtha' yas pa smon pa daṅ 'jug pa yoṅs su bzuṅ ba*.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. the instrumental in AṣṭaV 226.3: *yena bhagavāms tenopasaṃkrāntaḥ*, and the Pāli stock phrase *yena . . . ten'upasaṃkami*, the accusative in AṣṭaV 194.6: *bodhisattvaṃ mahāsattvaṃ upasaṃkramaṇa*, and the locative in GV 28.4: *tatra tatra tathāgateṣūpasaṃkramantaḥ*.

¹¹⁰ ñi 3a3f.: *sems can gyi lta ba sna tshogs kyis yoṅs su bskyod pa'i ñon moṅs pa zi bar bya ba la mkhas pa*.

¹¹¹ Cf. ñi 3a4: *tiṅ ne 'dzin brgya stoṅ mñon par sgrub pa la rnam par rtse*

ṇa[6Ts]*jñāna*[7Ts]*praveśa*[7Ta]*kuśalair*), (62) endowed with [other] qualities the praise of which¹¹² [even if it were continued] for innumerable Kalpas would not be exhausted (*a*[nB]*paryanta*[bTs]*kalpa*-[3Tv]*a*[nTv]*kṣiṇa*[vTs]*guṇa*[6Ts]*varṇa*>[3Tv]*samanvāgataiḥ*).

VII. STATISTICS OF COMPOUNDS

In lengthy compounds generally the last combination is the one to which the others are subordinated. Where the main compound cannot be found in the last place, it is printed in boldface.

Series I

No.	Member(s)	Type(s) of compound(s)
1	1	—
2	2	vB
3	1	—
4	1	—
5	3	iTv-vB
6	3	iTv-vB
7	1	—
8	2	aTs
9	2	vB
10	2	vB
11	2	vB
12	3	vB-aTs
13	3	vB-6Ts
14	5	iTs-3Tv-iTv-vB
15	6	aTs-6Ts-7Ts-aTs-2Tv

ba'i ye śeś rtoḡs par bya ba la mkhas pa, and ga 3b3f.: *tiñ ne 'dzin gyis rnam par rtsin pa*(*rtse ba* [?]) *brgya stoñ mñon par sgrub pa la* [3b4] *mkhas pa*.

¹¹² Here I assume that the order of *guṇa* and *varṇa* has to be changed. There is an explanation for this. Originally the text only wanted to say that it needs endless time to praise all *bodhisattva* qualities. The praise of the *guṇas* is not exhausted by innumerable *kalpas*, or: “[even if it were continued] for innumerable Kalpas it would not be exhausted”. But this remark got itself the status of a *bodhisattva* quality by the addition of *samanvāgataiḥ*. This only makes sense when *samanvāgata* is directly connected with *guṇa*, and *guṇa* is qualified by *akṣiṇavarṇa* (cf. GV 182.10: *varṇakṣayo 'sya bhaven na kadā cit*). However, according to SR 239,8–10 *akṣiṇa* could be combined with *guṇa* as well: *yeṣāṃ varṇaṇu kaś cid utsaḥi naro kalpāśataiḥ kṣepitum | kalpā-koṭisahasra bhāṣitu bahūn no ced guṇā kṣepitum no ca varṇa kṣipeya* . . .

Series II

No.	Member(s)	Type(s) of compound(s)
1	2	2Tv
2	2	2Tv
3	2	3Tv
4	2	sB
5	3	nTv-vB
6	5	aTs-7Ts-3Tv-2Tv
7	4	nB-bTs-3Tv
8	6	nB-bTs-6Ts-6Ts-2Tv
9	3	aTs-7Tv
10	4	iTv-nTv-vB
11	2	vB
12	2	nTa
13	2	vB
14	3	D-7Ta
15	2	nTa
16	2	nTv
17	4	vB-D-6Ts
18	3	iTv-2Tv
19	6	aTs-6Ts-7Ts-aTs-2Tv
20	3	aTs-2Tv
21	3	nTv-vB
22	4	aTs-6Ts-2Tv
23	3	sTs-2Tv
24	4	vB-D-D
25	5	aTs-aTs-3Tv-nTv
26	4	aTs-D-3Tv
27	5	6Ts-3Ta-D-7Ta
28	6	nTv-vTs-2Tv-iTv-vB
29	2	vB
30	2	iTv
31	2	vB
32	3	aDa-aB
33	5	6Ts-3Ts-7Ts-7Ta
34	3	nTv-vB
35	4	nB-bTs-2Tv
36	2	3Tv
37	8	nB-bTs-6Ts-2Ta-6Ts-3Ta-7Ta
38	13	D-D-D-D-D-D-D-D-sB-bTs-2Tv
39	3	nTv-vB

No.	Member(s)	Type(s) of compound(s)
40	10	aTs-6Ts-6Ts-D-aTs-D-D-6Ts-7Ta
41	5	aTs-3Tv-nTv-vB
42	3	aTs-3Tv
43	6	aTs-6Ts-6Ts-6Ts-7Ta
44	3	aB-3Tv
45	4	aTs-7Ts-2Tv
46	4	aTs-7Ts-2Tv
47	6	aTs-D-D-sTs-5Tv
48	3	iTs-7Ta
49	7	aTs-iTs-6Ts-nB-bTs-7Tv
50	5	aTs-D-D-3Tv
51	3	aTs-2Tv
52	4	6Ts-6Ts-7Ta
53	6	iTv-3Ta-aTs-aTs-2Tv
54	6	nB-bTs-6Ts-6Ts-7Ta
55	3	6Ts-7Ta
56	7	nB-bTs-6Ts-6Ts-3Tv-2Tv
57	9	nTv-vTs-2Tv-vTs-6Ts-6Ts-2Ta-iTa
58	5	aTs-6Ts-3Ts-7Ta
59	5	nTv-vTs-6Ts-7Ta
60	7	iTs-3B-bTs-6Ts-6Ts-7Ta
61	8	6Ts-6Ts-6Ts-6Ts-6Ts-7Ts-7Ta
62	8	nB-bTs-3Tv-nTv-vTs-6Ts-3Tv

In this chart can be found:

Type of Combination	number of items / frequency
D	23 (only in II)
T	172 (= 13 in I + 159 in II)
B	35 (= 9 in I + 26 in II)
Total	230 (= 22 in I + 208 in II)

Of the 23 **D**-combinations

22 are **D**, i.e. aggregates of substantives, and

1 **aDa**, i.e. aggregate of adjectives (in II 32).

Of the 172 **T**-combinations

27 are **aTs**, i.e. Karmadhārayas, in which a substantive is determined by an adjective (4 in I, and 23 in II),

10 **bTs**, i.e. Karmadhārayas, in which a substantive is determined by a Bahuvrīhi compound (10 in II),

- 1 **iTa**, i.e. Karmadhāraya, in which an adjective is determined by an indeclinable (II 57),
- 4 **iTs**, i.e. Karmadhārayas, in which a substantive is determined by an indeclinable (I 14, II 48.49.60),
- 8 **iTv**, i.e. Karmadhārayas, in which a verbal adjective is determined by an indeclinable (I 5.6.14, II 10.18.28.30.53),
- 2 **nTa**, i.e. Karmadhārayas, in which an adjective is determined by a negative (II 12.15),
- 12 **nTv**, i.e. Karmadhārayas, in which a verbal adjective is determined by a negative (12 in II),
- 2 **sTs**, i.e. Karmadhārayas, in which a substantive is determined by a substantive in the same noun-case (II 23.47),
- 5 **vTs**, i.e. Karmadhārayas, in which a substantive is determined by a verbal adjective (II 28.57.57.59.62),
- 2 **2Ta**, i.e. Tatpuruṣas, in which an adjective is determined by a substantive in the accusative (II 37.57),
- 19 **2Tv**, i.e. Tatpuruṣas, in which a verbal adjective is determined by a substantive in the accusative (1 in I, 18 in II),
- 3 **3Ta**, i.e. Tatpuruṣas, in which an adjective is determined by a substantive in the instrumental (II 27.37.53),
- 2 **3Ts**, i.e. Tatpuruṣas, in which a substantive is determined by a substantive in the instr. (II 33.58),
- 14 **3Tv**, i.e. Tatpuruṣas, in which a verbal adjective is determined by a substantive in the instr. (1 in I, 13 in II),
- 1 **5Tv**, i.e. Tatpuruṣa, in which a verbal adjective is determined by a substantive in the ablative (II 47),
- 37 **6Ts**, i.e. Tatpuruṣas, in which a substantive is determined by a substantive in the genitive (2 in I, 35 in II),
- 14 **7Ta**, i.e. Tatpuruṣas, in which an adjective is determined by a substantive in the locative (only in II)
- 7 **7Ts**, i.e. Tatpuruṣas, in which a substantive is determined by a substantive in the loc. (I 15, II 6.19.33.45.46.61), and
- 2 **7Tv**, i.e. Tatpuruṣas, in which a verbal adjective is determined by a substantive in the loc. (II 9.49).

Of the 35 **B**-combinations

- 2 are **aB**, i.e. Bahuvrīhis, in which a substantive is determined by an adjective (II 32.44),
- 8 **nB**, i.e. Bahuvrīhis, in which a substantive is determined by a negative (8 in II),
- 2 **sB**, i.e. Bahuvrīhis, in which a substantive is determined by a substantive (II 4.38),

- 1 **3B**, i.e. Bahuvrīhi, in which a substantive is determined by a substantive in the instrumental (II 60), and
 22 **vB**, i.e. Bahuvrīhis, in which a substantive is determined by a verbal adjective (9 in I, 13 in II).

Four Categories of Main Compounds

As one can see in the first list of this section, most of the main compounds, to which other members are subordinated, contain a verbal adjective. This is suggestive of much action related to the persons described, and also of an analysis of the compounds by means of transforming them into verbal sentences.

Different kinds of compounds suggest a different relation of the persons to the action expressed by the verbal adjective. This will be made explicit by the discussion of four categories of main compounds and of some subdivisions below. But sometimes action is only denied in the compounds, or belongs to other persons. On the other hand, there is more action in the passage than can be shown by a purely formal analysis. At all places where a Tatpuruṣa ending in *kuśala* or *viśārada* appears, it is determined by a substantive expressing a physical or mental action. The same holds for *abhimukhībhūta* in II 57. Some suggestions for evaluating these observations for the history of ideas and attitudes will be made in section VIII. There, too, some lengthy compounds will be analysed per category, and the transformation into a sentence governed by a verb or an adjective such as *kuśala* employed as a means for solving intricacies.

The four categories of main compounds in the passage are: (1) Tatpuruṣa main compounds ending with a verbal adjective (31 instances), (2) Tatpuruṣa main compounds expressing being skilled in and turned (*abhimukha*) to some action (14 instances), (3) Bahuvrīhi main compounds beginning with a verbal adjective (22 instances), and (4) main compounds without a verbal adjective or any other indication of action (6 instances).

(1) Tatpuruṣa main compounds with a verbal adjective as a second member determined by a substantive as the former member: We can make four subdivisions of which

(a) the first (1 instance of a **2Tv** relation in series I, 15 in series II) shows monks and *bodhisattvas* as effecting or having effected a result: the monks have obtained (*prāpta* [I 15]) something; the *bodhisattvas* (series II) have acquired (*pratilabdha* [1.2.6.45]), penetrated (*pratividdha* [8]), gone to, i.e. obtained (*gata* [19]), obtained (*prāpta*

[20.46]), overcome (*samatikrānta* [22]), put an end to (*pratiprasrabdha* [23]), abandoned (*prahīṇa* [51]), concentrated on (*adhimukta* [53]), embraced (*parigrhīta* [56]) something, and are overcoming (*abhibhavana* [35]), and concentrating on (*adhimucyamāna* [38]) something,

(b) the second (9 instances of a **3Tv** relation in series II) shows *bodhisattvas* as having made contact with something, or having themselves freed from something, or no longer being affected by the actions of others: they are diverting themselves with (*vihārin* [3]) and had come into contact with, i.e. are endowed with (*samanvāgata* [7.36.42.62]) something; they went away from, i.e. freed themselves from (*vigata* [50]) something, and were no longer overpowered (*anabhibhūta* [25]) or to be fathomed by anyone (*duravagāha* [26]; in 44 the persons are implied, the **3Tv** relation only says why it is so),

(c) the third (1 instance of a **5Tv** relation in series II) shows *bodhisattvas* as having been released from (*vimukta* [47]) something, and

(d) the fourth (2 instances of a **7Tv** relation in series II) shows *bodhisattvas* as sporting in (*vikrīḍita* [9]) and having descended into, i.e. comprehended (*avatīrṇa* [49]) something.

Altogether, there are 28 instances in these four subdivisions, only one occurring in series I. To them might be added an **iTv** relation of *ālāpin* (II 32) and combinations with the agent-nouns *lapaka* (II 16, **iTv**) and *deśaka* (II 18, **2Tv**), bringing the total to 31 instances (30 in series II).

(2) Tatpuruṣa main compounds of which the second member is an adjective expressing skill and, thereby, capability for physical or mental action, and the first member is a substantive indicating such an action:

In series II, 13 instances of a **7Ta** relation can be found where *bodhisattvas* are said to be skilled in (*kuśala*) making distinctions and pointing them out (27), speaking (33), (leading to) salvation (37), comprehending (40), knowing (43.52), teaching (48), causing to comprehend (55), going (58), requesting (59), tranquillizing (60), entering (61), and to be experienced in (*viśārada*, possibly implying “assured of [a good performance in]”) teaching (54).

In the margin of this category might be settled the **2Ta** relation of II 57, where *bodhisattvas* are said (to have become uninterruptedly) turned to a concentrated calling to mind etc.

(3) Bahuvrīhi main compounds of which the first member is a verbal adjective (**vB** relations): The verbal adjective signifies an action or

process (a) having been undergone by what is meant by the second member, or (b) no longer undergone, or (c) to be undergone or (d) no longer to be undergone. A **vB** relation in II 29, where the verbal adjectives *smita* only describes a state, takes a marginal position.

In series I, 9 **vB** relations, all of type (a), can be found. By the compounds monks are described as persons in whom the cankers and the fetters were extinguished (*[pari]kṣiṇa* [2.13]), whose minds and insights were freed (*vimukta* [5.6.14]), whose work and task were accomplished (*kr̥ta* [9.10]), whose burden was laid down (*apahr̥ta* [11]), and whose aim was obtained (*anuprāpta* [12]).

In series II, 5 **vB** relations of type (a), 5 of type (b), 1 of type (c) and 1 of type (d) can be found. By these compounds *bodhisattvas* are described as persons (a) whose energy, and vows, were activated (*ārabdha* [13.28]), from whom thoughts of reputation etc., and frowning, went away, i.e. who were freed of them (*[vy]apagata* [17.31]), whose Karma etc. were destroyed (*nihata* [24]), (b) whose vows no longer were mentally produced, i.e. were spontaneous (*akalpita* [5])¹¹³, from whom the extraordinary faculties no longer fell, i.e. in whom they were stable (*acyuta* [10]), whose minds no longer shrank, i.e. were confident (*asamkucita* [21], *asamlīna* [39]) and were no longer obstructed (*apratihata* [41]), whose words were to be [faithfully] received (*ādeya* [11]), and whose inspired eloquence was not to be cut off (*anācchedya* [34]).

(4) Main compounds (Tatpuruṣas or Bahuvrīhis) without a verbal adjective or an adjective expressing capability for action (1 in I, 6 in II): Monks are said to be (like) great elephants (I 8), *bodhisattvas* to have the transphenomenal as their object (II 4), to be diligent (II 12), without regard to their body and life (II 14), not hypocritical (II 15), and to be gentle and mild in their words (II 32).

VIII

To conclude, some suggestions are made regarding

(a) how to proceed when confronted with lengthy and intricate compounds of the kind the two series contain,

¹¹³ Note that PañcaD is more in harmony with the compounds in the neighborhood by saying *praṇidhānākalpitaiḥ*, an extreme example of a **2Tv**-relation of category 1, because the verbal adjective, as second member of the compound, is denied. This never happens in other instances of the passage.

- (b) how to use some observations for the history of ideas and attitudes, and
- (c) how to explain the excessive use of compounds in the passage.

(a) The most instructive examples of lengthy compounds, which for the present purpose I define as possessing 5 or more members, will now be discussed. This should result in some strategems which might be of help when one encounters similar compounds in other passages or texts.

When dealing with lengthy compounds, intricacies can sometimes be solved by directly relating to the (verbal) adjective a word or compound that is difficult to explain as determining the immediately following word or compound. This procedure can be justified by considering the difficult word or compound as a separate part of a sentence of which the (verbal) adjective is the multivalent predicate, i.e. able to bind more than one part of speech. Another way is to relate that word or compound to the entire cluster of the following words. While this may be more in concord with the reality of comprehending the meaning of smaller units, the first method has the practical advantage of allowing to register grammatical relations. Moreover, it is unavoidable in all those cases where a sentence seems to have been transformed into a long compound without much regard to the possibilities of a more intuitive understanding.

First, lengthy compounds based on a **vB** relation will be discussed; then, those based on a **Tv** relation; finally, those based on a **7Ta** relation.

Three of the **vB** main compounds in the passage have five or more members (I 14, II 28.41). They are not intricate. But in case one encounters similar compounds with more members it may be of some use to know that in the instances of the passage only the verbal adjective is determined by more words and compounds, not the **vB** compound as such. In I 14 (*samyag-ājñā-su-vimukta-citta*) it is *vimukta* that is first determined by the indeclinable *su* (their minds “well freed”) and then, strengthened by *su*, by *samyag-ājñā* (their minds “well-freed by right understanding”). The relation between *samyag-ājñā* and *su-vimukta* can be established by assuming a **3Tv** relation, where *vimukta*, representing the verbal predicate of a sentence, is determined by *samyag-ājñā* in the instrumental case.

The same holds in II 28 (*a-saṃkhyeya-kalpa-su-samārabdhā-praṇidhāna*) and II 41 (*sarva-sattva-a-pratihata-citta*). *samārabdhā*, and *pratihata*, are first determined by *su* (their vows “well activated”) and *a* (their minds “not obstructed”) respectively, and

then by *a-saṃkhyeya-kalpa* (their vows “well-activated during innumerable Kalpas”) and *sarva-sattva* (their minds “not obstructed by all beings”). The second determinations have to be related to the verbal adjective as representing the verbal predicate of a sentence, “innumerable Kalpas” of II 28 as an accusative of duration (a **2Tv** relation with *samārabdha*), and “all beings” of II 41 as an instrumental of the agent (a **3Tv** relation with *pratihata*).

Twelve of the Tatpuruṣa main compounds with verbal adjective have five or more members. Of them nine (I 15, II 8. 19.25.38.47.49.50.62) are simple in structure. The verbal adjective is only related to the immediately preceding word, which is the subject of other determinations. Interesting cases are II 6.53.56. Here two parts of the compound depend on the verbal adjective. The same interpretation as in the case of **vB** compounds is possible, viz. that first the verbal adjective is determined by the immediately preceding word or compound, and then, with an increased significance, by another word or cluster of words. Here, too, the grammatical explanation makes use of the theory that in a sentence a verb can bind more than one part of speech. In II 6 (*sarva-dharma-samatā-kṣānti-pratilabdha*), the *bodhisattvas* appear, if one understands *samatā*^o as *samatayā* (see n. 63), as having acquired patient acceptance (a **2Tv** relation) and as having acquired (it) by the (idea of) sameness with regard to all *dharma*s (a **3Tv** relation). In II 53 (*satata-samīta-pratiśrutkā-sama-sarva-dharma-adhimukta*) they are said to have concentrated on all *dharma*s as similar to an echo (a **2Tv** relation), and to have done so uninterruptedly (an **iTv** relation). In II 56 (*an-anta-buddha-kṣetra-vyūha-praṇidhāna-prasthāna-parigrhīta*) they are described as having embraced the setting-out [in the Great Vehicle] (a **2Tv** relation), and to have done so by means of a vow (to contribute to) the marvelous arrangement of endless Buddha-fields (a **3Tv** relation).

Of the ten **7Ta** main compounds with five or more members (all ending in *kuśala*, save one in *viśārada*) eight can be said to have a simple structure (II 33.40.43.54.58–61). In the penultimate member the action is specified which the *bodhisattvas* are skilled in and therefore capable of, and this action is determined by the former members of the compound¹¹⁴. The two remaining compounds are cases where

¹¹⁴ That this action is doubly determined by parts of the preceding compound may be suspected in II 40 and 61 from the combination of terms as well as from the form this item has in other versions. But for the moment I will keep in line with the Kanjur translation.

the function of *kuśala* must be explained by assuming that it would bind more than one part of speech, if the compound were transformed into a sentence. In II 27 (*dharmā-pravicaya-vibhakti-nirdeśa-kuśala*) the *bodhisattvas* are described as being skilled in making distinctions and pointing them out (a **7Ta** relation), and as having got the skill by the discrimination of *dharma*s (a **3Ta** relation). In II 37 (*an-anta-kalpa-koṭi-nirdeśa-jñāna-niḥsaraṇa-kuśala*) *kuśala* has even three valences: the *bodhisattvas* are said to be skilful in (leading people to) salvation (a **7Ta** relation), to have got the skill by knowing how to instruct people (a **3Ta** relation), and to have got the skill since infinite crores of Kalpas (a **2Ta** relation). Here, it is less easy to say, that *kuśala* with the increased significance it got from its preceding word is determined by other members of the compound. For *kuśala* and *viśārada* in the 8 other instances of lengthy compounds, and also in three instances of shorter compounds (II 48.52.55), never unite with the preceding word in such a way, that they would participate in its being the subject of further determinations. This is a strong indication that in II 27 and 37 long sentences had been transformed into a compound without much regard to the possibilities of a more intuitive understanding.

To the **7Tv** instances may be appended one example of a lengthy **2Ta** compound. In II 57 (*a-saṃkhyeya-loka-dhātu-gata-buddha-anu-smṛti-samādhī-satata-samitam-abhimukhī-bhūta*) the *bodhisattvas* are said to have become turned to a concentrated calling to mind of the Buddhas staying in innumerable world-regions (a **2Ta** main relation depending on *abhimukha*, *bhūta* adding that this had not always been so), and as having become turned to this uninterruptedly (an **iTa** relation).

(b) An indication will now be given (more must be reserved for another occasion) how some observations may be of interest for the history of ideas and attitudes. The observations are connected with the four categories of main compounds compiled in VII with the purpose of distinguishing different relations to action. As the fourth group contains the small amount of compounds which lack a verbal adjective or any other indication of action, it can be neglected here.

That only one instance of the first and most prominent category, Tatpuruṣas ending in a verbal adjective, can be found in series I (*°pāramīprāpta* [15], the longest compound of the series, not represented in two of the early Chinese translations) could be interpreted in the following way. For describing monks (and the ideals they have) a verbal adjective in a position in which it directly characterizes them

as agents of a verbal action, was, originally, neither necessary nor wished for. On the other hand, the *bodhisattvas* appear as preferably, and from the very beginning (II 1 *dhāraṇīpratilabdhaiḥ*, etc.), described as such agents, though not all, but only 25, of the 31 compounds of this type occurring in series II can be adduced for the statement (*vimukta* in 47 has a passive meaning; in 16 an action is only denied, and in 25, 26, 41 and 44 actions of others towards them are excluded).

To this the next category adds 13 instances of compounds describing *bodhisattvas* as experienced (*kuśala*, *viśārada*) in some action and, thereby, as future agents. Six of them (including the one with *viśārada*) are missing in the earliest Chinese translations (see Synoptic Edition), and of the remaining seven not all seem to have employed the word *kuśala*, only the action appearing in the translation. Such compounds seem to have become increasingly important in the centuries after Kumārajīva (ca. 400 C.E.).

The third category, Bahuvrīhi main compounds of which the first member is a verbal adjective, does not directly point to an action of the persons who are described by them. Here, the verbal adjective signifies a process (no longer) undergone by what is meant by the second member. However, the result expressed by the verbal adjective can mostly be considered as due to an effort of the said persons. Some qualities are described by only denying an action or process which would be of disadvantage to the said persons or denying an action of other persons in regard to them. In most cases it is an indirect way of connecting persons with action, and this seems to have been much appreciated in circles of monks. In series I nine (all homogeneous) of the main eleven compounds are **vB** relations, in series II only thirteen (not homogeneous) of the sixty-two.

(c) Finally, I want to attempt an explanation of the excessive use of compounds in the passage. To some extent it must also be applicable to similar prologues in other Mahāyāna Sūtras, though the list of *bodhisattva* qualities apparently is nowhere as expanded as in the passage.

Comparison with the use of compounds in other parts of the Pañca shows that what happens in the prologue is no development of Buddhist Sanskrit as such, at least not as far as contained in that text. Rather it seems that the language of later texts was affected by such passages. What, then, could have been the motive for this excessive use of compounds, especially in the series on *bodhisattva* qualities? As there are no requirements of metre or technical Sūtra style,

the argument of economics in using language does not prevail. Only one motive seems, therefore, to remain, the need for building up an imposing and aesthetically satisfying entrance to the dialogues of the Pañca. They have more entrances with that function (but with another structure), the Nidānaparivarta etc.

What I would like to call the first entrance conveys the image of two rows of columns, which, because of the propagandistic interest in *bodhisattvas*, had not remained symmetrical. Each quality of the monks and the *bodhisattvas* is isolated as a column, but it also belongs to a sequence. In each row the columns differ in height/length. This seems mainly to be caused by the exigencies of the description of that quality, though there is some tendency to expansion as the sequence develops.

The rows as well as the columns taken as isolated units show examples of stylistic repetitions of which a great part might be interpreted as intended for the purpose of some aesthetic effect.

Employing the categories used by G. VON SIMSON in op. cit. (n. 93), which are mostly in agreement with the definitions in J. GONDA'S Stylistic Repetition in the Veda (Amsterdam 1959), we could say about the rows that they are characterized throughout by the parallelism of the ending of the compounds in °*air/h* (except I 1, II 3.30), extended in II 15.16 to °*kair*. As to whole words this parallelism seems rather to be avoided as II 22.23, 45.46, 50.51, and 54.55 suggest. Positive examples are °*pratīlabdha* in II 1.2, and °*kuśalair/h* in II 58–61. There is alliteration of phonemes (ā° [I 11.12, II 7.8, 10–13, 15–17, 56.57], s° [I 14.15], and sat° [II 52.53])¹¹⁵, of prefixes, words, etc. (*suvimukta* in I 5.6, *kṛta* in I 9.10, *sarva* in II 25.26, 46.47, 50.51, *an*° in II 34.35, *sarvasattva* in II 40.41), and assonance (*karma*° [II 22–24], °*dharma[tā]*° [II 43.44], °*vaśitā*° [II 45.46], [°]*pratītya*° [II 48.49], °*buddha*° [II 56–59]).

In the isolated compound, instead of parallel case endings most often the vowels *a* and *ā* at the end of a member of a compound produce an effect of repetition. Alliteration can be found in II 37 *kalpakotī ... nirdeśajñānaniḥsa*°, II 38 *māyāmarīci ... pratiśrutka-pratibhāsa ... pratibimba*° (notice the sounds in *gaganagandharvānagāra*), II 53 *satatasamīta*°, II 56 *prañidhānaprasthānapari*°, II 57 *smṛtisamādhisatatasamīta*°, II 61 *samādhisatasahasra*°, and II 62 *kalpākṣiṇa*°, assonance in II 23 *pratipra*° and II 33 *gāthābhigīta*°, and paronomasia in I 9 *kṛtakṛtyaiḥ* and I 10 *kṛtakaraṇīyair* (this is

¹¹⁵ In lengthy compounds the beginning sounds are probably too distant from one another to have any noticeable aesthetic effect.

also an example of a stylistic connection of two compounds), and in I 15 °*paramapārami*° and II 19 *gatiṃgataiḥ*.

Examples of stylistic connection of compounds are rather scarce compared with what is described by G. VON SIMSON (op. cit. [n. 93]) with regard to other Buddhist Sanskrit texts. Neither are the examples of stylistic repetition within the compounds impressive. But here I hope that other categories can be found to confirm what I feel to be a very well-formed prose passage, though at some places other requirements prevail (e.g. in PañcaG II 5 *akalpita**pranīdhāna* is grammatically more convincing than *pranīdhānākalpita* of PañcaD, which conforms to the number of seven syllables of the four preceding compounds).

INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS IN THE TWO PAÑCAḠ SERIES¹¹⁶

<i>a(n)</i> °	II 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, 21, 25, 28, 34, 35, 37, 39, 41, 49, 54, 56, 57, 59, 62 (bis)	<i>ājāneya</i> <i>ājñā</i> <i>ādeya</i> <i>ānimitta</i> <i>ārabdha</i> <i>ālapana</i> <i>ālāpin</i> <i>āvaraṇa</i> <i>āsrava</i>	I 7 I 14 II 11 II 4 II 13 II 33 II 30 II 23, 47 I 2
<i>atyanta</i>	II 10	<i>utpāda</i>	II (49,) 58
<i>adhimātra</i>	II 42	<i>upamā</i>	II 38
<i>adhimukta</i>	II 53	<i>upasamkramaṇa</i>	II 58
<i>adhimukti</i>	II 40		
<i>adhimucyamāna</i>	II 38	<i>karaṇīya</i>	I 10
<i>adhyeṣaṇa</i>	II 59	<i>karman</i>	II 22, 23, 24, 47
<i>anuprāpta</i>	I 12	<i>kalpa</i>	II 28, 37, 62
<i>anūsaya</i>	II 50	<i>kalpita</i>	II 5 (a°)
<i>anusmṛti</i>	II 57	<i>kāya</i>	II 14
<i>anta</i>	II 35, 37, 56 (always with <i>an</i> °)	<i>kuśala</i>	II 27, 33, 37, 40, 43, 48, 52, 55, 58, 59, 60, 61
<i>apagata</i>	II 17	<i>kuśīda</i>	II 12 (a°)
<i>apahrta</i>	I 11	<i>kuhaka</i>	II 15 (a°)
<i>abhigīta</i>	II 33	<i>kṛta</i>	I 9, 10
<i>abhiññā</i>	II 9, 10	<i>kṛtya</i>	I 9
<i>abhinirhāra</i>	II 61	<i>koṭī</i>	II 37
<i>abhibhavana</i>	II 35	<i>kleśa</i>	(I 3,) II 24, 47, 60
<i>abhibhūta</i>	II 25 (an°)	<i>kṣaya</i>	II 8, 49 (both times with a°)
<i>abhimukhībhūta</i>	II 57		
<i>artha</i>	I 12	<i>kṣānti</i>	II 6, 19, 42
<i>arhat</i>	I 1	<i>kṣīṇa</i>	I 2, (13,) 62 (a°)
<i>avatāra</i>	II 40		
<i>avatāraṇa</i>	II 55		
<i>avatīrṇa</i>	II 49		
<i>ācchedya</i>	II 34 (an°)		

¹¹⁶ (. . .) in ms., but emended by * . . in section VI.

<i>gagana</i>	II 38	<i>prajñā</i>	I 6
<i>gata</i>	II 19, (31, 50,) 57	<i>praṇidhāna</i>	II 5, 7, 28, 56
<i>gati</i>	II 19, 40	<i>pratiprasrabdha</i>	II 23
<i>gandharvanagara</i>	II 38	<i>pratibimba</i>	II 38
<i>gambhīra</i>	II 19, 44, 49	<i>pratibhāna</i>	II 34
<i>gāthā</i>	II 33	<i>pratibhāsa</i>	II 38
<i>guṇa</i>	II 62	<i>pratilabdha</i>	II 1, 2, 6, 45
<i>gocara</i>	II 4	<i>pratividdha</i>	II 8
<i>caryā</i>	II 40	<i>prativedha</i>	II 43, 52
<i>citta</i>	I 5, 14; II 17, 39, 40, 41, 45	<i>pratiśrutka</i>	II 38
<i>cetas</i>	I 15	<i>pratiśrutkā</i>	II 53
<i>cyuta</i>	II 10 (a°)	<i>pratisamvid</i>	II 8
<i>jīvita</i>	II 14	<i>pratihata</i>	II 41 (a°)
<i>(jñāti)</i>	II 17	<i>pratītya</i>	II 48
<i>*jñātra</i>	II 17	<i>pratītyasamutpāda</i>	II 49
<i>jñāna</i>	II 37, 40, 43, 52, 61	<i>pratyarthika</i>	II 24
<i>dagacandra</i>	II 38	<i>pratyekabuddha</i>	II 26
<i>duravagāha</i>	II 26, 44	<i>pramāṇa</i>	II 54 (a°)
<i>dr̥ṣṭi</i>	II 47, 50, 60	<i>pravādin</i>	II 25
<i>deśaka</i>	II 18	<i>pravacaya</i>	II 27
<i>dharma</i>	II 6, 18, 19, 27, 38, *43, 46, 53, 54	<i>praveśa</i>	II 61
<i>dharmatā</i>	II (43,) 44	<i>praśamana</i>	II 60
<i>dhāraṇī</i>	II 1	<i>prasthāna</i>	II 56
<i>naya</i>	II 8, 49, 54	<i>prahīṇa</i>	II 51
<i>nāga</i>	I 8	<i>prāpta</i>	I (12,) 15; II 20, 46
<i>nānā</i>	II 60	<i>buddha</i>	II 57, 58, 59
<i>niḥkleśa</i>	I 3	<i>buddhakṣetra</i>	II 56
<i>niḥsaraṇa</i>	II 37	<i>bhava</i>	I 13
<i>nirapekṣa</i>	II 14	<i>bhāra</i>	I 11
<i>nirāmiṣa</i>	II 18	<i>°bhr̥kuṭika</i>	II 31
<i>nirdeśa</i>	II 8, 27, 37, 48, 54	<i>(madhu)</i>	II 32
<i>nirmāṇa</i>	II 38	<i>*madhura</i>	II 32
<i>nihata</i>	II 24	<i>marīci</i>	II 38
<i>para</i>	II 25, 33	<i>mahat</i>	I 8, II 9, 20
<i>parama</i>	I 15, II 19	<i>mānasa</i>	II 21
<i>parikṣīṇa</i>	I 13	<i>māyā</i>	II 38
<i>parigrhīta</i>	II 56	<i>māra</i>	II 22
<i>parimita</i>	II 59 (a°)	<i>mukha</i>	II 29
<i>paryanta</i>	II 62 (a°)	<i>yathātmya</i>	II 55
<i>paryutthāna</i>	II 50, 60	<i>lapaka</i>	II 16 (a°)
<i>parśad</i>	II 35	<i>lābha</i>	II 17
<i>pārami</i>	I 15	<i>lokadhātu</i>	II 57
<i>pūrva</i>	II 30	<i>vacana</i>	II 11, 32
		<i>varṇa</i>	II 62
		<i>vaśitā</i>	I 15, 45, 46
		<i>vaśībhūta</i>	I 4

<i>vikrīḍaṇa</i>	II 61		with <i>a</i> °)
<i>vikrīḍita</i>	II 9	<i>satatasamita</i>	II 53, 57
<i>vigata</i>	II 50	<i>*sattva</i>	II 40, 41, 60
<i>vibhakti</i>	II 27	<i>satya</i>	II 52
<i>vimukta</i>	I 5, 6, 14 (all with <i>su</i> °), II 47	(<i>satva</i>)	II 40, 41, 60
		<i>sama</i>	II 53
<i>viśārada</i>	II 54	<i>amatā</i>	II 6, *43
<i>vihārīn</i>	II 3	<i>amatikrānta</i>	II 22
<i>vīrya</i>	II 13	<i>samanvāgata</i>	II 7, 37, 42, 62
<i>vaiśāradya</i>	II 20, 36	<i>samādhi</i>	II 2, 57, 61
<i>vyapagata</i>	II 31	<i>samārabdha</i>	II 28
<i>vyūha</i>	II 56	<i>saṃyak</i>	I 14
		<i>sarva</i>	I 15, II 6, 22, 25, 26, 40, 41, 46, 47, 50, 51, 53, 58
<i>śata</i>	II 61		II 61
<i>śūṇyatā</i>	II 3	<i>sahasra</i>	I 5, 6, 14, II 28
<i>śrāvaka</i>	II 26	<i>su</i> °	I 5, 6, 14, II 28
<i>ślakṣṇa</i>	II 32	<i>sūkṣma</i>	II 40
<i>saṃyojana</i>	I 13, II 51	<i>smita</i>	II 29
<i>samlīna</i>	II 39 (<i>a</i> °)	<i>sva</i>	II 45
<i>saṅga</i>	II 7 (<i>a</i> °)	<i>svaka</i>	I 12
<i>saṃkucita</i>	II 21 (<i>a</i> °)	<i>svapna</i>	II 38
<i>saṃkhyeya</i>	II 28, 57 (both		

Abbreviations

Ad	Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā
AdH	Hsüan-tsang's translation of the Ad in T 220 (3) [vol. 7], p. 427 ff.
Aṣṭa	Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā
AṣṭaV	Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā. With Haribhadra's Commentary Called <i>Āloka</i> ed. P. L. VAIDYA . [Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, No. 4]. Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute, 1960.
BHSD	FRANKLIN EDGERTON, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary. Vol. II: Dictionary. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953.
CoPL	EDWARD CONZE, The Prajñāpāramitā Literature. 2nd ed., revised and enlarged. [Bibliographia Philologica Buddhica, Series Maior I]. Tokyo: The Reiyukai Library, 1978.
CPD	V. TRENCKNER et al., A Critical Pāli Dictionary. Copenhagen 1924—.
Daśa	Daśasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā
DaśaK	STEN KONOW, The Two First Chapters of the Daśasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā. Restoration of the Sanskrit text, analysis and index. Oslo 1941.
Dbh	Daśabhūmikasūtra, ed. P. L. VAIDYA. [Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, No. 7]. Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute, 1967.
ga	The Tibetan translation of the Pañca in the Peking edition of the Bstan-'gyur, Śer phyin ga 2b2 ff. (ed. SUZUKI, Vols. 88–89).

- GV Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra, ed. P. L. VAIDYA. [Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, No. 5]. Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute, 1960.
- KP Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka, ed. I. YAMADA. 2 vols. London: SOAS, 1968.
- Lañk The Lañkāvatāra Sūtra, ed. B. NANJIO. [Bibliotheca Otaniensis, Vol. 1]. Kyoto: Otani University Press, 1956 (1923).
- LSC The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom with the divisions of the Abhisamayālaṅkāra. Part I, tr. E. CONZE. London: Luzac & Company, 1961.
- MaPL TOKUMYO MATSUMOTO, Die Prajñāpāramitā-Literatur nebst einem Specimen der Suvikrāntavikrami-Prajñāpāramitā. [Bonner orientalistische Studien, Heft 1]. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1932.
- Mvy Mahāvvyutpatti, ed. R. SAKAKI. 2 vols. Kyoto 1916–1925 (repr. Tokyo 1962).
- MvyN A New Critical Edition of the Mahāvvyutpatti, Sanskrit-Tibetan-Mongolian Dictionary of Buddhist Terminology, edd. Y. ISHIHAMA – Y. FUKUDA. [Studia Tibetica, No. 16]. Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko 1989.
- ñi The Tibetan translation of the Pañca in the Peking Edition of the Bka'-gyur, Śer-phyin ñi laff. (ed. SUZUKI, Vols. 18–19).
- Pañca Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā
- PañcaD The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, ed. N. DUTT. [Calcutta Oriental Series, No. 28]. London: Luzac & Co., 1934.
- PañcaG Facsimile edition of the Gilgit manuscript of the Pañca in: Gilgit Buddhist Manuscripts. Part 3, edd. RAGHU VIRA – LOKESH CHANDRA. [Śatapiṭaka Series, Vol. 10/3]. New Delhi 1966.
- PañcaH Hsüan-tsang's translation of the Pañca in T 220 (2) [vol. 7], p. 1 ff.
- PañcaK Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā II–III, ed. T. KIMURA. Tokyo 1986.
- Pāṇ. Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī
- PraS Pratyutpannabuddhasaṃmukhāvasthitasamādhisūtra
- PraSH PAUL HARRISON, The Samādhi of Direct Encounter with the Buddhas of the Present. An Annotated English Translation of the Tibetan Version of the *Pratyutpanna-Buddha-Saṃmukhāvasthita-Samādhī-Sūtra* with Several Appendices relating to the History of the Text. [Studia Philologica Buddhica, Monograph Series V]. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1990.
- PraST The Tibetan Text of PraS, ed. P. M. HARRISON. Tokyo: The Reiyukai Library, 1978.
- Rketu Ratnaketuparivarta. Sanskrit Text ed. Y. KURUMIYA. Kyoto: Heirakuji-Shoten 1978.
- RketuT 'Dus pa chen po rin po che tog gi gzuñs, ... being the Tibetan translation of the Ratnaketuparivarta, ed. Y. KURUMIYA. Kyoto 1979.
- Śata Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā
- ŚataGh Čatasāhasrikā-Prajñā-Pāramitā. A Theological and Philosoph-

- ical Discourse of Buddha with his Disciples (in a Hundred-Thousand Stanzas), ed. P. GHOSA. Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1902–1913.
- SP Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-Sūtram, edd. U. WOGIHARA – C. TSUCHIDA (1934). Romanized and revised text. Tokyo: The Sankibo Buddhist Book Store, 1958.
- SR Samādhirājasūtra, ed. P. L. VAIDYA. [Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, No. 2]. Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute, 1961.
- ŚS Śikṣāsamuccaya, ed. C. BENDALL. St. Petersburg 1902 (repr. 's-Gravenhage: Mouton, 1957).
- SWTF Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden. Begonnen von E. Waldschmidt. Im Auftrage der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen hrsg. von H. BECHERT. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973–.
- T Taishō shinshū daizōkyō, edd. J. TAKAKUSU – K. WATANABE. Tokyo 1924–1934.
- Traité E. LAMOTTE (tr.), Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna (Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra). Tome 1: Chapitres I–XV. [Bibliothèque du Muséon, Vol. 18]. Louvain 1944 (repr. 1966).
- W II/1 JACOB WACKERNAGEL, Altindische Grammatik II, 1: Einleitung zur Wortlehre. Nominalkomposition. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1905 (repr. 1985).

THE SOURCES FOR BU STON'S INTRODUCTION TO THE ACTS OF A BUDDHA

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I.

In one of the pictorial traditions of India the life of the Buddha is, at least since post-Gupta times, represented by eight great events (four from the life and four miracles)¹. This tradition determined many steles of Pāla sculpture. There, the enlightenment takes a central position and the other events are arranged to the sides and to the top (usually *parinirvāṇa*) of the stele. The mode of narration is extremely reduced². This tradition in Tibet is represented by the Eight Stūpas which stand for / symbolize these events³. The textual sources, also diverging in some details, tell the event and the site where the event took place⁴. Probably the earliest depiction of the

* Prof. Ernst Steinkellner initiated this work during a seminar. I would like to thank him for his support and patience.

¹ JOANNA WILLIAMS, *Sārnāth Gupta Steles of the Buddha's Life*. *Ars Orientalis* 10 (1975) 171–192, p. 191, fig. 3.

² E.g. SUSAN L. HUNTINGTON, *The "Pāla-Sena" Schools of Sculpture*. Leiden 1984, figg. 54, 131, 152, 153.

³ An unusual Thangka in the Zimmerman Family Collection shows these eight scenes in the tradition of the Pāla steles and adds some other events at the bottom (Asita, Departure, Cutting the hair and Sujātā). In addition eight Stūpas are depicted on the upper edge of the Thangka. The proposed connection of the scenes with the twelve acts and with the Lalitavistara is impossible as stated by the authors. On the one hand, the twelve acts do not include any miracles, and on the other, the Lalitavistara does not include the *parinirvāṇa* which concludes both the eight great events and the twelve acts. Also the dating is disputable. See SUSAN L. HUNTINGTON – JOHN C. HUNTINGTON, *Leaves from the Bodhi Tree: The Art of Pāla India (8th–12th centuries)* and its International Legacy. Seattle–London 1990, p. 316–318, no. 107.

⁴ Cf. GIUSEPPE TUCCI, *Stupa. Art, Architectonics and Symbolism*. New Delhi 1988, p. v–vii, 21–24; HAJIME NAKAMURA, *The Aṣṭamahāsthānacaityaśtotra and the Chinese and Tibetan Versions of a Text Similar to it*. In: *Indianisme et Bouddhisme. Mélanges offerts à Mgr Étienne Lamotte*. Louvain-la-neuve 1980, p. 259–265; P 2024 & 2025.

Eight Stūpas is found in the 'Du khañ at Alchi⁵. An Indian model for these Eight Stūpas is still uncertain although a tradition exists of Stūpas erected above the eight parts of the Buddha's relics⁶.

In addition, there exists in Tibet a textual tradition which characterizes the life of the Buddha by the expression *mdzad pa bcu gñis*. This system of 'twelve acts' is well known there, and was used in the first western descriptions of the life of the Buddha according to the Tibetan tradition⁷. In the Tibetan Canon a Dvādaśakāranāmanaya-stotra is included which describes the life of the Buddha by arranging it in twelve acts. The Stotra is attributed on the one hand to Nāgārjuna, and on the other to 'Bri guñ skyod pa (1142–1217)⁸. A so-called 'act' signifies more a part of the life than a single deed. Accordingly, there exists a Tibetan version of the life of the Buddha, compiled by Chos kyi 'od zer (ca. 1300) which is entitled *mDzad pa bcu gñis* and is arranged in twelve parts. This version is only partly preserved in a Mongolian manuscript⁹. This system of twelve 'acts' was also used to

⁵ NAKAMURA (op. cit., p. 265) attributes the Aṣṭamahāsthānacaitya-stotra to the Kuṣāṇa-period! Cf. DEBORAH KLIMBURG-SALTER, *The Life of the Buddha in Western Himalayan Monastic Art and Its Indian Origins: Act One* (The Tucci Archives Preliminary Study, 2). EW 38 (1988) 189–214, p. 209, figg. 16 & 17.

⁶ In that connection the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra and related texts mention usually ten Stūpas: eight for the relics, one for the urn, and one for the remaining coal; cf. ERNST WALDSCHMIDT, *Die Überlieferung vom Lebensende des Buddha. Eine vergleichende Analyse des Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra und seiner Entsprechungen. Teil II*. Göttingen 1948, p. 328–330.

⁷ Cf. M. A. CSOMA DE KÖRÖS, *Notices on the Life of Śaṅkya* extracted from the Tibetan Authorities (1839), repr. in: *Tibetan Studies*. Budapest 1986, p. (229–263) 231 f. I was not able to find his source for the description of the first act; also ANTON SCHIEFNER, *Eine Tibetische Lebensbeschreibung Śakyamuni's des Begründers des Buddhathums*. St. Petersburg 1849, p. 2 and C. F. KÖPPEN, *Die Religion des Buddha und ihre Entstehung*. Berlin 1906, I/74. These works might have influenced the title of A. FOUCHER's article "Une liste indienne des actes du Buddha" about the correlations between textual and pictorial traditions (in: *École pratique des hautes études, section des sciences religieuses*. Paris 1908, p. 1–32). He does not explain the title and speaks in the article of scenes and episodes.

⁸ P 2026, 95b1–96a7; cf. LOBSANG DARGYAY, *The Twelve Deeds of the Buddha – A Controversial Hymn Ascribed to Nāgārjuna*. *The Tibet Journal* 9.2 (1984) 3–12.

⁹ N. POPPE (*The Twelve Deeds of the Buddha – a Mongolian Version of the Lalitavistara*. [Asiatische Forschungen 23]. Wiesbaden 1967, p. 11, 17f.) calls this text a shorter version of the Lalitavistara since some parts of the texts are identical in their Mongolian translations. However the *parinirvāṇa* is not included in the Lalitavistara and thus must have been described according to other sources. Only the parts 6–9 ("The one in which he became monk

describe the life of other important religious personalities¹⁰, but to my knowledge has never determined any pictorial tradition¹¹.

As there seems to exist no visual model for the Eight Stūpas in India, also no Indian literary model for the concept of the 'twelve acts' is known to me. This article should be a first step in determining whether any existed. The starting point for this inquiry is the chapter on the acts of the Buddha in Bu ston's Chos 'byuñ (B)¹². This chapter precedes the summarized biography of the Buddha and is, to my knowledge, the oldest available text discussing this theme. In the following, the sources used by Bu ston are identified and collected. I also attempt to clarify the context within which the deeds are mentioned in the sources.

As an introduction Bu ston says (according to OBERMILLER's translation): "Although the acts of the Buddha are so numerous as to be inconceivable to our mind, still, having in view those, who demand a definite number, and, moreover, in order to examine more closely the principal achievements of the Buddha, the learned (usually) mention twelve acts"¹³. In the following discussion Bu ston mentions sources in which the expression *mdzad pa bcu gñis* is used as a designation for the life of the Buddha (see below, quot. 1 & 2). Then he describes less frequently mentioned deeds in different enumerations and shows which act is usually the first in such enumerations (quot. 3–9). However, the largest part of this chapter is used to

and left home" to "Subdual of Śimnu/Māra") are preserved in an illustrated manuscript of the 18th century. Cf. L. LIGETI, Les douze actes du Bouddha. In: Monumenta Linguae Mongolicae Collecta V. Budapest 1974, p. 9–22.

¹⁰ Cf. G. H. MULLIN – Acharya TUB-TEN CHAM-PA, Kun-ga Gyal-tsen's 'Life of the Dalai Lama I: The Twelve Wonderous Deeds of Omniscient Gen-Dun Drub'. The Tibet Journal 10,4 (1985) 3–42.

¹¹ In the 'Brom ston lha khañ chen mo at Ta pho (15th–16th c.) and in the new temple in Poo, Kinnaur (finished 1990), I saw depictions of the life of the Buddha, on which the artists wrote an enumeration of the mDzad pa bcu gñis to introduce the events. However, it appeared to be only a conceptual frame for the whole composition which depicted other events as well.

¹² Transl. E. OBERMILLER, History of Buddhism (Chos-ḥbyung) by Buston. I. Pt.: The Jewellery of Scripture. Heidelberg 1931, p. 133–138 and II. Pt.: The History of Buddhism in India and Tibet. Heidelberg 1932, p. 72 (repr. Delhi 1986). It should be noted that OBERMILLER's division of the biography of the Buddha in twelve parts is not found in the original (cf. quot. 23).

¹³ OBERMILLER, op. cit., I/133 translating: *thub pa la mdzad pa bsam gyis mi khyab kyañ grañs la dga' ba rjes su bzuñ ba dañ gso bo ñe bar bzuñ nas mkhas pa rnam kyis mdzad pa bcu gñis su tha sñad mdzad de* (B 737,6f.).

demonstrate which acts are attributed to the Bodhisattva and which to the Buddha (quot. 10–22). The last two quotations are used as a transition to the actual biography of the Buddha. The expression *mdzad pa bcu gñis* is therefore used, on the one hand, as an expression for the Life of the Buddha, and on the other hand, for an enumeration of different events, in any representative number, which characterise the life of the Buddha.

Bu ston, therefore, does not specify a certain series of events but emphasizes that he follows in his summary of the life of the Buddha the verses quoted from the Uttaratantra (cf. quot. 8 [A2] & 23)¹⁴. The system of the twelve acts was apparently already a tradition by the early 14th century, at least in Tibet. This is not only proved by the above mentioned Stotra and the title of Chos kyi 'od zer's text but also by Bu ston's introductory sentence. It should be noted that Bu ston also discusses only deeds which are usually not found in such enumerations (the usually mentioned acts being simply assumed)¹⁵. It is also remarkable that usually the miracles, which constitute four of the eight great events, are not included in such enumerations (quot. 3 shows an exception).

The passage in Dharmamitra, where he speaks of *don mdzad pa (rnam pa) bcu gñis* (cf. quot. 2) attests to an Indian usage of a similar term. It is possible that Bu ston, in referring to this early expression in abbreviated form, identified it with the expression *mdzad pa bcu gñis* used by the Tibetan tradition. Thereby he possibly assumed that Dharmamitra's phrase was the model of the latter.

At the conclusion of the Buddha's biography Bu ston summarizes his sources once more: "These twelve acts are partly different in the Āgama, the Abhinīṣkramaṇasūtra and the Lalitavistara; here [they are] described following the Lalitavistara, and how [the Buddha] reached Nirvāṇa is described according to the [Vinaya-]Kṣudraka. To calm down reflections etc. about them one should know the Upāyakauśalyasūtra and others."¹⁶ Bu ston mentions for example

¹⁴ These verses are also used by mKhas grub rje to enumerate the acts of a Buddha; cf. F. D. LESSING – A. WAYMAN, Introduction to the Buddhist Tantric Systems. The Hague 1968 (repr. Delhi 1983), p. 24f.

¹⁵ For the usual enumerations compare Wen tshig's commentary to the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra P 5517, 117a–118b (quot. 9) or the enumeration of Dharmamitra (quot. 2 [B]).

¹⁶ B 789,2–4: *mdzad pa bcu gñis 'di dag la lun dan mñon 'byun dan rgya rol rnams la mi mthun pa ci rigs su 'byun mod kyi 'dir rgya rol gyi rjes su 'braṅs te bśad ciñ mya nan las 'das pa'i tshul phran tshegs bžin bśad do || 'di dag gi dgonz pa la sogs pa ži ba tu thabs la mkhas pa'i mdo la sogs par šes par bya'o ||*.

the 18 (heretic) teachers in his description of the descent from the Tuṣita heaven which are not mentioned in the Lalitavistara. The names and the following comparison of himself with a conch-shell (*śaṅkha*, *duñ*) which is used by the Buddha to comfort the gods must be taken from the Vinaya (as part of the Āgama) or the Abhiniṣkramaṇasūtra¹⁷. Bu ston also mentions that some texts enumerate four, some five considerations¹⁸. The expression *mdzad pa bcu gñis* was not found in any one of these texts.

II.

After giving the quotation, report, or reference from Bu ston (= A) the corresponding parts of the different sources are quoted and their context is indicated (= B)¹⁹. If a quotation from Bu ston is only a part of a cited passage, this part is indicated by bold letters. The sources are numbered following their appearance in Bu ston's chapter and the headings are given as Bu ston mentions them. Supplements are given in square brackets, the equivalents in Sanskrit in round brackets. The abbreviations used for the texts are listed at the end of the article.

1. Pad ma'i dad tshul (Kamalaśīla)

(A) B 737,7–738,1: *sañs rgyas kyi sku'am mdzad pa bcu gñis la sogs pa bsam la byiñ ba ži bar bya'o ||*

(B) This quotation could not be identified.

2. Chos kyi bśes gñen (Dharmamitra)

(A) B 738,1: *dga' ldan gyi gnas nas babs pa la sogs pa mdzad pa bcu gñis kyiś gdul bya smiñ par mdzad pa ||*

(B) This quotation is found in the eighth chapter of the Abhisamayālaṅkāra-kārikā-ṭīkā-prasphuṭapadā (P 5194). It describes the different bodys (*kāya*) of a Buddha.

P 5194, 121a2–8: *śākya thub pa la sogs pa'i gzugs kañ gis že bya ba la | dga' ldan nas babs pa la sogs pa don mdzad pa rnam pa bcu gñis kyi²⁰ gdul bya yoñs su smiñ par mdzad pa ni rnam pa smiñ pa'i sprul pa'i*

¹⁷ B 743,7–744,5; Abhiniṣkramaṇasūtra: P 967, 6a5–6b6; Vinaya: P 1030/17, 260a3–261a1.

¹⁸ B 743,1–3. In the Lalitavistara (14,8–24) they are four, in the Vinaya and the Abhiniṣkramaṇasūtra five: P 1030/17, 258a6–260a3 & P 967, 6b8.

¹⁹ In the cases when there were no critical editions at my disposal the Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking Edition (P), ed. D. T. SUZUKI, Tokyo–Kyoto 1955–1958, was used.

²⁰ *kyis*: *kyi*.

*sku ste | de la don mdzad pa bcu gñis ni 'phags pa dad pa'i stobs bskyed
pa la 'jug pa'i phyag rgya'i mdo²¹ las | ji skad du dus gcig tu phyogs
bcu'i 'jig rten gyi khams rab 'byams thams cad du dga' ldan gyi gnas
mchog na bzugs pa dañ | 'chi 'pho ba dañ skye ba dañ | mñon par 'byuñ
ba dañ | dka' ba spyod pa'i sbyor ba dañ | byañ chub kyi sñiñ por gśegs
pa dañ | 'dud bcom pa dañ | mñon par rdzogs par byañ chub pa dañ |
chos kyi 'khor lo rab tu bskor ba dañ | yoñs su mya ñan las 'da' ba dañ |
chos nub par ston pa la mkhas pa źes gsuñs pa rnams te | 'dir chos nub
par ston pa yañ gdul bya rab tu ma gus pa dag gi chos dañ chos smra ba
la rten pa'i sdig pa mi 'byuñ bar bya ba'i phyir sañs rgyas kyi mdzad pa
chen po ste | de'i phyir 'phags pa gser 'od dam pa źes bya ba theg pa chen
po'i mdo²² las |*

*sañs rgyas mya ñan mi 'da' źiñ | chos kyañ nub par mi 'gyur te |
sems can rnams ni gdul ba'i phyir | mya ñan 'da' la sogs pa ston ||
źes gsuñs so ||*

3. Rin chen phreñ ba (Ratnāvalī)

(A) B 738,1–3:

*sñiñ rje'i dbañ du gyur pa rnams | gśegs dañ bltams dañ rol pa dañ |
khab nas 'byuñ dañ dka' spyod dañ²³ |
byañ chub ched du²⁴ bdud sde 'joms ||
chos kyi 'khor lo bskor²⁵ ba dañ | lha rnams kun nas babs ba²⁶ dañ |
de bźin du ni mya ñan las | 'das pa ston pa'i²⁷ mdzad pa yin ||*

(B) This quotation is not to be found in the Ratnāvalī²⁸. In this case Bu ston seems to be mistaken because it is found in nearly identical form in the Bodhicittavivarāṇa (BV), which is also attributed to Nāgārjuna²⁹. Here the acts are attributed to a Bodhisattva (*rgyal ba'i sras*) like Samantabhadra who has fully developed the thought of enlightenment (*bodhicitta*)³⁰.

²¹ Śraddhābalādhānāvātāramudrāsūtra, P 867.

²² Suvarṇaprabhāsottamasūtra, P 176.

²³ *dka' spyod dañ: dka' ba spyod* (BV 91).

²⁴ *ched du: che dañ* (BV 91).

²⁵ *bskor: skor* (BV 92).

²⁶ *kun nas babs ba: kun gyis źu ba* (BV 92).

²⁷ *pa'i: par* (BV 92).

²⁸ Cf. M. HAHN, Nāgārjuna's Ratnāvalī. Vol. I: The Basic Texts (Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese). [Indica et Tibetica 1]. Bonn 1982.

²⁹ Cf. CH. LINDTNER, Nagarjuniana. Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna. Copenhagen 1982, p. 210 (BV 91–92). LINDTNER is of the same opinion (211 n. 91).

³⁰ LINDTNER, op. cit., p. 209–211.

4. Thabs la mkhas pa zes pa la sogs pa'i mdo
(Upāyakauśalya and other Sūtras)

(A) B 738,4: *dam pa'i chos nub pa la mkhas pa ||*

(B) This act could not be found in the Upāyakauśalyasūtra (P 927)³¹, but is mentioned in the above quoted section from Dharmamitra (2 [B]).

5. gSer 'od dam pa (Suvarṇaprabhāsottamasūtra)

(A) B 738,5:

sañs rgyas mya nan yoñs mi 'da' | chos kyañ nub par mi 'gyur te ||

(B) SPSū 17. The gods praise the Tathāgata in the following verses (Version Tib. I, first half of the 8th c.):

*sañs rgyas mya nan yoñs³² mi 'da' | chos kyañ nub par mi 'gyur te |
sems can yoñs su smin mdzad phyir |*

*yoñs su mya nan 'da' ba ston ||30||
sañs rgyas bcom ldan bsam mi khyab | de bzün gsegs pa rtag pa'i sku |
sems can rnam la phan pa'i phyir |*

bkod pa rnam pa sna tshogs ston ||31||

NOBEL, the editor of the Tibetan translations, notes to this stanza (n. 242) that the complement of this verse by OBERMILLER (op. cit. [n. 12], 1/181 n. 1247) doesn't fit any version of the original text. In my opinion OBERMILLER has completed this verse by quoting the version in Dharmamitra (2 [B]).

6. mDo sde rgyan gyi 'grel pa (Sūtrālaṅkārabhāṣya)

(A) B 738,6: *dga' ldan gyi gnas na bzugs pa la sogs pa ston pa'i sgo nas . . .*

(B) This quotation is the last of a series of comparisons for the arising of the thought of enlightenment (*cittotpāda*) in a Bodhisattva.

SABh 17,6–8: *upāyakauśalyasahagato meghopamaḥ sarvasattvārthakriyātadadhīnatvāt tuṣītabhavanavāsādisaṃdārśanataḥ | yathā meghāt sarvabhājanalokasampattayaḥ |*

7. mNon rtogs rgyan gyi 'grel pa (Abhisamayālaṅkāravṛtti)

(A) B 738,7: *dga' ldan gyi gnas na bzugs pa la sogs pa kun tu ston par ruñ ba . . .*

(B) Here too, one compares the *dharmakāya* with a cloud to describe a Bodhisattva's thought. It is the last of 22 similar comparisons.

³¹ In this case the quotation seems only to indicate a certain deed which ought to be mentioned in several different texts (Upāyakauśalyasūtra and others).

³² *yoñs*: *yoñs* (Tib. II).

P 5185, 24a7f.: *ñi śu gñis pa chos kyi sku dañ ldan pa ni sprin lta bu'o*
 || *de bzin gsegs pa'i spyod lam bstan par 'dod pa dañ | glañ po che'i lta*
stañs kyiś lta bar 'dod pa'i byañ chub sems dpa' zes rgya cher gañ gsuñs
pa ste | dga' ldan gyi gnas na bžugs pa kun tu ston pas sems can gyi don
bya ba rnam pa thams cad de la rag las pa'i phyir ro ||

AAV 22: *dvāvimśatitamo dharmakāyasahagato meghopamo yad āha –*
tathāgateri yāpathaṃ saṃdarśayitukāmena nāgāvalokitam avalokayitu-
kāmena bodhisattvena <mahāsattvene> ti vistarah | tuṣitabhavanavāsā-
disaṃdarśanena sarvasattvārthakriyāṇāṃ tadadhīnatvāt ||

8. rGyud bla (Uttaratantra)

(A1) B 738,7: *skye ba mñon par skye ba dan* /³³

(A2) B 740,2–4:

thugs rje chen pos 'jig rten mkhyen | 'jig rten kun la gzigś nas ni |
chos kyi sku las ma g.yos par | sprul pa'i rañ bzin sna tshogs kyiś ||
skye ba mñon par skye ba dañ | dga' ldan gnas ni 'pho ba dañ |
lhums su žugs dañ bltams pa dañ | bzo yi gnas la mkhas pa dañ ||
btsun mo'i 'khor dgyes rol ba dañ | nes 'byun dka' ba spyod pa dañ |
byañ chub sñiñ por gsegs pa dañ | bdud sde 'joms dañ rdzogs par ni ||
byañ chub chos kyi 'khor lo dañ |

mya ñan 'das par gsegs mdzad rnamś |
yons su ma dag žiñ rnamś su | srid pa ji srid gnas par ston ||

(B) RGV 87f. (characterizing the *nirmāṇakāya*):

mahākaruṇayā kṛtsnaṃ lokam ālokyā lokavit |
dharmakāyād avīralaṃ³⁴ nirmāṇaiś citrarūpibhiḥ ||53||
jātakāny upapattiṃ³⁵ ca tuṣiteśu cyutiṃ tataḥ |
garbhā[va]kramaṇaṃ janma śilpāsthānāni kauśalam ||54||
antahpuraratikrīḍāṃ naiṣkramyaṃ duḥkhacārikām |
bodhimaṇḍopasaṃkrāntiṃ mārāsainyapramardanam ||55||
saṃbodhiṃ dharmacakraṃ ca nirvāṇādhigamakriyāṃ³⁶ |
kṣetreṣv aparīśuddheṣu darśayatyā bhavasthiteḥ ||56||

³³ In connection with the last three quotations it is necessary to correct the translation of OBERMILLER (op. cit. [n. 12], I/134) as follows: "Some (gloss: Rigs ral) say that the so-called descent from the Tuṣita is performed as the first [(?) act]. Others (gloss: rGyañ ro ba) contradict to that because (in the above three quotations) the sojourn in the Tuṣita-heaven is mentioned as the first act" (B 738,6–739,1).

³⁴ T.: *ma g.yos pa*.

³⁵ T.: *skye ba mñon par skye ba dañ*.

³⁶ T.: *mdzad rnamś*.

9. dGoñs ba ñes 'grel gyi 'grel chen
 ("Great Commentary" to the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra)

(A) B 739,1f.: *'jig rten gyi khams thams cad du sprul pa'i skus dan po dga' ldan gyi gnas nas babs pa nas tha ma yoñs su mya ñan las 'das pa chen po ston pa'i bar gyi sañs rgyas kyi mdzad pa bcu gñis la sogs par gcig car ston . . .*

(B) Bu ston in his Chos bsgyur dkar chag (ChK) calls two commentaries of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra *'grel chen*: NISHIOKA 676 and 654. NISHIOKA 676 is identical with the commentary of Wen tshig, the Āryagambhīrasaṃdhinirmocanaṭīkā³⁷. NISHIOKA 654 is the Āryasaṃdhinirmocanasūtrasya Vyākhyāna by Byañ chub rdzu 'phrul³⁸. In neither texts is this quotation found in the section dealing with the explanation of the different bodys (*kāya*), which is included in the 10th chapter. Wen tshig calls the acts in his extensive commentary *mtshan ñid rnam pa* and quotes different enumerations³⁹. The content of the Vyākhyāna is in agreement with Bu ston, but the expression *mdzad pa bcu gñis* is not used⁴⁰.

10. mDo yab sras mjal ba (Pitāputrasaṃāgamasūtra)

(A) B 739,4f.:

*bye ba brgyad cur rgyal ba ñid / sañs rgyas ñid du bstan gyur kyañ /
 da duñ chog pa'i 'du śes bsal⁴¹ / byañ chub mchog tu thugs kyañ 'jug //
 ston gsum drug cu rtsa gcig gi / sañs rgyas zñ rnam dag gyur pa⁴² /
 ji ltar thub pa thabs mkhas dan⁴³ / rgyal ba khyod ni kun gyis 'tshal //
 da duñ dan por⁴⁴ thugs bskyed par / de dan der ni yoñs bstan te |
 da duñ⁴⁵ du yañ 'dren pa khyod |*

sañs rgyas mañ po ston par⁴⁶ mdzad //

(B) For this quotation Bu ston gives the context himself (B 739,3f.)

³⁷ Cf. E. STEINKELLNER, Who is Byañ chub rdzu 'phrul? Tibetan and Non-Tibetan Commentaries on the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* – A survey of the literature. BIS 4/5 (1989) 229–251, p. 236; NISHIOKA 655 & P 5517.

³⁸ P 5845. About the author compare STEINKELLNER, op. cit., p. 236–241.

³⁹ P 5517, 116b2–125a7.

⁴⁰ P 5845, 37a1–5.

⁴¹ *bsal*: *brtsal* (P).

⁴² *gyur pa*: *mdzad pa* (P).

⁴³ *dan*: *ba* (P).

⁴⁴ *da duñ dan por*: *da dud dan po* (P).

⁴⁵ *duñ*: *dud* (P).

⁴⁶ *par*: *pa* (P).

by summarizing the content of the fifth chapter⁴⁷. At the end of this chapter Mañjuśrī praises the Buddhas (P 760/16, 37a4–7):

*dpa' bo rnams ni thabs mkhas ste / sems can rnams la thugs brtse zin' /
lus can yons su smin mdzad phyir / dpa' bo chen po rnam par 'phrul //*
... (A)

11. Dam pa'i chos pad ma dkar po (Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra)

(A) B 739,6:

*bskal pa bye ston bsams kyi mi khyab pa /
de yi tshad ni nam yañ med pa nas /
byañ chub mchog rab 'di ni ñes thob ste /
ña ni rtag tu chos kyañ rab 'chad do //*

(B) In the 15th chapter of the SDhSū the Buddha explains to the Bodhisattva Maitreya why he was venerated by 100 000 Bodhisattvas (ch. 14). He begins with the following verses (SDhSū 323,7):

*acintīyā kalpasahasrakotyo, yāsām pramāṇam na kadāci vidyate /
prāptā mayā eṣa tadāgrabodhīr,
dharmam ca deśemy ahu nityakālam //1//
samādapemī bahubodhisattvān, baudhasmī jñānasmi sthapemī caiva /
sattvāna koṭīn ayutān anekān, paripācayāmī bahukalpakotyaḥ //2//*

12. Lañ kar gśegs pa (Lañkāvatārasūtra)

(A) B 740,1:

*'dod pa'i khamś dañ gzugs med du /
sañs rgyas rnam par 'tshañ mi rgya /
gzugs kyi khamś kyi 'og min du / 'dod chags bral khyod 'tshañ rgya'o //*

(B) This quotation belongs to the last part of the Sūtra, the Sagāthaka⁴⁸. The verses of this collection are meant to assist one in memorizing doctrines and narrations⁴⁹. The quoted verse has neither a connection to its context nor a matching part in the main body of the Sūtra. LASū 361: *kāmadhātāu tathārūpye na vai buddho vibudhyate /*

rūpadhātvakaniṣṭheṣu vītarāgeṣu budhyate //774//

⁴⁷ P 760/16, 31b6–37b6, sÑon byuñ ba 'od bsrus chen po (rto śus pa); e.g. the birth as Indraketu (P 760/16, 33b3).

⁴⁸ J. TAKASAKI (Analysis of the Lañkāvatāra. In search of its original form. In: Indianisme et Bouddhisme [s. n. 4], p. [339–352] 339 n. 3, 345) speaks hypothetically of two different texts with the same source material. Both, the Lañkāvatāra and the Sagāthaka, have about 220 verses in common and both have been enlarged in the course of time.

⁴⁹ Cf. D. T. SUZUKI, The Lankavatara Sutra – a Mahayana Text. London 1932 (repr. 1966), p. xliv – xlv and P. L. VAIDYA, Saddharma-lañkāvatāra-sūtra. Darbhanga 1963, p. XVI.

13. sTug po bkod pa'i mdo (Ghanavyūhasūtra)

- (A) B 740,1 f.: *sañs rgyas thams cad 'og min du /
sañs rgyas ma gyur 'dod khams su /
sañs rgyas mdzad pa mi mdzad do //*
- (B) P 778,20b4 f.: *yañ dag sañs rgyas byañ chub tu / 'chañ rgya 'og min gnas mchog du /
sañs rgyas ma gyur 'dod khams su /
sañs rgyas mdzad pa mi mdzad de //*
- ...

14. rGyud bla (Uttaratantra)

Cf. 8 (A2).

15. rNam bsad rigs pa (Vyākhyāyukti)

- (A) B 740,5: *bram ze'i khye'u bla ma nas bzuñ ste yoñs su mya ñan⁵⁰ 'das
pa chen po'i bar du sprul pa tsam zig yin par bstan pa //*
- (B) P 5562,129b4 f.: identical.

In the fourth part of this text Vasubandhu defends the Mahāyāna. The quotation is given as an example of a false opinion about the Mahāyāna, which contradicts the words of the Buddha.

16. [rNam bsad rigs pa]'i 'grel ba (Vyākhyāyuktiṭīkā)

- (A) B 740,5–7: *bcom ldan 'das 'od sruñ gi dus na bram ze'i khye'u bla
ma tshañs par spyod pa la gnas pa sprul pa yin par bstan to //* *de nas
dga' ldan du tog dkar por skyes pa dañ de nas zas gtsaṅ gi sras don
thams cad grub par bstan pa dañ | khab na bzugs pa dañ | khab nas ñes
par byuñ nas riñ 'phur la sogs pa la byañ chub kyi lam tshol ba la žugs
ba dañ | rim gyis sañs rgyas te chos kyi 'khor lo bskor ba dañ | de nas rim
gyis mya ñan las 'das pa chen po'i bar du sprul pa tsam zig yin par
bstan to //*

(B) P 5570,160b7–161a4 (The quotation of the original text is identical with Bu ston [15 (A)]):

... *bstan pa ji ltar byas pas še na | bcom ldan 'das 'od sruñ gi druñ na
bram ze'i khye'u bla ma tshañs par spyod pa la gnas pa sprul pa yin par
bstan to //* *de nas dga' ldan du lha'i bu tog dkar por skyas pa yin par
bstan to //* *der yañ lha'i rigs drug po dag la bka' stsal nas 'dir byon te | zas
gtsaṅ ma'i sras byañ chub sems dpa' don thams cad grub pa yin par
bstan to //* *bltam pa dan | skyo ba dañ | khab nas ñes par byuñ nas gžan
mu stegs can rnams las byañ chub kyi lam tshol ba la žugs par yin par*

⁵⁰ ñan: ñan las (P).

bstan to || rims kyis mñon par rdzogs par 'tshañ rgya žiñ mñon par rdzogs par sañs rgyas pa yin par bstan to || de nas bā ra nā ser thog ma kho nar sten lña dag la chos kyī 'khor lo bskor ba yin par bstan to | de nas rims kyis yohs su mya ñan las 'das pa chen po'i bar du sprul pa tsam žig yin par bstan to ||

17. Āg gi dbaṅ phyug grags pa (Vagīśvarakīrti)

(A) B 741,1f.:

*dpal⁵¹ ldan stug po bkod pa ñid du don dam thugs chud ciñ /
dga' ldan skye bo'i don mdzad phyir ni dam pa tog dkar gyur /
de nas 'dir ni 'gro ba'i don du śākya'i tog gyur gañ /
'chi bdag las rgyal sgyu ma kun ston de ni rgyal gyur cig ||*

(B) With this verse Vagīśvarakīrti opens his Mr̥tyuvañcanopadeśa (P 2620,139a3f.).

18. Śākya bśes gñen la sogs pa gsaṅ ba 'dus pa'i lugs (Śākyamitra and others of the Guhyasamāja-tradition)

(A) B 741,3f.⁵²: "... say, that the Teacher [i. e. the Buddha], when He was practising ascetism, left His worldly frame on the banks of the Nairanjanā river, and, in His spiritual form, rose up to the Akaniṣṭha heavens, where He became a Buddha in the form of the Body of Bliss." (OBERMILLER I/137).

(B) Śākyamitra's opinion is also mentioned in mKhas grub rje's rGyud sde spyi'i rnam par gžag pa rgyas par brjod⁵³. mKhas grub rje compares Śākyamitra's viewpoint, which is agreed to by Buddhaguhya, with the position of Ānandagarbha, who says that the Bodhisattva achieved Buddhahood in the Akaniṣṭha heaven before he displayed the twelve acts. All three authors wrote commentaries to the Sarvatathāgatatattvasaṃgrahasūtra and their positions are explained by mKhas grub rje according to their respective commentaries⁵⁴. Consequently the source of this reference is found in the extensive Kosalālaṅkāra of Śākyamitra (cf. P 3326, 20a7–20b4).

⁵¹ *dpal*: *bcom* (P 2620,139a3).

⁵² "... lugs kyis dka' ba spyod pa'i dus su rnam smin gyi lus chu bo ne rañdza ra'i 'gram du bžag nas ye śes kyī lus 'og min du phyin nas loñs spyod rdzogs pa'i skur sañs rgyas nas slar ye śes dka' ba spyod pa'i lus la žugs te. Here and in the following, Bu ston gives a report of different teachers' opinions, rather than citing them directly, therefore OBERMILLER's translation is quoted in the text and Bu ston in the notes.

⁵³ Cf. LESSING – WAYMAN, op. cit. (n. 14), p. 24–29.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* p. 24f.

19. Lotstsha ba chen po sprul pa'i sku Rin chen bzañ po

- (A) B 741,4f.: "Also the great Lotstsha ba sPrul pa'i sku Rin chen bzañ po says the same [as Śākyamitra] in his sNags log sun 'byin'"⁵⁵.
 (B) To my knowledge no original work by Rin chen bzañ po has been preserved. Bu ston lists in his catalog of the Chos 'byun a sNags log sun 'byin rgyas pa of Rin chen bzañ po as a text which was not available to him⁵⁶. As Rin chen bzañ po was translating Śākyamitra's Kosalālaṅkāra one can easily explain his agreement with Śākyamitra.

20. dBu ma pa Chos kyi bśes gñen (Mādhyamika Dharmamitra)

- (A) B 741,5f.: *'og min du sañs rgyas nas 'dir mdzad pa ston pa thub pa 'di lta bu dañ 'dod khamś nīd du mdzad pa bcu gñis ston ciñ sañs rgyas mñon du byed pa gñis yod*.
 (B) This passage could not be found in this form⁵⁷.

21. mÑon pa kun las btus (Abhidharmasamuccaya)

- (A) B 741,6f.: *de bzin gsegs pa bsam kyis mi khyab pa gañ ze na | gañ dga' ldan gyi gnas na gnas pa nas bzuñ ste yoñs su mya ñan las 'das pa'i bar du*⁵⁸ *byañ chub sems dpa'i spyod pa thams cad dañ | sañs rgyas gyi spyod pa yañ 'dod pa'i khamś su ston pa'i gañ zag go ||*
 (B) P 5550,130a6–8: This quotation is found in the second chapter where the different designations for persons are defined (*pudgalavya-vasthāna*)⁵⁹.

⁵⁵ ... rin chen bzañ pos kyañ sñags log sun 'byin du de ltar bśad do |.

⁵⁶ NISHIOKA 3064. Also it may be that there are two different texts, because Bu ston mentions a sNags log sun 'byin several times. In one case he uses a definition of this text ('*di rñams bya ba dañ rnal 'byor gyi cha gñis ka dañ ldan pas gñis ka'i rgyud ces rin chen bzan po'i sñags log sun 'byin du bśad do* [ChK III 65]) and in another he mentions a source for this text (*gñis med rnam rgyal gyi luñ nā ro 'grel chen dañ rin chen bzan po'i sñags log sun 'byin du drañs pa rñams 'di bas chuñ ba'i gñis med rnam rgyal yañ dag gcig yod kyi* ... [ChK III 66]). Klon rdol bla ma (Kl 1379,2f.) mentions a sNags log sun 'byin of Rin chen bzañ po with 48 folios (?).

⁵⁷ But cf. P 5194, 120b3f.: *sku 'di yañ smon lam 'am | tshogs kyi 'phen pa 'am | bzed pa tsam gyis phyē ba'i 'og min gyi gnas gcig kho nar mñon par rdzogs par 'tshañ rgya ba'i phyir rnam pa rab tu mañ po'i loñs spyod rdzogs pa'i sku 'og min rñams na gnas pa ni sprul pa'i sku 'ba' zig rgya chen por snañ bar zad do |.*

⁵⁸ du: dañ (P).

⁵⁹ Cf. W. RAHULA, *Le compendium de la super-doctrine (philosophie) (Abhidharmasamuccaya) d'Asaṅga*. Paris 1980, p. 158.

22. [mÑon pa kun las btus] gyi 'grel ba
(Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya)

- (A) B 741,7–742,1: *byaṅ chub sems dpa'i spyod pa thams cad ces bya ba ni dga' ldan gyi gnas na gnas pa nas bzuñ ste bdud las rgyal ba*⁶⁰ *bar du'o || sañs rgyas gyi spyod pa zes bya ba ni mñon par rdzogs par byaṅ chub ba nas bzuñ ste yoñs su mya ñan las 'das pa chen po'i bar du'o ||*
(B) ASBh 121: *sarvāṃ bodhisattvacaryām iti tuṣitabhavanavāsam upā-dāya yāvan mārāparājayam | buddhacaryāṃ ca darśayatī*⁶¹ *ty abhi-sambodhim upādāya yāvan mahāparinirvāṇam ||*

23. rGyud bla (Uttaratantra)

- (A) B 742,2: "Here (=in the following) [the life of the Buddha] should be explained according to the stanzas of the Uttaratantra"⁶².
(B) This sentence gives a possible reason for the headings added by OBERMILLER in his translation of the Buddha biography (op. cit. [n. 12], II/7–72).

24. [Lalitavistara]

- (A) Bu ston does not mention the source. B 742,3–5:
bsod nams rgya che tshogs mña' dran rtogs dañ |
blo gros mtha' yas šes rab 'od mdzad pa |
mtshuñs med stogs mña' sgyu rtsal rgya che ba |
mar me mdzad kyi luñ bstan dgoñs par mdzod ||
skyas mchog khyad kyi bsod nams dpal gyis ni |
dga' ldan pho brañ śin tu mdzas mod kyi |
'on kyañ thugs rje'i thugs dañ ldan pas na |
thugs rje'i rgyal mtshan dag tu char pa phob || ces pa nas |
'di ni dus lags btañ sñoms ma mdzad ces |
sñiñ rje'i yid dañ ldan la skul bar byed || ces pa la sogs pa bskul lo ||
(B) Already the first two stanzas do not belong together in the Lalitavistara. All three stanzas originate from the second chapter where the Bodhisattva is encouraged to be reborn (*samutsāhaparivarta*). Only half of the last stanza is quoted.

LV 9: *smara vipulapūṇyanicaya smṛtimatigatim*

anantaprajñāprabhākariṇ |
atulabalavipulavikrama vyākaraṇaṃ dīpaṃkarasyāpi ||1||

⁶⁰ *ba: ba'i* (P 5554,110a1).

⁶¹ *darśayatī*^o is missing in T. und C.

⁶² *'dir rgyud bla ma'i tshigs bcad bzñ du bsad par bya ste* (cf. 8[A2]).

*kiṃ cāpi tuṣṭitabhavanam tava puṇyaśrīyābhisobhate śrīmān /
atha ca puna karuṇamānasa pravaraṣa*

jambudhvaṇe varṣam ||10||

LV 10: *evaṃ bahuprakārā saṃgītiravānuniṣcarā gāthā /*

codenti karuṇāmanasaṃ ayaṃ sa kālo mā upekṣasva ||20||

Abbreviations

- AAV Abhisamayālaṅkāravṛtti: L'Abhisamayālaṅkāravṛtti di Ārya-Vimuktisena. Primo Abhisamaya, ed. C. PENSA. [Serie Orientale Roma XXXVII]. Roma: IsMEO, 1967.
- ASBh Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya: Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣyam, ed. N. TATIA. Patna 1976.
- B Bu ston Rin chen grub: bDe bar gśegs pa'i bstan pa'i gsal byed chos kyi 'byuñ gnas gSuñ rab rin po che'i mdzod chos 'byuñ. In: Collected Works of Bu ston, 24 (Ya), ed. LOKESH CHANDRA. New Delhi 1971, p. 737,6–742,5 & 789,2–4.
- BV Bodhicittavivaraṇa: CHRISTIAN LINDTNER, Nagarjuniana. Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna. [Indiske Studier IV]. Copenhagen 1982, p. 184–217.
- ChK Chos bsgyur dkar chag (Bu ston): SOSHŪ NISHIOKA, Putun Bukkyōshi Mokuroku Sakuin [Index to the Catalogue Section of Bu ston's History of Buddhism] I–III. Tōkyō Daigaku Bungakubu Bunka kōryū kenkyū shisetsu kiyō Kenkyū kiyō 4 (1980) 61–92, 5 (1981) 43–94, 6 (1983) 47–201.
- Kl Kloñ rdol bla ma: bKa' gdams pa dañ dge lugs bla ma rag rim gyi gsuñ 'bum mtshan tho. In: The Collected Works of Longdrol Lama, 25 (Ra), ed. LOKESH CHANDRA, 1285–1413.
- LASū Laṅkāvatārasūtra: The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, ed. B. NANJIO. [Bibliotheca Otaniensis, Vol. 1]. Kyoto 1956.
- LV Lalitavistara: Lalita-vistara, ed. P. L. VAIḌYA. [Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, No. 1]. Darbhanga 1958.
- P Tibetan Tripiṭaka. Peking Edition, ed. D. T. SUZUKI. Tokyo-Kyoto 1955–1958.
- RGV Ratnagotravibhāga: The Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra, ed. E. H. JOHNSTON. Patna: Bihar Research Society, 1950.

- SABh Sūtrālaṅkārabhāṣya: Asaṅga, Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṅkāra. Exposé de la doctrine du Grand Véhicule selon le système Yogācāra éd. et trad. par S. LÉVI. [Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études. Sciences historiques et philologiques, Fasc. 159 & 190]. Paris 1907-1911.
- SDhSū Saddharmapūṇḍarīkasūtra: Saddharmapūṇḍarīka, edd. H. KERN – B. NANJIO. [Bibliotheca Buddhica X]. St.-Petersbourg (1908-)1912 (repr. Osnabrück 1970 [tr. 1884 by H. KERN, The Saddharma-Pūṇḍarīka or the Lotus of the True Law, repr. Delhi 1965]).
- SPSū Suvarṇaprabhāśottamasūtra: Suvarṇaprabhāśottama-Sūtra. Das Goldglanz-Sūtra. Ein Sanskrittext des Mahāyāna-Buddhismus. Die tibetischen Übersetzungen mit einem Wörterbuch hrsg. von J. NOBEL. Leiden – Stuttgart 1944.

APROPOS A RECENT TIBETAN ART CATALOGUE*

By David Jackson, Hamburg

“Wisdom and Compassion: The Sacred Art of Tibet” is a large and beautifully produced catalogue for the major exhibition of Tibetan art organized by the Asian Art Museum of San Francisco in conjunction with the Tibet House, New York. The book consists of several sections, most of which were written, together or separately, by MARYLIN M. RHIE and ROBERT A. F. THURMAN, with photographs by JOHN BIGELOW TAYLOR. One of the strong points of the book is that its text is thus mainly the fruit of cooperation between two individuals of complementary interests: an art historian and a scholar of Tibetan Buddhism¹.

The first two chapters of the main body of the work are essays by THURMAN alone: “Wisdom and Compassion: The Heart of Tibetan Culture” (p. 17–19) and “Tibet, its Buddhism and its Art” (p. 20–38). Here THURMAN assumes no prior knowledge of either Buddhism or Tibet from the reader. His account is interesting and inspirational, but its historical explanations are at times idiosyncratic.

One of the interesting features of his essays is his use of novel and colorful renderings for standard terms and names, no doubt partly tongue-in-cheek or as conscious attention-grabbing devices: for example, the “Time Machine” for the *kālacakra* and “Death Terminator” for Yamāntaka, or even “high technology” for Tantra. But in his attempt to introduce his subject to a wider audience, he sometimes lapses into oversimplification about Tibetan culture in general. In an “overview” (p. 12), for example, he speaks about “Tibet’s complex culture, which is a completely spiritual one”. This prepares the reader for his later assertion (p. 17) that “virtually all

* Being a review article on: MARYLIN M. RHIE – ROBERT A. F. THURMAN, *Wisdom and Compassion. The Sacred Art of Tibet*. New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1991 (ISBN 0–8109–3957–6). 406p., US \$ 60,-. – I would like to thank Mr. Burkhard Quessel and Mr. Alexander von Rospatt for several valuable comments.

¹ Actually this is the second collaboration between the two of them. The first was RHIE – THURMAN 1984.

arts [in Tibet] are sacred". He also informs us (p. 13) about "Tibet's view of itself as one of the Buddhist Pure Lands and as a millennial nation" and we are told: "Tibet seems always to have attracted spiritual seekers". Which again prepares us for his thesis (p. 22) that Buddhism had transformed Tibet into "a peaceful, colorful, cheerful realm of pleasant and meaningful living".

It has been the fate of Tibet to generate many curious images of itself in the imaginations of outsiders, including some fairly rosy and romanticized ones. The tendency of many Westerners, for instance, has been to idealize the country into a real Shangrila, though to my knowledge this has mainly been a foreigners' view and did not find adherence in Tibet itself, either before or after 1959. In fact, the Tibetans (like probably most people) have generally looked outside of their normal communities for their promised lands, whether to India as the original Holy Land of Buddhism, or to the fabled Shambhala pure land in the north, or to one of the "hidden valleys" (*sbas yul*) of Padmasambhava in their borderlands.

To read THURMAN's account, however, one gets the impression that Tibet was a sort of "zone of gentleness", and that its inhabitants also viewed it as some kind of blessed realm. But obviously such a picture is incomplete. Where in this portrayal do Tibet's nomads, for instance, fit in, a people who lived almost exclusively on animal products and on meat that they hunted, raided or slaughtered, and who out of a resultant sense of guilt were also great patrons of religious masters? And where are we to place the ruthless bandit chieftains who regularly terrorized Lama pilgrims and traders in desolated areas? And what would traditional life in the great monasteries have been like without the delinquent warrior monks (*ldob ldob*)? In Tibet as in many a country, in addition to the genuine religious teachers there were also a host of dubious mendicants, madmen, and charlatans who plied their trade among the faithful, and life within the big monasteries witnessed the full range of human personalities, from saintly to coldly calculating.

But here is not the place to emphasize these less presentable aspects of Tibetan culture; for that would be playing into the hands of yet another, even larger and more powerful group of outsiders who have created their own mental image of Tibet. I refer to Tibet's largest neighbor, China. For the majority of the nearly one billion Han Chinese, the mental image of Tibet is that of a hopelessly backward area of feudal serfdom that was fortunately liberated by their Han brothers back in the fifties. Since millennia, the Chinese have considered all the neighboring peoples on the western borders to

be dirty, uncouth barbarians whose main rightful function was to be duly subdued and then faithfully to kowtow before the Middle Kingdom emperor forevermore. Regarding Tibet in particular, generations of Chinese schoolchildren everywhere (including in Taiwan and Hong Kong) have been taught that Tibet is and has been for centuries a grateful and submissive subject of the great Motherland, thus conveniently overlooking for instance that it was a non-Chinese people, namely the conquering Mongols, who first effectively brought China and Tibet into the same political orbit by conquering both countries. Nowadays most Chinese, and especially those in the People's Republic, continue to take this same old-fashioned paternalistic, imperialistic, Manifest-Destiny view of "their Tibetans". To them the matter is so self-evidently correct (indeed, it is a quasi-religious belief), that in a lead article of the pseudo-academic journal *China's Tibet* (vol. 3,3 [1992] 2) a spokesman could state the following without the slightest trace of shame or irony: "An analogy would be drawing on international law to discuss the relations between the US Federal Government and the indigenous [American] Indians". Welcome to the reservation, Red-face!

Tibetans thus find themselves caught between at least two fairly radical and warped views of themselves. Given the choice of just these two, of course they opt for the more positive Shangrila self-image, at least for external consumption. But this is not just a question of national self-esteem or public relations. The other view, that of the Chinese, calls the very survival of their civilization into question. It is no wonder that in the present very desperate situation in which they are caught, the Tibetans seek whatever sympathy and help they can get. And while it no doubt is true that the historical reality of traditional Tibet must have lain somewhere between the two extreme views of Shangrila heaven and reactionary feudal hell, what does that matter to a Tibetan in Tibet? For him openly to question the worn-out Chinese imperialistic mind-set or to engage in peaceful protesting for self-determination brands him immediately a "splittist traitor", subjecting him to imprisonment without trial, torture, or even worse.

For many Tibetans the last hope remains their exiled leader, His Holiness the Dalai Lama. And the latter, in his tragic and quixotic struggle to gain a measure of freedom and happiness for his people, has sought to universalize his genuine message of Buddhist non-violence and peace, and to bring it to the West. After many years of facing closed doors, he has recently received at least a small measure of belated moral recognition, though still not, of course, on any

meaningful political level. In the course of his travails, His Holiness has also on occasion presented Tibetan Buddhism doctrine in what strictly speaking must be called unorthodox ways to Westerners, reducing his message to what can be presented "merely" in terms of the most universal principles of life and morality, and making more accessible the underlying doctrines of the esoteric traditions.

It may well be, in fact, that some aspects of THURMAN's approach have been inspired directly or indirectly by the liberal and somewhat unorthodox teaching methods of the Dalai Lama, methods which for the latter are highly justified in the present circumstances. But in what sense then can this be considered traditional? And are outsiders really helping Tibet in the long run by perpetuating the Shangrila myth? It is true that it somewhat blunts the opposing overly negative image constructed by the Chinese. But some of the younger Tibetan intelligentsia believe that this myth makes it significantly harder for them to make a strong case for Tibet or to be taken seriously, especially among Third World countries.

I leave that to be sorted out by the Tibetans themselves. But still the impression remains that by over-idealizing the Tibetan traditions of art, culture and history on the one hand, and by popularizing them on the other, THURMAN does not in fact remain very close to the original traditions.

It is fitting that THURMAN undertakes (p. 12), for instance, to try to introduce in this book Tibetan art on its own terms. But what exactly are those terms? Tibetan art reflects the views and practices of the Buddhist Mantrayāna, an ancient esoteric tradition originating in India in the early centuries of our era. Yet THURMAN does not raise such fundamental issues as the requirement within the tradition for secrecy and for personal initiation and instruction from a qualified master. Instead, after just six introductory paragraphs, he suddenly and dramatically throws the Western reader into a virtual *sādhana* of an Anuttarayoga Tantra deity. Now the only problem in doing this is that the Tibetans traditionally considered these sorts of visualizations to be highly esoteric, and their masters only granted such teachings after a full ritual initiation. To preserve the power of the tradition, practitioners formally promise never to reveal publicly such teachings (or even to show the relevant books and images) to the unprepared and uninitiated. Within the Gelukpa curriculum, for example, most monks would not have been granted initiation until they had completed at least eight or ten years of basic studies. Thus for certain traditionally minded Tibetans it is a matter of sorrow and regret to see some of their most sacred and secret icons removed from

their holy context and exposed to the gaze of throngs of curious foreigners. For them, such a spectacle is also a reminder of the violent ransacking of their home temples; for many images were looted from the temples during the desecration of the monasteries by the Communists. The vast majority of these images from Tibet have in fact passed through the hands of opportunistic and unscrupulous “explorers”, if not those of actual thieves and smugglers.

THURMAN’s views on Tibetan history likewise seem at times to be selective and incomplete. He (p. 30) propounds as a general historical fact for instance that all of Tibet’s spiritual life reached its final fulfillment in Tson-kha-pa’s school: “The fourth wave of the Geluk Order completed the efforts of the other three in the work of bringing Buddhism into the absolute center of Tibetan national life”. Furthermore he thinks that it was with the great Fifth Dalai Lama that Tibet’s highest destiny was realized through the “creation of a completely monasticized state”. The Great Fifth no doubt did depart from the example of Śākyamuni (or Tson-kha-pa, for instance) in taking on political power. But it would be wrong to think that the Fifth Dalai Lama was the first to play the dangerous role of combined monk and king in Central Tibet. As early as five hundred years previously, *bla-ma* Žaṅ g.Yu-brag-pa (1123–1193), a Kagyudpa mystic and *tāntrika*, had ruled most of Central Tibet as a warrior monk, though he did not leave behind him a lasting governmental edifice. The Fifth Dalai Lama himself was well aware of this precedent set by Lama Žaṅ in the 12th century.

In a later section (p. 262) THURMAN writes: “The Gelukpas gratefully inherited the treasuries of wisdom and art from all the preceding establishments”. It would be closer to the truth to say that some Gelukpas do not mind presenting themselves as the successors to all of the earlier traditions (who are therefore conveniently made redundant). In actual practice, as a whole the Gelukpas have proven to be some of the least ecumenical of all the Tibetan traditions, and many still manifest a pronounced doctrinal exclusivism. A prominent more recent example of this trend was Pha-boṅ-kha-pa and his disciples; in the early 20th century Pha-boṅ-kha-pa did his best, for instance, to prevent the printing of Go-rams-pa’s works. The present Dalai Lama, however, has consistently and strongly fought against such attitudes.

There have also been a few earlier Gelukpa masters who extended the range of their spiritual quest outside the confines of their original school, a famous one being the Great Fifth Dalai Lama, Ṇag-dbaṅ-blo-bzaṅ-rgya-mtsho. But even the latter took only what he wanted from the other traditions, and what he did not like, he rejected, or in

some cases even banned outright. Among the Sakyapas, for instance, he particularly cherished the Tshar-pa order, yet he was ambivalent and a little condescending toward the 'Khon bDag-chen at Sakya, and he was not fond of the Nörpas. But to his traditional enemies, he and his camp were out and out hostile.

It is instructive to consider the fate of the 10th Karma-pa during the early period of Gelukpa ascendancy. At the defeat of the gTsañ king, the Karma-pa had to flee for his life, nearly alone and in great danger. After a narrow escape and many difficulties, he lived for years in exile in 'Jañ near the Chinese borderland of southeastern Kham. The treatment meted out to the Karma Kagyupa monasteries in his absence (including extensive confiscations), however, was mild in comparison with what Tāranātha and the Jonañpas received. The latter tradition the Great Fifth simply closed down completely within the confines of his domain, converting their temples to Gelukpa institutions and placing government seals on the printing blocks in their printeries. Fortunately for Tibet, the Great Fifth was in fact a remarkably broad man for his times, and his snuffing out of the Jonañpa as an institutional presence was an exceptional act. But for the other traditions, the further consequences of such sectarian attitudes instituted as central government policies became felt still stronger in the following centuries, much – I would say – to the impoverishment of Tibetan cultural and religious life as a whole. Theocracy and Gelukpa domination were not always unmixed blessings.

Moreover, the Dalai Lama's playing of the foreign (Qośot Mongol army) trump card during his struggle with the gTsañ king and the latter's allies came back to Tibet in spades, in the form of several invasions and military interventions by Mongols (Qośot and Dzuñgar) and Manchu-ruled Chinese. During the first invasion, the Great Fifth's own hand-picked regent was executed. Viewed from a longer perspective, a fatal precedent set by the Great Fifth was his excessive reliance on outside intervention for resolving an essentially internal Tibetan dispute. His establishment of an unwieldy and rigid theocracy, too, had many negative long-term consequences. The resulting lack of other significant secular power bases to play off against the conservative great convents was probably the great Achilles tendon of Tibet in the present century.

Perhaps my observations here reflect in part a Eurocentric, secular mind set (cf. THURMAN, p. 31). Yet I am not convinced that what THURMAN propounds is truer to the facts. His own viewpoint seems to be a bit Geluk-centric, and the sort of theocratic thinking he

engages in probably does not come anywhere near the present political thought of the Dalai Lama. But perhaps THURMAN has ventured many of these interpretations as deliberate challenges to further thought. If so, I hope he will follow up these sketches with a more fleshed-out and better-documented study. In any case, his essays certainly do succeed in their main purpose: to present Tibetan Buddhist art and ideas in ways that are bound to engage, attract and intrigue the Western reader.

The account of the Tibetan Buddhist orders, too, contains a few factual errors, which is surprising given THURMAN's sound grasp of Tibetan language and access to the original sources. On p. 27, for instance, he states that Drokmi came from the 'Khon family, whereas Drokmi in fact was only linked to them as a teacher in many of their lineages. And certainly Drokmi had not been a founder of a "monastic" order (cf. p. 166). THURMAN refers also to Sakya "monastery" itself (founded 1073) as having soon thrived with numerous monks. In fact, a community of monks did not become established there until much later, in the early 1200s, and so for many decades it was not a true monastery. Moreover he asserts (p. 165) that "... the Khons ... brought great organizational ability to the Sakyapas' early administration". In fact during the period of their rule, the Sakya hierarchs traditionally appointed a lay noble to the post of highest administrator (*dpon chen*), while in theory they devoted themselves mainly to spiritual matters.

On p. 28 THURMAN states that Milarepa transmitted to Gampopa the responsibility for carrying on the Kagyupa order. In Milarepa's time there was nothing resembling an "order", just a great anchorite-teacher and the small and fluctuating band of his disciples. After studying for a while under Milarepa, Gampopa went off to meditate, and the two never met again face-to-face. Moreover, the "Sonam Drakpa" mentioned on p. 29 was not a master of the Sakya order – could bSod-nams-rtse-mo have been meant? As a student of scholastic traditions, the latter stood not so much in Atiśa's lineage as in the tradition of rÑog-lo as received directly from Phywa-pa Chos-kyi-señ-ge.

The next section of the book devoted to the study of styles was written by MARYLIN M. RHIE, and it was entitled "Tibetan Buddhist Art: Aesthetics, Chronology, and Styles" (p. 39–66). It contains an essay on stylistic trends, broken down almost century by century and region by region (dividing Tibetan into three main zones: West, Central and East). Here I somehow sense that at least historically we are on somewhat firmer ground, and not necessarily because of an

easier subject matter. The problems of chronology and stylistic description in Tibetan art are notoriously difficult, and the "conclusions" one reaches are sometimes little more than a chain of loosely linked hypotheses. But RHIE approaches her subject with due care and caution. She shows herself to be very familiar not only with the art of the adjoining Buddhist countries (notably China and Central Asia) but also with contemporary scholarship on Tibetan art of all periods. She even attempts now and then to use some of the traditional Tibetan stylistic categories, especially for works made in the 16th century and later. For example she says (p. 59): "In Eastern Tibet the rise of the Karma Gadri style of painting, known from written sources as a major Tibetan artistic style and associated with the Karmapa branch of the Kagyu Order, arises in the second half of the 16th century". She states that most of the major artists working in this style were Karma Kagyupas in Kham and Amdo, though to my knowledge, the Karma Gardri (*sgar bris*) painters were not active in Amdo². She adds several useful comments on the relation of the Gardri to middle and later Ming painting in the 17th and 18th centuries (p. 63).

RHIE also mentioned (p. 61) "the emergence of the 'New Menri' style, which is said to have been initiated by Chöying Gyatso (active 1620–1665), who worked for the first Panchen Lama and later became the painter for the Fifth Dalai Lama in Lhasa, where this style flourished". She added (p. 62): "Emerging at the time when the Fifth Dalai Lama was asserting commanding leadership for Tibet in the political, religious and cultural spheres, it developed not only into a national Tibetan style, but eventually into an international one". My impression, however, is that Chos-dbyiñs-rgya-mtsho was probably more influential in the development of later gTsañ and especially bKra-sis-lhun-po traditions (gTsañ was his origin, and he was mainly active there, especially at the court of the Pañ-chen Rin-po-che). Moreover, as a patron of religious art, the Fifth Dalai Lama made a conscious effort to patronize both of the two main schools of his period – Menri and Khyenri – and he even sponsored attempts to revive styles which by then were archaic, such as the Byi'u-ris³. In general, he sought to promote not one but several or numerous of the artistic, cultural and spiritual traditions that he considered himself heir to, though he did it selectively and with a connoisseur's eye, so to

² She cites "L. Chandra", which should in fact be SMITH 1970. The former edited the series.

³ See Dalai bla-ma V, I/283.

speak. In my opinion, the relatively uninspired spiritual and cultural homogenization that set in from the 18th century onward in Central Tibet was neither his direct work nor intention, but it followed from the forces he had let loose.

RHIE further refers to the latter style of the 17th and 18th centuries as the “Tibetan international style” (following probably J. HUNTINGTON). But that was surely not the only Tibetan style to go “international”, as this exhibition well demonstrates through its many works recovered from Khara Khoto. Or should we call the latter “Indo-Tibetan international”?

Some of RHIE’s initial comments on general Tibetan aesthetics, though, leave me wondering what her traditional sources might have been. She writes (p. 39): “The aesthetics of Tibetan Buddhist art is based upon revealing the Buddhist understanding of the way things truly are”. It is true that religious art attempts to represent a higher and purer reality, but art works are not held to reveal the ultimate or highest reality. The ultimate is not limited to any particular colors or forms. Here the matter could perhaps have been explained in terms of the basic categories of the three “Bodies” of Buddhahood discussed by THURMAN (p. 35) or in terms of the three types of sacred “support” (*sku gsun thugs rten*).

The Catalogue

The main body of the book consists of the section “The Sacred Art of Tibet: Catalogue” (p. 67–384), most of the entries to which seem to have been co-written by RHIE and THURMAN. It is divided into three main sub-sections, which relate to Tibetan sacred history (p. 70–163), Tibetan Buddhist orders (p. 164–306), and Tibetan perfected worlds (p. 310–384).

One of the most appealing *Thaṅkas* in the exhibition for me is that of Sarasvatī (p. 135, no. 27), which is found in the first sub-section, and which the authors describe as “Eastern Tibet, 17th century”⁴. But while the authors give a good description of the *bodhi-sattva*-goddess and the landscape, they say very little about the six smaller figures in the sky and foreground. Who do these figures represent? They all seem to be connected with the scholarly activities which flourish through the grace of this goddess, especially the study of Sanskrit grammar. The latter studies underwent a revival during the 1700s in and near Derge through the influence of Si-tu Paṅ-chen (1699–1774), editor of the Derge Kanjur. Another participant of note

⁴ RHIE also discusses the work on p. 63.

was his colleague and friend Źu-chen Tshul-khrims-rin-chen (1700–1769), editor of the Derge Tanjur, who was incidentally a great devotee of this goddess. In the painting, the scholars are shown practicing Sanskrit morphological exercises on their hand-held writing slates. This practice was evidently called *sgra'i sa ris*, and it was a typical part of the traditional Tibetan style of Sanskrit education (see also the figure of “Lodro” in painting no. 51, p. 184). The top central figure is evidently a great *paṇḍita*-grammarian, perhaps Candragomin (and indeed there is a grammatical tradition attributed to Sarasvatī herself). I think RHIE in her comments is stylistically and historically on the right track, though probably the work belongs to the 18th century and specifically to the scholarly circles of Derge.

In connection with statue no. 38 (p. 150), it should be noted that the phrase *dpal ldan bla ma* (“glorious teacher”) is extremely common in inscriptions. The link suggested with the particular master dPal-ldan-señ-ge is tenuous at best.

Another very striking work is no. 51 (p. 184), which is called a “Nyingma Lama”. But I can see no convincing reason to consider the main figure a Nyingmapa. Here an exact transcription of all the inscriptions would have been useful (and it would have spared me a lot of eye strain!). In any case, the main figure is almost certainly a Sakyapa, as can be seen for instance from his hat and robes; perhaps he was a master of the Tshar-pa sub-school. Five out of the six historically most recent figures are famous Sakyapas: Bla-ma dam-pa bSod-nams-rgyal-mtshan, Theg-chen chos-rje Kun-dga'-bkra-śis, Go-rams-pa bSod-nams-señ-ge, Gon-dkar rDo-rje-gdan-pa, and Man-thos Klu-sgrub-rgya-mtsho.

If this is a Lama and a lineage of teachings received, the order of figures would be the following: (1) Mañjuśrī, (2) Maudgalyāyana, (3) Śrīsiṃha, (4) “Karwa Tongtsen”, (5) Śāntaraksita, (6) “Mithub Dawa”, (7) Blo-gros, (8) rDo-rje bDud-'joms, (9) Klu'i-rgyal-mtshan, (10) “Gyiso Dawa”, (11) Slob-dpon rTse-mo, (12) “Tsongyen Drakpa”, (13) bSod-nams-rgyal-mtshan, (14) Theg-chen chos-rje, (15) Go-bo rab-'byams, (16) Klon-chen rab-'byams, (17) rDo-rje-gdan-pa, and (18) Mañ-thos Klu-sgrub-rgya-mtsho. This is unlikely to be a series of rebirths, since many of the lives overlap, Bla-ma-dam-pa bSod-nams-rgyal-mtshan and Theg-chen chos-rje Kun-dga'-bkra-śis, for instance, being uncle and nephew. On the other hand, there do seem to be a few gaps, if it is supposed to represent an unbroken lineage.

Generally speaking, a systematic transcription of all inscriptions would have increased the usefulness of the book very much. Commercial publishers sometimes resist this idea, viewing such things as

nothing more than arcane padding material, but for the systematic study of Tibetan art this is an absolute necessity. In the end it might have added four or five pages of densely printed black and white text, no doubt costing far less than a single color plate. Systematic translations of the inscriptions would also have been helpful for non-specialists. Here and there the authors have given their translation of inscriptions, but again, without the original inscriptions.

I will restrict my remaining comments to some of the paintings and figures of the Sakya order, which appear for the most part in chapter 7 of the book (p. 199–235), the second part of the second main sub-section. First of all, a few general points in connection with the historical introduction. To begin with, properly speaking the Sakya order did not begin in any real sense with the founding of the temple at Sakya in 1073, nor did dKon-mchog-rgyal-po found an order based on the practice of the Lam 'bras (cf. p. 200), though indeed he had received some of 'Brog-mi's other transmissions of Hevajra teachings. He did not in any monastic sense establish a "succession of abbots" (he was a lay tantric practitioner). The true establishment of an incipient "order" came only later with the activities of Sa-chen Kun-dga'-sñin-po and his greatest sons (bSod-nams-rtse-mo and Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan), who gathered, transmitted and systematized a huge Tantric corpus⁵. As already mentioned above, the Sakyapa monastic traditions were not transmitted to it by Drokmi (a primarily Tantric master) or Atiśa (whose lineages were mainly preserved within the bKa'-gdams-pa). Instead, the main scholastic traditions of Sakya in an early period were mainly indebted to the gSañ-phu Ne'u-thog tradition founded by rNog lo-tsā-ba, and those traditions were transformed in the 13th century through the extensive writings and teachings of Sa-skya Paṇḍita, who had studied directly under Indian masters. The truly monastic traditions of Sakya became established only in the early 1200s through the ordination of Sa-skya Paṇḍita by his main Indian master, the Kashmiri *paṇḍita* Śākyaśrībhadrā (1140s–1225).

Regarding the dating of painting no. 61 to ca. 1429, this has no firm external foundation besides the opinion of TUCCI, who thought it belonged to a set commissioned by Ñor-chen Kun-dga'-bzang-po (1382–1456) after he had founded Ñor. Of course the dating may be approximately correct, but I am not sure whether this painting ever belonged to a set of Lam 'bras Thankas. TUCCI's "verbal plane" was

⁵ Sa-chen's wide studies which laid the foundations for the tradition are represented by painting no. 61, which portrays all of his teachers.

evidently a loose rendering of the term *gsuñ ñag*, which is the honorific term for the Lam 'bras instructions.

Sculpture no. 62, that of Bsod-nams-rtse-mo (1142–1182), may well have belonged to one of the many sets of Lam 'bras lineage masters made in Lo Mustañ (now in northwest Nepal) during the 15th and 16th centuries that were broken up and sold by unscrupulous people during the 1960s. That provenance is even more likely for figures 63 and 86, namely those of Glo-bo mkhan-chen (1456–1532) and Buddhaśrī (1339–1419). In traditional Tibetan geography, Lo Mustañ (Glo-bo sMon-thañ) is not placed in gTsañ but rather in the eastern parts of Western Tibet (mÑa'-ris).

Buddhaśrī was very significant within the Ñor-pa lineage (the predominant Buddhist tradition in Lo as well as in Derge); for he was the Tibetan master from whom Ñor-chen himself received the Lam 'bras (he was not the Indian master of this name, who seems to have been conflated in the catalogue with Kha-che Pañ-chen). It is a pity not being able to read the whole inscription, but I cannot identify the donor “Yon-chen Mul” from the translation of the inscription in the catalogue.

Figure 64 is a painting of Paṇḍita Gayadhara, the Indian master who transmitted the Lam 'bras to 'Brog-mi Śākya-ye-śes (992–1072[?]). This is one of a set of Thañkas of the Ñor-pa lineage of the Lam 'bras, probably commissioned in or near Ñor during the mid 1500s. Since the last figure shown in the lineage of teachers is dKon-mchog-lhun-grub (1497–1557), the 10th abbot, the work could well have been commissioned by his main disciple Sañs-rgyas-señ-ge (1504–1569), who succeeded his teacher on the abbatial see in 1557 and acted as abbot until 1569.

Paintings such as the present one represent a constellation of sacred figures – some supramundane and some human – in a certain relationship to each other. Just what this relationship is needs to be deciphered carefully. Here one finds in the composition the expression of both hierarchy and chronological descent. More precisely, one finds here the relationship and order of a “teacher lineage” (*bla ma brgyud pa*), which was one of the fundamental principles and sacred realities expressed by such Thañkas (especially in the 15th and 16th centuries)⁶. The lineage of masters was crucial for the efficacy of the practices in question: the meditator had to have received the teaching in an unbroken lineage of realized masters going back to the original enlightened revealer of the precepts. Extraordinary instruc-

⁶ For previous studies of such lineages, see JACKSON 1986 and 1990.

tions were thought to be impossible without an extraordinary lineage. Therefore one of the main things celebrated by the Thānkas of 15th- and 16th-century Tibetan Tantric traditions was the genuineness and thus spiritual power of their particular lineage.

So which lineage is this one, and how is it shown in the painting? The lineage is named in an inscription at the bottom front: *mchod rten druñ thob gyi bla ma brgyud pa*. This lineage was received by Ñor-chen from Buddhaśrī as one of the allied set of instructions (*lam skor*) received in connection with the Lam 'bras, and the record of it is found in his record of teachings received (*thob yig*), p. 70,1.5.

It would have been better to number the figures according to the sequence of the lineage, for that would have made interpreting the Thānka easier. The order of figures is arranged according to the fairly standard convention: (1) top center, (2) his right hand, (3) his left, and so on. Thus the top row would be: 8, 6, 4, 2, 1, 3, 5, 7, 9.

The present lineage can thus be listed from the Thob yig rgya mtsho: (1) rDo-rje-'chan, (2) [= previous no. 6], (3) [= prev. no. 2], (4) [= prev. no. 7], (5) [= prev. no. 3], (6) [= prev. no. 8], (7) [= prev. no. 4], (8) [= prev. no. 9], (9) [= prev. no. 5], (10) [= prev. no. 10], (11) [= prev. no. 15], (12) [= prev. no. 16], (13) [= prev. no. 21], (14) [= prev. no. 22], (15) [= prev. no. 23], (16) [= prev. no. 24], (17) [= prev. no. 25], (18) [= prev. no. 26], (19) [= prev. no. 27], (20) [= prev. no. 28], (21) [= prev. no. 29], (22) [= prev. no. 30], (23) [= prev. no. 31], (24) [= prev. no. 32], (25) [= prev. no. 33], (26) [= prev. no. 34], and (27) [= prev. no. 42].

Images 69 and 70 are both described as "Parasukha-Chakrasamvara Father-Mother". Tibetans received the Cakrasamvara teachings in several lineages that were kept very distinct, stemming as they did from different Indian *mahāsiddhas*. Among the Ñor-pa, for example, three were intensively practiced: the traditions of Lu-hi-pa, Nag-po-pa and Dril-bu-pa. Thus it is a good idea to try if possible to identify the specific lineage represented by a given Thānka. No. 70 (p. 221), for instance, seems to be the lineage of the initiation received in Nag-po-pa's traditions (*nag po pa'i dban gi brgyud pa*), which is recorded in Ñor-chen's Thob yig rgya mtsho on p. 51,2.1. Here Sa-chen and another figure (his immediate teacher [?]) are not shown in the main sequence of the lineage, but have been moved to places of preeminence in the inner square occupied by the deity. This composition is also interesting as an example of an alternative (and evidently quite old) way of beginning the lineage. The top row begins on the far left and progresses to the right, before adopting a left-right alternation between columns.

The lineage of no. 71 (p. 222, Mahākāla Pañjaranātha) is also interesting from a structural point of view: It begins with Vajradhara at the top middle, progresses three figures to the viewer's left, and then drops down the left column. Then it returns to the first *paṇḍita* in the top row (Sa-paṇ), goes right, and finally descends down the right column. Again Sa-chen occurs in an anomalous position owing to the great veneration paid him by the tradition. Accordingly, in the normal sequence he should be in the position of his son Grags-pargyal-mtshan, second from left in the left column (who oddly enough appears above his older brother bSod-nams-rtse-mo). But instead he is placed here near the center of the top row, just to the left-hand of Vajradhara.

Painting no. 73 (p. 226) is a great treasure of Ñor, having been commissioned by Ñor-chen Kun-dga'-bzañ-po (1382–1456) himself, as is clearly mentioned in the inscriptions. This and a number of other paintings were commissioned by Ñor-chen in memory of his deceased teacher Sa-bzañ 'Phags-pa gZöñ-nu-blo-gros, but they could have been painted anytime in the last few decades of Ñor-chen's life. The precise date of Sa-bzañ 'Phags-pa's death is not known to me, but he was present for both the novice and full-monk ordinations of Ñor-chen at Sa-skya, the latter in the *lcags-pho-brug* year (1400). The work could well date to the 1430s or 1440s. This painting was no. 14 in a forty-four-*maṇḍala* set of the Vajrāvalī cycle, one of the main collections of Tantric teachings received by Ñor-chen from Sa-bzañ 'Phags-pa. This particular painting depicts the gZuñs grwa lna bcu gsum ma (see his Thob yig rgya mtsho, p. 76,4.3). The remarkable story of Sa-bzañ 'Phags-pa's journeying to Nepal to receive the initiations and text-transmissions of this cycle is repeated in various historical sources⁷. It is also known that Ñor-chen patronized Newar painters on occasion.

Paintings nos. 75 (p. 231) and 77 (p. 234) have the *yi-dam* Raktayamāri as their main figure, but again each represents a different tradition. The first is the *maṇḍala* of the so-called "Raktayamāri in a group of Thirteen Deities" (*gséd dmar lha bcu gsum ma*). Ñor-chen lists a number of his lineages for this tradition, all of which he received from Sa-bzañ 'Phags-pa (see his Thob yig rgya mtsho, p. 78,4.5–79,1.3 and cf. the lineages in the rGyud sde kun btus, vol. 30, p. 82,6). In this painting the lineage follows a simple succession of left to right (respective to the viewer).

Painting no. 77 depicts the tradition of "Raktayamāri in a group

⁷ See for instance the mention in Ñor-chen, p. 77,3.

of Five Deities''. This, like the preceding, may possibly be the tradition of Chag lo-tsā-ba Chos-rje-dpal (cf. the *gśed dmar lha lña ma chag lugs kyi dbaṅ gi brgyud pa* in Ānor-chen, Thob yig rgya mtsho, p. 78,3.5, and the lineages in the rGyud sde kun btus, vol. 30, p. 79,4). Here again Ānor-chen lists several alternative lineages for this tradition, all of which he received from Sa-bzaṅ 'Phags-pa. In this painting, the lineage begins with the top central figure of Vajradhara, progresses to the left end, then returns to the first figure on Vajradhara's left hand, and finally proceeds to the right (respective to the viewer).

Tracing other Sakyapa Lineages

Instead of describing some of the lineages mentioned above in more detail, perhaps it would be more worthwhile to discuss in practical terms how anyone with a smattering of Tibetan might go about tracing such lineages. The following comments apply especially to Thāṅkas from the Nor-pa and closely allied traditions, which anyway seem to have produced most of the accessible paintings of this type.

In classical Tibetan studies in general, as well as in Tibetan art history in particular, one needs at least a basic familiarity with the main lineages. But in actual practice, it is almost impossible for anyone outside the tradition to remember in detail more than just a few lineages. Therefore the most important things to know are how to identify the lineage in general, and where to turn for more specific information on the likely lineage.

But even without knowing which lineage is portrayed, one can often fruitfully begin by trying to find the starting point of the lineage. This is a useful first step because it helps one understand the structure of the painting and the chronological conventions expressed in it. For the vast majority of gSar-ma-pa (''new-translation-era'', i.e. post-10th-century) Tantric lineages, the first figure is the Tantric primordial Buddha Vajradhara. If he is situated in the top middle, then one can guess that the following figures of the lineage will appear alternating to his right and left. The seat at the right hand of a master usually has precedence over the seat at his left hand, and so a senior or more immediate follower in the lineage will occupy that position. In the same way, a higher position generally has precedence over a lower one.

A number of earlier paintings, however, follow several slightly different conventions regarding the arrangement of masters in the

top row, depicting, for example, the originator of the lineage at the top right of the painting (i.e., at the top left from the viewer's perspective). I have described one or two other unusual orderings above. In any case, there is usually some principle of hierarchy or chronological sequence governing the placement of such figures: it is almost never a random arrangement. Therefore one should by all means try to recognize which principles were actually at work in determining how the figures were ordered.

Turning now to the identification of the precise lineage, one strategy is to try to find *Ñor-chen*, and then to identify the master immediately preceding him in the lineage. Then one will know in which section of *Ñor-chen's* record of teachings received (*Thob yig rgya mtsho*) this lineage is recorded⁸. This record lists all the teachings received from each master separately, each in a single section. Here I give a table of contents to *Ñor-chen's* *Thob yig*⁹:

- (1) *Śar-chen Ye-śes-rgyal-mtshan* (d. 1406), p. 45,2.4–65,4.2 (2a–43a)
- (2) *dPal-ldan-tshul-khrims* (1333–1399), p. 65,4.2–67,4.1 (43a–47a)
- (3) *Buddha-śrī* (1339–1419), p. 67,4.1–76,1.3 (47a–63b)
- (4) *Kun-dga'-rgyal-mtshan*, p. 76,1.3–3.3 (63b–64b)
- (5) *Sa-bzañ 'Phag-pa gZon-nu-blo-gros*, p. 76,3.3–102,3.3 (64b–116b)
- (6) *bKra-śis-rin-chen*, p. 102,3.3–107,4.4 (116b–127a)
- (7) *Lo-tsā-ba sKyabs-mchog-dpal-bzañ-po*, p. 107,4.4–108,3 (127a–b).

One can also try to identify directly the main deity or deities portrayed, and then search for the corresponding lineage. This is very simple to do if there exists an inscription at the bottom of the *Thaṅka* specifying the identity of the lineage, as is sometimes the case with some fine *Thaṅkas*. And many *Thaṅkas* contain inscriptions below each figure. Even with a fairly rudimentary grasp of Tibetan, it is possible to copy the first few inscriptions, and then locate and transcribe the corresponding names of the *siddhas* and masters of likely lineages. (It will now help to identify the teacher of *Ñor-chen*, if that has not already been done.) A more detailed comparison of these lists will confirm whether one has found the correct lineage or not.

It is not enough to know that the figure is, say, *Cakrasaṃvara* or *Raktayamāri* of the “*Sa-skyapa* tradition”. One must identify which

⁸ The importance of *Ñor-chen's* *Thob yig rgya mtsho* was already noticed by Tucci 1949: I/124f.

⁹ *Ñor-chen*, p. 44,4.1–108,2.6.

particular tradition of the deity is being portrayed. This sounds difficult and complicated, but usually there are not more than three or four major traditions of the same deity transmitted in a given school, and usually less. Often the identities of the first *mahāsiddhas* indicate the general tradition very clearly, but sometimes only a detailed iconographical study of other sources will decide the issue.

When the main figure portrayed is not a deity but rather a master of the tradition, one must try to identify him in order to ascertain whether he is shown as a master of the same lineage portrayed above and around him, or whether he is portrayed as belonging to still another lineage. There is a good chance from the outset that the main figure belongs to one of the most important lineages of the Nōr-pa tradition (typically the Lam 'bras). An exquisite multiple-painting set of Thānkas would rarely have been dedicated to portraying as its central figures the masters of some minor lineage. However, even relatively "minor" lineages are found portrayed around each teacher of the "major" lineage. And sometimes a single Thānka portrays by its main figures just a part of a lineage, say four sequential masters. Just what the exact situation is in each particular case must be determined by a careful study of all the evidence.

If the Thānka comes from a period subsequent to Nōr-chen, then it should not be so difficult to trace the individual figures after Nōr-chen, especially if inscriptions are present. I include below (in the appendix) a list of the Nōr abbots and their chronology as far as I know them at present. When inscriptions exist below the figures, it is now a relatively simple matter to find out when they lived and for many even their tenures as abbots. The names appearing in inscriptions may be the personal ordination name (e.g. Kun-dga'-bzañ-po) or it may be a title by which he was widely known (e.g. Nōr-chen rDo-rje-'chan) or simply a brief epithet (e.g. Nōr-chen). The names are sometimes given in typical shortened forms in which the even-numbered syllables are missing (e.g. dPal-tshul-ba for Dpal-ldan-tshul-khrims).

For lineages which deviate slightly from the abbatial line, one can consult the record of teachings received of Žu-chen Tshul-khrims-rin-chen, or the final lineage record sections of such great later collections as the sGrub thabs kun btus and rGyud sde kun btus, or even the published lineage record of His Holiness the Sa-skya khri-'dzin Rin-po-che. The famous Thob yig records of the later Nōr-pa mkhan-pos such as dKon-mchog-lhun-grub (1497–1557, 10th abbot) and Sans-rgyas-phun-tshogs (1649–1705) which served as sources for many later Sa-skya-pa lineage records have not yet become available.

Even in the absence of inscriptions, it is possible to learn a lot from the lineage records and other written sources. But in any event, inscriptions are what in most cases will confirm the other evidence. Therefore future serious publications on Tibetan art, including catalogues, should at the very least document the inscriptions on each painting or sculpture that have never been carefully described before¹⁰. Even if the person or people writing the catalogue cannot identify the figures named, there is every reason to hope that someone else may come along in the future who knows the tradition better and may be able to identify the specific lineage. If the author is unable to make full use of the inscriptions, then he or she can these days probably find a qualified person who is willing to help, perhaps even entering into a collaboration such as the main co-authors of this book have so fruitfully done.

A better sense of lineage and concrete tradition would have improved the book under review, though of course one cannot expect uniformity of quality throughout a book of such length and scope. If I have harped a bit about lineages here, it is because they are so seldom taken into account properly, though in fact they are often easy to recognize and understand. Moreover, I offer the above comments and suggestions in the knowledge that probably nobody besides the two authors could have written either a more effective general introduction or a more sensitive and adequate catalogue to an exhibition of such amazing variety and significance. The publishers are to be congratulated for producing an elegant book from cover to cover.

¹⁰ When recording inscriptions, it is important to record exactly what is there, even unusual or impossible orthographies. They may be shortened names (bKris for bKra-sis), or the result of the illiteracy of the scribe or painter who wrote them down. If some syllables are missing or damaged, each missing horizontal space on the line can be indicated by an x. Punctuation should also be precisely indicated.

APPENDIX: THE ABBOTS OF NÖR – A CHRONOLOGICAL LIST

Here is a composite list of the Nör abbots, compiled after the comparison of several sources (slightly revised from JACKSON 1989). The dates of births and deaths, when known, are given within parentheses, and the abbatial tenures are given without parentheses. The tenures of some later abbots are uncertain and will need to be further corroborated through contemporaneous accounts. Those within square brackets are highly conjectural.

- (1) Nor-chen Kun-dga'-bzañ-po (1382–1456), 1429–1456
- (2) Mus-chen Sems-dpa'-chen-po dKon-mchog-rgyal-mtshan (1388–1469), 1456–1461?
- (3) 'Gar-ston 'Jam-dbyaṅś-śes-rab-rgya-mtsho (1396?–1474?), 1461?–1465?
- (4) rGyal-tshab Kun-dga'-dbañ-phyug (1424–1478), 1465–1478
- (5) dPal-ldan-rdo-rje (1411–1482), 1479?–1482
- (6) Go-bo rab-'byams-pa bSod-nams-señ-ge (1429–1489), 1483–1486
- (7) Yoṅś-'dzin dKon-mchog-'phel (1445–1514), 1486–1513
- (8) Mus-chen Saṅś-rgyas-rin-chen (1453?–1524), 1513–1524?
- (9) rGyal-ba Lha-mchog-señ-ge (1468–1535), 1524?–1534
- (10) dKon-mchog-lhun-grub (1497–1557), 1534–1557
- (11) Saṅś-rgyas-señ-ge (1504–1569), 1557–1569
- (12) dKon-mchog-dpal-ldan (1526–1590), 2 tenures: 1569–1579, 1583–1590
- (13) Brañ-ti Paṅ-chen Nam-mkha'-dpal-bzañ (1535–1602), 2 tenures: 1579–1583, 1590–1594?
- (14) Shar-pa Byams-pa Kun-dga'-bkra-śis (1558–1603?), 1595–1603?
- (15) rTse-gdon khri-chen Sa-skyapa Kun-dga'-bsod-nams-lhun-grub (1571–1642), 1603–1618?
- (16) sGrub-khañ-pa dPal-ldan-don-grub (1563–1636), 1618?–1622?
- (17) Bran-ti mkhan-chen Nam-mkha'-saṅś-rgyas, 1622?–1625?
- (18) Śar-chen Śes-rab-'byuñ-gnas (1596–1653), 1625?–1653?
- (19) Brañ-ti mkhan-chen Nam-mkha'-rin-chen (1624?–1669?), 1653?–1657?
- (20) rGyal-rtse-ba Byañ-pa Nāg-dbañ-bsod-nams-rgyal-mtshan (1598[?]-1674[?]), 1657?
- (21) Snar-thaṅ dPal-'byor-gliñ-pa Khañ-gsar mkhan-chen bSod-nams-rgya-mtsho (1617–1667), 1658–1667
- (22) sGrub-khañ-pa dPal-mchog-rgyal-mtshan (1599–1673?), 1667–1671
- (23) Hor-ston Paṅ-chen Nam-mkha'-dpal-bzañ (1611–1672), 1671–1672
- (24) Śar Mi-ñag-gi-ston-pa Lhun-grub-dpal-ldan (1624–1697), 1673–1686?
- (25) mKhan-chen mÑā'-ris-pa Saṅś-rgyas-phun-tshogs (1649–1705), 1686?–1689?
- (26) Śar-chen Saṅś-rgyas-bstan-'dzin (d. 1705), 1689?–1695?
- (27) Śabs-stod rDzi-luñ-pa Byams-pa Śes-bya-bzañ-po (d. 1702?), 1695?–1702?
- (28) Śar Mi-ñag Rab-sgañ-pa Byams-pa Tshul-khrims-dpal-bzañ (1675–1710), 1703–1710
- (29) gTsañ Phyug-gzūn sPel-skyapa bSod-nams-dpal-ldan (1669–1713), 1710–1713
- (30) Khañ-gsar Byams-pa bSod-nams-bzañ-po (1689–1749), 1713–1722, also *gdan-tshab* 1740?–1741
- (31) gTsañ mDo-mkhar-ba mkhan-chen bKra-śis-lhun-grub (1668?/1671?–1739), 1722–1725

- (32) mKhas-btsun Dar-rtse-mdo Tshul-khrims-lhun-grub (1676–1729/30), 1725–1729?
- (33) Thar-rtse Byams-pa Nam-mkha'-bsam-'grub (1696–1754?), 1730–1733
- (34) Phan-khañ mkhan-chen dPal-ldan-chos-skyoñ (1702–1769), 1733–1740
- (35) bŚes-gñen Ldan-ma Sañs-rgyas-dpal-bzañ, tenure 1740?–1741 or only 1741
- (36) Khañ-gsar-ba Byams-pa bSod-nams-lhun-grub (1714–1745), 1741–1745
- (37) Klu-sdiñs Rin-chen-mi-'gyur-rgyal-mtshan (b. 1717), 1746–1751
- (38) gTsañ-pa Sañs-rgyas-ye-śes, tenure 1751? "short-lived"
- (39) Mi-ñag-pa dKon-mchog-grags-pa (b. 1716), tenure 1751–?
- (40) Khañ-gsar-ba Ñag-dban-chos-skyoñ-bzañ-po (b. 1723), ?–1771–?
- (41) Khams-pa rnam-'dren Sañs-rgyas-grags-pa (b. 1720s?), ?–1780–?
- (42) Khams-pa mtshuñs-med Phun-tshogs-don-grub
- (43) Khams-pa chos-rje Byams-pa-kun-dga'-bsod-nams (d. c. 1787), ?–1787
- (44) Thar-rtse Byams-pa-nam-mkha'-'chi-med (1765–1820), 1789–1793
- (45) Khams-pa mkhas-btsun Ñag-dbañ-dam-chos (d. 1804/5), 1793?–1804
- (46) Li-thañ-pa Byams-pa bSod-nams-dpal-'byor, 1805–1811
- (47) Thar-rtse Byams-pa-kun-dga'-bstan-'dzin (1776–1862), 1811–1821
- (48) Khañ-gsar-ba Ñag-dban-blo-gros-bzañ-po, 1821–c. 1823?
- (49) Yoñs-'dzin Pañdita Mi-ñag-pa dPal-ldan-chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan (c. 1784–c.1854?), c.1823?–c.1829?
- (50) Phan-khañ Byams-pa dPal-ldan-bzañ-po, c. 1830?–1835
- (51) Thar-rtse rnal-'byor 'Jam-dpal-bzañ-po (1789–1864), 1835–1842
- (52) Khañ-gsar-ba Ñag-dbañ-blo-gros-bstan-'dzin, 1842–1849?
- (53) Phan-khañ Kun-dga'-bstan-pa'i-blo-gros (1822–1884), 1849–1851?
- (54) Thar-rtse mkhan-chen Byams-pa-kun-dga'-bstan-pa'i-rgyal-mtshan (1829–1870), 1851–1859
- (55) Khañ-gsar mkhan-chen Ñag-dbañ-bsod-nams-rgyal-mtshan (b. 1830s, d. 1890s), 1859–1866
- (56) Khañ-gsar 'Jam-dbyaṅs-śes-rab-rgya-mtsho (d. 1873?), "seven-year tenure" [1866–c.1870?]
- (57) Phan-khañ mkhan-chen dPal-ldan-blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan (1840–1900), "seven-year tenure" [c.1870?–c.1876?]
- (58) Thar-rtse 'Jam-dbyaṅs-rin-chen-rdo-rje (1837–1901), "eight-year tenure" [c. 1876?–c.1881?]
- (59) Khañ-gsar mkhan-chen Ñag-dbañ-blo-gros-sñiñ-po (b. 1840s?), "tenure of approximately 10 years" [c.1881?–c.1890?]
- (60) Khañ-gsar Ñag-dbañ-mkhyen-rab-'jam-dpal-sñiñ-po (1859?–1939/40), tenure c.1890?–1895
- (61) Phan-khañ Ñag-dbañ-kun-dga'-bstan-pa'i-rgyal-mtshan (1863–1899), 1895–1898
- (62) Phan-khañ Byams-pa-dpal-ldan-chos-mdzad, tenure 1898–1904?
- (63) Thar-rtse 'Jam-dbyaṅs-kun-bzañ-bstan-pa'i-rgyal-mtshan, tenure 1904?–? [two tenures?]
- (64) Phan-khañ 'Jam-dbyaṅs-kun-bzañ-thub-bstan-chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan [?–1921?]
- (65) Khañ-gsar Dam-pa Rin-po-che Ñag-dbañ-blo-gros-gzān-phan-sñiñ-po (1876–1953), c.1921–c.1924? [second tenure, c.1926–1927?]
- (66) Klu-sdiñs rgyal-sras 'Jam-dbyaṅs-chos-kyi-ñi-ma (1872–1926), 1924–1926

- (67) Thar-rtse 'Jam-dbyaṅs-kun-bzañ-thub-bstan-chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan (1903–1960), 1927–1930?
- (68) Phaṅ-khañ Ṇag-dbañ-blo-gros-theg-mchog-bstan-pa'i-rgyal-mtshan (1906–c.1960), 1930–1933?
- (69) Khaṅ-gsar Ṇag-dbañ-yon-tan-rgya-mtsho (d. Derge, 1960s, in his 50s or 60s), 1933–1934/5?
- (70) Phaṅ-khañ Ṇag-dbañ-mkhas-grub-rgya-mtsho (1917–c.1969), 1936–39, 1948–1951
- (71) Thar-rtse Byams-pa-nam-mkha'-kun-bzañ-bstan-pa'i-rgyal-mtshan (1907–1940), 1939–1940 (four months)
- (72) Klu-sdiṅs 'Jam-dbyaṅs-thub-bstan-luñ-rtogs-rgya-mtsho (1896–1952), 1942–1945?
- (73) Khaṅ-gsar Ṇag-dbañ-mkhyen-brtse-thub-bstan-sñiṅ-po (1913–88), 1945–1948, 1957–59? (two tenures)
- (74) Thar-rtse 'Jam-dbyaṅs-kun-dga'-bstan-pa'i-rgyal-mtshan (1933–1987), 1951–1954
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ARCHIV FÜR INDISCHE PHILOSOPHIE

AN UNNOTICED FRAGMENT OF A MANUSCRIPT OF LĀSAKA'S COMMENTARY ON THE PARĀTRĪŚIKĀTANTRA

By Jürgen Hanneder, Marburg

1. Lāsaka (Lāsakāka) or Lakṣmīrāma is certainly not to be reckoned among the great figures of the Trika system of Kashmir Śaivism, but his commentary on the Parātrīśikātantra (PT) evinces the fact that even centuries after the zenith of the Trika main works of the school were commented upon. The two known works of Lāsaka are his commentary on the Bhagavadgītā (BhG) which, according to RASTOGI¹, is available in manuscript form, and a commentary on the PT edited as no. LXIX of the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies (KSTS)². The latter edition is based on two mss. which are described as follows³:

“*ka*. A modern copy of the Research Department. Script Śārada of recent origin [!]. Number of leaves 13 with 18 lines on an average per page, each line having 16 letters. Size 6½" × ½" [!]. This manuscript happens to be abounding in spelling mistakes and omissions.

“*kha*. A country-paper manuscript belonging to Dr. Shiv Nath Sastri, Ācharya, D.O.C., etc., of this Department. Script Śārada. Contains leaves 20. Lines per page 14 with 23 letters in a line; size 8" × 6". Almost correct. Date 1949 Vikrami.”

His date is given in this edition as 1732 of the Śāka era, based on the concluding verse of his commentary on BhG⁴. Lāsaka's literary activity must therefore be placed between the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century⁵.

¹ N. RASTOGI, *The Krama Tantricism of Kashmir. Historical and General Sources I*. Delhi 1979, p. 109.

² *The Parātrīśikā Vivṛiti of Rājānaka Lakṣmīrāma*, ed. JAGADDHARA ZĀDU SHĀSTRĪ. Srinagar 1947.

³ In J. ZĀDU's preface to his edition of *The Parātrīśikā Laghuvṛtti* by Abhinavagupta. [KSTS LXVIII]. Srinagar 1947, p. 2.

⁴ *lakṣmīrāma iti dviḥ tra nivasan kaśmīrabhūmaṇḍale, meror mātūr upāt-tadehajanano rājānagopālakāt | śrīsāke dviguṇādribhūparimite māse tathaiivās-vine, śuklāyām pratipady ajāṅghrinīrato gītāsu ṭikām vyadhāt ||* (ib. p. 9).

⁵ Cf. A. PADOUX, *La Parātrīśikālaghuvṛtti de Abhinavagupta*. Paris 1975, p. 10.

2. During research on a ms. of the Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya the present author noticed, in a codex deposited in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, a fragment of a work not mentioned in CABATON's catalogue⁶. According to him the codex "Sanskrit 865" comprises three works⁷, but right at its end there is one more change in the marginal abbreviations of titles: in the margin of the last three pages we have *pa rā*. For one familiar with the Trika system the first association had to be the above Tantra, but this could not be known to CABATON.

One question that is posed by this ms. is the date of Lāsaka. At the end of the 3rd part of the codex there is a colophon: *saṃvat 61 mārṅa vati 3 budhe likhitam idam*. This corresponds to Wednesday, November 4/14 1685⁸. The Lāsaka commentary starts immediately after this colophon. The discrepancy between the date of the BhG commentary and our colophon could be explained in different ways, but none of them seems finally convincing: there could have been two Lāsakas separated by a century, the last verse of the BhG commentary could be an interpolation or – which is the easiest explanation, for it dispenses with further enquiry – the scribe of our codex lived a century later and copied the old colophon. This is also not convincing as the marginal notes prove that the scribe was well aware of what he was writing. As none of these explanations seems satisfactory, the question has to remain unsolved as long as a study of the ms. of the BhG commentary and a detailed paleographical study of the Śāradā codex is wanting.

3. Nevertheless the ms. is interesting for its variant readings, which are given with reference to the pages and lines of the KSTS ed.:

p. 1,4 °*sudhārṇavam* for °*svadhārṇavam* – 5 °*śrīparameśvara*° for °*śrīparamaśiva*°, °*citsudhāsamudrasya* for °*citsvadhāsamudrasya*, °*nisṇandasya* for °*pūrṇasvarūpasya* – 6 °*anunmelana*° for °*anunmīlana*° – 7(f.) °*varṇa*° in °*varṇapratyāhāra*° is placed between the lines with °*kākapādas* – 10 °*kriyātmaka* for °*kriyātmakam* – 11f. °*cittabuddhilakṣaṇā antaḥkaraṇasrotāḥ* for °*cittabuddhilakṣaṇāntaḥkaraṇam srotāḥ*.

⁶ A. CABATON, Catalogue sommaire des manuscrits Sanskrits et Pālis. Paris 1907.

⁷ CABATON's description runs as follows (p. 143): "Īśvarapratyabhijñāhṛdaya. II. Śīvasūtravimarśinī. III. Sadācāraprakaraṇa, par Saṅkarācārya. XVIIIe siècle. Écriture kāśmīrī. Papier indien, 195 × 145 mm., 255 pages, 12 à 15 l., 12 à 16 aks. D.-rel. (Sanskrit Dév. 360)".

⁸ The date was calculated by Prof. Claus Vogel, Bonn.

p. 2,1 *udyataḥ* for *udyuktaḥ*, *pātañjalahaṭhayogavādīpūrvamīmāṃsa-*
kadharmasāstrādyāḥ for *pātañjalahaṭhayogipūrvamīmāṃsakādayaḥ*
 – 4f. °*varṇavikāsam adhi*° for °*varṇavikāsatmakam* [!] *adhi*° – 5f. *adh-*
vānam mupa° (with redundant *anusvāra*) for *adhvānam upa*° – 7
brāhmaṇā ya for *brāhmaṇā ye* – 9 after *iti* the ms. adds *catvāri parā-*
paśyantīmadhyamāvaikharīti vācaḥ parigaṇitāḥ padāni svarūpāṇi
brāhmaṇā brahmajñāḥ manīṣiṇaḥ śāstrajñāḥ guhāyām cidguhāyām
trīṇi parāpaśyantīmadhyamārūpāṇi neṅgayanti na paravedyībha-
vanti turīyam vaikharīrūpaṁ bhāgaṁ manuṣyādyā jīvā vadanti
spāṣṭam uccārayanti || śrīdevy uvāca for *śrībhairavī* – 12 °*samatā* for
samatām – 13 *vidyante* for *vidyate*, *uttaram prakṛṣṭam* for *prakṛṣṭam*
uttaram – 14 *kule śarīre* for *kaulikasiddhidam kule dehe* – 16f. *dehasya*
 for *dehādeś*, *cidaikātmyarūpā jīvanmuktiḥ tad uktaṁ* for *cidaikāt-*
myapratipattidārdhyaṁ jīvanmuktiḥ | uktaṁ ca – 18 The ms. ends
 with °*pratipatti*.

There are several marginal and interlineary notes, some of them hardly readable: *yataḥ*, the first word of the introductory verse has the comment *cidarṇavāt*, *āvedayanti jñāpakībhavanti*. The position of the *eva* has provoked the following comment: *evakāro bhinnakramaḥ tā ity anena sambadhyate*, and *vande* is paraphrased as *samāviśāmi*.

Although our ms. may not be a major contribution to the improvement of the KSTS ed., it yet underlines the fact that at least some of the editions in this series are in need of thorough revision. For what is plain at first sight is that the scribes of the two late mss. of the edition, or even the editor, have confounded the Śāradā *su* with *sva* (p. 1,4), because for the Vedic *svadhā-* was most probably not meant by Lāsaka.

PRAMĀṆAVĀRTTIKA IV (4)*

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The present article is the fourth in a series aiming at a translation of the chapter on inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*) in the *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV), the major work of the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti (6th–7th century A. D.). For the first three articles on k. 1–14, 15–27, and 28–47 respectively, see TILLEMANS 1986, 1987, and 1992. The verses translated here below are part of Dharmakīrti's elaboration upon Dignāga's definition of a thesis (*pakṣalakṣaṇa*) in a logical argument. In particular, k. 48–71 continue PV's elaboration upon Dignāga's provision *svayam*: the thesis consists in only what was intended (*iṣṭa*) by the proponent (*vādin*) himself (*svayam*). The discussion centers on the following problem: when a proponent attempts to prove that a subject (*dharmin*) has a particular property (*dharma*), then is he also in some sense proving the other properties attributed to that *dharmin* by his school's philosophical treatises (*śāstra*) or scriptures (*āgama*) ? In other words, does his thesis include not just the property under discussion, but also some or all of the other properties which happen to be mentioned in the canonical literature of his school? The discussion begins with a general treatment of the role of appeals to scriptural authority in inferences, and then proceeds to a more technical argument as to whether contradicting a property accepted in a treatise constitutes a logical downfall of some sort, or a point of defeat for the proponent.

(48) *uktaṃ ca nāgamāpekṣaṃ anumānaṃ svagocare |*

siddhaṃ tena susiddhaṃ tan na tadā śāstram iṅśyate ||

“Now, it has [already] been said that an inference [which functions by the force of real entities (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*)] does not depend upon scripture with regard to its object [i.e. what is to be

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proved (*sādhya*)]¹. What is established by such an [inference], is well established; at the time [of making such an inference]², a treatise is not taken into account.”

= PVin III 9; P. 291b5f. (without Pāda d). The reference is to PV IV 2: *anumāṇīyāye neṣṭam . . . / vācaḥ prāmāṇyam* “Speech is not held to be a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) with regard to the realm of an inference”. PVV specifies that the inference at stake here is *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*.

We have treated of the Epistemological school’s position on scriptural authority in some detail elsewhere³. So without pretending to develop fully the problem here, let us briefly describe the background of k. 48–51. First of all, the usual type of inference, such as that of sound’s impermanence, which proceeds objectively from one real state of affairs (*artha*) to another (cf. PV IV 16) and involves a natural connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*) between the terms, is known as *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*. Dharmakīrti also accepts that there are inferences which are based on passages in accepted scriptures (*āgamāśrita*), rather than directly upon the real states of affairs themselves, but maintains that these inferences are permissible only in cases of completely imperceptible (*atyantaparokṣa*) objects, namely, those, such as the details of the law of *karman*, which cannot be ascertained by means of direct perception or *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*. A treatise or scripture will be authoritative for such inferences, if it passes the following investigation:

- (a) Its accounts of perceptible states of affairs (*pratyakṣa*) are not refuted by direct perception.
- (b) Its accounts of imperceptible states of affairs (*parokṣa*), such as selflessness (*nairātmya*), which are accessible to the usual *vastubala*-type inference, are not refuted by any *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*.
- (c) The treatise’s statements concerning completely imperceptible (*atyantaparokṣa*) states of affairs are not directly or indirectly contradicted by other statements in the treatise, i.e. by another scripturally based inference (*āgamāśritānumāna*).

¹ Cf. PVV 432,11: *vastubalapravṛttam anumānam nāgamāpekṣam svasya gocare sādhya iti*.

² Cf. PVV 432,13f.: *tadānumākāle śāstrasyānāśrayaṇāt*. We follow D. SHĀSTRĪ in reading *tadānumākāle*; RS reads *tadānukāle*.

³ See TILLEMANS 1990a: I/23–35 (and the references therein); cf. HAYES 1984, BIJLERT 1989: 80–82 and 122–125, and the introduction to TILLEMANS 1993. For references and explanations concerning *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*, see JACKSON 1987: II/428–430 (n. 146).

K. 48 and 49 stress that when one is analysing a treatise to see whether it satisfies criteria (a) and (b), one cannot at that time use the treatise's own statements to prove anything: one can only rely on inferences whose validity can be assessed independently, i.e. *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*. Clearly, to do otherwise would make the evaluative investigation run the risk of circularity, for one would rely on the treatise to evaluate the selfsame treatise. Hence Dharmakīrti's important point (in k. 48f.) that the treatise should not be taken into account at the time one is investigating its statements by means of *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*. It is only after criteria (a) and (b) have been satisfied that one may proceed to (c) – this is the point of k. 50f. (see n. 8). Note that Dharmakīrti's method for determining the authority of treatises and scriptures was initially developed in PV I 215–217, these verses being in turn an explanation of PS II 5a⁴.

(49) *vādatyāgas tadā syāc cen na tadānabhyupāyataḥ /*
upāyo hy abhyupāye 'yam anaṅgam sa tadāpi san //

“[Objection:] But in that case the debate would be relinquished. [Reply:] No, because there is no acceptance [of a treatise] at the time [of making a *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*]⁵. Indeed, this [investigation (*vicāra*)] is the method for accepting [a treatise]; [so] even if there is [acceptance of a treatise] at this time, this is not a factor.⁶”

= PVin III 10; k. 10 and 11a are missing in P., but found in D. 193b6. On the opponent's position, see our explanations to k. 53.

(50) *tathā⁷ viśuddhe viśayadvaye śāstraparigrahaṃ /*
cikīrṣoḥ sa hi kālaḥ syāt tadā śāstreṇa bādhanam //

“When the two [types of] objects [viz. those which are perceptible (*pratyakṣa*) and those which are imperceptible (*parokṣa*)] are [ascertained as] faultless in this manner [i.e. by means of direct perception

⁴ PV I 215f.: *pratyakṣeṇānumānena dvividhenāpy abādhanam / drṣṭādrṣṭārthayor asyāviśaṃvādas tadarthayoh ||215|| āptavādāviśaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatā / buddher agatyābhikhitā parokṣe 'py asya gocare ||216||* and PS II 5ab: *āptavākyāviśaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatā /*, tr. in BUIJLERT 1989: 122–124 and TILLEMANS 1990a: I/24f.

⁵ Cf. PVinT 33b4f.: *dños po'i stobs kyiis žugs pa'i rjes su dpag pa'i dus de'i tshe khas blaṅs pa med pa'i phyir ro ||*. Cf. PVV's gloss on *tadā*, *sādhanopanyāsa*kāle, and PVV-n 1 *vastubalapravṛtte*.

⁶ Cf. PVV 432,20f.: *śāstrābhyupāye 'yam vicāra upāyaḥ | tatas tadā vicāra*kāle *sann apy abhyupagamo 'naṅgam . . .*

⁷ PV-k (III) *tathā*: PV-k (I) *śāstrā*; PV-k (II) *tadā*. PV Tib. *de ltar = tathā*.

and inference], then for one who wishes to adopt the treatise, this would indeed be the occasion [to accept it]. It is at this time that there [can] be invalidation (*bādhana*) on account of a treatise.”⁸
= PVin III 11; P. 291b6.

(51) *tadvirodhena cintāyās tatsiddhārtheṣv⁹ ayogataḥ |*

tṛtīyasthānasamkrāntau nyāyyaḥ¹⁰ śāstrapari-grahaḥ ||

“[This is] because one should not think that things established by means of that [treatise] are in contradiction with that [treatise]. When one proceeds to the third type of existent [i.e. *atyantaparokṣa*], it is correct to adopt a treatise.”

= PVin III 12; P. 291b6f.

There seem to be two different commentarial interpretations of *tadvirodhena* in k. 51a. Devendrabuddhi¹¹, and probably Manoratha-

⁸ See PVBh 505,3f.: *tathety anumānena pratyakṣeṇa ca viśayadvayaśya pratyakṣaparokṣasya viśuddhatāyām yadi tāvatā na paritoṣas tadā śāstrapari-grahacikīrṣāyām sa hi kālaḥ syād abhyupagamasya | tadaiva śāstreṇa bādhanam |*. We have in the main followed Prajñākaragupta here; Manorathanandin does not comment upon *śāstrapari-graḥaṁ cikīrṣoḥ*, but speaks only of *śāstrāśrayaṇenānumānam cikīrṣoḥ sataḥ* “when one wishes to make an inference by recourse to a treatise”. – PVV ad k. 50: *śāstropadarśite viśayadvaye pratyakṣaparokṣe rūpanairātmyādau tadā pramāṇapavrttyā viśuddhe nirñīte sati paścād atyantaparokṣe svargādau śāstreṇa śāstrāśrayaṇenānumānam cikīrṣoḥ sataḥ sa hi kālo 'bhyupagamasya' yadi śāstrabādhō na bhavet | atas tadā śāstreṇa bādhanam sādhyasāadhanāder iṣyate |* (text has *abhyupagamyā*; cf. PVBh above) “Suppose the two [types of] objects taught in the treatise – viz. perceptible and imperceptible [objects] such as form and selflessness [respectively] – are at this time ascertained by the action of a *pramāṇa* as being faultless. Then, subsequently (*paścāt*), when one wishes to make an inference concerning completely imperceptible [objects] (*atyantaparokṣa*), such as heaven, by means of a treatise, or by recourse to a treatise, then this is indeed the occasion for acceptance, provided that [this] treatise is not invalidated. Therefore, at this time, one admits that *sādhyā*, *sādhana*, etc. can be invalidated on account of a treatise”.

⁹ Mṛy. *tat siddhārtheṣv*.

¹⁰ Mṛy. *nyāyyaḥ*.

¹¹ PVP P. 333a2–4: *de tshe bstan bcos ñid kyis gnod par rgol ba la 'gyur ro || ci'i phyir ze na | de dañ 'gal ba ste | bstan bcos dañ 'gal bas so || de grub pa'i don te bstan bcos la mthoñ ba'i don dag la dpyod pa gan yin pa de'i | dpyod du mi ruñ ñid phyir ro || bstan bcos la 'gal ba yod na des bstan pa'i don mi ruñ ba'i phyir te | rten¹ med pa'i dpyad pa mi 'jug go zes bya ba'i don to |* (P., D. [279a5f.] *gtan*. PVT comments on *rtēn* [see n. 14]) “At that time the proponent would incur invalidation on account of the treatise itself. Why? Because, due to contradiction with that, i.e. due to contradiction with the treatise, it would be unfitting to deliberate upon the things established in that, i.e. upon the things which are found in the treatise. The point is: if there is a contradiction in the

nandin, understood k. 51ab as follows: due to the fact that the proponent contradicts his treatise, the contents of that treatise could no longer be invoked in any deliberation. Accordingly, if we followed Devendrabuddhi, k. 51ab would have to be translated as: “[This is] because, due to a contradiction with the [treatise] (*tadvirodhena*), it would be unfitting to deliberate upon the things established in that [treatise]”. We have, however, preferred not to interpret *tadvirodhena* as giving a reason (i.e. “due to”), but instead to take it together with *cintāyās*: “think that . . . are in contradiction with that”. Note that the Tibetan translation of *tadvirodhena cintāyās* by *de dañ ni 'gal bar sems pa* supports this latter interpretation, and Prajñākaragupta also seems to have construed k. 51ab in this way¹².

The point of k. 51ab is to provide a reason for k. 50d's assertion, “It is at this time that there [can] be invalidation (*bādhana*) on account of a treatise”. Once a proponent has accepted a treatise, then its propositions concerning *atyantaparokṣa* matters can invalidate a thesis which directly or indirectly is in contradiction with the contents of that treatise. The proponent cannot allow/think that his thesis concerning completely imperceptible subjects (*dharmin*) – subjects which are establishable only by means of a treatise – is in fact, in contradiction with that selfsame treatise which he accepts. If such a contradiction occurs, the proponent's thesis is thereby invalidated¹³.

treatise, then since the things which it teaches are unfitting, the deliberation will not function without any basis”.

¹² PVBh 505,8–12: *na hi parīkṣye¹ sāstrābhyupagame tadvirodhena cintā tacchāstraprasiddhe 'rthe yuktā | tathā hi | parīkṣitam tad yadi sāstram uccaiḥ pratijñayā tat katham asya vācyaṃ² parīkṣaṇaṃ tasya punar na kāryaṃ parīkṣaṇaṃ cen na parīkṣitam tat || tasmāt parīkṣya pratyakṣānumānābhyāṃ tadaviṣayaṃ trtīyasthānaśaṃkrāntinimittam sāstrābhyupagama iti nānumānaviṣayasya sāstram bādhakam |* (¹sic RS, but cf. PVBh Tib. 186b2 *brtags nas bstan bcos khas blaṅs na* implying *parīkṣya* – ²sic RS, but PVBh Tib. 186b3 has *gnod*, suggesting that we should read some form of *BĀDH*, e.g. *bādhyaṃ*) “Indeed, when one has examined and then accepted a treatise, it is not reasonable to think that the things established by that treatise are in contradiction with it [i.e. the treatise]. For, if this treatise has been much examined, how could it be invalidated by the [proponent's] thesis? Another investigation of the [treatise] should not be undertaken; if there is investigation, the [treatise] was not examined. Therefore, when one has examined by means of perception and inference, the ground for proceeding to the third type of existent is one which does not concern this [perception or inference], [but] is the acceptance of a treatise. Thus, a treatise is not an invalidator (*bādhaka*) for the realm of inference”.

¹³ Cf. PVinT P. 34b4f.: *bstan bcos khas blaṅs na yañ de dañ 'gal ba'i don khas mi blaṅ ste | de khas len na bstan bcos kyis¹ gnod par 'gyur ro || dper na*

Contrary to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and other schools, which use proofs from authority in the case of both empirical and non-empirical matters (*dṛṣṭādrṣṭārtha*), the Buddhist uses them only in the case of *atyantaparokṣa*, that is, things which are inaccessible to perception and *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*. For *atyantaparokṣa*, however, not only may treatises be used, but indeed they must be used to ascertain these otherwise rationally inaccessible truths: the natures of completely imperceptible subjects (*dharmin*) are only knowable through recourse to treatises. Hence Dharmakīrti's statement in k. 51cd: "When one proceeds to the third type of existent [i.e. *atyantaparokṣa*], it is correct to adopt a treatise".¹⁴

(52) *tatrāpi sādhyadharmasya nāntarīyakabādhanam*¹⁵ /
parihāryam na cānyeṣām anavasthāprasaṅgataḥ //

"In this case too [when one adopts a treatise], the invalidation of what is invariably related (*nāntarīyaka*) with the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*) [as for example, selflessness (*nairātmya*) with momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*)]¹⁶ is to be avoided, but not [the invalida-

bstan bcos las rab tu grags pa'i chos khas blaṅs nas de daṅ 'gal ba bde ba ma yin pa rab tu ster ba ṅid smra na bstan bcos kyis' gnod pa bzin no | (¹sic following D. [30a5–7]; P. reads *kyi*) "If one has accepted the treatise, things in contradiction with it should not be accepted; for if one does accept them, one will be invalidated by the treatise. For example, when one has accepted the Dharma recognized in a treatise, then if one asserts something which contradicts that [treatise], such as that [Dharma] bestows unhappiness [on people], this would be invalidated by the treatise".

¹⁴ For the Naiyāyika position see NS.I 1,7f.: *āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ | sa dvividho dṛṣṭādrṣṭārthatvāt* |. On the indispensability of scripture, see PVinT 34b3f.: *gnas gsum pa dbañ po las 'das par 'pho ba na | bstan bcos len pa rigs ldan yin te | gdon mi za bar bya ba yin te | bstan bcos khas ma blaṅs na ni dpyod pa'i gzi med pa'i phyir ro* | "When one proceeds to the third type of existent, which transcends the senses, it is justified to adopt a treatise, i.e. this definitely should be done; for if one does not accept a treatise, there will be no basis for the investigation". See also PVT 320a2f. which comments on Devendra-buddhi's phrase *rtēn med pa* ("no basis"; see n. 11) in terms of the inexistence of the *dharmin* (*chos can*) recognized in the treatises: *rtēn med pa zēs bya ba ni bstan bcos la 'gal ba yod na de la rab tu grags pa'i chos can yañ yod pa ma yin pa de bas na rten med pa'i dpyod pa mi 'jug go* |.

¹⁵ PV-k (III), Mṛy. *sambaddhasyaiva bādhanam*. PV-k (I) and (II)'s *nāntarīyakabādhanam* is supported by PV Tib. *med na mi 'byun la gnod ṅid*.

¹⁶ See PVV 433,14f.: ... *sādhyadharmasya yañ nāntarīyakam sambaddham yathā kṣaṇikatvasya nairātmyam tasya bādhanam parihāryam* |. On the connection between impermanence/momentariness and selflessness, see e.g. PV II 254ab. See n. 79 below.

tion] of other things; for then it would follow absurdly that there would be no end (*anavasthā*).”

= PVin III 13; P. 291b7.

(PVV's introduction to k. 53:) “[Objection:] But a debate should not be engaged in unless one has relied upon a treatise. Thus, also in the case of a *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*, there is reliance upon a treatise. [Dharmakīrti] replies:”¹⁷

(53) *keneyam sarvacintāsu śāstram grāhyam iti sthitiḥ /*

krteḍānīm asiddhāntair grāhyo dhūmena nānalaḥ //

“Who made this rule that a treatise must be held in every deliberation? Now [if that were so], then people who had no philosophical tenets (*asiddhānta*) could not understand fire by means of smoke.” = PVin III 14; P. 291b7f. The objection which provoked k. 53 as a reply was no doubt based on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika views and is essentially the same objection as in k. 49 – although in both cases precisely who the adversary was remains unanswered by Dharmakīrti or his commentators. Prajñākaragupta introduces k. 53 as replying to the charge that if one engaged in debate without accepting a treatise, one would simply be a caviller (*vaiṭaṇḍika*) and a nihilist (*nāstika*), raising objections without having a position of one's own¹⁸. The opponent's views are thus in keeping with the Naiyāyika's definition of debate (*vāda*) in NS I 2,1, which speaks of *vāda* not contradicting the school's philosophical tenets (*siddhāntāviruddha*). For the Naiyāyika, arguing without holding a system of tenets at all would be cavil (*viṭaṇḍā*), as defined in NS I 2,3. Dharmakīrti's initial reply is to invoke the obvious fact that unphilosophical people certainly do make inferences; following the Naiyāyika's strictures, however, their ordinary day to day inferences – such as inferring that there is fire because there is smoke – would all become impossible, because no treatises are relied upon.

¹⁷ PVV 433,20f.: *nanu śāstram anapekṣya na vādaḥ kartavya iti vastubalapravṛttānumāne 'pi śāstrāpekṣety āha.*

¹⁸ PVBh 505,21: *nanu śāstram anabhyupagamyāpi vāde vaiṭaṇḍikāḥ syāt | anāśritaśāstrakasya nāstikatvāt |* “[Objection:] But surely, in a debate, when one has not even accepted a treatise, one would be a caviller, for he who does not base himself upon a treatise is a nihilist”. As we argued in connection with k. 42, Uddyotakara, in the Nyāyavārttika, rejected Dignāga's proviso *svayam* and the view that the thesis should be “independent of treatises” (*śāstrānapekṣa*) – thus Uddyotakara is one of the plausible candidates for being the opponent in this discussion.

(PVV's introduction to k. 54:) "Now, for anyone to have a connection (*saṃbandha*) with philosophical tenets is incoherent. For indeed, if there were [such] a connection, it would be either congenital (*sahaja*) or dependent upon contingent conditions (*aupādhika*). To negate both [these alternatives Dharmakīrti] states:"¹⁹

(54) *riktasya jantor*²⁰ *jātasya guṇadoṣam apaśyataḥ |*
*vilabdā rata kenāmī siddhāntaviśamagrahāḥ*²¹ //

"When a person is born without [philosophical tenets] and does not see [their] virtues and faults, then alas, who bestowed [upon him] these wicked demons (*graha*)²² of philosophical tenets!"

= PVin III 2; P. 285b6f. If we accepted the opponent's view that a person was always answerable for his philosophical tenets, Dharmakīrti would then ask in what sense a person has or, is connected with, these tenets. "When a person is born without [philosophical tenets]" shows that there is no congenital (*sahaja*) connection; "does not see [their] virtues and faults" shows that there is no connection dependent upon contingent conditions (*aupādhika*). In other words, tenets are certainly not congenital parts of a person, like the organs of his body. They would only become his when contingent conditions had been satisfied, viz. that he had evaluated them by means of *pramāṇas*: the virtues and faults of tenets cannot be understood simply by citing scripture²³. However, prior to a person's making an independent evaluation by means of *pramāṇas*, the tenets could not be attributed to him – who then decrees or decides that he is still answerable for various treatise-based positions? As Prajñākaragupta explains, the conclusion is: "Therefore, inference does not presuppose the acceptance of treatises"²⁴.

¹⁹ PVV 434.2f.: *na ca kasya cit siddhāntasaṃbandho yuktaḥ | tathā hi saṃbandho bhavan sahaḥ vā bhaved aupādhiko vā | dvayam api niṣeddhum āha |*.

²⁰ MIY. *jantoj*.

²¹ MIY. *siddhāntaviśam agraḥāḥ*.

²² Cf. M. MONIER-WILLIAMS, Sanskrit-English Dictionary, s.v. *graha*: "... evil demons or spirits who seize or exercise a bad influence on the body and mind of man". Devendrabuddhi specifies that these tenets are like wicked demons because one cannot get rid of them. See PVV-n 5 ad k. 55, which is a small fragment of PVP: *tyājayitum aśakyatvāt*.

²³ Cf. PVP P. 334a3f.: *gñis pa yañ ma yin te | luñ tsam gyis yon tan ñes pa ma mthoñ ba' la'o ||* ('sic D. [280a3], P. om.) "It is not the second [type of connection] either, for virtues and faults are not seen by means of mere scripture".

²⁴ PV Bh 506,10: *tasmān na śāstrābhyupagamapūrvakam anumānam |*.

(55) *yadi sādhanā ekatra sarvaṃ śāstraṃ nidarśane*²⁵ /
darśayet sādhanam syād ity eṣa lokottarā sthitiḥ ||

“It is said that if, on the basis of the example, [the proponent] could show that all the [properties found in] treatises were [pervaders (*vyāpaka*)] of one and the same means of proof (*sādhanā*) [i.e. reason], then [the latter] would be a [valid] *sādhanā*. This rule is out of this world[; for in the world there actually are some *sādhana*s, but if this were correct, there would not be any *sādhana*s at all]!”²⁶

= PVin III 15; P. 291b8–292a1. The position of Dharmakīrti’s adversary would be that the only reasons which could be considered valid are those which did in fact imply all the properties which treatises spoke of in connection with the proof in question. In short, if some treatises held properties *q*, *r* (e.g. the Vaiśeṣikasūtra’s position that sound is a “quality of space”, *ākāśaguṇatva*) and others held *s* and *t*, then a reason *p* (e.g. “being produced”, *kṛtakatva*) would be valid only if *q*, *r*, *s* and *t* were indeed *vyāpaka* of *p*. The demand is absurdly strong: the result would be that there could no longer be any valid reasons at all, for treatises contradict each other in ascribing mutually incompatible properties²⁷.

²⁵ PV-k (I) *sarvaśāstranidarśane*.

²⁶ Additions follow PVinT 35a5f.: *gal te dpe la bstan bcos las mthoñ ba’i don kun sgrub par byed pa gcig la khyab par byed pa yin par ñe bar bstan pa de lta na sgrub par ’gyur ro ze na | ’di ni ’jig rten las ’das pa’i lugs śig go | ’jig rten la sgrub par byed pa cuñ zad yod pa kho na ste | de lta na ni sgrub par byed pa ’ga’ yañ med par ’gyur te . . .* Tibetan commentators, such as dGe ’dun grub pa, follow Dharmottara and emphasize that pervasion (*vyāpti*) is being spoken of here. dGe ’dun grub pa summarizes the opponent’s view as “if something is a valid reason, then one should show, on the basis of the example, that it will be pervaded by all scriptural properties (*luñ don*)”; see dGe 302,1 f.: *gal te mthun dpe la bstan bcos kun gyis sgrub par byed pa gcig ñid la khyab par bstan pa | sgrub byed yañ dag tu ’gyur ro ze na | rtags yañ dag yin na | lun doñ kun gyis mthun dpe’i steñ du khyab pa bstan dgos so zes pa ’di ni chos can | mi ’thad de | ’jig rten gyi tha snyad las ’das pa’i lugs ñan yin pa’i phyir |*. While Manorath-anandin does not speak of *vyāpaka/vyāpti* in his commentary on this k., he certainly does in connection with k. 56, which is a continuation of the argument in k. 55. Finally, note that Devendrabuddhi brings out Dharmakīrti’s caustic humour: *de dag ’jig rten ’das lugs sam zes bzad gad du mdzad pa’o* “He ridicules [this position] by saying ‘Are these rules which are out of this world?’”.

²⁷ Cf. PVBh 506,16: *śāstravirodho hi parihartum aśakya eva | śāstrāñām eva parasparavirodhāt |*. Cf. also the summary of the argument in Bu ston 378,6f.: *rtags la luñ don ma lus pas khyab pa ñes dgos zes bya ba ’di ni ’jig rten las ’das pa’i lugs yin te | ’jig rten na rtags yañ dag yod kyañ luñ don ma lus pas khyab pa ñes pa med pa’i phyir ro ||* “When it is said that there must be the certainty that the reason (*rtags* = *linga*) is pervaded by all scriptural proper-

The adversary here and in what follows takes up the theme, begun in k. 43, that a reason which proves the opposite of a property ascribed in a treatise incurs the fault of being a contradictory reason (*viruddhahetu*).²⁸

(56) *asambaddhasya dharmasya kim asiddhau na sidhyati /*
hetus tatsādhanāyoktaḥ kim duṣṭas tatra sidhyati ||

“When an unconnected *dharma* [such as *ākāśaguṇatva*] is not established, then why should [impermanence (*anityatva*), which is what one sought to prove and which is a *vyāpaka* of the reason *kṛtakatva*] not be established? Why should the reason which was stated to prove that [*vyāpaka*, i.e. *anityatva*] be faulty when the latter [which is its actual *sādhya*] is established?”²⁹

= PVin III 16; P. 292a1. Dharmakīrti continues his reply to the opponent in k. 55 by saying that there is, at any rate, no danger that a reason, like *kṛtakatva*, be contradictory, because it is impermanence which is being proven (*sādhya*); whatever problems there might be with an irrelevant and unconnected property like *ākāśaguṇatva* do not concern the validity of *kṛtakatva* in this context.

(PVV’s introduction to k. 57:) “[Objection:] But if a property [mentioned] in the treatise is invalidated, then what was intended [to be proved] will not be established either. [Dharmakīrti] replies:”³⁰

(57) *dharmān anupanīyaiva*³¹ *drṣṭānte dharmiṇo ’khalān*³² /
vāgdhūmāder jano ’nveti caitanyadahanādīkam ||

“A person infers [things] such as consciousness and fire from [reasons]

ties without exception, this is a rule which is out of this world; for in the world there are valid reasons, but there is no certainty that they are pervaded by all scriptural properties without exception”.

²⁸ PVP P. 334a8-b2: *de lta ma yin na | chos gcig ma bstan pa na yan rjes su ’gro ba can de ŋid la gnod pa’i phyir | gtan tshigs thams cad ’gal ba dan dpe bsgrub par bya bas ston par ’gyur ro ze na |* (D. 280a6) “[Opponent:] Otherwise, if one *dharma* were not demonstrated, then that which has the positive concomitance (*anvaya*) [with it] would be invalidated. Therefore, reasons would all become contradictory, and the examples would be void of what is to be proved (*sādhya*)”. Cf. NS I 2,6’s definition of *viruddhahetu*: “When one has accepted a set of philosophical tenets (*siddhānta*), [the reason] which is in contradiction with it is [termed] *viruddha*” (*siddhāntam abhyupetya tadvirodhī viruddhaḥ*).

²⁹ For additions, see PVV. The phrase *tatra sidhyati* should be understood as a locative absolute in accordance with PV Tib. *de grub yin na*.

³⁰ PVV 435,2: *sāstrārthabādhane ’bhimatasya’pi na siddhir iti cet | āha ||*.

³¹ Miy. *dharmānanuṣa*°.

³² PV-k (III) °*khalān*.

such as speech and smoke without in any way adducing every one of the *dharmīn's dharmas* in the example.”³³

= PVin III 17; P. 292a1f.

(58) *svabhāvaṃ kāraṇaṃ vārtho*³⁴ *vyabhicāreṇa sādhasyaṃ* /
*kasya cid vādabādhāyāṃ*³⁵ *svabhāvān na nivartate* //

“When a state of affairs (*artha*) proves an essential property (*svabhāva*) or a cause (*kāraṇa*) without any deviation (*avyabhicāreṇa*), then if it should [happen to] invalidate the position of someone [who is devoted to a treatise], it does not turn away from its [real] nature (*svabhāva*) [of being either identical with what is to be proved or an effect of what is to be proved]³⁶.”

= PVin III 18; P. 292a2f.

(59) *prapadyamānaś cānyas*³⁷ *taṃ nāntarīyakam īpsitaiḥ* /
sādhyārthair hetunā tena katham apratipāditaḥ //

“And when the adversary understands that this [reason] is invariably related (*nāntarīyaka*) with the intended states of affairs constituting the *sādhyā*, then how is it possible that he is not persuaded by this reason?”

³³ Cf. PVV 435,5–7: *dharmīṇo dharmān sāstradarśitān akhilān hetuvyāpakatvenānupanīyāpradarśya vāgdhūmāder hetoś caitanyadahanādīkam yathākramam svasamtānavan mahānasavac ca jāno 'nveti pratipadyate* // “A person infers (*anveti* = *pratipadyate*) consciousness, fire, etc. from the reasons speech, smoke and so forth, just as in the case of his own continuum and a kitchen respectively, but without adducing (*anupanīya* = *aprarśya*) as a *vyāpaka* of the reason every one of the *dharmīn's dharmas* which are taught in a treatise”. The allusion is to the analogical proof for other minds which is to be found in Dharmakīrti's *Samtānāntarasiddhi* (SS): one can infer the existence of other minds from others' speech-behaviour, just as in one's own case; see SS 1: *buddhipūrvam kriyāṃ dṛṣṭvā svadehe 'nyatra tadgrahāt | jñāyate yadi dhīś cīttamātre 'py eṣa nayaḥ samaḥ* //, a Skt. fragment tr. in KITAGAWA 1973: 408f. n. 8 as follows: “If [you say that] one shall know [the existence of] intelligence [other than his own] on the ground that he grasps actions in other [persons' bodies] after having seen [in] his own body that his actions are preceded by [his own] intelligence, then [I must say that] this method of reasoning is the same even in the case of idealism”.

³⁴ PV-k (II) *cārtho*.

³⁵ PV-k (I) *vādibādhāyāṃ*.

³⁶ Cf. PVV 435,13: *svabhāvād vyāpakakāraṇagamakān na nivartate* “It will not turn away from its *svabhāva*, i.e. making known a *vyāpaka* or a cause”, and PVinT 36a4: *de'i bdag 'ñid dan de'i 'bras bu'i no bo 'ñid las ldog par mi 'gyur ro* | “It will not turn away from its *svabhāva* of either identity with [what is to be proved] or being an effect of [what is to be proved]”.

³⁷ Mīx. °*mānaścānyas*.

= PVin III 19; P. 292a3.

K. 57–59 serve to show the complete irrelevance of what is stated in treatises when one makes a *vastubalappravṛttānumāna*:

(a) When we prove something of some *dharmin*, then, psychologically speaking, it is not so that we at the same time seek to prove everything which a treatise might ascribe to that same *dharmin*.

(b) If the reason is valid by the usual standards of Dharmakīrtian logic (i.e. if it is a *svabhāvahetu* or a *kāryahetu*), then it does objectively prove what we wish it to prove, whether or not it also happens to prove the opposite of what the treatise says. As Dharmottara explicitly brings out (PVinT 36b8 ff.), proof is dependent on ontological considerations, namely, the existence of a natural connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*) between the terms.

(c) Once the opponent has understood the reason and its connection with what is to be proven, he too will be convinced, irrespectively of what his treatises might say.

In what follows, Dharmakīrti replies to the adversary's idea that the proponent is refuted because of his impropriety in stating the reason, *kṛtakatva*, which contradicts *ākāśaguṇatva*. The general discussion seems to be situated in the context of the Naiyāyika's scheme of debaters' points of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*), of which one is *pratijñāvirodha* ('contradiction of the thesis'); to quote NS V 2,4, this consists in 'a contradiction between the reason and the thesis' (*pratijñāhetvor virodhaḥ*)³⁸. Dharmakīrti's view is that contradiction between *kṛtakatva* and *ākāśaguṇatva* simply occurs objectively, and thus the proponent himself, who never intended to prove *ākāśaguṇatva*, should not be thought to be responsible for creating a contradiction by stating a bad logical reason.

(60) *ukto 'nukto 'pi vā hetur*³⁹ *viroddhā*⁴⁰ *vādino 'tra kim /*
na hi tasyoktidoṣeṇa sa jātaḥ śāstrabādhanaḥ //

'Whether the reason is stated or not, it is [objectively (*vastuta eva*)⁴¹] in contradiction [with the property mentioned in the treatise]. What

³⁸ See NS V 2,1 ff. which speaks of twenty-two types of points of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*), of which the third is *pratijñāvirodha*.

³⁹ PV-k (I/III), Mṛy. *ced dhetur*. PV-k (II)'s reading *vā hetur* is better supported by PV Tib. *gtan tshigs brjod dam ma brjod kyañ*.

⁴⁰ PV-k (I/III), Mṛy. *virodho*. PV-k (II) has the quasi-adjectival *viroddhā* (from *viroddhr*) qualifying *hetuḥ*. This seems preferable to the noun *virodha* and corresponds better to PV Tib. *gtan tshigs brjod dam ma brjod kyañ //* 'gal na rgol pas 'dir ci byas //.

⁴¹ PVV 436,1.

[refutation] could there be of the proponent in this case! For indeed it was not due to a fault in his statement that the [reason] came to invalidate the treatise.”

(61) *bādhakasyābhīdhānāc ced doṣo yadi vaden na saḥ |*
kiṃ na bādheta so 'kurvann ayuktaṃ⁴² kena duṣyati ||

“[Objection:] There is a fault [attributable to the proponent], because he states [a reason] which invalidates [a property, like *ākāśaguṇatva*, which is mentioned in his treatise].⁴³ [Reply:] Then if he did not state [the reason], why wouldn't it [still] invalidate [that property]? [Because objectively (*vastutas*) the reason is in contradiction with the property mentioned in the treatise, then it definitely does invalidate it.⁴⁴] When he does nothing incorrect, why is he at fault!”

(PVV's introduction to k. 62:) “[Objection:] But surely if the proponent were not at fault even when he stated a faulty reason, then he would not commit any fault even if he were to state [reasons] which were unestablished (*asiddha*), etc. [Dharmakīrti] replies:”⁴⁵

(62) *anyeṣu hetvābhāseṣu sveṣṭasyaivāprasāadhanāt |*
duṣyed vyarthābhīdhānena nātra tasya prasāadhanāt ||

“In the case of the other [types of] fallacious reasons (*hetvābhāsa*), the [proponent] would be at fault because, by stating something ineffectual (*vyartha*), there would be no proof of what [the proponent] himself really intended. [But] in this case [i.e. when the proponent states the reason *kṛtakatva*], then because it does prove that [property, viz. impermanence], he is not [at fault].”⁴⁶

⁴² MIV. *'kurvan na yuktaṃ*.

⁴³ Devendrabuddhi specifies that the proponent states the reason without realizing that it contradicts his treatise; see PVP P. 335b2: *gal te bstan bcos kyi don khas blaṅs pa la gnod byed dpyad pa med par brjod pa'i phyir rgol ba de'i skyon yin no ze na |* (D. 281a4f.) “[Objection:] Because he unwittingly states something which invalidates an accepted property [mentioned] in the treatise the fault is [attributable] to this proponent”.

⁴⁴ See PVV 436,8f.: *vastutas tadvirodhītvād avāśyaṃ bādhate*.

⁴⁵ PVV 436,10f.: *nanu yadi duṣṭahetuvacane 'pi na vādino duṣṭatā | tadāsiddhādivacane 'pi na doṣaḥ syād ity āha |*

⁴⁶ See PVV 436,15f.: *atra kṛtakatve tu vādyukte vāñchitasyānityatvasya prasāadhanān na vādī duṣyati | śāstrārthe tu vādyaniṣṭe bādhyamāne śāstram eva duṣṭaṃ bhaviṣyati ||* “But in this case, i.e. when the proponent states [the reason] *kṛtakatva*, then because it does prove the intended [property], impermanence, the proponent is not at fault. By contrast, when a property [mentioned] in a treatise, but unintended by the proponent, is invalidated, then it is only the treatise which will be faulty”.

Dharmakīrti here sets forth some of the basic principles of his own account of *nigrahasthāna*:

(a) a reason is to be evaluated only in terms of whether it proves the intended *sādhya*, and not vis-à-vis other properties spoken of in the treatises of the proponent's school⁴⁷;

(b) the proponent commits a fault, or is defeated, by presenting a reason which fails to prove this *sādhya*.

Therefore, presenting *hetvābhāsa*, such as unestablished or inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) reasons, does indeed constitute a *nigrahasthāna* for the proponent, because they fail to prove the intended *sādhya*. However, the fact that a reason such as *kṛtakatva* also objectively happens to be in contradiction with an unintended property such as *ākāśagaṇatva* is no fault of the proponent: at most it shows the faults of his treatise.⁴⁸

(63) *yadi kiṃ cit kva cic chāstre na yuktam pratiśidhyate |
bruvāṇo yuktam apy anyad iti rājakulasthitih ||*

“It is royal decree to say that if in some treatise there is anything which is not correct, then when [the proponent] asserts another [property] which is even correct, he will be refuted!⁴⁹ [For, a king's edict, operating by force, is precisely what is outside distinctions between correct and incorrect.⁵⁰]”

= PVin III 20; P. 292a3f.

⁴⁷ Cf. Dharmakīrti's remarks in connection with k. 67, as well as PVin *gtan tshigs thams cad kyi skyon dañ yon tan ni rañ gi bsgrub par bya ba la bltos nas bsam par bya ba yin* “The faults and merits of all reasons are to be judged in reference to their own *sādhya*”; see n. 72.

⁴⁸ See n. 46. Dharmakīrti's own account of *nigrahasthāna* will be elaborated and systematized in his later work, the *Vādanyāya* (VN). See MUCH 1986 for a summary of the *Vādanyāya*'s position on *nigrahasthāna*.

⁴⁹ See PVV 436,22f.: *tāvatānyad anityatvādi yuktam api kṛtakatvāhetunā bruvāṇaḥ pratipādayan pratiśidhyate* “Then simply because of that, when [the proponent] asserts (*bruvāṇaḥ* = *pratipādayan*), by means of the reason *kṛtakatva*, other [properties], such as impermanence, etc., which are even correct, he will be refuted”. Note that the Tibetan versions of PV and PVin place *api* (= *kyañ*) after *anyad* (= *gžan pa dag*). Cf. PVinT 36b3f. which understands *api* = *kyañ* in this way and takes *gžan pa dag kyañ* as meaning “other reasons too”: *gal te bstan bcos la lar dños po 'ga' rigs pa ma yin pa des na gtan tshigs des dgag par bya ba yin pa de tsam gyis rigs¹ pa smra ba'i gtan tshigs gžan dag kyañ ci ste khyod kyis dgag par bya bar 'gyur* | (¹text reads *rig*).

⁵⁰ PVV 436,23: *rājaśāsanaśyaiva balappravṛttasya yuktāyuktavicāraṇāba-hirbhāvāt* |.

(64) *sarvān arthān samīkr̥tya vaktuṃ śakyam na sādhanam /*
*sarvatra tenotsanneyam*⁵¹ *sādhyaśādhanasamsthitiḥ ||*

“Once all properties [found mentioned in the treatise] are treated equally [as being the *sādhya*], no *sādhana* (= ‘reason’) can [ever] be stated[; for one cannot, on the basis of an example, apprehend a pervasion (*vyāpti*) by all *dharma*s found in the treatise]⁵². Thus, in all cases (*sarvatra*)⁵³, the possibility of there being *sādhya* and *sādhana* would be eliminated.”

= PVin III 21; P. 292a4f.

(PVBh’s introduction to k. 65:) “[Objection:] But if the reason is not faulty even though *ākāśaguṇatva* is invalidated, then how could a [reason] which is *viruddhāvyabhicārin* constitute a fault of the *sādhana*? In the latter case, on the one hand, there is a fault because of a contradiction with a property which is established by another *sādhana*. In the former case, on the other hand, the actual contradiction with a property which is established by a treatise is a fault. [Reply:] This is not correct, for”⁵⁴

(65) *viruddhayaṃ ekadharminy ayogād astu bādhanam /*
*viruddhaikāntike nātra*⁵⁵ *tadvad asti virodhitā ||*

“Since two contradictory [*dharma*s] cannot occur in one *dharmin*, then let there be invalidation of the *viruddhaikāntika*. There is no contradiction like that here.”

Following Dharmottara’s *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (NBT) to NB III 110, the term *viruddhāvyabhicārin* (which is synonymous with PV’s term *viruddhaikāntika*) can be interpreted as a *tatpuruṣa* compound – i.e. “a [reason] which is non-deviant with regard to something in contradiction [with another proven property]” – or a *karmadhāraya* compound – i.e. “a non-deviant [reason] which is [also a] contradictory [reason]”.⁵⁶

⁵¹ PV-k (II) *tena succhanneyam*, Mṛy. *tenotsanne 'yam*.

⁵² PVV 437,1f.: ... *sādhanam vaktuṃ aśakyam dṛṣṭānte śāstradr̥ṣṭākṣhila-dharmavyāptyanupalambhāt |*

⁵³ PVV glosses *sarvatra* by *dharmini* “with regard to any *dharmin*”.

⁵⁴ PVBh 508,29–31: *yadi tarhy ākāśaguṇatvabādhane 'pi na hetuḥ śāṣṭhā katham viruddhāvyabhicārī sādhanadoṣaḥ | tatpāpi sādhanāntaraprasiddhārthavirodhato doṣaḥ | ihāpi śāstraprasiddhārthavirodha eva doṣaḥ | na sad etat | yataḥ |*

⁵⁵ Mṛy. °*ntikenātra*, but cf. PV Tib. 'gal nes la / gnod 'gyur 'dir ni de 'dra ba'i || 'gal ba yod pa ma yin no ||. Both PV Tib. and the Indian commentators clearly read the locative *viruddhaikāntike*.

⁵⁶ NBT 224,9–11 *ad* NB III 110: *nanu cācāryeṇa viruddhāvyabhicāry api saṃśayaḥetur uktaḥ | hetvantarasādhitasya viruddham yat tan na vyabhicaratīti viruddhāvyabhicārī | yadi vā viruddhaś cāsau sādhanāntarasiddhasya dhar-*

To take a concrete case, consider Dignāga's own example, involving *kṛtakatva* and *śrāvaṇatva* ("audibility"), given in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*vṛtti III. The same reasoning is discussed in Śaṅkarasvāmin's *Nyāyapraveśa* (NP) and is cited by Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin in connection with PV IV 65⁵⁷. In a debate between a Vaiśeṣika and an advocate of sound's permanence, such as a Mīmāṃsaka, the reason, *kṛtakatva*, will prove the Vaiśeṣika's view that sound is impermanent, just as it will in Buddhist logic. On the other hand, the Mīmāṃsaka may then argue to the Vaiśeṣika that sound is permanent because it is audible (*śrāvaṇatvāt*), like soundness (*śabdatva*). In such a case, the reason *śrāvaṇatva* ("being audible") will be absent from all dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*); for there is nothing which is both audible, impermanent and different from the *pakṣa*, sound. However, for the Vaiśeṣika, the example, soundness, would be a similar instance (*sapakṣa*), as it is audible and, being a universal, is permanent. Thus, *śrāvaṇatva* would have to be (for the Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsaka at least) a valid reason which would prove exactly the opposite of what *kṛtakatva* validly proves⁵⁸.

masya viruddhasāadhanād avyabhicārī ca svasādhavyabhicārād viruddhavyabhicārī || "But surely, the Ācārya [Dignāga] said that a [reason which is] *viruddhavyabhicārī* is a cause for doubt. *viruddhavyabhicārī* means that [a reason] does not deviate from that which is in contradiction with something established by the other reason; or else, it is *viruddhavyabhicārī* if it is (a) contradictory (*viruddha*) because of being a *sādhana* for the contradiction of a *dharma* which has been proven by the other *sādhana*, and is (b) non-deviant (*avyabhicārī*) because of being non-deviant with regard to its own *sādhya*"; cf. NPV 26, which also discusses both renderings of the compound, but argues against the *karmadhāraya*.

⁵⁷ See PSV (b) P. 132a4f.: *gañ gi phyir bsad pa'i mtshan ñid can gyi 'gal ba dag gcig la the tshom bskyed pa dag mthoñ ste | dper na byas pa dañ mñan par bya ba dag las sgra la rtag pa dañ mi rtag pa dag ñid la the tshom za ba bzün no* || (cf. KITAGAWA 1973: 495 and 194). In NM 4,2 (ed. KATSURA 1979) Dignāga spoke of the five inconclusive reasons (*anaikāntikahetu*) in the ninefold *hetucakra* – viz. nos. I, III, V, VII, IX – and then added the *viruddhavyabhicārī* as an extra type, yielding the sixfold classification which is equally what we find in the *Nyāyapraveśa*. In NM's k. 8 (= PS III 25) he classified *anaikāntikahetu* according to a threefold classification: "common" (*sādhāraṇa*), "[too] exclusive" (*asādhāraṇa*) and *viruddhavyabhicārī*. We follow Haribhadrasūri's *Nyāyapraveśavṛtti* in taking the first reason (i.e. *kṛtakatva*) as having a Vaiśeṣika proponent and the second (i.e. *śrāvaṇatva*) as being the reply of the Mīmāṃsaka (NPV 26,23f.: *anītyaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭavad iti vaiśeṣikenokte mīmāṃsaka āha | nītyaḥ śabdaḥ śrāvaṇatvāc chabdatvatavati* |).

⁵⁸ The argument by means of *śrāvaṇatva* turns on the logical structure of the so-called "inconclusive reason which is [too] exclusive" (*asādhāraṇānāikāntikahetu*). See TILLEMANS 1990b and the references therein.

Dignāga's position here is probably best understood as maintaining that if we take *kr̥takatva* and *śrāvaṇatva* together, this complex reason itself will be a *viruddhāvyabhicārin* in that it will lead to sound's being both permanent and impermanent. This seems to be what is maintained in PSV, which speaks of *than cig pa dag* ("the two together"), and is definitely the position in NP and Haribhadrasūri's *Nyāyapraveśavṛtti*⁵⁹. In short, a reason composed of two parts *x* and *y* is *viruddhāvyabhicārin* if *x* proves a property *p* and *y* proves non-*p*.

Although it is clear that Dignāga recognized that there were reasons which were *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, and gave examples of them, it is less clear as to why Dignāga himself thought this possibility was really worth considering from a logical point of view. A tempting explanation might be that Dignāga (implicitly) recognized that his theory of the triple characterization (*trairūpya*) of valid logical reasons did not specify wholly sufficient conditions for inferring the truth of a proposition, and that paradoxical cases like the *viruddhāvyabhicārin* could thus arise, needing elimination by an *ad hoc* category of fallacies. This is indeed arguable.⁶⁰ However, significantly, this was not Dharmakīrti's explanation of Dignāga's point about *viruddhāvyabhicāra*. In NB III 110ff. Dharmakīrti definitely did take the *trairūpya* as providing such sufficient conditions and argued that Dignāga was thinking of cases where one or both of the component reasons were "valid" only within a defective system of philosophical tenets – thus, the problem of *viruddhāvyabhicāra* could arise when one of the disputants relied on an inference which was simply based on his scriptures (*āgamāśrītānumāna*). In fact, genuinely valid reasons leading to two contradictory *dharma*s qualifying one and the same *dharmin* were, according to Dharmakīrti, logically impossible: objectively speaking, at least one of the reasons must

⁵⁹ NP 3.2.2 (TACHIKAWA 1971: 125, 142 [6]) cites the same case of *kr̥takatva* and *śrāvaṇatva*, explicitly specifying that the *viruddhāvyabhicārin* reason is the two taken together: *ubhayoḥ saṁśayaḥetutvād dvāv apy etāv eko 'naikāntikaḥ samuditāv eva*. See NPV 27, which debates whether the two reasons together (*samasta*) or separately (*vyasta*) are the "cause for doubt", but concludes in favour of the former alternative. Finally, see PSV (b) P. 132b1: *than cig pa dag la the tshom gyi mshan 'ñid dan ldan pa'i phyir*.

⁶⁰ We also see that the commentator Īśvarasena took Dignāga's *trairūpya* as not presenting sufficient conditions, but more like necessary conditions. To arrive at sufficient conditions Īśvarasena was compelled to introduce a further requirement to the effect that the thesis should not be invalidated (*abādhitaviśayatva*) – see STEINKELLNER 1966: 82f. See also HAYES 1980: 266 n. 33 for the view that Dignāga's *trairūpya* only presented necessary conditions.

simply have committed one of the usual fallacies of *asiddha*, *anaikāntika*, etc. The result was that in formulating NB's classification of *hetvābhāsa*, Dharmakīrti deemed the *viruddhāvyabhicārīn* as being logically irrelevant. In PV IV he used the Dignāgean term on a few occasions, and perhaps even granted it some applicability, but later in NB the *viruddhāvyabhicārīn* was not considered to be worthy of inclusion in the scheme of *hetvābhāsa* at all⁶¹.

With this background in mind, we can now turn to the argumentation in k. 65. The opponent is seeking to establish a parallel between the case of the *viruddhāvyabhicārīn* reason being fallacious and the case of *kṛtakatva* proving a property (i.e. the negation of *ākāśaguṇatva*) which is in contradiction with the property (i.e. *ākāśaguṇatva*) mentioned in the treatise. If the former is fallacious, why is not the latter also? Dharmakīrti's answer in k. 65cd is simply that the contradiction brought about by the *viruddhāvyabhicārīn* reason and the putative "contradiction" brought about by *kṛtakatva* plus the treatise are not analogous: in the former case we would be proving both impermanence and permanence, two mutually exclusive properties; in the latter case, we would only prove impermanence and the absence of *ākāśaguṇatva*, i.e. *ākāśaguṇatvābhāva* (see PVV), properties which are perfectly compatible, neither invalidating (*BĀDH*) the other⁶².

⁶¹ NB III 110–113: *viruddhāvyabhicāry api saṁśayaḥetur uktaḥ | sa iha kasmān noktaḥ || anumānaviṣaye 'sambhavāt || na hi sambhavo 'sti kāryasvabhāvaḥ uktalakṣaṇayor anupalambhasya ca viruddhatāyāḥ || na cānyo 'vyabhicārī ||* "It was said [by Dignāga] that the *viruddhāvyabhicārīn* is also a cause* for doubt. Why then was it not mentioned here? [Reply:] Because it cannot occur in the realm of inference. Indeed, that effects or essential properties, with the characteristics which we have described, or non-perceptions too, could be contradictory is impossible. And there is no other [type of] non-deviant [reason]." (*Note that the Tibetan of NB translates *saṁśayaḥetu* by the *tshom gyi rgyu*); NB III 114: *tasmād avastudarśanabalappravṛttam āgamāśrayam anumānam āśritya tadarthavicāreṣu viruddhāvyabhicārī sādhanadoṣa uktaḥ |* "Therefore, when [the disputants] rely on a scripturally based inference which operates due to unrealistic understanding, then in deliberations upon these properties, *viruddhāvyabhicārīn* is said to be a fault of the *sādhana*".

⁶² See PVP P. 336b3–6: 'di la ni de 'dra'i 'gal ba yod ma yin | ji ltar rtag pa dañ mi rtag pa 'di gñis 'gal ba yin pa de ltar na skabs su bab pa dañ skabs su bab pa ma yin pa'i chos can dag gi nañ nas skabs su bab pa'i bsgrub par bya ba la skabs su bab pa ma yin pa dañ 'gal ba yod pa ma yin na gañ gis na gcig grub pa na gzan la gnod par 'gyur | dper na sgra la mi rtag pa ñid dañ nam mkha'i yon tan ñid med pa dag byas pa ñid las grub pa thob pa lta bu'o || de bas na gnod par

(66) *abādhyabādhakatve 'pi tayoh śāstrārthaviplavāt |*
*asambandhe 'pi bādhā cet syāt sarvaṃ sarvabāadhanam*⁶³ //

“Suppose that the two [properties, viz. impermanence and ‘not being a quality of space’ (*ākāśaguṇatvābhāva*) which were respectively under and not under discussion]⁶⁴ did not invalidate each other (*abādhyabādhaka*), but that because a property [like *ākāśaguṇatva* mentioned] in the treatise had been nullified (*viplava*), there would

bya ba dañ¹ gnod par byed pa ma yin pa dag rtags gcig las grub pa la 'gal ba yod pa ma yin no || (‘D. [282a3f.] om. *gnod par bya ba dañ*) “There is no contradiction like that here. Contrary to permanence and impermanence which are contradictory, then in terms of what is and is not under discussion, the *sādhya* under discussion is not [in fact] in contradiction with a [property] which is not being discussed [i.e. *ākāśaguṇatvābhāva*], so that [if it had been in contradiction], the establishment of one would have implied the invalidation of the other. Sound’s being impermanent and not being an *ākāśaguṇa* are, for instance, both proven by *kṛtakatva*. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the two [properties] which do not invalidate each other (*gnod par bya ba dañ gnod par byed pa ma yin pa* = *abādhyabādhaka*) and which are proven by the same reason”. Prajñākaragupta gave a somewhat different account, relating k. 65 to some of the main themes discussed in NB; see PVBh 509,1–6: *viruddhāvyabhicārīṇor iha parasparaviruddhārthāvyabhicārītā dvayor api samānabalaiva | dvayor apy āgamāśritatvāt | vastubalapravṛttam tv anumānam śāstram ca na tathābhūtam | tatas tayor na parasparabāadhanam viruddhāvyabhicārivat | na ca dvayor api sādhanam viruddhāyor ekaṭra dharmiṇy ayogāt | śāstrasya tu viruddhānumānāpekṣayā pramāṇatvābhāvāt tadartho bādhyata eva na bādhako viruddhāvyabhicārivat | śāstrasya ca pramāṇabalān-anuṅgrhītasya pratiśiddham eva prāmāṇyam | tasmān na viruddhāvyabhicārīpakṣopakṣepapakṣaḥ kṣamaḥ* “Here the two [reasons which are] *viruddhāvyabhicārīn* are [each] non-deviant with regard to mutually contradictory properties; both have exactly the same force in that they both depend upon scripture. By contrast, an inference which functions by the force of [real] entities (*vastubalapravṛtta*) and a treatise are not like that. Therefore, these two do not invalidate each other as do [reasons] which are *viruddhāvyabhicārīn*. Now, both [reasons] [can] not be *sādhana*, for it is impossible that two contradictory [properties] be present in one and the same *dharmīn*. The treatise, however, is not a *pramāṇa* with regard to inferences of contradictory [properties], and therefore, the property [mentioned] in it is just simply invalidated (*bādhyata eva*), but does not [itself] invalidate (*bādhaka*) as in the case of [reasons] which are *viruddhāvyabhicārīn*. And any validity for a treatise which is not favoured with the force of *pramāṇas* is completely denied. Consequently, the position which cites the thesis of a *viruddhāvyabhicārīn* [as being analogous] is untenable”. Note that Prajñākaragupta maintains that both the *viruddhāvyabhicārīn* reasons, *kṛtakatva* and *śrāvaṇatva*, depend upon scripture.

⁶³ PV-k (I), Mṛy. °*bādhakam*.

⁶⁴ PVV 437,14 glosses *tayoh* as *prakṛtāprakṛtāyor anityatvākāśaguṇatvābhāvayoh*.

[still] be invalidation (*bādhā*) of even a [property like impermanence] which had no necessary connection (*saṃbandha*) [with *ākāśaguṇatva*].⁶⁵ Then any [reason] would invalidate any [*sādhya*].”

Cf. PVin P. 292a5f.⁶⁶ Dharmakīrti's argument is a complex *reductio ad absurdum*. Suppose one admitted that impermanence and *ākāśaguṇatvābhāva* were indeed compatible, but nonetheless maintained that impermanence was invalidated (i.e. negated) by *kṛtakatva*, because *ākāśaguṇatvābhāva* was in contradiction with what the treatise advocated. This would have been justified if there had been a necessary connection (*saṃbandha*) between impermanence and *ākāśaguṇatva*, so that negating *ākāśaguṇatva* would have logically implied negating impermanence⁶⁷. But there is no such connection. Now, suppose that in spite of the lack of any connection, the invalidation of impermanence is still to be accepted. Then whenever any reason invalidates any property whatsoever in the treatise, the *sādhya*, impermanence, will also be invalidated and *kṛtakatva* will thus be contradictory. Dharmakīrti's commentators once again introduce the now familiar parallel between *ākāśaguṇatva* and smell's being a quality of the earth element (*prthivīguṇatva* = *bhūguṇatva*) first evoked in PV IV 44f. The logic is as follows:

- (a) A reason such as “arising from effort” (*prayatnānantarīyakatva*) would indeed invalidate the proposition in the Vaiśeṣikasūtras (cf. VS II 1,1; 2,3) to the effect that smell is a quality of the earth, in that if something has *bhūguṇatva*, it must be permanent and hence cannot arise from effort.
- (b) Thus the Vaiśeṣika's treatise is vitiated. One of its propositions has been nullified.
- (c) Smell's being a quality of the earth and sound's being a quality of space are also two completely unconnected propositions, just like sound's impermanence and sound's being a quality of space.
- (d) Therefore, if the reason *kṛtakatva* invalidated impermanence because an unconnected property, like *ākāśaguṇatva*, was invali-

⁶⁵ Cf. PVV 437,18f.: *śāstrārthasya śāstrābhyupagatasyākāśaguṇatvasya viplovāt kāraṇād asaṃbaddhe 'prakṛtākāśaguṇatvasaṃbandharahite 'nityatve 'pi bādhā bhavatīti cet |*.

⁶⁶ *gnod bya gnod byed ma yin pa dag gcig las grub pa 'gal ba' med kyañ | gal te bstan bcos la gnod pas 'gal bar 'dod na | de ni yul gzan la yañ mtshuñs pa'i phyir 'gal bar 'gyur ro |* ('sic D. [194a6], P. me).

⁶⁷ Note that Devendrabuddhi glosses k. 65's use of *saṃbandha* as the logically necessary connection where one term cannot exist without the other, viz. *avinābhāva* (= *med na mi 'byuñ ba*).

dated, then *kṛtakatva* would even invalidate impermanence when some completely unrelated scriptural proposition, i.e. smell's being a quality of the earth, was invalidated by a different reason like *prayatnānantarīyakatva*⁶⁸.

(67) *saṃbandhas tena tatraiva*⁶⁹ *bādhānād asti ced asat |*
hetoḥ sarvasya cintyatvāt svasādhyaḥ guṇadoṣayoḥ ||

“[Objection:] There is [in fact] a necessary connection (*saṃbandha*)[, in that *ākāśaguṇatva* is present in just the *dharmin*, sound]⁷⁰. Consequently, it is because there is invalidation of precisely this [latter property due to *kṛtakatva* that there is a contradiction].⁷¹ [Reply:] [This] is not correct, in that the merits and faults of all reasons are to be judged in reference to their own [actual] *sādhya*.”

Cf. PVin P. 292a 6f.⁷²

(PVV's introduction to k. 68:) “Moreover, merely being present in the *dharmin* does not constitute a necessary connection (*saṃbandha*). Rather,”⁷³

⁶⁸ Cf. PVV 437,19–22: *evam tarhi prayatnānantarīyakatvād gandhe prthivīguṇatvabādhane sarvaṃ kṛtakatvādi sarvasyānityatvādeḥ sādhyasya bādhānam syāt | śabdādau dharmīṇy aprakṛtāśāstrārthabādhānasya tulyatvāt |* “Now, in this manner, when smell's being a quality of the earth is invalidated on account of [the reason] *prayatnānantarīyakatva*, then any [reason] such as *kṛtakatva*, would invalidate any *sādhya*, such as impermanence. [This is] because with regard to the *dharmin* sound and the like, the invalidation of a property [mentioned] in the treatise, but not under discussion, remains the same”.

⁶⁹ PV-k (II) *tasyaiva*.

⁷⁰ We follow PVV; see n. 71. Cf. PVP P. 337a1: *gal te nam mkha'i yon tan ñid la sogs pa de sgra ñid dañ | 'brel pa yod pa yin gyi ...* (D. 282a7-b1) “[Objection:] *ākāśaguṇatva*, etc. has a necessary connection with soundness (*sgra ñid* = *śabdātva*) ...”.

⁷¹ The Skt. *bādhānād* differs from the Tib. *gnod par 'gyur* which does not reflect the ablative (PV Tib.: *'brel yod des na de ñid la || gnod 'gyur ze na ma yin te ||*). Manorathanandin is the only commentator who explains k. 67b in terms of the ablative, albeit in a syntactically tortuous fashion: *atha tatra śabda eva dharmīṇy ākāśaguṇatvasya sattvāt saṃbandho 'sti tena kṛtakatvāt tasyaiva bādhānād vīrodhaḥ | prthivīguṇatvam tu śabde dharmīṇy a-sambaddham | tatas tadbādhane 'pi śabde kṛtakatvam aviruddham iti cet |*.

⁷² *des na¹ de ñid la gnod par² 'gyur gyi | de lta ma yin na ni 'gyur ro ze na | ma yin te | gtan tshigs thams cad kyi³ skyon dañ yon tan ni rañ gi bsgrub par bya ba la bltos nas bsam par bya ba yin pa'i phyir ro ||* (1P. om. *na* – 2D. om. *par* – 3D. *kyis* [D. 194a6f.]).

⁷³ PVV 438,1: *kim ca dharmīṇi sattāmātram na saṃbandhaḥ | kim tu*.

(68) *nāntarīyakatā sādhye*⁷⁴ *saṃbandhaḥ seha nekṣyate*⁷⁵ /
*kevalam sāstrapīḍeḥa*⁷⁶ *doṣaḥ sānyakṛte samā* //

“Being invariably related (*nāntarīyakatā*) with the *sādhyā* is [what we term] the necessary connection (*saṃbandha*). This [invariable relation with the *sādhyā*] is not found here [i.e. when *ākāśaguṇatva*, which is not under discussion, is invalidated]⁷⁷. In this case, the only fault is the invalidation of the treatise; this [invalidation of the treatise] would be the same [even] when effectuated by another [reason, like *prayatnānantarīyakatva*].”

Cf. PVin P. 292a8⁷⁸. The opponent in k. 67 maintains his position that vitiation of a treatise will make the reason contradictory. But he seeks to eliminate the undesirable consequence that simply any refutation of any property mentioned in the treatise would lead to this result. In particular, the invalidation of smell’s being a quality of the earth element (*bhū/prthivīguṇatva*) will not count when one is proving sound’s impermanence, because the respective *dharmin*s are different: it is only those properties, like *ākāśaguṇatva*, which are linked to sound which are relevant in an argument about sound.

The opponent in k. 67 thus invokes the usual Vaiśeṣika view that sound is an *ākāśaguṇa*, and construes this connection as constituting the *saṃbandha* which Dharmakīrti had required. According to the opponent, then, since *ākāśaguṇatva* has a *saṃbandha* with sound, it is only when *ākāśaguṇatva* (and not *bhū/prthivīguṇatva*) is invalidated that the reason *kṛtakatva* would become contradictory (see n. 71). Dharmakīrti’s initial reply in k. 67 is to reiterate his fundamental idea that reasons are valid or invalid only with regard to the *sādhyā* which the proponent actually intends, the point being that *ākāśaguṇatva* is not intended at all. In k. 68, however, Dharmakīrti attacks the opponent’s version of a *saṃbandha* holding between the *dharmin* and the *sādhyā* as irrelevant. The real necessary connection or invariable relation at stake should have been between *ākāśaguṇatva* and the *sādhyā*, impermanence: in that case, invalidating *ākāśaguṇatva* would have invalidated impermanence. But, in

⁷⁴ M1Y. *nāntarīyakatāsādhye*.

⁷⁵ PV-k (III) *nekṣate*.

⁷⁶ PV-k (I) *sāstrabādheha*; PV-k (II) *sāstrapīḍeti*. Cf. Tib. ‘dir = iha.

⁷⁷ Cf. PVV 438,4f.: *sādhye nāntarīyakatā sādhyāvinābhāvitvaṃ saṃbandha ucyate* | *sā sādhyānāntarīyakatā*¹ *ihāprakṛtākāśaguṇatvabādhane*² *sati nekṣyate* (¹text reads *nāntarīyatā* – ²text reads *ihapra*°).

⁷⁸ *de ni gzan gyis byas na yan mtshuṅs pa’i phyir ‘gal bar ‘gyur ro* | (D. 194b1).

fact, such a connection does not exist at all between those two terms⁷⁹.

Finally in k. 68cd, Dharmakīrti restates his earlier point (see k. 62 and our explanations) that a contradiction between *kṛtakatva* and *ākāśaguṇatva* only serves to invalidate the treatise: it does not constitute a logical fault for the proponent, like *viruddhahetu*. Moreover, it is not just *kṛtakatva* which would invalidate the treatise. Any other reason (e.g. *prayatnānantarīyakatva*) which clashes with a property in the treatise (e.g. *bhūguṇatva*) would have the same result of invalidating the treatise. Thus, the opponent's views in k. 66 about "nullification of the properties [mentioned] in the treatise" (*śāstrārthaviplava*) would lead to the absurdity that even valid reasons, like *kṛtakatva*, would become contradictory⁸⁰.

⁷⁹ Cf. PVBh 510,3–5: *yaḥ sādhyasādhanaṇāntarīyakas tadbādhane hi tad-abhāve vyāpyasyāpi nīrvṛteḥ | na cākāśaguṇatvasya sādhyānantarīyakatā | tatas tadabhāve 'pi na sādhyoparodhaḥ |* "Indeed, when there is an invalidation of some [property] *x* which is invariably related with the establishment of the *sādhyā**, then when *x* is inexistent, what is pervaded [by *x*] (*vyāpya*) will also be negated. But *ākāśaguṇatva* is not invariably related with the *sādhyā*. Therefore, even if it [i.e. *ākāśaguṇatva*] be absent, the *sādhyā* is not negated" (*PVBh Tib. 191b3 translates *sādhyasādhanaṇāntarīyaka* by *bsgrub par bya ba 'grub pa med pa na mi 'byuñ ba*). – Devendrabuddhi describes the required necessary connection with the *sādhyā*, impermanence, as just like the invariable relation between impermanence and suffering discussed in PV II; see PVP P. 337a6: *dper na mi rtag pa ñid ni sdug bñhal la sogs pa med na mi 'byuñ ba'i phyir ro ||* (D. 282b3), and cf. PV II 254ab (= 253cd in VETTER 1990): *anītyāt prāha tenaiva duḥkhaṃ duḥkhān nirātmatām |* "Thus [the Buddha] said that from impermanence, suffering [and] from suffering, selflessness". – Finally, note that while this relatively sophisticated argument in PV and PVBh is phrased in the terminology of Indian logic, it certainly is also formally valid, as can be seen by the following reconstruction. Let us accept that sound's being produced (*kṛtakatva*) establishes the following two true propositions: (a) For all *x*: if *x* is a sound, then *x* is impermanent, and (b) For all *x*: if *x* is a sound, then *x* is not an *ākāśaguṇa*. From (a) and (b) we can not derive the negation of sound's impermanence as in: (c) For all *x*: if *x* is a sound, then *x* is not impermanent. We could only derive (c) if there was a *sambandha* between impermanence and *ākāśaguṇatva*, i.e. something like the following would have to be true: (d) For all *x*: if *x* is impermanent, then *x* is an *ākāśaguṇa*. While the truth of (b) and (d) would have allowed us to derive the truth of (c), in fact (d) is false, and hence (c) cannot be derived.

⁸⁰ Cf. PVP P. 337a8-b2: *bstan bcos kyi gnod pa' de gzan gyis byas te | gzan brtsal ma thag tu byuñ ba'i gtan tshigs kyis dri la sogs pa'i chos can gzan la sa'i yon tan ñid la sogs pa zlog² par byed pa mtshuñs śiñ 'dra ba yin no || de bas na sgra la byas pa ñid la sogs pa 'dod pa sgrub par byed pa yañ skyon dan ldan pa yin no ||* (¹D. [282b5f.] om. *bstan bcos kyi gnod pa* – ²P. bzlog) "This invalidation of the treatise is effectuated by another. In other words, another, i.e. the reason, *prayatnānantarīyakatva*, would be similar in negating [properties]

(PVV's introduction to k. 69:) "But the followers of the Ācārya [Dignāga] argue, 'When a debate is engaged in after one has accepted a treatise, then at that time all the *dharma*s found in the treatise are the *sādhya*'. Here [Dharmakīrti] replies:"⁸¹

(69) *śāstrābhyupagamāt sādhyah śāstradrṣṭo 'khilo yadi |
pratiññāsiddhadrṣṭāntaheturādah*⁸² *prasajyate ||*

"Suppose that because one accepted a treatise, all [*dharma*s] found in [that] treatise would be the *sādhya*. Then it would follow absurdly that a statement of an unestablished example or reason would have to be a thesis."

Cf. PVin P. 292b2f.⁸³. As we see in Manorathanandin's introduction to k. 69, the objector is now supposedly a Buddhist follower of Dignāga. Prajñākaragupta goes even further and characterizes him as a commentator on the Pramāṇasamuccaya, leading us to conjecture that k. 69 might well be an argument with Īśvarasena, the earlier commentator on PS whose views were largely contested by Dharmakīrti⁸⁴.

Dharmakīrti's reply consists in invoking a parallel with Dignāga's rejection (in PS III 3) of the definition of the thesis (*pratiññā*) which the Naiyāyika had given in NS I 1,33, i.e. *sādhyanirdeśah pratiññā*

such as *bhūgaṇatva* of another *dharmin*, smell, etc. Consequently, in the case of sound, accepted *sādhana*s, like *kṛtakatva*, would also [absurdly] have faults".

⁸¹ PVV 438.10f.: *yad apy āhur ācāryīyāḥ śāstram abhyupagamya yadā vādaḥ kriyate tadā śāstradrṣṭasya sakalasya dharmasya sādhyatety atrāha* | Cf. PVBh 510.8–11: *pramāṇasamuccayasya vyākhyātā prāha | śāstrābhyupagamāt sādhyatā sakalasya śāstradrṣṭasyānyathā śāstrābhyupagamasya vyarthatā | na hi tadarthāsādhyātāyām śāstropagamah kva cid upayogī | abhyupagamam vārhati | svātantreṇa pramāṇena na kiṃ cit | tasmād upagamya śāstram tadarthaḥ sādhanīyaḥ | tatas tadvirodhe doṣa eva* | "A commentator on the Pramāṇasamuccaya says [the following]: 'Because one accepts a treatise, all which is found in the treatise is the *sādhya*. Otherwise, accepting a treatise would be meaningless. Indeed, if its propositions were not the *sādhya*, then accepting the treatise would not be of use for anything, nor would one be entitled to accept [it]. Nothing is [effectuated] autonomously by a *pramāṇa*. Therefore, once one has accepted a treatise, the property [mentioned] in it becomes the *sādhya*. Thus, when there is a contradiction with the [treatise], a fault does indeed occur'".

⁸² PV-k (I) °*drṣṭānte hetu*°.

⁸³ *gʼzan yaṅ gal te bstan bcos khas blaṅs pa'i phyir bstan bcos las¹ mthoṅ ba thams cad bsgrub bya ba² nid du 'dod pa yin na ma grub pa'i gtan tshigs brjod pa yaṅ dam bca' bar 'gyur ro* | ('D. [194b2f.] *la* – 'D. om. *ba*).

⁸⁴ On earlier commentators' positions on the thesis definitions in PS III 2 and NM, see our forthcoming article, "Pre-Dharmakīrti Commentators on Dignāga's Definition of a Thesis (*pakṣalakṣaṇa*)".

(see PV IV 24–26 and our explanations). In brief, Dignāga had argued that if “statement of a *sādhya*” (*sādhyanirdeśa*) were to be the defining characteristic of the thesis, then, absurdly, statements of unestablished reasons and examples would also become theses: being unestablished (*asiddha*), they thus state something to be established, i.e. *sādhya*, and should become theses⁸⁵. Now, when faced with the Buddhist commentator’s view that *dharma*s mentioned in the treatise should also be the *sādhya*, Dharmakīrti replies that the Buddhist would have to include the unestablished reasons and examples which are mentioned in the treatise. Thus, in effect, the Buddhist commentator would fall into the same absurdities as the Naiyāyika, whom Dignāga had already refuted.

(70) *uktayoḥ sādhanatvena no ced īpsitavādataḥ*⁸⁶ /

nyāyaprāptam na sādhyatvam vacanād vinivartate //

“[Objection:] Because [the word] “intended” (*īpsita*) is specified [in Dignāga’s definition of the thesis], then the [unestablished reasons and examples] which are stated as *sādhana* would both not be [*sādhya*]. [Reply:] The logical consequence that [unestablished properties accepted in the treatise] would be *sādhya* does not disappear [merely] because of the statement [that what is intended is the *sādhya*].”⁸⁷

Cf. PVin P. 292b3⁸⁸.

(71) *anīpsitam asādhyaṃ ced vādināṇyo ’py anīpsitaḥ* /

dharmo ’sādhyaś tadāsādhyaṃ bādhamānaṃ virodhi kim //

“[Opponent:] But what is unintended [by the proponent] is not the *sādhya* [even if it is the position of the treatise]. [Reply:] Then the other *dharma* [viz. *ākāśaguṇatva*, etc.], which was not intended by the proponent, would not be the *sādhya* either. In that case, why is [a reason, like *kṛtakatva*] which invalidates a non-*sādhya* [like *ākāśaguṇatva*] contradictory?”⁸⁹

⁸⁵ See PS III 3cd: *tathā cāsiddhadṛṣṭāntahetuvādaḥ prasajyate* // “Thus, a statement of an unestablished example or reason would absurdly have to become [a thesis]” (Skt. fragment and explanations in KATSURA 1975: 68f.; see also TILLEMANS 1987: 152f.).

⁸⁶ PV-k (1) *īpsitabādhataḥ*; cf. Tib. *smros phyir* = *vādataḥ*.

⁸⁷ Cf. PVV 438,22f.: *nanv asiddhasya śāstrābhīyupagatasya sādhyatvam nyāyaprāptam vacanamātrād īpsitasādhyaṃ pratipādakavān na vinivartate* //.

⁸⁸ *tshig phrad smos pas sgrub byed du ’dod pa spaṅs pa’i phyir skyon med do že na ma yin te | rigs pas’ thob pa ni tshig gis bzlog par mi nus pa’i phyir ro |* (sic D. [194b3f.], P. *pa*).

⁸⁹ Additions are all based on PVV *ad* k. 71.

PVV and PVBh explain that in k. 70 the opponent invokes Dignāga's definition of the thesis as given in k. 1 of his *Nyāyamukha*: *svayam sādhyatvenepsitaḥ pakṣo viruddhārthānirākṛtaḥ* "The thesis is what is intended by [the proponent] himself as the *sādhyā* [and] is not opposed by contradicting states of affairs". The provision *īpsita* in this definition, just like *svarūpeṇaiva* in *Pramāṇasamuccaya*'s version (see PV IV 28f. and our explanations), should eliminate all *sādhana*s, like reasons and examples; for the proponent never intended to prove such things: he only intended to prove *sādhyā* and not *sādhana*⁹⁰. Dharmakīrti's initial reply in k. 70 is to stress that if the adversary seriously holds that every *dharma* in the treatise is the *sādhyā*, then the unpalatable consequences in question cannot be averted; for they are logically derivable. Merely citing Dignāga's words changes nothing in this respect; for if one agrees with k. 69's principle, *śāstrābhyupagamāt sādhyāḥ śāstradrṣṭo 'khilāḥ*, then every *dharma* in the treatise, whether intended by the proponent or not, must be the *sādhyā*. If, however, the opponent (in k. 71) insists that it is really only what is intended by the proponent which is the *sādhyā*, then the other properties mentioned in the treatise will become irrelevant, and thus the *sādhyā* for the reason *kṛtakatva* will be just impermanence: *ākāśaguṇatva*, which was never intended by the proponent at all, can be refuted with impunity and with no threat of the reason becoming a *viruddhahetu*.

This ends one section of Dharmakīrti's discussion of *svayam* ("himself") in Dignāga's definition of the thesis (*pakṣalakṣaṇa*).⁹¹ The next twenty *kārikās* will take up other debates on the utility or possible redundancy of the term *svayam*, after which follows a discussion of *anirākṛta* ("not opposed").⁹² (To be continued)

⁹⁰ For NM's k. 1 see KATSURA 1977: 109. In PVin (see n. 88), which speaks of the particle *eva*, it is clear that the related discussion there concerns PS III's definition rather than that of NM. Dharmakīrti, in PV IV 86–88, will argue that the definitions in NM and PS are equivalent.

⁹¹ Dharmakīrti's initial presentation of the four characters of PS III 2's definition (i.e. *svarūpa*, *eva*, *svayam* and *iṣṭa*) was in PV IV 28f. From k. 30 until k. 41 he treated of various problems in connection with *iṣṭa*. The section on *svayam* began at k. 42.

⁹² Corrigenda in MIYASAKA's edition of PV IV Tib. 48–71: **54a** read *reñ bur* instead of *miy.*'s *riñ por* ("long"). Contrary to *miy.*'s note, P. N. do not read *riñ bur*, but *reñ bur*, as does PVBh Tib. 187a7. *reñ bur* would mean "separately, alone" (cf. TANG *et al.*, Bod rgya tshig mzdod chen mo, s.v. *reñ bu* which gives *rkyan pa* and *gcig pu* as synonyms; see also JÄSCHKE's Tibetan-English Dictionary, s.v. *reñ bu*) – **57c** read *dud* ("smoke") instead of *duñ*. *miy.*'s own

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- Bu ston Tshad ma rnam par 'nes pa'i 'fīkā tshig don rab gsal of Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290–1364). In: *Collected Works*, Vol. 24. New Delhi 1971.
- D. sDe dge edition of Tibetan canon. sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka, bsTan 'gyur Tshad ma. Tokyo 1981 ff.
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- k. *kārikā(s)*
- KATSURA 1975 SHORYU KATSURA, New Sanskrit Fragments of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. JIP 3 (1975) 67–78.
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subsequent correction to *du* is an unnecessary change in the text, as *du ba* and *dud* both mean “smoke” – 62a P. N. read *gžan dag las* instead of *bžan dag las* – 70a read *sgrub byed* (= *sādhana*) as in P.D.N., instead of *My.*'s *grub byed* – 70c read *rigs pas* (= *nyāya*) with P., instead of D. and *My.* *rig pas*.

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- N. sNar than edition of Tibetan canon
- NB Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti, with Nyāyabinduṭīkā of Dharmottara and Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa ed. D. MALVANIA. [Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. 2]. Patna 1955.
- NBT Nyāyabinduṭīkā of Dharmottara (see NB)
- NM Nyāyamukha of Dignāga, Taisho XXXII, 1628. Ed. and tr. into Japanese in KATSURA 1977ff.
- NP Nyāyapraveśa of Śaṅkarasvāmin, ed. & tr. in: MUSASHI TACHIKAWA, *A Sixth-Century Manual of Indian Logic*. JIP 1 (1971) 111–145.
- NPV Nyāyapraveśavṛtti of Haribhadrāsūri, ed. by A. B. DHUVVA. [Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica, No. 41]. Delhi 1987.
- NS Nyāyasūtra of Gautama, ed. with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana by P. SHĀSTRĪ and H. SHUKLA. [Kashi Sanskrit Series 43]. Varanasi 1970.
- P. Peking edition of Tibetan canon
- PS *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dignāga, P. 5700.
- PSV (a/b) *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* of Dignāga, (a) tr. Vasudhararakṣita and Seṅ rgyal, P. 5701 / (b) tr. Kana-kavarman and Dad pa śes rab, P. 5702.
- PV *Pramānavārttika* of Dharmakīrti (PV I = Svārthānumāna; PV II = *Pramāṇasiddhi*; PV III = *Pratyakṣa*; PV IV = *Parārthānumāna* [cf. MIY., which adopts a different order]).
- PVBh *Pramānavārttikabhāṣya* or *Vārttikālaṃkāra* of Prajñākaragupta, ed. R. SĀṆKRṬYĀYANA. [Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. 1]. Patna 1953 (Tib. P. 5719).
- PVin *Pramāṇaviniścaya* of Dharmakīrti, P. 5710.
- PVinT *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* of Dharmottara, P. 5727.
- PV-k (I) *Kārikās* of PV, ed. R. SĀṆKRṬYĀYANA in appendices to JBORS 24 (1938), Parts I–II.
- PV-k (II) *Kārikās* of PV included in Manorathanandin's PVV, ed. R. SĀṆKRṬYĀYANA in appendix to JBORS 24 (1938), Part III.
- PV-k (III) *Kārikās* of PV (included in Prajñākaragupta's PVBh)
- PVP *Pramānavārttikapañjikā* of Devendrabuddhi, P. 5717.

- PVT
PVV
PVV-n
RS
Skt.
SS
STEINKELLNER 1966
Tib.
TILLEMANS 1986
TILLEMANS 1987
TILLEMANS 1990a
TILLEMANS 1990b
TILLEMANS 1992
TILLEMANS 1993
VETTER 1990
VN
- Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā of Śākyabuddhi, P. 5718.
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RAHULA SĀṆKṚTYĀYANA
Sanskrit
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VS

Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda, with the commentary of Candrānanda ed. JAMBUVIJAYAJI. [Gaekwad's Oriental Series 136]. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1961.

PRAMĀNAVINIŚCAYA III 64–67

(Die Reduzierung richtiger Gründe auf den *svabhāva*- und *kāryahetu*)

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Die vorliegende Arbeit ist Teil meines Plans, das nur in tibetischer Übersetzung erhaltene dritte Kapitel des *Pramānaviniścaya* ins Deutsche zu übersetzen. Bei der „Second International Dharmakīrti Conference“ (Wien 1989) hielt ich einen Vortrag über die Reduzierung der Gründe auf den *svabhāva*- und *kāryahetu* in PVin III (IWATA 1991). Die diesem zugrundeliegende Stelle des PVin (III 64–67) wird daher im Folgenden als erstes Stück angeboten. Die Übersetzung des Anfangs (PVin III 1–3) soll in späteren Bänden erscheinen. Bei der Übersetzung wurde die Ausgabe von Derge (D) als Grundtext verwendet. Die Lesart von P wurde nur dann angegeben, wenn die von D dem Sinn nach nicht einleuchtend ist und daher nicht gewählt wurde.

In PVin III 34–63 erklärt Dharmakīrti den Sinn und Zweck von Dignāgas neunfacher Gliederung des logischen Grundes und weist darauf hin, daß die richtigen und widersprüchlichen Gründe im *hetu-cakra*, i.e. II und VIII bzw. IV und VI, angegeben werden, um zu zeigen, daß allein diejenigen Gründe, die auf der wesentlichen Verbindung (*svabhāvavapratibandha*) basieren, ohne jede Abweichung ihre Folge erkennen lassen (vgl. 34, 301a5f.). Diese wesentliche Verbindung ihrerseits besteht in Identität und Kausalität (vgl. PVin II 46,17–20 = PVSV 17,12f.), und zwar in dem in wirklichen Sachen vorkommenden ontologischen Verhältnis¹. Dharmakīrti unterschei-

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¹ Vgl. STEINKELLNER 1984: 458f., 462–464 und 470–473; IWATA 1988: 12–15.

det drei gültige Gründe: den Grund als Nichtbeobachtung (*anupalabdhi*), wesentliche Beschaffenheit (*svabhāva*) und Wirkung (*kārya* [vgl. PVin II 28]). Von diesen wird der Grund als Nichtbeobachtung auf den Grund als wesentliche Beschaffenheit reduziert (vgl. PVin III 303a5 [ad 40–44]). Nach Dharmakīrtis Logik gibt es also eigentlich nur zwei gültige Gründe: die wesentliche Beschaffenheit und die Wirkung.

Auf einen Einwand hin, daß es außer diesen drei auch andere Gründe gebe, um eine Folge mit Sicherheit zu erschließen, beweist er im Folgenden (PVin III 64–67), daß alle Gründe, die im Alltagsleben angenommen werden, entweder auf den Grund als wesentliche Beschaffenheit oder auf den Grund als Wirkung reduziert werden können. Dieser Nachweis zeigt indirekt, daß Dharmakīrtis System der Logik, der die wesentliche Verbindung zugrundeliegt, im allgemeinen gültig ist.

ANALYSE

A Grund, der auf den *svabhāva* zu reduzieren ist (310b7–311a8):

A1 Bei der Schlußfolgerung auf die Geeignetheit (*yogyatā*) für das Hervorbringen der Wirkung aus dem Grund „vollständiger Ursachenkomplex“ wird dieser Grund auf den *svabhāva* reduziert (310b7–311a1).

A2 Der Ursachenkomplex kann nur die Geeignetheit, die Wirkung hervorzubringen, erschließen lassen, nicht aber das Entstehen der Wirkung selbst (311a1–4).

A3 Nur aus den vollständigen Ursachen wird die Geeignetheit erschlossen, nicht aber aus den unvollständigen Ursachen (311a4–8).

B Gründe, die auf den *kārya* zu reduzieren sind (311a8–313a3):

B1 Die eine durch denselben Ursachenkomplex hervorgebrachte Wirkung, aus welcher auf eine andere Wirkung dieses Ursachenkomplexes geschlossen wird, wird auf den *kārya* reduziert (311a8–b6).

B2 Das Ganze, aus dem auf einen der Teile des Ganzen geschlossen wird, wird auf den *kārya* reduziert (311b6–312a1).

B3 Das eine Ding, aus dem auf das andere Ding, das gleichzeitig mit jenem vorhanden ist, geschlossen wird, wird auf den *kārya* reduziert (312a1–313a3).

ÜBERSETZUNG

A Grund, der auf den *svabhāva* zu reduzieren ist (P 310b7–311a8, D 213a4–b4):

(P 310b7, D 213a4) [Einwand:] Wenn nun das Entstehen der Wir-

kung (*kāryotpāda*) aus der [zum Hervorbringen der Wirkung] fähigen Ursache (**samarthēna hetunā*) erschlossen wird, wieso ist der [Grund, d. h. die fähige Ursache] in den drei Arten des logischen Grundes (d. i. Grund als wesentliche Beschaffenheit [*svabhāva*], Grund als Wirkung [*kārya*] und Grund als Nichtbeobachtung [*anupalabdhi*])² enthalten?³

⁴ Das Entstehen der Wirkung⁵, das aus der fähigen (**samartha*) Ursache [als Grund] erschlossen wird⁶, bezeichnen wir als wesentliche Beschaffenheit (*svabhāva*) [dieser Ursache]⁷, weil [das Ent-

² Vgl. PVT je 23b3f. = PVSVT 43,11f.: *sa katham kāraṇākkhyo hetus (= logischer Grund) trividhe svabhāvakāryānupalambhākkhye hetāv antarbhavati.*

³ D. h. beim Schluß aus der Ursache auf die Wirkung besteht der Grund aus dem vollständigen Ursachenkomplex. Dieser aber könnte zu keinem der drei Gründe gehören; er ist kein Grund als Nichtbeobachtung (*anupalabdhi*), denn aus ihm läßt sich auf die bejahte Folge, nicht aber die Verneinung einer Sache schließen; er ist kein Grund als Wirkung, weil er die Ursache zum Wesen hat; er ist kein Grund als wesentliche Beschaffenheit, denn zwischen den beiden ist keine Verbindung realer Identität (*tādātmya*) vorhanden, weil von der einen Sache (d. i. dem Ursachenkomplex) die andere Sache (d. i. die Wirkung) erschlossen wird (vgl. PVT 23b4f. ≈ PVSVT 43,12–14: *na tāvad anupalabdhou vidhisādhanaṭvā | kāraṇasvabhāvatvā na kāryahetau | arthāntareṇārthantarasyānumānān na svabhāvahetau*).

⁴ Die parallele Stelle (PVS 6,24–7,1) ist in STEINKELLNER 1971: 185f. übersetzt, die Strophen PV I 7–11 mit Kommentar (PVS) in MOOKERJEE 1964: 33–39.

⁵ Genauer: die Möglichkeit/Fähigkeit, die Wirkung hervorzubringen; vgl. PVin III 310b8–311a1, PVT 23b6–8 und PVSVT 43,19–21: *yaḥ kāryotpādo 'numīyate sa hetoḥ svabhāvo varṇitaḥ | kuto 'rthāntarānapekṣatvāt | tenāyam arthaḥ | kāryotpādanayogyatā <kāraṇakalāpa/hetu> (?)mātrānubandhitvāt svabhāvabhūtā |*

⁶ Der Schluß von der Ursache auf die Wirkung wird nach Śākyabuddhi wie folgt formuliert (PVT je 24a5f.): (*sbyor ba ni*) *rgyu zad par tshogs pa gañ* (D; P *gañ yin*) *dañ gañ yin pa | de dañ de ni skad cig ma phyi ma phyi ma yons su gyur pas 'bras bu skyed* (P; D *bskyed*) *par ruñ ba ñid yin te | dper na rgyu tshogs pa 'bras bu bskyed zin pa dag lta bu'o || 'di yan rgyu zad par tshogs pa yin pas (rañ bzin gyi* [D; P *gyis*) *gtan tshigs yin no ||*) „Alle diejenigen Ursachen, die ganz vollständig [für das Hervorbringen der Wirkung] sind, sind durch die Umwandlung der jeweils späteren Augenblicke dafür geeignet, die Wirkung hervorzubringen, wie die vollständigen Ursachen, die [ihre] Wirkung schon hervorgebracht haben (= *vyāpti*!). Auch diese [Ursachen] sind ganz vollständige Ursachen (= *pakṣadharmatā*!) ...“. In dieser Formulierung sind das Subjekt der Schlußfolgerung (*sādhya*dharmin) und der Grund die ganz vollständigen Ursachen, wobei das Subjekt bestimmte Ursachen ist, während der Grund aus den allgemeinen Ursachen besteht (vgl. ib. 24a4f. und Bu 504,4f.).

⁷ So nach PVT 23b7f.: *ruñ ba ñid (= yogyatā) kyī mtshan ñid kyī chos de ni rgyu tshogs pa de'i rañ bzin yin par brjod do ||* und PVSVT 43,19f. Dharmot-

stehen der Wirkung]⁸ von keiner anderen Sache abhängt (64 ≈ PV I 7).

(310b8–311a1) Auch dieses [Entstehen der Wirkung] ist, da es von nichts anderem als von dem entsprechend zusammengeschlossenen [Ursachenkomplex] abhängt, die an nichts als an diesen [Komplex] gebundene (*tanmātrānubandhin*) wesentliche Beschaffenheit des Dinges⁹ (d. i. des Komplexes)^{10, 11} In diesem Fall (d. i. beim Schluß auf das Entstehen der Wirkung) wird nämlich bloß (*kevala* = 'ba' 'zig) eine Geeignetheit (*yogyatā*) der Ursachen zusammen zum Hervorbringen der Wirkung erschlossen¹² und die Geeignetheit [die Wirkung hervorzubringen] ist nur an den Komplex gebunden (*sāmagrīmātrānubandhin*) [und hängt von keiner anderen Ursache ab]. [Die Geeignetheit] ist daher nichts anderes als die wesentliche Beschaffenheit [dieses Komplexes].

tara faßt es aber wie folgt auf: „Diesen Schluß auf das Entstehen der Wirkung bezeichnet man [als einen Schluß, der auf] dem Grund als wesentlicher Beschaffenheit [basiert]“ (Dh *we* 133a7f.: 'bras bu skye bar rjes su dpog [D; P dpogs] pa 'di ni rañ bzin gyi gtan tshigs yin par brjod do ||).

⁸ Siehe n. 5.

⁹ Im Text steht *no bo* (*de tsam dañ*); nach Dh (133b2) heißt es *no bo'i* (*de tsam dañ*). Diese Übersetzung entspricht skt. *bhāvasya*. Lesart: *mi ltos pas na* (P; D *ni*) *no bo* <'i> *de tsam* ...

¹⁰ Vgl. PVSVT 43,24f.: *tādrīmātrānubandhī svabhāvaḥ | kasya bhāvasya* (?; im Text *bhāvah*) | *samagrasya kāraṇakalāpasya* |.

¹¹ Zur Ableitung der Ansicht Dharmakīrtis, daß der Ursachenkomplex ein Grund als wesentlichen Beschaffenheit ist, siehe App. I.

¹² Antwort gegen den Einwand, der besagt: „Wieso kann das Entstehen der Wirkung, obwohl es von nichts [anderem als dem Ursachenkomplex] abhängt, eine wesentliche Beschaffenheit [des vollständigen Ursachenkomplexes] sein, da es doch ein anderes Ding [als dieser] ist?“ (*yady apy anapekṣaḥ kāryotpādas tathāpy arthāntaratvāt katham svabhāvaḥ* [PVSVT 43,27; vgl. Dh 133b3]). Lesart des Textes P Vin III: 'bras bu bskyed par (D; P *pa*) ruñ ba ñid 'ba' (P; D 'ga') 'zig rjes su dpog la.

¹³ Die Wirkung läßt sich aus der Ursache nicht im allgemeinen erschließen, weil das Entstehen der Wirkung, die in der Zukunft vorkommt, durch die gegenwärtige Ursache nicht festgelegt wird. Infolgedessen ist, was man in Wirklichkeit aus dem Ursachenkomplex erschließen kann, bloß die Möglichkeit des Entstehens der Wirkung, indem man beim vollständigen Ursachenkomplex die Geeignetheit, die Wirkung hervorzubringen, erschließt. Diese Geeignetheit ist dem Sinn nach ein und dasselbe wie die Möglichkeit (*sambhava*), weil die Geeignetheit, wenn kein Hindernis vorliegt, durch die Umwandlung der Fähigkeit in den jeweiligen Augenblicken das Hervorbringen der Wirkung festlegt; vgl. Bu 504,5f.: 'bras bu skye ruñ zes pa gegs med na nus pa skad cig phyi ma phyi mar 'gyur bas 'bras bu bskyed nes pa yin pas brtag pa mtha' bzuñ gi 'bras bu bskyed pa ste 'bras bu skye ba srid pa dañ don gcig go ||.

(311a1–3) [Einwand:] Wieso sagst du aber nicht, daß aus dem Ursachenkomplex (*kāraṇasāmagrī*) die Wirkung selbst erschlossen wird?¹⁴ [Antwort:] [Es ist nicht so.] weil Dinge als Ursachen (*kāraṇadravya*) nicht allein dadurch, daß sie zusammengeschlossen sind (*samagra*), ihre Wirkung hervorbringen; denn das Entstehen der Wirkung hängt von der Umwandlung (*pariṇāma*)¹⁵ der durch den [jeweils vorangehenden Ursachen]komplex entstehenden Kräfte (*śakti*) [für das Entstehen der Wirkung] ab. Da inzwischen (d. i. während dieser Umwandlung der Kräfte) Hindernisse (*pratibandha*) gegen dieses [Entstehen der Wirkung] eintreten können, ist es nicht [immer möglich, aus dem Ursachenkomplex] die Wirkung zu erschließen. Da die Geeignetheit [die Wirkung hervorzubringen] hingegen von keinem anderen Dinge [als dem Ursachenkomplex] abhängt, besteht kein Widerspruch für einen Schluß [auf die Geeignetheit aus dem Ursachenkomplex]. (311a3f.) [These:] Dieser Ursachenkomplex ist durch eine schrittweise Umwandlung der Kräfte [zum Hervorbringen der Wirkung] fähig, die Wirkung hervorzubringen, [Grund:] weil es keine andere Nebenursache (*pratyaya*) für die Umwandlung der Kräfte gibt, von welcher [der Ursachenkomplex] abhängen müßte. Auf Grund der Tatsache, daß das Entstehen der Kraft bloß durch den [zeitlich] vorangehenden und gleichartigen (*pūrvasajātīya*) [Ursachenkomplex] verursacht ist, wird gelehrt, daß die Geeignetheit des [Ursachen-]Komplexes von keiner anderen [Sache] abhängt.

(311a4f.) Die Geeignetheit ihrerseits wird aus den vollständigen Ursachen allein erschlossen; da die noch nicht vollzähligen (*asamagra*) [Ursachen] überhaupt nicht fähig sind [die Wirkung hervorzubringen], wird die Wirkung aus diesen [einzelnen, noch nicht vollzähligen Ursachen] nicht erschlossen¹⁶. (311a5–7) ¹⁷Selbst wenn [bei der

¹⁴ Ein Gegner fragt nun, warum beim Schluß aus dem Ursachenkomplex auf die Wirkung die zu beweisende Beschaffenheit in der Geeignetheit, die Wirkung hervorzubringen, besteht, nicht aber im Entstehen der Wirkung selbst.

¹⁵ Vgl. PVT 24b4 = PVSVT 44,21f.: *pūrvapūrvakṣaṇād uttarottara-viśiṣṭakṣaṇotpādah* (das Entstehen der jeweils weiteren verschiedenen Augenblicke aus den jeweils vorangehenden Augenblicken), Dh 133b7 und PVT 24b7 = PVSVT 44,27. Zu Dharmakīrtis Lehre vom *pariṇāma*, der Fähigkeit, die Wirkung hervorzubringen, vgl. HB II/137f. und SH. KATSURA, „Dharmakīrti no ingaron“ (Dharmakīrtis Theorie der Kausalität). Nanto Bukkyō 50 (1983) 100f.

¹⁶ Nach den Kommentatoren vertreten die Mīmāṃsakas die Meinung, daß aus dem unvollzähligen (*asamagra*) Ursachenkomplex die Wirkung erschlossen werde; vgl. PVT 27a7f. (l. *ma* [D; P om.] *tshogs pa las*) und PVSVT 50,18.

¹⁷ Zu Dharmakīrtis Behauptung, daß es unmöglich sei, die Folge ohne

Schlußfolgerung auf die Wirkung aus dem unvollständigen Ursachenkomplex] das Vorhandensein [des Grundes] im Ungleichartigen (*vipakṣavṛtti*) nicht beobachtet wird, ist [diese Schlußfolgerung] mit einem Rest [für den sich das gemeinsame Fehlen nicht sicher erkennen läßt] versehen (*śeṣavat*)¹⁸ [und daher nicht schlüssig]^{19,20} wie z. B. bei der Schlußfolgerung auf [das Verhensein mit] Begierde (*rāga*) usw. aus [dem Verhensein mit] Körper, Sinnesorganen und Erkenntnis²¹. Begierde usw. setzen nämlich den Hang zu [den Vorstellungen von] „Ich“ und „Mein“ voraus (*ātmātmīyābhīniveśa*) [nicht aber ein Verhensein mit Körper, Sinnesorganen usw.], weil, wenn man [etwas] nicht als „Ich“ oder „Mein“ erkennt, Zuneigung (*anunaya*) und Haß (*pratigha*)²² nicht [entstehen]; denn ohne das irrige Denken (*ayoniśomanaskāra*)²³ entstehen gar keine Laster [wie Be-

Abweichung aus dem Grund bloß dadurch zu erschließen, daß man den Grund im Ungleichartigen (*vipakṣa*) nicht sieht, weil nicht alle Fälle des Ungleichartigen beobachtet werden können, vgl. PVin II 66 und 39,25–30.

¹⁸ „Weil es kein Erkenntnismittel gibt, das [den Grund] im Gegenteil [des zu Beweisenden] aufhebt“ (*viparyaye bādhakapramāṇābhāvāt* [PVSVT 51,17]). Zum Auftreten dieses Erkenntnismittels als Feststellung des gemeinsamen Vorkommens (*anvaya*) beim Grund als wesentlicher Beschaffenheit vgl. HB 4.3–7. – Nach den Kommentatoren ist *śeṣavat* in das possessive Suffix *-vat-* und das Wort *śeṣa-* zu zerlegen, das einen Rest, der abweichend zweifelhaft ist, bezeichnet; vgl. PVT 33a4: *gaṇ la lhaq ma 'khrul par the tshom za ba'i yul yod pa de ni lhaq ma dan ldan pa yin no* „Wenn die [Schlußfolgerung] mit einem Rest, nämlich einem Gegenstand, der abweichend zweifelhaft ist, versehen ist, ist sie *śeṣavat*“, und PVSVT 56,27 f.: *śeṣo 'sti śeṣavad anirñīto viśayo 'stīti*. Diese Auffassung ist von den Auffassungen Vātsyāyanas verschieden, von denen eine in der Schlußfolgerung auf die Ursache aus der Wirkung besteht (vgl. PVT 32b8 ff.). Zum Unterschied in der Auffassung von *śeṣavat* zwischen Dharmakīrti und den Naiyāyikas vgl. STEINKELLNER in seiner Übersetzung von PVin II n. 433 und 436.

¹⁹ Vgl. Dh 135a2, PVT 33a3 und PVSVT 50,20 f.: *śeṣavad anumānam anaikāntikam*.

²⁰ Vgl. PVin II 66 = PV I 13: *na cādarśanamātreṇa vipakṣe 'vyabhicāritā / sambhāvyaṇvyabhicāratvāt sthālītandulapākavat ||*.

²¹ Vgl. PVSVT 50,25 f.: *rāgādīmān ayaṃ puruṣo dehavattvād indriyavat-tvād buddhimattvāt | evaṃ dehādībhyo rāgādyanumānam |*.

²² *anunaya* und *pratigha* sind die Befleckungen, welche zu den neun *saṃyojanas* gehören, während *rāga* und *dveṣa* zu den sechs *anuśayas* gehören.

²³ D. i. eine Erkenntnis, die in vierfacher Weise irrig ist (*viparyasta*): Erkenntnis von Vergänglichem als ewig, Erkenntnis von Leid als Lust, Erkenntnis von Unreinem als rein und Erkenntnis des Nichtselbst als Selbst; vgl. Dh 135a7 ff. – Karṇakagomin faßt den *yoniśomanaskāra* wie folgt auf: „*yoni* (Ursprung) ist Vergänglich[keit], Leid, Selbstlosigkeit usw. der Dinge, weil sie die Ursache für das Entstehen der richtigen Einsicht ist. *yoniśaḥ*

gierde, Haß usw.]. (311a7f.) Wenn auch der Körper usw. [mittelbar] Ursache [für das Entstehen von Begierde, Haß usw.] sind, haben [diese nur mittelbaren Ursachen] allein [wenn sie nämlich der Hauptursache, des Hangs zu „Ich“ oder „Mein“, ermangeln] nicht die Fähigkeit (*sāmarthya*) [Begierde, Haß usw. hervorzubringen]. Selbst wenn das Vorhandensein [des Grundes, d. i. des Verhenseins mit Körper, Sinnesorganen usw.] im Ungleichartigen nicht beobachtet ist (*vipakṣavṛtter adṛṣṭāv api*), weicht daher dieser Grund [von der Folge, d. i. vom Vorhandensein von Begierde, Haß usw.] ab (*vyabhicārin*), und zwar in dem Sinne, daß [bei dieser Schlußfolgerung] ein [nicht geprüfter] Rest übrig bleibt^{24, 25}

bedeutet, daß man den [Ursprung] (*yonī*) preist, nämlich zum Objekt hat ... oder °*śaḥ* ist Suffix, [wenn man den *yonīśomanaskāra* so auffaßt, daß] man jeweils an den einzelnen Ursprung denkt“ (PVSVT 50,29f. & 51,10f.: *yonīḥ padārthānām anityaduḥkhānātmādi | samyagdarsanaprasūtihetuvāi | taṁ śamsaty ālambata iti yonīśaḥ | yonim yonim manaskarotīti ... śas pratyayo vā*).

²⁴ Beim Entstehen der Begierde, des Hasses usw. spielt der Hang zu „Ich“ und „Mein“ die Rolle der Hauptursache, wobei Körper, Sinnesorgane, Erkenntnis usw. höchstens mittelbar Ursache sind, in dem Sinne, daß sie den Hang erwecken (*prabodha*; vgl. Dh 135b3). Nur wenn der Ursachenkomplex zur Hervorbringung der Begierde usw. aus diesem Hang und anderen Nebenursachen besteht und daher vollständig ist, können Begierde usw. als Folge aus diesem Ursachenkomplex als *svabhāvahetu* erschlossen werden. Andernfalls ist der Schluß auf die Begierde usw. aus den Ursachen nicht möglich. Zum Unterschied in der ontologischen und logischen Beschreibung des Entstehens der Begierde, des Hasses usw. s. App. II.

²⁵ Im vorliegenden Abschnitt ist damit gezeigt, daß der Schluß auf die Wirkung aus einer Ursache nur dann möglich ist, wenn der Grund im Ursachenkomplex zum Hervorbringen der Wirkung besteht und die Folge in der Geeignetheit bzw. der Möglichkeit für das Hervorbringen der Wirkung. Der charakteristische Gedankengang Dharmakīrtis liegt darin, daß er die Kausalität – das Verhältnis von Hervorbringendem und Hervorzubringendem, das normalerweise das Nacheinander-Vorkommen von Ursache und Wirkung voraussetzt (vgl. PV III 246abc und PVin I 60, 8ff. [s. n. 27]) – an einem bestimmten Augenblick allein analysiert, in dem die Ursache, das Hervorbringende, vorhanden ist; m. a. W., daß er aus dem Kausalitätsverhältnis von Ursache und Wirkung einen statischen Aspekt von beiden heraushebt, indem er den bei der Kausalität vorausgesetzten zeitlichen Unterschied im Vorkommen der Ursache und Wirkung möglichst vermindert. In einem derartigen gleichzeitigen Zustand von Ursache und Wirkung hat der Ursachenkomplex die Geeignetheit bzw. Fähigkeit zum Hervorbringen der Wirkung als seine wesentliche Beschaffenheit; d. h. hier besteht nicht das dynamische Verhältnis von Hervorbringendem und Hervorzubringendem, sondern ein statisches Verhältnis von Ein-und-dasselbesein des Ursachenkomplexes und seiner Geeignetheit bzw. Fähigkeit. Auf diesen Aspekt sich beziehend beweist Dhar-

B Gründe, die auf den *kāryahetu* zu reduzieren sind (P 311a8–313a3, D 213b4–215a7):

(P 311a8-b1, D 213b4f.) ²⁶[Einwand:] ²⁷Wieso [gehört] dann die Erkenntnis der (sichtbaren) Form usw. durch den Geschmack usw., welcher weder die Wirkung noch die Ursache [der Form] ist [und daher mit dieser Form nicht im Verhältnis von Ursache und Wirkung steht] und [dem Wesen nach] ein anderes ist [als die Form], [zu einem der Schlüsse, die auf einem der drei Arten von Gründen basieren]? [Antwort:] Auch diese

Erkenntnis der Form usw. durch den Geschmack, welche auf ein und demselben [Ursachen-]Komplex [wie der Geschmack] basiert, ist dadurch [mittelbar möglich], daß eine Beschaffenheit [nämlich die Fähigkeit, die gleichzeitig mit dem Geschmack vorhandene

makīrti, daß der Ursachenkomplex, aus dem die Geeignetheit (die Wirkung hervorzubringen) als seine wesentliche Beschaffenheit erschlossen wird, ein Grund als wesentliche Beschaffenheit ist.

²⁶ Das folgende Textstück widmet sich dem Nachweis, daß und wie richtige Gründe, die mit der Folge nicht im Verhältnis des Dem-Wesen-nach-Dasselbeseins (*tādātmya*) stehen, auf den Grund als Wirkung (*kāryahetu*) reduziert werden.

²⁷ Im vorigen Abschnitt wurde gezeigt, daß der Grund, wenn Grund und Folge sich auf dieselbe Sache beziehen, zur Klasse des *svabhāvahetu* gehört. Hier handelt es sich nun um die Frage nach der Reduzierung derjenigen Gründe, die gleichzeitig mit der Folge vorhanden und der Sache nach voneinander verschieden sind und daher mit ihrer Folge weder im Verhältnis von realer Identität noch von Kausalität stehen. So kann man z. B. dadurch, daß man in der Finsternis eine Limonade schmeckt, auf die sichtbare Form der Limonade schließen, oder dadurch, daß man Feuer sieht, auf die Wärme des Feuers (vgl. PVSVT 45,26ff.). Diese Gründe der Schlußfolgerungen beziehen sich im Bereich der realen Dinge auf andere Entitäten als ihre Folgen und haben daher kein Verhältnis eines Dem-Wesen-nach-Dasselbeseins mit ihnen. Ferner sind sie gleichzeitig mit ihren Folgen vorhanden. Daher haben sie auch kein Verhältnis von Ursache und Wirkung (vgl. Jñ 322b3), weil nach Dharmakīrti die Ursache zeitlich der Wirkung vorangehen muß. Auf die Widerspruchlichkeit der gegnerischen Ansicht, daß Ursache und Wirkung gleichzeitig entstehen, weist er im folgenden hin: „[Ein Ding als Ursache] ist vorher (d. h. im Augenblick vor der Wirkung) nicht fähig, weil es [nach der gegnerischen Ansicht zu diesem Zeitpunkt] noch nicht existiert, und später (d. h. im Augenblick, wo es gleichzeitig mit der Wirkung vorhanden und fähig ist, die Wirkung hervorzubringen) ist es überflüssig [weil die Wirkung schon zustandegekommen ist]. Deswegen sind alle Ursachen vor [dem Entstehen der Wirkung] vorhanden“ (*asataḥ prāg asāmarthyāt paścāc cānupayogataḥ | prāgbhāvaḥ sarvahetūnām* [PV III 246a–c, zitiert in Nyāyaviniścayavivarāṇa I/257,4f.; vgl. PVin I 60,8–11 und TOSAKI 1979: 344]). Damit erhebt sich die Frage, zu welcher Art von Dharmakīrtis drei Gründen diese Gründe wie Geschmack, Feuer usw. gehören.

Form hervorzubringen]²⁸ der [materiellen] Ursache [welche zeitlich dem Geschmack vorangeht]²⁹ und diesen hervorbringt] erschlossen wird. [Daher gehört der Grund, aus dem hier geschlossen wird, zur Klasse der Wirkung als Grund,]³⁰ wie z. B. [im Falle des Schlusses] vom Rauch [als Grund] auf [Asche und Kohle, in die] sich [das zum Hervorbringen des Rauchs mit Feuer zusammenwirkende] Holz umwandelt (*indhanavikāra* [65 = PV I 9]).³¹ (311b1f.) Auch hier³² wird bloß eine derartige (mit dem Hervorbringen der Form verbundene)³³ Ursache erschlossen³⁴. ³⁵Denn [auch hier

²⁸ Vgl. PVSVT 46,5: *rasāt sākṣāt taddheto* (= *rasopādānakāraṇasya*) *rasasamānakālabhāvīrūpajanakatvaṃ niścīyate*.

²⁹ Vgl. PVSVT 46,4: *rasasya yo hetuḥ pūrvam <u> pādānam tasya yo dharmo rūpajanakatvaṃ tasyānumānena*.

³⁰ Man schließt vom Geschmack nicht unmittelbar auf die Form, die keine Wirkung des ersten ist, sondern nur auf die Ursache des Geschmacks, genauer darauf, daß die Ursache des Geschmacks als Nebenursache eine ungestörte Fähigkeit, die Form hervorzubringen, hat. Daher gehört der Grund dieses Schlusses, nml. der Geschmack, zur Klasse der Wirkung als Grund, weil der Grund, aus dem die Folge als Ursache erschlossen wird, eine Wirkung als Grund ist; vgl. PVT 25b1–3. Zum Schluß aus dem Geschmack auf die Form vgl. auch MOOKERJEE 1964: 36 ff. und KAJIYAMA 1966: 74 ff.

³¹ Zitiert in NBhūṣ 294,14f., TSP 510,17f., NVT 137,2f. (vgl. KAJIYAMA 1966: n. 191), ŚVK III/6,26f. und TarR 89,1f. Lies: *rjes su dpag pa <s>* (vgl. Dh 136a3).

³² Nach Dh 136a5 *der* (= *tatra*), im Tib. aber *de*.

³³ Vgl. Dh 136a5f. und PVSVT 48,13: *tathābhūta iti rūpajananasambandho 'numīyate*.

³⁴ Vgl. PVSVT 48,13f.: *yasminn* (= *rūpajananasambandhe hetau*) *anumīyamāne kāryāntaram api tad*(= *hetu*)*viśeṣaṇam niścitam bhavati na tv anumitāt kāraṇāt paścāt kāryāntaram anumeyam* „Wenn diese (nml. die mit dem Hervorbringen der Form verbundene) Ursache erschlossen wird, dann ist auch die andere Wirkung [dieser Ursache] (nml. die Form), welche durch diese [Ursache] qualifiziert wird, festgestellt; es ist aber nicht [so], daß die zu erschießende andere Wirkung durch die erschlossene Ursache später [festgestellt wird]“.

³⁵ Lesart des Textes PVin III: *gzugs kyi ñe bar len pa'i rgyu* (P; D om.) *nus pa žugs 'pa'i lhan cig byed pa'i rkyen* (‘besser wäre *pa <can> gyi*; vgl. PVSvt 409a1: *nus pa žugs pa can*). Die ontologische Basis des Schlusses vom Geschmack auf die Form und der Vorgang dieses Schlusses implizieren, daß dieser Schluß hauptsächlich nur in einem Schluß auf die Beschaffenheit der Ursache des Geschmacks besteht, wobei die Erkenntnis der Form durch das Vorhandensein dieser Beschaffenheit mittelbar angedeutet ist, weil die Form und der Geschmack durch denselben Ursachenkomplex verursacht sind. Vgl. PVT 25b7 = PVSVT 48,17: *tathābhūte ca hetāv anumite 'rthād rūpānumānam | rūparasayor ekasāmagryadhīnatvāt* „[Die Ursache des Geschmacks, welche für die materielle Ursache der Form eine mit dieser zusammenwir-

gibt es folgende Kausalität:] die [materielle] Ursache des Geschmacks (*rasa*hetu), die eine zusammenwirkende Nebenursache (*sahakāripratyaya*) der materiellen Ursache der Form (*rūpopādānakāraṇa*) ist, deren Fähigkeit (unbehindert) vor sich geht, erzeugt den Geschmack, wie z. B. das Feuer als mit [dem Holz als] der materiellen Ursache der spezifischen Umwandlung des Holzes [in Asche und Kohle] zusammenwirkende Nebenursache [dafür, daß Asche und Kohle entstehen,] Rauch erzeugt. (311b2–5) ³⁶Der Geschmack [entsteht] nämlich nicht, ohne daß sich seine eigene Ursache dem Hervorbringen ihrer Wirkung zuwendet. Eben dieses [Wirken der Ursache des Geschmacks] ist die [Begleit-]Ursache für das Wirken der materiellen Ursachen der Form³⁷. Dieses Wirken der materiellen Ursache des Geschmacks (*rasopādānakāraṇa*) ihrerseits wirkt mit dem Wirken der materiellen Ursachen der Form. Infolgedessen läßt der Geschmack, welcher aus einer solchen [materiellen] Ursache [des Geschmacks] entstanden ist [und deren begleitende Ursache die materielle Ursache der Form ist], indem er eine solche [Ursache des Geschmacks] erschließen läßt³⁸, die

kende Nebenursache ist, bringt den Geschmack hervor.] Wenn die so beschaffene Ursache [des Geschmacks aus dem Geschmack] erschlossen wird, wird die Form mittelbar erschlossen, weil der Geschmack und die Form auf demselben Ursachenkomplex beruhen“. Man könnte aber einwenden, daß bei diesem Schluß die Form unmittelbar aus der Ursache des Geschmacks, welche aus dem Geschmack erschlossen ist, erschlossen wird, der Schluß auf die Form also nicht in einem Schluß auf die Beschaffenheit der Ursache des Geschmacks allein besteht, sondern in zwei Schlüssen (vgl. Dh 136a4f. und PVSVT 48,11f.). Um diesen Einwand zu widerlegen, legt Dharmakīrti die ontologische Basis dieses Schlusses vor: der Geschmack und die Form stehen zwar weder im Verhältnis von Identität noch von Hervorbringendem und Hervorgebrachtem, aber bei ihnen gibt es eine Verbindung, die darin besteht, daß sie von demselben Ursachenkomplex abhängen (*ekasāmagryadhīnatvaṃ pratibandhaḥ*). Diese ermöglicht die Notwendigkeit dafür, daß sie voneinander nicht getrennt sind (*parasparāvinirbhāganīyama*; vgl. PVSVT 46,22ff.).

³⁶ Der Text ... *med na ro med pa de ñid* (P; D *ñid gzugs*) *kyi ñe bar len pa'i rgyu* (P; D *len pa*) *rnams kyi 'jug pa'i rgyu yin* ... ist unklar. Nach PVT 26a2 und PVSVT 48,22 (... *vinā na rasa utpadyate | saiva* ...) lese ich: ... *rañ gi rgyu 'bras bu bskyed par bya ba la mñon du phyogs pa med na ro med do || de ñid* (= *saiva*) *gzugs kyi ñe bar len pa'i rgyu rnams kyi 'jug pa'i rgyu yin no ||*.

³⁷ „Weil sich die materielle Ursache der Form nur mittels der materiellen Ursache des Geschmacks, nml. [mittels] der [mit der ersten] zusammenwirkenden [Nebenursache], [dem Entstehen] der eigenen Wirkung zuwendet“ (PVSVT 48,25: *rasa*hetunaiva *sahakāriṇā rūpopādānasya svakāryaṃ pratyābhimukhyāt*; vgl. PVT 26a4).

³⁸ Um den Grund der Schlußfolgerung, in welcher Grund und Folge im Bereich der realen Dinge dem Wesen nach verschieden sind, auf einen *kārya*-*hetu* zu reduzieren, betrachtet Dharmakīrti nicht den statischen Aspekt, daß

Form erschließen. Auch bei diesem [Schluß vom Geschmack auf die Form] erkennt man sowohl diejenigen [Folgen], welche [in zeitlicher Hinsicht, d. h. hinsichtlich des Zeitpunkts, in dem ein bestimmter Geschmack empfunden wurde] vergangen sind, als auch diejenigen, welche [mit der konkreten Geschmacksempfindung] gleichzeitig sind, nicht aber die zukünftigen [Folgen], weil [der gegenwärtige Grund von diesen] abweicht³⁹. Somit ist auch diese [Erkenntnis der Form durch den Geschmack] eine (solche), die aus einer Wirkung als Grund entsteht⁴⁰. (311b5f.) Damit ist auch der Schluß von den [mit ihren

der Geschmack und die Formen bloß gleichzeitig vorhanden sind, sondern den dynamischen Aspekt, daß diese beiden Wirkungen respektive durch ihre eigene materielle Ursache hervorgebracht werden, so daß er den Ansatz für eine Kausalität finden kann, welche für die Reduzierung des Grundes auf den *kāryahetu* unentbehrlich ist. Zur Interpretation dieser Kausalität s. App. III.

³⁹ Die zukünftige Wirkung wird nicht nur mit der gegenwärtigen Ursache verbunden, sondern auch mit anderen, neuen Ursachen. Dabei ist es möglich, daß diese Ursachen fehlen. Deswegen läßt sich nicht feststellen, daß die zukünftige Wirkung immer entsteht. Daher ist der Schluß auf das zukünftige Aufgehen der Sonne aus der Tatsache, daß die Sonne heute aufgeht, keine gültige Schlußfolgerung, weil hier der zwingende logische Grund fehlt, wie z. B. auch bei dem Schluß, daß man die Sonne morgen sehen wird, aus dem Grund, daß man einen Esel heute sieht (vgl. PVSVT 49,10–13 und Dh 137a1–3).

⁴⁰ In der PVSV wird daraus der Schluß gezogen, daß kein anderer Grund als die drei Arten des Grundes die Folge erkennen läßt (vgl. PVSV 8,12f.). Die Naiyāyikas vertreten aber die andere Ansicht, daß dem gültigen Grund und dessen Folge wenigstens eines von den Verhältnissen zugrundeliege, die im Kontakt (*saṃyoga*), in der Inhärenz (*samavāya*), der Widersprüchlichkeit usw. bestehen; vgl. VSū III 1,8 und IX 18 und NBh 878,6: Beim Schluß von Rauch auf Feuer z. B. besteht zwischen Feuer und Rauch ein Verhältnis von Kontakt; beim Schluß von Hörnern auf Kuh inhärieren die Hörner der Kuh; beim Schluß von der Form eines Dinges auf das Berührbare desselben Dinges inhärieren die Form und das Berührbare ein und demselben Ding; beim Schluß vom Nichtvorhandensein des Regens auf das Vorhandensein der Verbindung zwischen Wind und Wolken steht das Nichtvorhandensein des Regens in Widerspruch mit dem Nichtvorhandensein der Verbindung zwischen Wind und Wolken (vgl. VSūV 26,5ff. und NBh 878,6f.: *līṅgaṃ punaḥ saṃyogi samavāyī ekārthasamavāyī virodhi ceti | yathā dhūmo 'gneḥ | gor viśāṇam | pāṇiḥ pādasya | rūpaṃ sparśasya | abhūtaṃ bhūtasyeti* [vgl. NVT 879,11ff.]). Nach PVSVT ist an der betreffenden Stelle in der PVSV gemeint, daß die von Opponenten behaupteten Gründe, die auf dem Kontakt, der Inhärenz usw. beruhen, die Folge nicht erkennen lassen (49,16–19): *na tāvad aśīṣṭānāṃ saṃyogo 'sti śīṣṭānāṃ api kiṃ saṃyogena svahetubhya eva śīṣṭānāṃ utpatteḥ | tasmān na saṃyogavaśād gamakatvam apratibaddhatvāt | ghaṭapataṭayor* (im Text: *ghaṭaghaṭayor*) *iva | tathā prthaksiddhānāṃ na samavāyah | aprthaksiddhānāṃ api kiṃ samavāyena | svahetubhya evoparyuparibhāvena niṣpatteḥ* | „Zunächst ist der Kontakt bei nicht zusammengefüigten

Eiern flüchtenden] verstreuten⁴¹ Ameisen oder von fliegenden Fischen usw. auf Regen erklärt [insofern auch diese Schlüsse auf einer Wirkung als Grund beruhen]. Auch hier ist die Ursache des Regens, [d. i. eine Veränderung in den vier] Elementen allein, die Ursache der Verwirrung usw. unter den Ameisen usw.⁴² Der Schluß von der Form

[Dingen] nicht [möglich]. Was nützt der Kontakt selbst bei zusammengefügteten [Dingen], da die zusammengefügteten [Dinge] nur aus ihren eigenen Ursachen entstehen? Deswegen [kann der Grund] nicht kraft des Kontaktes [die Folge] erkennen lassen, weil [der Grund und die Folge in diesem Fall] nicht verbunden sind, wie z. B. Topf und Tuch. Genauso ist bei getrennten [Dingen] die Inhärenz nicht [möglich]. Was nützt die Inhärenz selbst bei nichtgetrennten [Dingen], da [auch] sie in ihrem jeweiligen Übergeordnetsein nur aus ihren eigenen Ursachen zustandegekommen sind?“. Der Grund, der auf der Widersprüchlichkeit beruht, d. h. der Grund im Schluß vom Nichtvorhandensein des einen auf das andere, welches mit dem einen in Widerspruch steht, gehört nach Kārṇakagomin zur Gattung des *anupalabdhihetu* (vgl. ib. 49,21: *virodhī cānupalabdhāv antarbhāvitāḥ*). – Nach Dharmakīrti sind diese von den Naiyāyikas vertretenen Verhältnisse keine Grundlage für die Sicherung der Umfassung des Grundes durch die Folge, weil bei ihnen keine wesentliche Verbindung, Identität oder Kausalität, möglich ist (vgl. PVin III 38 = PV IV 203). – Ferner prüft Kārṇakagomin auch die von den Naiyāyikas behaupteten drei Arten der Schlußfolgerung: *pūrvavad anumānam* ist ein Schluß von der Ursache auf die Wirkung. Dieser ist nicht schlüssig. *śeṣavad anumānam* ist ein Schluß von der Wirkung auf die Ursache. Dieser wird anerkannt. *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam anumānam* ist eine Erkenntnis, in der man in bezug auf einen Beschaffenheitsträger vom Grund auf die Folge schließt, nachdem man erfahren hat, daß die Umfassung des Grundes durch die Folge in bezug auf einen anderen Beschaffenheitsträger bewiesen ist; wie man z. B., nachdem man bei Devadatta das Ankommen an einem anderen Ort, das eine Bewegung voraussetzt, gesehen hat (*deśāntaraprāptim gatipūrvikām dṛṣtvā*), auch bei der Sonne vom Ankommen an einem anderen Ort auf die Bewegung schließt. Auch dieser Schluß ist ein Schluß, der aus der Wirkung als Grund entsteht; denn das Ankommen an einem anderen Ort ist die Wirkung der Bewegung (ib. 49,22–27). Nach Kārṇakagomin beruhe jede Schlußfolgerung auf einer gemeinsamen Beobachtung. Dies werde vom Meister noch später gelehrt werden (ib. 49,27 f.). Als Beispiel für eine Schlußfolgerung, die auf einer gemeinsamen Beobachtung beruht, gibt Uddyotakara den Schluß vom Kranich (*balākā*) auf Wasser. Auch der Grund dieses Schlusses wird auf die Wirkung als Grund reduziert, wie später erwähnt wird (vgl. PVin III 312b8–313a2).

⁴¹ *mthoñ ba* scheint keine gute Wiedergabe zu sein. Die tibetischen Übersetzungen von PVS (409a6) und Dh (137a4) haben *'pho ba*. Vielleicht ist *mthor ba* (= *vikīratī*) zu lesen.

⁴² Lesart: *char pa'i rgyu 'byuñ ba 'ga' zig kho na* (P; D *gi ni*) *grog ma la sogs 'khrug* (D; P *'khrul*) *pa la sogs pa'i rgyu yin no* ||. Die Skt.-Parallele hat aber *bhūtapariṇāma eva varṣahetuḥ* ... (PVS 8,14). Nach Dh (137a5f.) bedeutet das: Die [Veränderung in den vier] Elementen allein ist die Ursache sowohl des Regens als auch der Verwirrung usw. unter den Ameisen usw. Dies ergibt sich daraus, daß der Regen und die Verwirrung der Ameisen usw. aus demselben Ursachenkomplex, nämlich der Veränderung in den vier Elementen, her-

auf das Berührbare (*spraṣṭavya*) ist [auch] aus der Wirkung als Grund entstanden; denn die Form usw. beruht auf den [vier] Elementen [und diese machen das Wesen des Berührbaren aus]⁴³.

(311b6–312a1) [Einwand:] Wieso ist dann [der Schluß], daß [ein Ding] Hörner hat, weil es eine Kuh ist, [ein Schluß, der auf einer der drei Arten des Grundes beruht]?⁴⁴ [Antwort:] Auch in diesem Fall

vorgebracht sind (zum Schema dieses kausalen Verhältnisses s. App. IV). Da die Veränderung in den vier Elementen (*X) als Ursache der Verwirrung der Ameisen aus der Verwirrung der Ameisen (X), d. i. von der Wirkung als Grund, erschlossen wird und diese Veränderung (*X) als Ursachenkomplex für den Regen den mit der Verwirrung der Ameisen (X) gleichzeitig vorhandenen Regen (Y) impliziert, wird die Verwirrung der Ameisen, insofern sie das Vorhandensein des Regens erkennen läßt, auf eine Wirkung als Grund reduziert. Natürlich wird auch hier nicht eine zukünftige Folge, der zukünftige Regen, im allgemeinen erschlossen. Hinsichtlich dieser Folge kann man nur sagen, daß die Geeignetheit für das Regnen oder der mit der Verwirrung gleichzeitig vorkommende Regen erschlossen wird (vgl. PVT 27a6f., PVSVT 50,13–17 [1. *varṣahetoḥ* st. °*tuḥ*] und DhPr 115,32–34: *tathā pipīlikot-saraṇasya . . . yo hetuḥ sa eva katipayakālavayavadhānena varṣakaraṇayogyas tataḥ pūrvavad dhētudharmānumānam | rūparasayor ivaikasāmagryadhīnatayaiva vā tatsamakālikavarṣaṇānumānam* |).

⁴³ „Die neun übrigen materiellen [*dhātus*] (nml. fünf Sinnesorgane, Form, Ton, Geruch, Geschmack) sind aus den [vier] Elementen konstituiert“ (AK I 35ab: *śeṣā rūpino nava bhautikāḥ* |); „Das Berührbare hat elf Dinge zum Wesen, nämlich die vier Elemente, Weichheit, Rauheit, Schwere, Leichtigkeit, Kälte, Hunger und Durst“ (AKBh 7,8f.: *spraṣṭavyam ekādaśadravya-svabhāvam | catvāri mahābhūtāni ślakṣṇatvaṃ karkaṣatvaṃ gurutvaṃ laghutvaṃ śītaṃ jighatsā pipāsā ceti* |). Aus der Form, der Wirkung als Grund, werden die vier Elemente als Ursache erschlossen, und es ist festgelegt, daß beim Vorhandensein der vier Elemente das Berührbare, das mit der Form gleichzeitig ist, vorhanden ist. Daher ist die Form, die das Berührbare impliziert, eine Wirkung als Grund. Die Naiyāyikas sind aber gegen diese buddhistische Ansicht. Nach Jayantabhaṭṭa z. B. wird dieser Grund „Form“ im Schluß von der Form auf den Geschmack weder als Ursache noch als Wirkung bezeichnet und gehört zu einem *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam anumānam* (s. NM 344,2ff.). Auch Vācaspatimiśra hält den Schluß von der Form auf das Berührbare für ein *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam anumānam* (s. NVT 151,18f.). Zu anderen Beispielen, die zur Wirkung als Grund angeführt werden, s. App. V.

⁴⁴ Wenn man einige Teile von einem Ding sieht und es als Kuh feststellt, aber wegen irgendeines Hindernisses einen anderen Teil, z. B. die Hörner, nicht wahrnimmt, schließt man aus dem Kuhtum darauf, daß es Hörner hat. Der Grund dieses Schlusses ist weder eine wesentliche Beschaffenheit, weil der Grund (nml. die Kuh) und die Folge (nml. die Hörner) dem Wesen nach verschieden sind, noch ist der Grund eine Wirkung, weil Grund und Folge gleichzeitig vorhanden sind und bei gleichzeitigen Dingen kein Verhältnis von Ursache und Wirkung möglich ist. Er gehört auch nicht zur Klasse der Nichtbeobachtung als Grund, weil er keine Sache verneint (vgl. Dh 137b4–6 und Jñ 322b7f.).

[wird die Folgerung, daß es] Hörner haben [muß], aus dem Kuhlum (als dem, was als „Kuh“ bestimmt wird und was die Wirkung dessen ist, was als „Hörner“ bestimmt wird) [gezogen]; denn [es gibt eine Art von Kausalität, die darin liegt, daß] ohne die [Teile des Ganzen] das [Ganze] nicht [möglich] wäre, weil die Ursache für die Bestimmung des Ganzen [der Kuh] (*samudāyavyavasthāyāḥ kāraṇam*, d. i. für die Geeignetheit des Dings, als „Kuh“ bezeichnet zu werden)⁴⁵ etwas ist, das [als Teil des Ganzen] zum Ganzen gehört (*samudāyin* [66]).

Die Kuh ist ein Ganzes, das aus Wamme (*sāsnā*), Hörnern usw. besteht. Infolgedessen ist, weil die Bestimmung des Ganzen (d. i. der Kuh) durch den [Teil], der zum Ganzen gehört, veranlaßt wird (**nimittaka*), [in bezug auf einen Beschaffenheitsträger die Bestimmung als Kuh] ohne die [Teile, wie z. B. die Hörner] nicht [möglich], und wenn [die Teile, welche einen logischen Nexus mit dem Ganzen erfüllen,] vorhanden sind, [dann] zeigt [dies (?)] [das Hörnerbesitzen als] die Ursache für sie selbst [d. i. für die Bestimmung als „Kuh“]. Somit ist die Erkenntnis des Hörnerbesitzens usw. aus dem Kuhlum (d. h. ihrem Grund) eine [Erkenntnis], welche aus ihrer Wirkung als Grund entstanden ist (*kāryalīṅgaja*)⁴⁶.

(312a1f.) Ein derartiges Wesen des Wassers [nämlich das Stillstehen] ist, weil [dieses] durch den Träger (*ādhāra*, d. i. den Grund des Wassers, der das Wasser stillstehen läßt) ermöglicht wird (67ab),

eine Wirkung dieses [Trägers]. Das Vorhandensein des Trägers wird, obwohl [dieser] tiefe Grund [des Wassers] nicht zu sehen ist, von dem Sehen des stillstehenden Wassers erschlossen. Auch diese [Erkenntnis] ist aus einer Wirkung als Grund entstanden, weil das derartige Wesen des Wassers aufgrund des Trägers zustandegekommen ist⁴⁷. Ohne eine Unterstützung (*upakāra*) seitens des [Trägers] zu erfahren,

⁴⁵ Vgl. Dh 137b6f.: *ba lañ zes tshogs pa rnam par gzag* (D; P *bzag*) *pa ba lañ gi tha sñad du run ba ñid* . . . , und Bu 510,6f.

⁴⁶ Nach Dh (138a3f.6f.) wird der Schluß vom Ganzen auf einen Teil wie folgt formuliert: Der *sādhya* *adharmin* besteht aus sämtlichen Teilen, welche in bezug auf die Bestimmung als Kuh nicht als abweichend gesehen werden, der *hetu* in der Geeignetheit für die Bestimmung des Ganzen ([*sāmagrīvyavasthāyogyatā*] nml. für den Wortgebrauch „Kuh“) und der *sādhya* *adharma* in einem noch nicht gesehenen Teil (z. B. Hörner) des Ganzen. Zur Analyse dieser Schlußfolgerung s. App. VI.

⁴⁷ Vgl. P Vin III 312b8. Das Textstück: *de'i 'bras yin* | . . . *grub pa'i phyir ro* || fehlt in P, ist aber in Dh (138b5–7) belegt. Im vorliegenden Abschnitt wird gezeigt, daß der Grund, wenn Grund und Folge zur gleichen Zeit an verschiedenen Orten vorhanden sind und diese aus jenem erschlossen wird, zur Klasse des *kāryahetu* gehört.

ist es nämlich nicht möglich, daß [das Wasser] seitens dieses [Trägers] diesen besonderen Zustand (*avasthāviśeṣa*) erreicht⁴⁸. Auch was den [Einwand] angeht, daß diese Unterstützung eine [vom Wasser] verschiedene Sache (*arthāntara*) sei, haben [wir uns schon ablehnend] geäußert⁴⁹.

(312a2f.) [Einwand:] Das Wasser steht (**sthita*) in dieser Weise nicht deswegen, weil ein besonderes Wesen durch den [Träger (d. i. den Grund des Wassers)] entstanden ist, ⁵⁰sondern wegen des Kontakts (*saṃyoga*) [der zwischen dem Träger und dem Wasser vorhanden ist]. [Antwort:] Wieso ist dieser [Kontakt] ein Kontakt zwischen diesen beiden? Meint man, daß er [einer] ist, weil er durch die beiden entstanden ist oder weil er [den beiden] inhäriert (*samavāya*), wieso könnte [im zweiten Fall] der [Kontakt] nicht nur dem einen [der beiden] inhärieren [d. i. dem Wasser unabhängig von seinem Träger]⁵¹ oder [im ersten Fall] nicht [nur bei einem der beiden] entstehen?⁵²

(312a3f.) [Einwand:] [Deshalb] weil in dem [allein] die Fähigkeit [den Kontakt oder die Inhärenz zustandezubringen] nicht vorhanden ist. [Wenn das Wasser und der Träger des Wassers hingegen zusammen sind, haben sie die Fähigkeit.]⁵³ [Antwort:] Da dieses [Wasser oder sein Träger] auch [mit dem anderen] zusammen (*sahita*) gerade so [d. i. unfähig] ist, solange es einzeln keine Fähigkeit zu diesem [Hervorbringen des Kontaktes oder zur Inhärenz]⁵⁴ hat [wegen der

⁴⁸ Zur ontologischen Basis für den Schluß aus dem stillstehenden Wasser auf den Träger des Wassers und für die Reduzierung des Grundes, des stillstehenden Wassers, auf die Wirkung als Grund s. App. VII.

⁴⁹ Vgl. PVin II 19,3ff. Wenn die Unterstützung vom Wasser verschieden ist, dann wäre die Verbindung zwischen dem Wasser und der Unterstützung nicht möglich. Wenn man dennoch eine Unterstützung annimmt, dann bräuchte man nämlich noch eine andere Unterstützung für die Verbindung von beiden. Infolgedessen könnte man die unerwünschte Konsequenz eines *regressus ad infinitum* nicht vermeiden (vgl. Dh 139a1f.).

⁵⁰ Für das Folgende (312a2ff.) vgl. auch die Übersetzung der PVSV-Parallelstellen in VETTER 1964: 101f. und ŪTA 1988: 3ff.

⁵¹ Vgl. Dh 139a5f.

⁵² D. h., wenn der Gegner behauptet, daß der Kontakt durch das Wasser und den Träger des Wassers entsteht oder diesen beiden inhäriert, dann müßte er zugeben, daß diese beiden auch die Fähigkeit haben, einzeln den Kontakt zu erzeugen oder vom Kontakt inhäriert zu sein. Wieso brauchen dann die beiden von einander abhängig zu sein? Vgl. PVSVT 280,8–10: *yadi tau kuṇḍabadarākhyau bhāvau saṃyogajanane ādhārabhāvopagamane vā pratyekam samarthasvabhāvau tadā kim ity anyonyam apekṣata iti* (= PVT 194a8–b1).

⁵³ Vgl. PVT 194b1f. = PVSVT 280,10: *prthag <asam> artham tad ubhayaṃ parasparasahitam eva samartham iti cet.*

⁵⁴ Vgl. Dh 139a7f. und Bu 513,1.

vom Gegner angenommenen Nichtveränderbarkeit dieser Dinge]⁵⁵, wäre es nicht möglich, daß [das Wasser] mittels des Kontaktes [zwischen dem Wasser und seinem Träger] diesen [Kontakt]⁵⁶ hat, weil [der Träger des Wassers hinsichtlich des Kontaktes] nicht unterstützend ist (*anupakāraka*)⁵⁷.

(312a4–6) [Einwand:] [Nur] wenn [das Wasser und sein Träger] beisammen sind, haben sie die Fähigkeit [zum Hervorbringen des Kontaktes oder zur Inhärenz], weil dadurch, daß [das Eine] das von ihm [verschiedene] Andere unterstützt [und umgekehrt das Andere das Eine unterstützt]⁵⁸, einerseits am Wasser und andererseits an seinem Träger] eine Besonderheit entsteht [welche die Fähigkeit zum Hervorbringen des Kontaktes oder zur Inhärenz ausmacht]. [Antwort:] Was ist diese [wechselseitige] Unterstützung der [beiden], die [wegen ihrer Gleichzeitigkeit] nicht Hervorgebrachtes und Hervorbringendes sind (*ajanyajanakabhūta*)⁵⁹? [In diesem Fall ist keine wechselseitige Unterstützung möglich, nicht die Unterstützung des eigenen Wesens

⁵⁵ Vgl. PVT 194b2f. = PVSVT 280,11f.: *tat parasparasahitam api tā-drṣam evāsamartham evākṣaṇikatvāt* ... Wenn die Dinge vergänglich (*ksanika*) sind, ist es nicht widersprüchlich, daß sie vorher einzeln nicht fähig sind, später aber fähig werden, sofern sie die durch einen mitwirkenden Faktor verursachte Besonderheit (*sahakārikṛtaviśeṣa*) haben und durch ihr Versehen bedingt zusammentreten. Aber wenn sie, wie der Gegner meint, nicht vergänglich wären, wäre diese Änderung nicht möglich.

⁵⁶ Dh 139a8, aber nach Bu 512,7: im Sinne eines [bestimmten] Stillstehens des Wassers (*chu gnas pa*); vgl. auch Bu 513,2f.: *chu la ... gzis phan 'dogs | gzi la ... chus phan 'dogs par byed pa las gnas pa'i khyad par ldan pa skye ba'i phyir* ...

⁵⁷ Vgl. PVSVT 280,13: *saṃyogam praty anupakāratvāt*; rGyal 383,1f., aber nach Bu: „weil [der Träger ... hinsichtlich des Wassers] nicht unterstützend ist“ – d. h.: Da nach Ansicht des Gegners das Wasser und sein Träger als gleichzeitig vorhanden behandelt werden, kann der Träger des Wassers das mit dem Träger gleichzeitige Wasser nicht bewirken, also nicht unterstützen (s. Bu 513,1f.: *gzis chu la phan 'dogs par byed pa ma yin par khas blaṅs | lhan cig pa'i gzis phan mi 'dogs par tshad mas grub pa'i phyir ro ||* [vgl. Dh 139b1: *gaṇ daṇ chu lhan cig par gyur pa de ni de la phan 'dogs par <mi> byed pa kho na ste ||*]), weil dieses Wasser vor dem Wirken des Trägers schon vorhanden ist (vgl. Jñ 324a2f. *ad* PVin III 312b1). Dies wird in Jñ 323b3f. (*ad* PVin III 312a4f.) deutlich erklärt (vgl. n. 59).

⁵⁸ Vgl. PVSVT 280,15ff. (l. *yo 'nyo st. yo yo*) und Bu 513,2 (s. n. 56). Lesart des Textes PVin III: *nus pa yin no ze na |* (P; D *yin no ||*).

⁵⁹ Nach Jñ dürften die logischen Schritte der Erwiderung wie folgt formuliert werden: (1) Verbindung zwischen dem Träger des Wassers und Wasser durch den Kontakt; (2) nach Ansicht des Gegners besteht diese Verbindung in dem gleichzeitigen Verhältnis von Träger und Getragenen (*āśrayāśrayibhāva*); (3) bei gleichzeitigen Dingen ist kein Verhältnis von Hervorbringendem und Hervorgebrachtem vorhanden (*ajanyajanaka*); (4) keine

des Wassers oder des Wesens seines Trägers durch den Träger oder das Wasser:] Das eigene Wesen (*svarūpa*) [des Wassers oder des Trägers] ist nämlich [gleichzeitig mit dem Träger oder dem Wasser unabhängig von dem Träger oder Wasser schon] vorhanden (*siddha*)⁶⁰ und daher keine Wirkung [des Trägers oder Wassers]. Auch wenn nämlich [der Träger oder das Wasser] das andere Wesen [d. i. das vom Wasser oder Träger verschiedene Wesen] verursacht, [ist die Unterstützung nicht möglich, weil der Träger oder das Wasser dann nur das andere Wesen unterstützt⁶¹ und deshalb] das [Wasser oder den Träger selbst, die eigentlich unterstützt werden müßten,] nicht unterstützen kann; denn in beiden Fällen⁶² unterstützt das, was nicht einwirkt (*akāraka*), nicht, weil es überhaupt nicht tätig ist⁶³. Das ist mehrfach erklärt worden⁶⁴. (312a6f.) [Weil kein Wesen, das schon vorhanden ist, durch einen anderen Faktor unterstützt werden kann,]⁶⁵ werden somit alle Verbindungen zwischen [verschiedenen]⁶⁶ Dingen (*vastu-sambandha*) durch die Verschiedenheit (*pravibhāgena*)⁶⁷ kraft des un-

gegenseitige Unterstützung zwischen dem Träger und dem Wasser; vgl. Jñ 323b3f.: *yañ dag par sbyor bas (= samyoga) ni dus geig pa'i rten dañ brten* (D; P *rten*) *pa dag 'brel par* (D; P *bar*) *byed pa'i phyir 'brel pa can dag phan tshun bskyed par bya ba dañ skyed par byed pa dag med pas so ||*.

⁶⁰ Vgl. PVSVT 280,22f.: *na hi paro badarādīnām kuṇḍādeḥ sakāśāt svarūpotpattim vāñchati | svahetor eva teṣāṃ niṣpatteḥ |* „Der andere [kann] nicht behaupten, daß das eigene Wesen der Früchte des Judendorns usw. unmittelbar aus dem Teller usw. entstehe, weil sie [wegen ihrer Nichtvergänglichkeit] durch ihre eigene Ursache allein [schon] vorhanden sind“. Lesart des PVin III: *rañ* (P; D *gañ*) *gi no bo grub zin pas ...*

⁶¹ Vgl. PVSVT 280,24f. und Bu 513,4f.

⁶² D. i. in den Fällen, wo der Träger des Wassers das eigene Wesen des Wassers und ein anderes als das Wasser verursacht; vgl. PVSVT 280,25.

⁶³ In Erwiderung auf einen Einwand, der besagt, daß bloß die Nähe (*samnidhāna*) eine Unterstützung ist, obwohl sie die beiden Unterstützungen, welche sich auf anderes als Wasser und nicht anderes als Wasser richten, nicht bewirkt; vgl. Bu 513,5: *phan pa gzan dañ gzan min pa'i gñis ka mi byed kyañ ñe ba ñid phan pa yin no ze na ||* und Dh 139b5 (im Vergleich mit Bu wäre nach dem Vorderteil des Satzes *gal te ... ma yin pa* eine Negation zu ergänzen).

⁶⁴ Vgl. PVin II 18,28–19,5 und PVSV 53,20ff.

⁶⁵ Vgl. Dh 139b6f.: *gañ gi phyir grub pa'i rañ bzin rnam la phan pa 'ga' yañ med pa de'i phyir* und Bu 513,6f. – d. h., weil ohne das Verhältnis von Ursache (→ Hervorbringendem) und Wirkung (→ Hervorgebrachtem) keine Unterstützung möglich ist (vgl. rGyal 384,4).

⁶⁶ Vgl. Jñ 323b6 (*dños po tha dad pa*), Bu 513,7 (*dños po don gzan gyi 'brel pa*) und rGyal 384,3.

⁶⁷ PVSVT 281,5f. zieht die zweite Erklärung *pravibhāgena* zum Hauptsatz und konstruiert sie mit *vyavasthāpyante*.

terschiedlichen Nutzens (**upayogaviśeṣa*), den gerade das Hervorbringende [für das Hervorgebrachte hat, eine Verschiedenheit, die auf der Ebene des Sprachgebrauchs z. B. als das Verhältnis von Erscheinendem und zur Erscheinung Gebrachtem, von Träger und Getragenen usw. ausgedrückt wird] auf Grund des Verhältnisses von Wirkung und Ursache (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*) bestimmt⁶⁸. Daher ist auch dieses Trägersein (*ādhārabhāva*), das z. B. zum Teller oder zur Erde gehört, nichts anderes als die Kraft, [das Getragene, wie] z. B. die Früchte des Judendorns (*badara*) oder das Wasser, hervorzubringen (*jananaśakti*). (312a7f.) Also ist das [sprachliche] Behandeln so wie [die Erkenntnis] u. a. dieser [Objekte] (wie des Tellers und der Früchte des Judendorns oder des Grundes und des Wassers) dem Wesen dieses [Verhältnisses von Träger und Getragenen] nach allein durch das Verhältnis von Hervorgebrachtem und Hervorbringendem bewirkt, weil [es eigentlich z. B. zwischen den Früchten des Judendorns und dem Teller keinen Kontakt gibt oder weil,] selbst wenn [man annimmt,] es bestehe ein Kontakt, diese [Objekte] ohne <das> [Verhältnis von Hervorgebrachtem und Hervorbringendem]⁶⁹ nicht [möglich] wären (*avinābhāva*) und es [daher] zwecklos wäre, [hinsichtlich des Verhältnisses von Träger und Getragenen] Schritt für Schritt (d. i. mittels der Einführung der Unterstützung und des Kontaktes) nachzudenken⁷⁰.

(312a8-b1) [Einwand:] [Der Grund des Wassers ist] nicht deswegen Träger [des Wassers], weil [er ein vorher nicht gewesenes Ding, d. i. stehendes Wasser] hervorbrächte (*janana*), sondern weil [er das schon

⁶⁸ Vgl. PVSV 54,1–3: *yaḥ kaś cit kasya cit kva cit pratibandhaḥ sa sarvo janyatāyām evāntarbhavati*. Zur Ansicht Dharmakīrtis über die Reduzierung der Verbindung zwischen verschiedenen Dingen auf die Kausalität s. App. VIII.

⁶⁹ Lies *de dag <de> med na mi 'byuñ ba* (vgl. Dh 140a4). Nach Dh 140a4 und Bu 514,4 bedeutet *de: janyajanakabhāva*. Jñ liest dagegen *de dag <de> med na mi 'byuñ ba <ma> yin pa* ... („weil ... diese [nml. Träger und Getragenes] nicht ohne den [Kontakt] nicht vorhanden sind, ...“) und hält diese Aussage für die Begründung der Aussage *brgyud pas ... don med pa* (323b8 und 324a2).

⁷⁰ D. h. der folgende Gedankengang wäre zwecklos: Das Verhältnis von Hervorbringendem und Hervorgebrachtem liegt der Unterstützung zugrunde, diese ihrerseits dem Kontakt und dieser dem Verhältnis von Träger und Getragenen (vgl. Dh 140a4–6 und Bu 514,4: *bskyed bya skyed byed las phan pa de las ldan pa de las rten dañ brten pa źes brgyud pas rten dañ brten par rtogs pa don med pa'i phyir ro* ||). Das Verhältnis von Träger und Getragenen wird nämlich, ohne vom Kontakt abhängig zu sein, bloß durch das Verhältnis von Hervorbringendem und Hervorgebrachtem zustandegebracht.

vorhandene Wasser] still stehen läßt (*sthāpaka*)⁷¹. [Antwort:] [Das stimmt nicht.] Durch [das vorige Argument, daß] die Unterstützung (*upakāra*) [des Wassers durch den mit dem Wasser gleichzeitig vorhandenen Träger des Wassers, sei sie nun Unterstützung des eigenen Wesens des Wassers oder eines vom Wasser verschiedenen Wesens, nach der Ansicht des Gegners nicht möglich ist]⁷², ist schon [klar] erklärt worden, daß das Stillstehen (**sthiti*) [des Wassers, sei es ein vom Wasser] verschiedenes Ding oder ein nicht verschiedenes Ding, [nicht möglich ist]⁷³. (312b1–4) [Einwand:] [Der Grund des Wassers ist] das, was still stehen läßt (*sthāpaka*), weil er [das Wasser] am Fallen hindert (*pātapratibandha*) [und nicht deshalb, weil er einen neuen Zustand, das Stillstehen des Wassers, hervorbringt]. [Antwort:] Was ist [das von dir genannte] „Hindern“ [für ein Ding]? [Erstens] ist ein jedes Hindern des [Wassers] am Fallen, das durch etwas, das Stehen veranlaßt (*sthāpayitr*), hervorgerufen wird, überhaupt (*eva*) kein anderes Ding [als das fallende Wasser, das zum Stehen gebracht wird, selbst]⁷⁴; [oder] wenn [zweitens das, was hindert,] ein anderes Ding [als das fallende Wasser] ist, wieso [kann] es dann, da doch [der Träger des Wassers] nur auf das [Hindern] einwirkt (*upayoga*), das Fallen [des Wassers] verhindern? Auch gegen [die Ansicht, daß das Wasser] wegen des [durch den Träger des Wassers

⁷¹ Vgl. Dh 140a6f.: *grub zin pa gnas par byed pa'i phyir | gzi yin gyi | ma grub pa skyed par byed pa'i phyir ni ma yin no ze na |*, Bu 514,5 und rGyal 385,4: *sñar ma grub pa gsar du skyed par byed pa'i phyir ni gzi ni ma yin no ze na |*.

⁷² Vgl. PVin III 312a4–6.

⁷³ D. h.: Wenn der Stillstand des Wassers vom Wasser verschieden ist, kann das Wasser durch keinen Faktor stillgelegt werden; wenn es hingegen von ihm nicht verschieden ist, dann wäre die Unterstützung des Wassers durch den Träger des Wassers zwecklos, weil zu der Zeit, wo das Wasser vorhanden ist, der Stillstand des Wassers schon vollkommen vorhanden ist; vgl. Bu 514,5f.

⁷⁴ Lesart des Textes PVin III: *gegs zes bya ba ci zig |* (P; D *zig*). Nach Dh 140b1–3 und Bu 514,7–515,2 ist damit gemeint: Kein Nichtseiendes (*med pa*) wird durch ein wirkliches Ding (*bhāva*) bewirkt. Das Hindern müßte ein wirkliches Ding sein, weil es Wirkung (*bya ba*) ist; dann könnte es aber entweder ein anderes Ding als fallendes Wasser sein oder nicht. Wenn es nicht ein anderes Ding ist, dann müßte man Dharmakīrtis Ansicht Recht geben, daß der Träger als das, was das Wasser still stehen läßt, das Stillstehen hervorbringt, weil das Hindern vom Wasser nicht verschieden ist (vgl. rGyal 386,2f.). – Nach PVSVT 283,20 ist die Nichtverschiedenheit des Hinderns vom stillzulegenden Wasser nicht möglich, weil nach der Ansicht des Gegners das Wesen des stillzulegenden Wassers durch einen anderen Faktor als das Hindern am Fallen vorhanden ist (*tatsvabhāvasyānyato nispatti*^o).

bewirkten, vom Wasser selbst verschiedenen] Hinderns [am Fallen] (*pratibandhāt* = *gegs kyi* <*s*>) nicht fällt, dürfte sich der gleiche Vorwurf ergeben, nämlich: Wieso sollte das [Wasser], selbst wenn das als [am Fallen] Hindern [bezeichnete] Ding (*dños po* = **bhāva*) durch den [Träger] bewirkt wäre, nicht fallen, da doch der besondere [Zustand], welcher zum Wesen des Dinges (nämlich des Wassers) geworden ist, dem Bewegung als Beschaffenheit zukommt, [erneut] weder vergangen noch entstanden ist (d. h. ein Zustand, das Fallen, nicht vergangen⁷⁵ und ein anderer Zustand, das Stillstehen, nicht entstanden ist)⁷⁶? Falls [der Gegner behauptet, daß] durch [das Ding als am Fallen] Hindern ein besonderer [Zustand, nämlich das Nichtfallen im fallenden Wasser] vorhanden ist⁷⁷, dann würde [sich die unerwünschte Konsequenz ergeben, daß das Wasser immer noch] fallen [würde], weil das [fallende] Ding, da [nicht nur das am Fallen Hindern, sondern] auch der [besondere Zustand] dem Wesen nach [von dem fallenden Dinge] verschieden ist, [selbst beim Bewirken des Hinderns, wie vorher] bloß das[selbe] Wesen hat (*de'i bdag ñid kho na*), [welches das Fallen nicht ausschließt]⁷⁸, oder [falls der Gegner einwendet, daß der durch das Hindern bewirkte Zustand wiederum einen anderen Zustand bewirke] sich ein *regressus ad infinitum* (*anavasthā*) ergäbe. [Wenn das durch den Grund des Wassers bewirkte Hindern so wie der durch das Hindern bewirkte besondere Zustand kein anderes Ding als das fallende Wasser ist]⁷⁹, könnten die anderen ein solches Wesen (d. i. die Beschaffenheit des vom Grund des Wassers hervorgebrachten Nichtfallens bzw. Hinderns), welches [erneut] bewirkt worden ist, nicht als das Hindern anerkennen⁸⁰.

⁷⁵ Weil das Ding dasselbe Eigenwesen, durch welches es vorher gefallen ist, auch gegenwärtig besitzt; vgl. Dh 140b5f.

⁷⁶ rGyal 387,1f.: ... 'og gñis chu'i bdag ñid du gyur pa'i thur du ltuñ ba'i khyad par ñams pa dañ mi gyo bar gnas pa'i khyad par skyes pa med pa'i phyir |.

⁷⁷ Vgl. PVSVT 283,23f.: *ādhārakṛtenārthāntareṇa pātapratibandhena badarāder apātaḥ kriyata iti cet.*

⁷⁸ Vgl. Dh 140b6f.: ... *gegs 'ba' zig tu ma zad de | khyad par de yañ bdag ñid gzan yin pa'i phyir dños po ni ltuñ* (D; P *ltañ*) *ba ldog pa med pa de'i bdag ñid kho na yin no ||* und Bu 515,4f.; Lesart des Pvin III: ... *dños po de'i bdag ñid* (P; D om. *bdag ñid*) *kho na yin pas* ...

⁷⁹ Vgl. Dh 140b8–141a1 und Bu 515,6: *ltuñ ba'i bdag ñid du gyur pa'i gegs sam khyad par byed do ze na |* „Wenn [der Gegner] einwendet, [der Grund des Wassers] bewirke [die Wirkung], die dem Wesen nach [das] fallende [Wasser] ist, [nämlich] das Hindern oder den besonderen Zustand“.

⁸⁰ Denn, falls die Gegner das Hervorbringen des Nichtfallens bzw. des Hinderns, welches mit dem fallenden Wasser ein und dasselbe ist, anerkennen würden, so würden sie die Ansicht Dharmakīrtis, daß der Grund des Wassers

(312b4–6) Daher (d. h. weil die obigen zwei Ansichten, daß das Hindern sowohl als ein anderes Ding als das fallende Wasser als auch als nicht anderes Ding durch den Grund des Wassers bewirkt wird, widerlegt worden ist)⁸¹ [könnten die Gegner als dritte Möglichkeit behaupten, daß] das Hindern ein Nichtsein des Fallens (*pātābhava*) ist. Wie [könnte dann aber] dieses [Nichtsein als bloße Verneinung des Fallens] durch irgendeine [Ursache] bewirkt werden? Kein [zu Bewirkendes (*kārya*), welches] als Nichtsein (*abhāva*) bezeichnet wird, existiert; denn, wenn das [Nichtsein des Fallens] in irgendeiner Weise (nämlich als das Wesen des fallenden Wassers oder als ein vom Wasser Verschiedenes) das zu Bewirkende ist, kann [das Nichtsein des Fallens] nicht [mehr] ein Nichtsein sein⁸² und dürfte sich [auch wenn das Nichtsein des Fallens als ein anderes Ding als das Wasser angenommen wird] die unerwünschte Konsequenz wie vorher⁸³ ergeben. Deshalb bedeutet die [Aussage:] „[Der Träger des fallenden Wassers] bewirkt das Nichtsein (*abhāvaṃ karoti*)“ die Verneinung der Wirkung des Dinges (*bhāvakriyāpratīṣedha*), d. h., daß [er] das Ding nicht bewirkt (*bhāvaṃ na karoti*). (312b6f.) Falls daher [die Aussage: „Er bewirkt das Nichtsein des Fallens“] in der folgenden Weise [umgeformt] ausgesagt wird: „Er läßt [das Wasser] nicht fallen“⁸⁴, wird auch diese [Aussage von uns Buddhisten] sicherlich angenommen: Das Fallen des [fallenden Wassers] ist durch den [Träger] nicht bewirkt, weil [das Wasser] schon dadurch, daß es die Beschaffenheit des Fallens hat, von selbst fällt, wie in die Luft geworfene [Steine].

und die materielle Ursache des Wassers das stillstehende Wasser hervorbringen, also das kausale Verhältnis von Hervorbringendem und Hervorgebrachtem zwischen dem Grund des Wassers und dem Wasser (vgl. PVin III 312a6f.) akzeptieren (vgl. Dh 141a1f., Jñ 324b1 und Bu 515,6f.).

⁸¹ Vgl. Bu 515,7.

⁸² „Das Bewirken [eines Objekts] wird von dem Sein [des Objekts] umfaßt; [der Gegner setzt aber voraus, daß] auch in bezug auf das Nichtsein (*abhāva*) ein Bewirken vorhanden sei; daher [wäre das Nichtsein des Fallens] nichts anderes als das Sein“ (Dh 141a4f.: *byed pa ni yod pas khyab pa yin la dños po med pa la yañ byed pa yod de* | [P; D *yin no* ||] *des na* [P; D *ni*] *dños po ñid do* ||); vgl. PVT 196b8 = PVSVT 284,10f.: *abhāvasya kāryatvād bhāva eva syāt*.

⁸³ D. h. dieses Nichtsein könnte, weil es keine Kraft hat, das fallende Wasser nicht stilllegen; daher fiele das Wasser immer noch. Oder wenn man, um das Wasser stillzulegen, ein weiteres Nichtsein des Fallens voraussetzt, dann dürfte sich ein *regressus ad infinitum* ergeben, wie bei der gegnerischen Ansicht, daß durch das Hindern des Fallens ein besonderer Zustand im fallenden Wasser vorhanden sei (vgl. PVin III 312b3f.).

⁸⁴ D. h. der Träger des Wassers hat keine Fähigkeit in bezug auf das Fallen des Wassers; vgl. Dh 141a6f.

(312b7) Und wenn es so ist (d. h., wenn der Träger des Wassers das Hindernis des Fallens als bloßes Nichtsein des Fallens nicht bewirkt und das Wasser von selbst fällt)⁸⁵, wieso [kann] der Träger, welcher bei dem [Wasser] keinen [besonderen Zustand] bewirkt (*akimcitkara*), der stilllegende [Faktor] des [Wassers] sein? Da dieses [Wasser] daher durch keinen [anderen Faktor am Fallen] gehindert ist, dürfte es nie stillstehen. (312b8) Somit wird auch mit [dem Ausdruck] „das Hindernis am Fallen“ gesagt, daß die augenblicklichen Dinge an denselben Orten, wo [ihre eigenen] materiellen Ursachen vorhanden waren, entstehen (*upādānasamānadeśotpādāna*). Also ist erwiesen, daß ein derartiges [Stillstehen] des Wassers durch den Träger [des Wassers] entsteht⁸⁶.

(312b8–313a2) Auch der Kranich (*balākā*) ist, weil das Ruhen [des Kranichs] auf dem Wasser beruht (67cd [?])⁸⁷ -

„Wirkung des [Wassers]“ ist zu ergänzen (**anuvartate*) [wie bei 67ab]⁸⁸. Das Ruhen des Kranichs [an einem Ort] beruht auf dem Wasser [welches zeitlich dem Ruhen vorhergeht]⁸⁹; denn [das Ruhen] ist [mit dem Wasser] in der Weise verbunden, daß es die Wirkung des [Wassers] ist, weil das Ruhen des [Kranich-]Körpers durch das [Wasser, welches dem Ruhen zeitlich vorhergeht, neu⁹⁰] erreicht wird. [Dabei] läßt [das Ruhen des Kranichs] das [Vorhandensein des] Was-

⁸⁵ Vgl. PVSVT 284,20f.: *pātapratibandhasyābhāvamātratvenākāryatve*, PVT 197a2 und Bu 516,4: *rañ ñid ltuñ ba'i chos can de lta yin dan* ...

⁸⁶ Mittels des Kontakts zwischen dem Wasser und seinem Träger bzw. mittels des Hindernisses am Fallen oder der Besonderheit des Nichtfallens läßt sich die Tatsache, daß das Wasser stillsteht, nicht erklären. Der Grund dafür liegt darin, daß Wasser und der Träger des Wassers als nichtvergänglich und als gleichzeitig vorhanden angenommen werden, und daher zwischen den beiden keine Kausalität möglich ist, welche für die Erklärung des Stillstehens, nämlich dafür, daß der Träger für das Wasser einen besonderen Zustand bewirkt, nötig wäre. Dagegen behauptet Dharmakīrti, daß der Stillstand des Wassers ohne diese zusätzlichen Faktoren, wie Kontakt, Inhärenz, Hindernis des Falls usw. einzuführen, mittels der Kausalität erklärbar ist, welche in dem Verhältnis von Hervorbringendem und Hervorgebrachtem zwischen dem vergänglichen Wasser und seinem Träger besteht (vgl. Dh 141b4 und Bu 516,7). Zu dieser Kausalität vgl. App. VIII.

⁸⁷ Dieses Stück wird im Tibetischen nicht als Vers übersetzt. Das Wort **anuvartate* (*rjes su 'jug go*) aber deutet an, daß es ein Teil des Verses ist.

⁸⁸ Vgl. Jñ 324b5f.: *'bras bu'o* (P; D *bu'i*) *zes rjes su 'jug go zes bya ba ni mdo sña ma las bdag ñid de 'dra'i* (67a) *rgyu* [] *de'i 'bras bu zes smos pa ltar* (D; P *lta*) *ro* || ('besser wäre *'dra ba ni*); rGyal 390,3f.

⁸⁹ Vgl. Bu 517,2f.: *chu skyar gyi lus gnas pa ni chos can | chu de'i 'bras bu ñid du 'brel pa yin te | don gzan sña ma chu la brten pa yin pa'i phyir ro* ||.

⁹⁰ Vgl. Bu 517,3: *chu de las lus gnas pa gsar du thob pas so* ||.

sers erkennen (*gamaka*)⁹¹, indem es von [Bedingungen] abhängt wie dem Ort (z. B. der Wüste) [der Zeit (z. B. dem Frühling, wenn es nicht viel Wasser gibt)] usw.⁹² Durch diese These [daß die obigen Gründe, welche zwar gültig sind, aber von den von uns gelehrten drei Arten des Grundes verschieden zu sein scheinen, und doch auf einen der drei Gründe reduziert werden können] ist zu beweisen, daß auch bei anderen [Gründen, welche die Folge] erkennen lassen, die Verbindung [von Dieses-Sein oder Daraus-Entstehen vorhanden ist]⁹³.

(313a2f.) Somit gibt es keinen [die Folge] erkennen lassenden [Grund], der außerhalb der drei Arten von Gründen ist; denn [ein solcher anderer Grund hätte von Natur aus keine Verbindung, und] bei einem [Grund], welcher von Natur aus keine Verbindung hat, [gibt es] keine Feststellung (*niyama*), daß [er] ohne [die Folge] nicht vorhanden ist (*avinābhāva*).

⁹¹ Den Schluß vom Kranich als Grund auf das Wasser hat Uddyotakara als Beispiel für die auf der Gemeinsamkeitsbetrachtung beruhenden Schlußfolgerung verwendet (*sāmānyato drṣṭam*), welcher keine Kausalität zugrunde liegt (vgl. NV 148,11 und 149,4ff.). Nach Vācaspatimiśra gehört das von Vātsyāyana angeführte Beispiel des *sāmānyato drṣṭam anumānam* – der Schluß von der Erfahrung der Ortsveränderung der Sonne auf das Umlaufen der Sonne (*ādityasya vrajyā*) – zur Gattung des *śeṣavad anumānam* (d. i. des Schlusses von der Wirkung auf die Ursache); denn zwischen dem Ankommen der Sonne an einem anderen Ort (*śavitur deśāntaraprāpti*) und dem Umlaufen der Sonne besteht ein Verhältnis von Wirkung und Ursache und aufgrund dieser Kausalität wird das Umlaufen der Sonne als Ursache für das Ankommen der Sonne an einem anderen Ort als Wirkung erschlossen. Deswegen führe Uddyotakara als zutreffendes Beispiel für das *sāmānyato drṣṭam anumānam* einen anderen Schluß an, dessen logischer Nexus (*avinābhāva*) kein Verhältnis von Ursache und Wirkung voraussetzt. Dies sei der Schluß vom Kranich auf das Wasser (vgl. NVT 148,22–29 und 149,4–6). Dharmakīrti bestreitet aber eben diese Verneinung des Verhältnisses von Ursache und Wirkung; denn zwischen dem Wasser und dem Ruhen des Kranichs besteht doch eine Kausalität, d. i. ein Verhältnis von Hervorbringendem (*janaka*) und Hervorgebrachtem (*janya*). Das Ruhen des Kranichs (X) zu einer Zeit (T) ist nämlich die Wirkung des zeitlich vorhergehenden Ursachenkomplexes, der aus der materiellen Ursache des Kranichs (*X) und dem Wasser (*Y) besteht, welches das Ruhen des Kranichs (X) unterstützt (zum Schema dieser Kausalität s. App. IX). Von der Konstruktion her ist diese Kausalität gleich mit der Kausalität zwischen Teller oder Grund des Wassers und Früchten des Judendorns oder Wasser (vgl. n. 68 und App. VIII). Infolgedessen wird von Dharmakīrti auch der Schluß vom Kranich auf das Wasser auf einen, der auf der Wirkung als Grund beruht, reduziert.

⁹² Vgl. Dh 141b7–142a1 und Bu 517,3f.

⁹³ Vgl. Bu 518,5. Lesart des Textes P_{Vin} III: *go bar byed pa gzan dag* (P; D om.) *la*.

PARALLELSTELLEN

310b7–311a1 (= D 213a4–6): *yaś tarhi samagreṇa hetunā kāryotpādo 'numīyate sa katham trividhe hetāv antarbhavati* | (PV I 7 [= PVin III 64; zitiert in NBhūṣ 300,9f., NM 336,14f., TBV 563,3f. und TarR 106,4f.])

*hetunā yaḥ samagreṇa kāryotpādo 'numīyate |
arthāntarānapekṣatvāt sa svabhāvo 'nuvarṇitaḥ //*

asāv api yathāsaṃnikhitān nānyam apekṣata iti tanmātrānubandhī svabhāvo bhāvasya | tatra hi kevalam ... samagrāṇām kāryotpādānāyogyatānumānāt | yogyatā ca sāmāgrīmātrānubandhinīti svabhāva-bhūtaiva ... (PVSV 6,22–29).

311a1–4 (= D 312a6–b1): *kiṃ punaḥ kāraṇam sāmāgryāḥ kāryam eva nānumīyate | ... na hi samagrāṇīty eva kāraṇadravyāṇi svakāryam janayanti | sāmāgrījanmanām śaktīnām pariṇāmāpekṣatvāt kāryotpādasya | atrāntare ca pratibandhasambhavān na kāryānumānam | yogyatāyās tu dravyāntarānapekṣatvān na virudhyate 'numānam | uttarottaraśaktipariṇāmena kāryotpādanasamartheyam kāraṇasāmāgrī | śaktipariṇāmapratyayasānyasyāpekṣaṇīyasyābhāvād iti | pūrvasajātīmātrahetutvāc chaktiprasūteḥ sāmāgryā yogyatānanyāpekṣiṇīty ucyate* | (PVSV 7,1–12).

311a4f. (= D 213b1f.): *samagrāṇy eva hi kāraṇāni yogyatām apy anumāpayanty asamagrasyaikāntāsāmarthyāt* | (PVSV 8,18f.).

311a5f. (= D 213b2f.): *yathā dehendriyabuddhibhyo rāgādyanumānam | ātmātmīyābhiniveśapūrvakā hi rāgādayaḥ ...* (PVSV 8,19f.).

311a7 (= D 213b3): *ayoniśomanaskārapūrvakatvāt sarvadoṣotpatteḥ* | (PVSV 8,20f.).

311a7f. (= D 213b3f.): *dehādīnām hetutve 'pi na kevalānām sāmāthyam astīti || vipakṣavṛtter adṛṣṭāv api śeṣavat° ... saṃśayaḥ* (zitiert in TarR 107,15f.) | (PVSV 8,21f.).

311a8–b4 (= D 213b4–7): *yā tarhy akāryakāraṇabhūtenānyena rasādinā rūpādigatiḥ sā katham | sāpi* (PV I 9 [= PVin III 65; zitiert in TSP 510,17f., NBhūṣ 294,14f., NVTṬ 137,2f. (vgl. KAJIYAMA 1966: n. 191), ŚVK III/6,26f. und TarR 89,1f.])

*ekasāmāgryadhīnasya rūpāde rasato gatiḥ |
hetudharmānumānena dhūmendhanavikāravat //*

tatra hetur eva tathābhūto 'numīyate | pravṛttaśaktirūpopādāna-kāraṇasahakāripratyayo hi rasahetū rasam janayati | indhanavikāra-viśeṣopādānahetusahakāripratyayāgnidhūmajananavat | tathā hi ... svakāraṇasya phalotpādanam praty ābhimukhyena (PV I 10ab [zitiert in TarR 89,3f.])

... *na vinā rasah saiva ... | rūpopādānahetūnām pravṛttikāraṇam | sāpi rasopādānakāraṇapra-vṛttī rūpopādānakāraṇappravṛttisahakāriṇī | tasmād yathābhūtād dheto rasa utpannas tathābhūtam anumāpayan rūpam anumāpayati* (PVSV 7,12–8,4).

311b4–6 (= D 213b7–214a2): *tatrāpi* (PV I 10cd [zitiert in TarR 89,4].)

... *atītaikakālānām gatis nānāgatānām vyabhicārāt ... tasmād iyam*

kāryalingajā //

... *etena pipīlikotsaraṇamatsyavikārāder varṣādy anumānam uktam | tatrāpi bhūta° ... eva varṣahetuḥ pipīlikādisamkṣobhādihetur iti* (vgl. NBhūṣ 294,18–20) | (PVSV 8,6–15).

311b7 (= D 214a3): vgl. *yad api gotvād viśāṇṭīyādau samudāyavya-vasthāyāḥ kāraṇam samudāyina ity abhihitam ...* (TBV 594,19f.).

312a1 (= D 214a5): vgl. *tādrśam ca jalam ādhārasya kāryam eva* (DhPr 115,25) und *jālasya punaḥ sthairyam upārjitam ādhāraṇataḥ* (TarR 89,16 [mit °ṇātaḥ]).

(D 214a5 [P om.]): vgl. *sthiraṁ jalam ādhāraṁ gamayati kāryatayaiva* (TarR 89,16f.).

312a2–7 (= D 214a7–b4): *kim tarhi | saṁyogakṛtaḥ | kim ... sa tayor ... saṁyogaḥ | tābhyām janānāt samavāyād vā | sa kim ekatraiva na samavaiti janyate vā | tasyāsāmarthyāt | tad asamarthaṁ prthak tat sahitam api tādrśam evety anupakāraakatvān na saṁyogena tadvat syāt | sahitasya tadanyopakārād viśeṣotpatteḥ sāmarthyam | ko 'yam ajan-yajanakabhūtānām upakāraḥ | svarūpasya siddher akāryatvāt | pa-rarūpakriyāyām api tatrānupakārāt | ubhayathākārakasyākimcitkar-ratvenānupakāraakatvād ity uktaprāyam | tasmāt sarva eva vastusaṁ-bandhā janakasyaivopayogaviśeṣavaśāt pravibhāgena kāryakāraṇa-bhāvād vyavasthāpyante* (zitiert in TarR 109,5f.) | *tad ayaṁ kuṇḍādīnām apy ādhārabhāvo badarādiṣu jananaśaktir eva* | (PVSV 70,20–71,5).

312a8-b1 (= D 214b5): ... *sthitihetutvād ādhāro na jananāt* ... (PVSV 71, 11f.).

312b1-3 (= D 214b5-7): ... *pātapratibandhāt* ... *sthāpako bhavet* | ... *sa hi pātapratibandho nārthāntaram eva yaḥ sthāpayitrā kriyeta* | *arthāntaratve tatraiva* ... *upayoga iti kaḥ patataḥ pratibandhaḥ* | *prati-bandhād apāte* 'pi *tulyaḥ paryanuyogaḥ* ... (PVSV 71,13-17).

312b4-6 (= D 215a1-3): *tasmāt pātābhāvaḥ* ... °*pratibandhaḥ sa katham kena cit kriyate* | ... *nābhāvo nāma kaś cit* | ... *tasya katham cit kāryarūpatve* 'bhāvāyogāt | *tasmād bhāvakriyāpratiṣedha°* ... *eṣa bhāvaṃ na karotīti yāvat* | (PVSV 71,18-21).

312b7f. (= D 215a3f.): *tathā ca* ... *akimcitkaraḥ* ... *kaḥ kasya sthā-pako nāma* | *tenāyaṃ kena cid apratibaddha iti na kadā cit tiṣṭhet* | *tasmāt pātapratibandha ity api kṣaṇikānām bhāvānām upādānasam-ānadeśotpādanam ucyate* | (PVSV 71,21-25).

312b8-313a1 (= D 215a5): vgl. (*tādṛśaṃ ca jalam ādhārasya kāryam eva* |) *tādṛśī ca balākā salilasya* | (DhPr 115,26).

313a2f. (= D 215a6f.): *tena nānyo hetur gamako* 'sti | *apratibaddha-svabhāvasyāvinābhāvanīyamābhāvāt* | (PVSV 8,12f.).

Appendizes

I (ad n. 11)

Dharmakīrtis Ansicht, daß der Ursachenkomplex ein Grund als wesentliche Beschaffenheit ist, wird mittels der folgenden drei Sätze erklärt:

(1) „Auch eine Beschaffenheit ist Grund [als wesentliche Beschaffenheit] mit Bezug auf eine [andere] wesentliche Beschaffenheit, die sich an [ihr] bloßes Vorhandensein anschließt.

(2) Das Dieselbesein der [anderen] Sache (Y) [mit der einen (X)] ist nämlich [nur] gegeben, wenn sie (Y) sich bloß an die [andere (X)] anschließt, aber nicht, wenn sie von etwas anderem abhängt.“ (PVSV 4,1-3: *svabhāve bhāvo* 'pi *bhāvamātrānurodhini* // [PV I 2cd] *hetur iti vartate* | *tādātmyaṃ hy artha-sya tanmātrānurodhiny eva nānyāyatte* [vgl. PVin II 24,10-14]).

(3) „Eben diese Beschaffenheit (Y), die sich bloß an das Vorhandensein [der beweisenden Beschaffenheit (X)] anschließt und *svabhāva* [genannt wird], ist der Sache nach selbst die [beweisende] Beschaffenheit (X)“ (PVin II 32,27-29 = PVSV 24,14f.: *ya eva bhāvo bhāvamātrānurodhī svabhāva ity ucyate sa eva svayaṃ vastuto bhāvaḥ*).

Aus dem zweiten Satz läßt sich die Aussage entnehmen: wenn die andere Sache (Y) dieselbe wie die eine Sache (X) – d. i. *svabhāva* der einen (X) – ist, schließt sich die andere (Y) bloß an das Vorhandensein der einen (X) an. Aus

dem dritten Satz folgt umgekehrt: Wenn sich die andere (Y) bloß an das Vorhandensein der einen (X) anschließt, ist die andere (Y) dieselbe wie die eine (X). Also ist das Dieselbesein der anderen (Y) wie die eine (X) mit dem Anschluß der anderen (Y) an das bloße Vorhandensein der einen (X) gleichbedeutend (vgl. IWATA 1988: IA). Nach dem ersten Satz impliziert der Anschluß der anderen (Y) an das bloße Vorhandensein der einen (X), daß die eine (X) ein Grund als wesentliche Beschaffenheit für die andere (Y) als Folge ist. Aus diesen Aussagen folgt:

„Anschluß des Y an das bloße Vorhandensein des X“ = „Y ist ein *svabhāva* von X“ → „X ist ein Grund als *svabhāva*“.

Auch beim Schluß aus der Ursache auf die Wirkung schließt sich das Entstehen der Wirkung (Y) bloß an das Vorhandensein des Ursachenkomplexes (X) an, weil jenes (Y) von nichts anderem als diesem (X) abhängt; daher wird das Entstehen der Wirkung (Y) – genauer: bloß die Geeignetheit/Möglichkeit, die Wirkung hervorzubringen (vgl. PVin III 64abc, 310b8–311a1) – als wesentliche Beschaffenheit des Ursachenkomplexes (X) bezeichnet (PVin III 64d). Und dieser Ursachenkomplex (X) ist nach dem obigen Schema ein Grund als wesentliche Beschaffenheit für die Folge (vgl. PV I 2cd), nämlich die Geeignetheit, die Wirkung hervorzubringen (vgl. Dh 133a7f.: *’bras bu skye bar rjes su dpog* [D; P *dpogs*] *pa ’di ni rañ bžin gyi gtan tshigs yin par brjod do || ci’i phyir ze na | don gzan la ni mi ltos* [P *ltos*; D *ltos pa’i*] *phyir te | de tsaṃ dañ rjes su ’brel pa’i* [D; P *ba’i*] *phyir ro ||*); vgl. TarR 106,9–11 (lies *°bhāvitvena* statt *°bhābitvena*).

Zur Definition und Interpretation des *svabhāvahetu* vgl. STEINKELLNER 1971: 205ff., 1974 und 1984: 461ff.; zur Anwendung dieses Argumentes zum Beweis, daß die *anupalabdhi* als Grund ein *svabhāvahetu* ist, vgl. IWATA 1989: 9 und 1991: I.2.

II (ad n. 24)

Das kausale Verhältnis zwischen dem vollständigen Ursachenkomplex (UK) und der Wirkung einerseits und die logische Umformung dieser Kausalität andererseits werden wie folgt schematisiert:

vollständiger UK	ergibt	Wirkung
Körper, Sinnesorgan usw. + Hang zu „Ich“ und „Mein“	ontologisch	Begierde, Haß usw.
<i>svabhāvahetu</i>	logisch	Folge
Ursachenkomplex (UK)	→	Geeignetheit des UK zur Hervorbringung der Wirkung

III (ad n. 38)

Der dynamische Aspekt bei der Schlußfolgerung vom Geschmack auf die Form wird wie folgt beschrieben. Um die zu einer Zeit T hervorgebrachten Wirkungen, nämlich den Geschmack X und die Form Y, zu erzeugen, sind ihre eigenen materiellen, zur vorhergehenden Zeit *T vorhandenen Ursachen, nämlich die materielle Ursache des Geschmacks *X und die materielle Ursache der Form *Y, tätig. Diese Ursachen sind einerseits die Hauptursache für das Hervorbringen ihrer eigenen Wirkung, andererseits aber die Neben-

ursache für das Hervorbringen der anderen Wirkung in dem Sinne, daß die materielle Ursache des Geschmacks *X, indem sie mit der materiellen Ursache der Form *Y zusammenwirkt, dem Entstehen der Form Y mittelbar hilft, ebenso wie die materielle Ursache der Form *Y dem Entstehen des Geschmacks X mittelbar hilft.

<i>hetusāmagrī</i> (UK) zur Zeit *T	Wirkung zur Zeit T
*X (<i>rasopādānakāraṇa</i>)	↔ X (<i>rasa</i>)
*Y (<i>rūpopādānakāraṇa</i>)	↔ Y (<i>rūpa</i>)

Mit anderen Worten: Die eine materielle Ursache (*X/*Y) kann sich, nur wenn sie mit der anderen materiellen Ursache (*Y/*X) als der mit ihr zusammenwirkenden Nebenursache versehen ist, dem Hervorbringen ihrer eigenen Wirkung zuwenden (vgl. PVT 26a4 und PVSVT 48,25 in n. 37) – d. h., der Geschmack X und die Form Y entstehen aus demselben Ursachenkomplex *X und *Y (vgl. PVSVT 48,17 und 19). Diese Kausalität wird im logischen Bereich wie folgt umgeformt: An Hand des kausalen Verhältnisses zwischen dem Geschmack und seiner materiellen Ursache kann man vom Geschmack X auf die materielle Ursache des Geschmacks *X schließen. Dabei ist der Grund eine Wirkung als Grund. Diese materielle Ursache des Geschmacks *X konstituiert zusammen mit der Form *Y einen vollständigen Ursachenkomplex, aus welchem allein die Wirkungen, der Geschmack X und die Form Y, entstanden sind. Wenn man bei dieser Kausalität die Form als Wirkung nur auf dasjenige, das gleichzeitig mit dem Geschmack X vorhanden ist oder früher als dieser vorhanden war, beschränkt (vgl. 311b4f.), dann kann man logisch sagen: „Wenn der vollständige Ursachenkomplex *X und *Y des Geschmacks X vorhanden ist, ist die Form Y sicher vorhanden“; denn wenn die eine Wirkung des Ursachenkomplexes vorhanden ist, ist auch die andere Wirkung desselben Ursachenkomplexes notwendig vorhanden. Da aus dem Geschmack X, nämlich der Wirkung als Grund, seine Ursache *X erschlossen wird und es selbstverständlich ist, daß die Ursache des Geschmacks *X mit der Ursache der Form *Y zusammen das Vorhandensein der mit dem Geschmack gleichzeitigen Form Y sichert, kann die Form Y aus diesem Geschmack X mittelbar erschlossen werden (vgl. PVT 26a6ff. und PVSVT 46,5–7 und 48,27–49,4: *tasmād yathābhūtād dhetoḥ iti pravṛttaśaktirūpopādānakāraṇasahitāt pūrvakṣaṇasamgrhītād rasāl līngatvenābhīmato rasa ut <pa> nnaṣ tathābhūtam eva hetum anumāpayan gamayan samānakālaṃ rūpaṃ gamayati*). Daher läßt sich der Grund dieser Schlußfolgerung als *kāryaketu* bezeichnen.

Der wesentliche Gedanke dieser Schlußfolgerung wird also mittels einer Konjunktion der folgenden beiden logischen Aussagen zusammengefaßt:

Wenn der Geschmack X vorhanden ist, ist seine materielle Ursache *X vorhanden, und wenn die materielle Ursache des Geschmacks *X und die materielle Ursache der Form *Y vorhanden sind, ist die Form Y vorhanden, d. h. (*rasa* [X] → *rasopādāna* [*X]) ∘ (*rasopādāna* [*X] ∘ *rūpopādāna* [*Y] → *rūpa* [Y]),

wie z. B.: Wenn Rauch (X) vorhanden ist, ist Feuer (*X) vorhanden, und wenn Feuer (*X) und Holz (*Y = materielle Ursache von Asche und Kohle) vorhanden sind, sind die Umwandlungsprodukte des Holzes (= Asche und Kohle [Y]) vorhanden, d. h. (*dhūma* [X] → *agni* [*X]) ∘ (*agni* [*X] ∘ *indhana* [*Y] → *indhanavikāra* [Y]).

Dabei ist die zweite Aussage ($*X \circ *Y \rightarrow Y$) ein spezifischer Fall der Umfassung: „Wenn der Ursachenkomplex ($*X$ und $*Y$) vorhanden ist, ist die Geeignetheit seine Wirkung (Y/X) hervorzubringen vorhanden“. Obwohl sich die Schlußfolgerung vom Geschmack X auf die Form Y im erkenntnistheoretischen Gedankengang auf diese Weise in zwei spaltet, bedeutet das nicht, daß sie aus zwei verschiedenen Schlußfolgerungen besteht, nämlich aus der Schlußfolgerung vom Geschmack auf die Ursache des Geschmacks und aus der Schlußfolgerung vom Ursachenkomplex auf das Entstehen der Form; denn bei dieser Schlußfolgerung ist der zu erschließende Gegenstand diejenige Form Y , die gleichzeitig mit dem Geschmack X ist, und vor dem Vorhandensein des Geschmacks X ist schon sein Ursachenkomplex ($*X$ und $*Y$) vereint, welcher eben der Ursachenkomplex der Form Y ist. In diesem spezifischen Fall wird die Form Y selbstverständlich selbst erkannt – d. h. um die Form Y zu erkennen, braucht man keine Schlußfolgerung von ihrem Ursachenkomplex auf das Entstehen der Form. Daher besteht die Schlußfolgerung auf die Form von der logischen Form her gesehen nur aus dem einzigen Schluß vom Geschmack auf die Beschaffenheit der Ursache des Geschmacks (vgl. Dh 136a5f., 136b5 und Bu 509,4). Somit wird der Grund dieser Schlußfolgerung auf die Wirkung als Grund reduziert.

IV (*ad* n. 42)

Das kausale Verhältnis zwischen dem Ursachenkomplex, i. e. der Veränderung in den vier Elementen, und der Wirkung, i. e. der Verwirrung der Ameisen und dem Regen, wird folgendermaßen schematisiert:

Ursachenkomplex zur Zeit $*T$	Wirkung zur Zeit T
Veränderung in den vier Elementen ($*X$)	Verwirrung der Ameisen (X)
Veränderung in den vier Elementen ($*Y$)	Regen (Y)

V (*ad* n. 43)

In DhPr werden noch andere Beispiele, die zur Wirkung als Grund gehören, angeführt. Beim Schluß auf den Schatten aus einem Baum, auf den die Sonne scheint, gehört dieser Baum zur Wirkung als Grund; denn der durch die Sonnenstrahlen beschienene Baum (X) ist mit seinem Schatten (Y) dadurch verbunden, daß diese beiden durch denselben Ursachenkomplex hervorgebracht sind, welcher aus der materiellen Ursache des Baums ($*X$) und den Strahlen ($*Y$) besteht (s. DhPr 115,19f.: *vrkṣasya chāyāyām ekasāmagryadhīnatayaiva pratibandhaḥ | tatas tatpratipatiḥ kāryaliṅgajaiva*). „Und mit dem Augenblick des Baums (X) versehen entsteht der [Schatten (Y)] aus der materiellen Ursache der Sonnenstrahlen ($*Y$), die zeitlich [dem Schatten (Y)] vorhergeht und in dem Augenblick des Baums ($*X$) vorhanden ist, der zeitlich [dem mit dem Schatten (Y) gleichzeitig vorhandenen Baum (X)] vorhergeht“ (ib. 115,21f.: *sā ca pūrvasmād ālokopādānāt pūrvavrkṣakṣaṇād vrkṣakṣaṇena sārddham utpadyate*).

<i>ekahetusāmagrī</i> zur Zeit $*T$	Wirkung zur Zeit T
$*X$ (<i>vrkṣopādāna</i>)	→ X (<i>vrkṣa</i>)
$*Y$ (<i>ālokopādāna</i>)	→ Y (<i>chāyā</i>)
	→ <i>āloka</i>

Wenn aus dem beschienenen Baum (X) als Wirkung die Ursache des Baumes (*X) erschlossen wird, wird auch die Beschaffenheit der Ursache des Baumes, nämlich daß die materielle Ursache des Baumes mit den Strahlen zusammenwirkend den Schatten hervorbringen kann, erkannt, und diese Fähigkeit zum Hervorbringen des Schattens impliziert, daß derjenige Schatten (Y), der in zeitlicher Hinsicht mit dem Baum (X) gleichzeitig ist, sicher vorhanden ist. Daher gehört der beschienene Baum zur Wirkung als Grund.

Auch beim Schluß vom Fallen der einen Seite auf das Steigen der anderen Seite der Waage oder beim Schluß vom Aufgehen des Mondes auf das Blühen von Lotus-Blumen gehören diese Gründe zur Wirkung als Grund. Denn in beiden Fällen sind der Grund und die Folge diejenigen Wirkungen, die durch denselben Ursachenkomplex verursacht sind: Beim ersten Fall besteht der Ursachenkomplex aus den beiden Seiten der Waage und der menschlichen Bemühung (*puṣaprayatna*, d. h. etwa, daß man ein Ding auf die Waage legt; vgl. DhPr 115, 22 ff.).

Ursachenkomplex zur Zeit *T	Wirkung zur Zeit T
<i>tulārvāgbhāga</i> —————→ X (<i>arvāgbhāgonnamana</i> ° <i>gāvanamana</i>)	
<i>puṣaprayatna</i> < < - - - - -→	
<i>tulāparabhāga</i> —————→ Y (<i>parabhāgāvanamanan</i> ° <i>gonnamana</i>)	

Beim zweiten Fall besteht der Ursachenkomplex aus den spezifischen Elementen (*mahābhūtaṭiṣeṣa*), welche den Gegenstand der Bezeichnung „Zeit“ ausmacht (*kālavayavahāraṭiṣaya*). Ebenfalls als ontologische Basis gilt die letztere Kausalität beim Schluß aus dem *nakṣatra* Kṛttikā auf Rohiṇī; denn als Ursache für das Aufgehen sowohl der Kṛttikā als auch der Rohiṇī werden diese spezifischen Elemente, die man als „Zeit“ bezeichnet, angenommen (*ya eva kṛttikodayahetur mahābhūtaṭiṣeṣaḥ kālasamjñitah sa eva katipayakālavayavadhānena rohiṇyudayahetur iti* ... [DhPr 115,30f.]; vgl. TS 1423 und KAJIYAMA 1966: 75n. 191).

VI (ad n. 46)

Zwischen dem Grund und dem zu beweisenden Faktor besteht eine Kausalität, insofern der Besitz eines noch nicht gesehenen Teils (z. B. Hörner) Ursache der Geeignetheit für die Bestimmung des Ganzen ist. Aber diese Kausalität ist bloß metaphorisch (**lākṣaṇika* = *mtshan ṅid pa*), nicht wirklich (*vāstava*) – d. h., weil in bezug auf Teile wie Hörner usw. das Wort „Kuh“ verwendet wird, hat die Geeignetheit für den Gebrauch des Wortes „Kuh“ die Hörner usw. als Ursache (*nimitta*); vgl. Dh 138a4f.: *'di la* (P; D *las*) *rgyu dan'bras bu'i dños po ni* (P; D *ṅid ni*) *mtshan ṅid pa yin gyi | dños po pa ni ma yin no || rwa la sogs pa'i yan lag rnam la* (P; D *om.*) *ba laṅ gi tha sñad 'jug pa'i phyir ba laṅ gi tha sñad du ruṅ ba* (P; D *'jug pa*) *ṅid ni rwa la sogs pa rgyu mtshan can yin no ||* und Bu 511,3f. In diesem Sinne ist der Grund dieses Schlusses, die Geeignetheit für die Bestimmung als Kuh, die Wirkung des Besitzens von Hörnern usw., wird also auf eine Wirkung als Grund reduziert. Wenn man aber umgekehrt aus einem gesehenen Teil (z. B. aus den Hörnern) auf die Geeignetheit für den Wortgebrauch „Kuh“ schließt, wird dieser Grund auf eine wesentliche Beschaffenheit als Grund reduziert; denn die Folge, Geeignetheit, ist eine wesentliche Beschaffenheit des Komplexes der Teile (vgl. Dh 138a6f. [mit unklarem *gaṅ gi*; lies *gaṅ gi* <*tshe*> ?] und Bu

511.4). Das Beispiel dieser wesentlichen Beschaffenheit als Grund ist schon in PVin III 303b3f. angedeutet worden. Man könnte aber einwenden: Wie man aus dem Sehen der Form auf das Berührbare schließt, so schließt man aus dem Sehen eines für den Wortgebrauch „Kuh“ geeigneten Teiles auf einen anderen Teil, der auf demselben Ursachenkomplex beruht. Wäre dieser Schluß nicht schlüssig, dann würde auch der Schluß aus dem Kuhtum auf einen Teil der Kuh nicht schlüssig sein.

Dharmottara läßt einerseits diesen Gegner annehmen, daß der letztere Schluß schlüssig sein kann, andererseits hält er den ersten Schluß aus dem Kuhtum auf einen Teil für nötig: Wenn der Schluß aus dem einen Teil auf einen anderen Teil gültig ist, ist dieser Schluß schon mittels des Schlusses aus der einen Wirkung (z. B. dem Geschmack) auf die andere Wirkung (z. B. die Form) desselben Ursachenkomplexes erklärt, weil bei beiden Schlüssen Grund und Folge durch denselben Ursachenkomplex verursacht sind (vgl. PVin III 65). Gesondert vom Schluß aus der einen Wirkung auf die andere Wirkung wird der Schluß aus dem Kuhtum auf einen Teil der Kuh deswegen angeführt, weil der Grund des letzteren Schlusses nicht in Wirklichkeit eine Wirkung ist, sondern bloß als Wirkung vorgestellt ist. Es ist damit zu zeigen beabsichtigt, daß ein solcher Schluß, welcher auf einem Grund beruht, der in übertragenem Sinne metaphorisch als Wirkung bezeichnet wird, möglich ist (vgl. Dh 138a7-b4 [mit unklarem *de ste* in 138b1; lies *ci ste*?] und Bu 511,4–6).

VII (*ad* n. 48)

Der Reduzierung des Grundes, des stillstehenden Wassers, auf die Wirkung als Grund liegt die Kausalität zugrunde, welche darin besteht, daß das zu einer Zeit T stillstehende Wasser X durch das zur vorhergehenden Zeit *T vorhandene Wasser *X als materielle Ursache (*upādānakāraṇa*) und den zur vorhergehenden Zeit *T vorhandenen Träger des Wassers *Y als unterstützenden Faktor verursacht ist.

Ursachenkomplex zur Zeit *T	Wirkung zur Zeit T
*X (<i>udaka/badara</i>) = <i>upādānakāraṇa</i> x (<i>sahakāra</i>)	X (<i>*sthitodaka/badara</i>)
*Y (<i>ādhāra/kruṇḍa</i>) = <i>upakāra</i>	

Da zwischen dem stillstehenden Wasser X und dem Träger des Wassers *Y ein Verhältnis von Hervorgebrachtem und Hervorbringendem (*janyajanaka*) besteht, wird der Träger *Y (d. i. die Nebenursache) aus der Wirkung des stillstehenden Wassers X erschlossen. Daher wird dieses Wasser X auf die Wirkung als Grund reduziert. Diese Art der Kausalität wird auch in PVSV 70,16ff. behandelt, wo es sich um eine Kausalität zwischen Teller (*Y) und Früchten des Judendorns (X) handelt (s. VIII).

VIII (*ad* n. 68)

Die fundamentale Idee Dharmakīrtis, daß die Verbindung zwischen verschiedenen Dingen schließlich nichts anders als Kausalität ist, die in dem Verhältnis von Hervorbringendem und Hervorgebrachtem besteht, basiert auf seiner kausalen Theorie, nach der die Wirkung durch einen vollständigen Ursachenkomplex bewirkt wird, welcher aus der materiellen Ursache und den Begleit-

ursachen besteht, die die Funktion der materiellen Ursache unterstützen. In diesem Abschnitt richtet Dharmakīrti sein Augenmerk auf die Kausalität zwischen Wirkung und Mitursache, um zwischen verschiedenen Dingen, welche zur gleichen Zeit vorhanden sind und daher den Eindruck machen, als ob sie kein kausales Verhältnis hätten, eine Art von Kausalität zustandezubringen. Im Falle, daß sich z. B. Früchte des Judendorns (oder Wasser) auf einem Teller (oder auf dem Boden) befinden, d. h. bei einem Verhältnis von Träger und Getragenen, scheint das Verhältnis von Hervorbringendem und Hervorgebrachtem für die beiden beteiligten Elemente nicht zu bestehen. Wenn man aber die Mitursache in Betracht zieht, kann man eine Art von Kausalität herauslesen: Die stillstehenden Früchte des Judendorns X zu einem Zeitpunkt T als Wirkung werden durch die materielle Ursache der Früchte des Judendorns *X, die zum vorhergehenden Zeitpunkt *T vorhanden war, bewirkt. Dabei beziehen sie (X) eine Unterstützung durch den Teller *Y, der mit der materiellen Ursache *X zur gleichen Zeit *T vorhanden war. Dies wird von Dharmakīrti folgendermaßen dargestellt (zum Schema dieser Kausalität s. App. VII):

„Der Teller (*Y), welcher mit [der materiellen Ursache der Früchte des Judendorns (*X), die] zu dem den [Früchten des Judendorns (X) als Wirkung] vorhergehenden Zeitpunkt [vorhanden war,] mitwirkt, bringt die Wirkung der Früchte des Judendorns (X) an demselben Ort hervor [wo die Früchte des Judendorns (*X) vorhanden waren, und daher] wird er als Träger bezeichnet“ (PVSV 70,17–19: *tatpūrvakṣaṇasahakāri kuṇḍaṃ tatraiva badarakāryaṃ janayad ādhāra ity ucyate*).

Denn „durch den Träger ist verursacht, daß ein schweres Ding [z. B. die zu einer Zeit *T vorhanden gewesenene Früchte des Judendorns (*X)], obwohl es von Natur aus die Beschaffenheit hat, eine nicht an demselben Ort vorhandene Wirkung (d. i. das Ding, das denselben Daseinstrom hat) hervorzubringen, eine an demselben Ort vorhandene Wirkung [z. B. die zu einer späteren Zeit T vorhandenen Früchte des Judendorns (X)] hervorbringt“ (PVSV 70,16f.: *prakṛtyaiva guruṇo dravyasyāsamānadeśakāryotpādanadharmanāḥ samānadeśakāryotpādanabhāva ādhāraḥ* [PVSV 70,14–71,25 wurde von ŌTA (1988: 3ff.) ins Japanische übersetzt; vgl. auch VETTER 1964: 101 f.]).

Somit kann der Teller als hervorbringender Träger angenommen werden, weil der Teller, obwohl er die Früchte des Judendorns nicht als Hauptursache hervorbringt, als Mitursache die Kraft hat, die Entstehung der Wirkung zu verursachen:

„Das Hervorbringen der [Früchte des Judendorns, die von Natur aus] auseinanderrollen, an dem[selben] Ort [wo die materiellen Ursachen der Früchte des Judendorns vorhanden waren] ist die die Früchte des Judendorns etc. [mitbewirkende] Kraft des Tellers etc.“ (PV I 144bcd: *praviśarpataḥ | śaktis taddeśajananaṃ kuṇḍāder badarādiṣu* //).

Auch im Falle, daß eine Lampe einen Topf beleuchtet, besteht das Verhältnis von Hervorbringendem und Hervorgebrachtem, weil das Verhältnis von Beleuchtetem und Beleuchtendem (*vyangyavyaṅjaka*) dadurch möglich ist, daß die Lampe die Entstehung des Eigenwesens [des Topfs], welches eine Erkenntnis von sich hervorzubringen in der Lage ist, verursacht (*pradīpakṛtena . . . vijñānajananasamarthasvarūpotpādena*; vgl. PVSVT 281,8f. ≈ PVT 195b2f.).

IX (*ad* n. 91)

Die Kausalität zwischen Wasser und dem Ruhen des Kranichs wird folgendermaßen schematisiert:

Ursachenkomplex zur Zeit *T	Wirkung zur Zeit T
Kranich (*X) —————→	Ruhen des Kranichs (X)
Wasser (*Y) — — — — —→	

Abkürzungen und Literatur

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THE MADHYAMAKA THEORIES REGARDED AS FALSE BY THE DGE LUGS PAS*

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The phrase “the Madhyamaka theories regarded as false by the dGe lugs pas” will be used in this paper as a generalized designation for the Madhyamaka theories that were propounded by some early Tibetan masters in the period between the introduction of Buddhism into Tibet (8th c.) and Tsoñ kha pa Blo bzañ grags pa'i dpal (1357–1419) and regarded as false by Tsoñ kha pa and later dGe lugs pas. In Tsoñ kha pa's *Lam rim chen mo* as well as in the *Grub mtha' chen mo* of 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa'i rdo rje (1648–1722), for instance, we can find some Madhyamaka views refuted and mentions of the names of those who advocated the refuted views. Having consulted these materials, D. SEYFORTH RUEGG has drawn our attention to these early Madhyamaka theories in Tibet in his paper “On the Thesis and Assertion in the Madhyamaka” (RUEGG 1983). PAUL WILLIAMS, who was interested in 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa's attribution in his *Grub mtha' chen mo* of one of the “false Madhyamaka theories” to rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus (?-1185)¹, has discussed that in detail and has

* This paper is based on a previous article in Japanese (YOSHIMIZU 1991), where I introduced 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa's criticism of the “false Madhyamaka theories” and tried to identify their advocates. Since I did not know of WILLIAMS' significant study (1985) on rMa bya Byaṅ brtson, I had no doubt as to 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa's attribution to Byaṅ brtson of theory **B1** (see below, p. 206) at that time. Nor did I express any doubt as to MATSUMOTO's identification of theory **B**, i.e. view c in the *Lam rim chen mo* (see below, p. 210), with the “theory of freedom from extremes as the middle view” (*mtha' bral la dbu ma smra ba*) propounded by Go ram pa (cf. MATSUMOTO 1989: 246f. and 1990: 34f.). Now, however, I do not think that his identification is correct. I shall briefly discuss this matter in this paper too. – My best thanks are due to Prof. David Jackson and Prof. David Seyforth Ruegg, who gave me valuable suggestions regarding both contents and English expressions.

¹ The Deb ther sñon po tells us that “rMa bya Byaṅ brtson died seventeen years after Phyā pa's death” (Deb sñon *cha* 1a6), not that “When Phyā pa was seventeen rMa-byā Byaṅ-chub brtson-'grus died” as ROERICH translated (BA 329, 4f.; indicated in KUIJP 1983: 302 n. 283). YAMAGUCHI (1982b:

shown that this attribution is not correct, through examining Byaṅ brtson's own work, the 'Thad pa'i rgyan, as well as numerous quotations of Byaṅ brtson found in later Sa skya pa's writings (WILLIAMS 1985).

Both before and after the time of Tsoṅ kha pa, what was called into question by Tibetan Mādhyamikas was first of all how to interpret the theoretical and methodological difference between the Raṅ rgyud pa (*Svātantrika) and Thal 'gyur ba (*Prāsaṅgika). Tsoṅ kha pa's interpretation of the Prāsaṅgika system occasioned a strict criticism among the later Sa skya pa masters such as Roṅ ston Śes bya kun rig (1367–1449), sTag tshaṅ lo tsā ba (1405–?), Go ram pa bSod nams seṅ ge (1429–1480) and gSer mdog paṅ chen Śākya mchog ldan (1428–1507). They received in turn a strong rejoinder from such later dGe lugs pas as Se ra rJe btsun pa Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469–1546) and 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa'i rdo rje. The arguments of both sides, Sa skya pa and dGe lugs pa, in this period can be known in detail through the actual works of the masters involved². However, it should be noted that, as WILLIAMS has discussed, the "Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka theories regarded as false by the dGe lugs pas" were also considered to be false by their opponents, the Sa skya pas. rMa bya Byaṅ brtson was actually one of the earliest Mādhyamika scholars who discussed the "false Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka theories".

In this paper I would like to attempt to identify "the Madhyamaka theories regarded as false by the dGe lugs pas" in their historical perspective through investigating the accounts in 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa's Grub mtha' chen mo as well as Tsoṅ kha pa's Lam rim chen mo and comparing them with the accounts in the writings of rMa bya Byaṅ brtson and later Sa skya pas.

I. The "False Madhyamaka Theories"

At the beginning of the Madhyamaka chapter of the Grub mtha' chen mo, 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa concentrates on refuting what he takes to be false interpretations of Madhyamaka thought, setting forth a large section called "Refutation of Erroneous [Views]" ('*khrol*

72) as well as JACKSON (1985: 29 n. 22, following Tshe tan zabs druṅ) have identified the year of rMa bya's death as 1185.

² E.g. in sTag tshaṅ pa's Grub mtha', Go ram pa's lTa ba'i śan 'byed, Se ra rJe btsun's lTa nan mun sel and 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa's Grub mtha' chen mo. Cf. also MATSUMOTO 1982a/b and TAUSCHER 1992.

ldan dgag pa), of which a great part is devoted to refuting sTag tshañ lo tsā ba, a strong opponent of Tsoñ kha pa. This section consists of two parts:

1. General refutation of the types of erroneous views (*'khrul ldan gyi dbye ba spyir dgag pa* [Grub chen K 18a4–31a6, B 14b1–24b1])
2. Specific refutation of a mass of errors (*'khrul 'du'i phuñ po bye brag tu dgag pa* [Grub chen K 31a6–102b5, B 24b1–74b3])

Section 2 deals exclusively with sTag lo's "errors" in his own Grub mtha'. Here we shall direct our attention to 1 only. 'Jam dbyaṅs bzad pa presents in this section three types of "false Madhyamaka theory" that had already existed in Tibet before Tsoñ kha pa flourished:

- (1) The theory of annihilation maintaining that nothing exists (*ci yañ med*), e.g. the *rdzogs chen* maintained by the Hva śaṅ and the *phyag rgya chen po* taught by later bKa' brgyud pas
- (2) The theory of "emptiness-of-other" (*gzan ston*) and the eternal self (*rtag bdag*), e.g. the Jo nañ pa's doctrine
- (3) The theory that the Mādhyamika admits neither the two kinds of reality (*bden gñis*) nor anything established by valid cognition (*tshad grub*), and does not maintain any doctrinal system of his own (*rañ lugs*).

He concludes that the above interpretations fall into extremes (*mthar lhuñ*) and that their advocates can never be Mādhyamikas, although they pride themselves on being Mādhyamikas (*dbu mar rlom kyañ* [Grub chen K 18a4, B 24b1 f.]).

Let us briefly survey numbers (1) and (2) first. Number (1) is explained as follows:

“(a) The teaching (*skor*) of the ‘Great Perfection’ (*rdzogs pa chen po*) of the Chinese scholar Hva śaṅ: He asserts that with regard to the [philosophical] basis (*gzi*) [that serves as the starting point for practice], the meaning of ‘existing as conventional’ (*kun rdzob tu yod pa*) is ‘existing [only] from the aspect of an erroneous cognition’ (*blo 'khrul ba'i nor yod pa*), even though all the conventional [things] (*kun rdzob*) [in fact] are not established [as] a [real] basis (*gzi*) like the horn of a hare and a hair [erroneously seen] in space. [Regarding his doctrine of] the path [of practice] at the time of meditation (*lam sgom tshe*), he rejects all elements of discriminative understanding (*śes rab*), having thought that all activities (occurring) in the mind are the grasping of [conceptualized] characteristic (*mtshan 'dzin*), which is a work of the Evil One (*bdud las*). At the time of [non-meditative] practice (*spyod pa'i tshe*), he rejects the ten practices regarding

(Buddhist) teachings (*chos spyod bcu*) and the five *prajñāpāramitās* (*phar phyin lña*) because all of them are [just a means] for a fool who climbs up from below.

(b) [Regarding] the successors of this [*rdzogs chen* teaching], some retained the terms, meanings, acts and practices (*min don bya spyod*) [as they were originally taught by the Hva śāṅ].³

(c) Although the *phyag chen* (*mahāmudrā*) of the bKa' brgyud pa founders Mar pa and Mi la ras pa (*bka' brgyud goñ ma mar mi*) was a genuine one (*mtshan ñid pa*), from an intermediate period [after Mi la ras pa] (*bar skabs nas*) many who had learned various teachings understood (it) in the same way as Hva śāṅ's theory, thinking that the statements of the sGrub sñiñ (i.e. Saraha's Dohakoṣa) that 'Texts (*glegs bam*) whose nature is equal to clay, stone and wood should not be respected' and the explanation that one should not make any conceptual thoughts (*rnam rtog*) in meditative concentration (*mñam bzag*) of the stage of completion of the Anuttarayogatantra (*bla med rdzogs rim*) to be a method of practice for beginners who possess the highest faculties . . .'⁴

Hva śāṅ Mo ho yan is a well-known Ch'an master, who is reported to have been defeated by Kamalaśīla in the debate at bSam yas, and his teaching that "not thinking and not conceptualizing are the highest way to realization" is very often cited by the dGe lugs pas as a bad example.⁵ The question here is why 'Jam dbyaṅs bzad pa took

³ This passage probably indicates later Tibetan meditators such as of the Chinese style *rdzogs chen*.

⁴ Grub chen K 19a1–5, B 15a3–6: (a) *gzi la kun rdzob thams cad ri boñ gi rva dan rab rib kyi nam mkha'i skra śad ltar gzi cir yañ ma grub kyañ blo 'khrul pa'i nor yod pa kun rdzob tu yod pa'i don du 'dod la | lam sgom tshe yid la gañ byas thams cad mtshan 'dzin bdud las su bsams nas śes rab kyi cha kun 'gog ciñ spyod pa'i tshe chos spyod bcu dan phar phyin lña sogs thams cad blun po mas 'dzeg gi ched yin pas 'gog par byed pa'i rgya nag gi mkhan po hva śāṅ gi rdzogs pa chen po'i skor dan | (b) de'i rjes 'brañs miñ don bya spyod sor bzag byed pa 'ga' žig dan | (c) bka' brgyud goñ ma mar mi dag gi phyag chen ni mtshan ñid pa yin mod bar skabs nas chos lugs sna tshogs ñan mkhan mañ pos grub sñiñ skor nas | sa rdo śiñ gi ran bzin gyi || glegs bam dag la phyag mi bya | žes sogs dan | bla med rdzogs rim gyi mñam bzag na rnam rtog bya mi ruñ bar bsad pa rnam las dan po pa'i dbañ rnon gyi ñams len lugs yin par bsams śiñ | hva śāṅ gi lugs dan mthun par go nas | . . .² (only in B – ²The description of the view (c) of the later bKa' brgyud pa who kept Hva śāṅ's teachings with a slight change of terminologies is continued).*

⁵ In Tsoñ kha pa's *Lam rim chen mo* alone, we can see, for instance, the following mentions of the Hva śāṅ and his teaching: *bzañ rtog dan ñan rtog gañ yin kyañ 'gog na ni rgya nag gi mkhan po hva śāṅ gi gzuñ 'dzugs 'dod par gsal ba yin no ||* (LR 38a5f.); *rtog pa thams cad la skyon du blta ba'i log rtog gis chos mañ du spoñ ba rgya'i mkhan po ltar gyur pa mañ du snañ no ||* (LR

this theory to be a “false Madhyamaka theory”, although Hva śaṅ himself does not seem to have claimed to be a Mādhyamika. He was probably first revered as a Madhyamaka master by his disciples⁶. According to D. UYAMA in his study of these Ch’an masters’ teachings presented in Tunhuang documents, they tried to pretend to be Mādhyamikas by proclaiming their teacher to be a Mādhyamika and their Ch’an system consistent with Madhyamaka in order to survive after the official ban of Hva śaṅ’s teaching as a result of his defeat at bSam yas⁷.

’Jam dbyaṅs bṣad pa implies the similarity of the *phyag chen* teaching of the late bKa’ brgyud pa to the Hva śaṅ’s theory too. He means that the original *phyag chen* of Mar pa and Mi la ras pa was a genuine one (*mtshan ṅid pa*), whereas the later interpreters introduced questionable doctrines similar to the *rdzogs chen*. It is interesting to note that ’Jam dbyaṅs bṣad pa adduces Sa skya Paṇḍita (1182–1251)’s statement from his sDom gsum rab dbye that there is no difference on meaning between the modern *phyag chen* and the *rdzogs chen* of the Chinese (Ch’an) system⁸. Those who are criticized by ’Jam dbyaṅs bṣad pa here are supposed to have been sGam po pa (1079–1153), Raṅ byuṅ rdo rje (1284–1338) and their adherents: sGam po pa *alias* Dwags po lha rje is said to have claimed to be a Mādhyamika and to have integrated Atiśa’s Lam rim teaching with

424b5f.); *gal te gaṅ du rtog kyaṅ rtog pa de thams cad kyis ’khor bar ’chiṅ bas tsom ’jog gi mi rtog par ’jog pa grol byed kyi lam mo sṅam na | ’di ni sṅar maṅ du bkag zin la | de lta na hva śaṅ gi lugs la yaṅ skyon ’dogs rgyu cuṅ zad kyaṅ med par ’gyur te |* (LR 467b3f.); *hva śaṅ ’dod pa ltar sems ’phro ba bsdus pa’i yod la byed pa spaṅs pa tsam gyis mtshan med dam mi rtog par ’jug pa mi srid par gsal bar bstan no ||* (LR 475a6f.).

⁶ Hva śaṅ is revered as a Madhyamaka master (*dbu ma’i don gyi mkhan po*) in a document from Tunhuang entitled “dBu ma’i don gyi mkhan po theg pa chen po la chos kyi don daṅ rgyu dris pa’i lan daṅ gzuṅ du bris pa” (Pelliot tib. 829). This text as well as some other documents of Ch’an teachings from Tunhuang present a Ch’an system in which Madhyamaka theory and Ch’an practice are integrated; cf. e.g. KIMURA 1980: 456, UYAMA 1986: 32, 36 and RUEGG 1989: 84.

⁷ Cf. UYAMA 1986: 48.

⁸ Grub chen K 18b6–19a1, B 15a2f.: *da lta’i phyag rgya chen po daṅ || rgya nag lugs kyi rdzogs chen la || yas babs daṅ ni mas ’dzeg gñis || rim gyis pa daṅ cig car bar || min ’dogs bsgyur ba ma gtogs par || don la rnam par dbye ba med ||* Sa skya Paṇḍita’s criticism of the *phyag chen* of the later bKa’ brgyud pa by regarding it as the same thought as Hva śaṅ’s has been extensively discussed in JACKSON 1982, KUIJP 1986, BROIDO 1987, RUEGG 1989: 101–110 and JACKSON 1990. RUEGG has indicated that Sa skya Paṇḍita’s criticism fits more the teaching of Žaṅ Tshal pa brTson ’grus grags pa (1123–1193) than that of sGam po pa (1989: 102–109).

the *phyag chen* of Mi la ras pa in his Lam rim thar rgyan⁹. Rañ byuñ rdo rje is said to have propounded the “Great Madhyamaka” (*dbu ma chen po*), identifying it with the *phyag chen* as well as *rdzogs chen* teachings¹⁰.

‘Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa makes an effort to prove that these *rdzogs chen* and *phyag chen* teachings are not to be identified with the tantric teachings since from the standpoint of the dGe lugs pa the teaching of the Anuttarayogatantras must accord in essence with that of the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika¹¹. He cites many statements that seem to be contrary to the *rdzogs chen* and *phyag chen* teachings from tantric scriptures such as the Dohākoṣa and Guhyasamājatantra, in order to show the misuse or misinterpretation of these texts by the opponents.

(2) The theory of “emptiness-of-other”. Obviously the Jo nañ pa is a representative of this view. ‘Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa explains:

“The omniscient great Jo nañ pa (*kun mkhyen jo nañ pa chen po*, i.e. Dol bu pa [1292–1361]) takes the ten *sūtras* of essence (*sñiñ po’i mdo bcu*)¹², the rGyud bla ma (i.e. the Ratnagotravibhāga) and the Dus ’khor (i.e. the Kālacakratantra) as [representing] the real intention (*dgoṅs pa*) [of the Buddha]. And he [accordingly] asserts that the way of the “emptiness” in accord with the gNod ’joms (Bṛhaṭṭika) that the perfect ([nature] *yoṅs grub*) is not (identifiable with) the (other) two (natures) – dependent (*gžan dbaṅ*) and conceptualized (*kun bṛtags*) – is the supreme emptiness of all kinds [of emptiness taught] in the Dus ’khor etc., because [he thinks] that the ‘emptiness of self’ (*rañ stoñ*) [which is an emptiness in the sense that] (visual) matter

⁹ Cf. Śel gyi me loñ (bKa’ brgyud) 6a3f. (indicated in TACHIKAWA 1982: 104): ... *bka’ gdams kyi lam rim dan mid la’i phyag chen gyi gdams pa gcig tu hril nas lam rim thar rgyan mdzad* |.

¹⁰ Cf. Phyag chen smon 19ab: *yid byed bral bas ’di ni phyag rgya che || mtha’ dan bral ba dbu ma chen po yin || ’di ni kun ’dus rdzogs chen zes kyañ bya || gcig šes kun don rtogs pa’i gdeñ thob śog ||* (TACHIKAWA 1987: 99 n. 17; 1989: 183f.).

¹¹ I have discussed this standpoint of the dGe lugs pa based on Tsoñ kha pa’s commentary on the Pañcakrama by tantric Nāgārjuna; see YOSHIMIZU 1989: 14–17. Also in the bKa’ brgyud pa tradition, there was a non-Tantric *phyag chen* teaching; s. RUEGG 1988.

¹² (1) Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, (2) Ārya-Dhāraṇīśvararājaparipṛcchāsūtra, (3) Mahāparinirvānasūtra, (4) Aṅgulimālīyasūtra, (5) Śrīmāladevīsiṃhanādasūtra, (6) Jñānālokālaṃkārasūtra, (7) Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśasūtra, (8) Mahābherīhāraśūtra, (9) Nirvikalpapraveśadhāraṇī, and (10) Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, enumerated in Guñ thañ dKon mchog bstan pa’i sgron me (1762–1823)’s commentary on the Legs bsad sñiñ po (Drañ nes dka’ grel 708.5ff.); cf. HAKAMAYA 1992: 71.

lacks the (visual) matter (itself) if the (visual) matter is examined by [right reasoning] that examines ultimate reality, is an emptiness (in the sense of) annihilation (*chad ston*) as explained in the Dus 'khor, and that the 'emptiness of reality of own nature' (*ran gi no bo bden ston*) regarding every thing is accordingly the same as it (i.e. the 'emptiness of self').¹³

With regard to the *tathāgatagarbha* theory and the Jo nañ pa, extensive studies by modern scholars are available¹⁴. 'Jam dbyaṅs bzad pa here mentions the names of masters such as Śākya mchog ldan and Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507–1554) as advocates of this theory, and Paṇ chen rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, Bu ston (1290–1364) and Red mda' ba (1349–1412) as its critics¹⁵.

As can be seen in the fact that Mi bskyod rdo rje represented the theory of "emptiness-of-other", terming it *dbu ma gžan ston* in his dBu ma gžan ston, theory (2) was accepted as a Madhyamaka theory by some later masters. UHEYAMA (1986: 32 and 40) indicates that the Ch'an masters after Hwa śaṅ introduced the idea of *dharmadhātu*, i.e. the *tathāgatagarbha* theory, into their system too. In short, it may be said that the *rdzogs chen* and *phyag chen* teachings in Tibet – theory (1) – was closely linked to theory (2).

II. The "False Interpretations" of the Theory of the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika

Expounded in the Grub mtha' chen mo and the Lam rim chen mo

Theory (3) includes several interpretations of the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika position regarded as false by the dGe lugs pas. It is classified by 'Jam byaṅs bzad pa as follows:

(A) The theory that the Prāsaṅgika does not admit any existence even conventionally – (A1) Thaṅ sag pa etc. assert: While the Svātantrika applies the qualification "ultimately" (i.e. in ultimate

¹³ *kun mkhyen jo nañ pa chen pos sñiñ po'i mdo bcu dañ rgyud bla ma dañ dus 'khor dgoṅs par byas nas gzugs don dam dpyod byed kyis dpyad tshe gzugs gzugs kyis ston pa rañ ston dañ de dus 'khor nas bsad pa'i chad ston yin la des na chos gañ yañ rañ gi no bo bden ston yañ de dañ 'dra bas ston tshul gnod 'joms ltar yoṅs grub ni gžan dbaṅ kun btags gñis ma yin pa'i tshul gyi ston pa de dus 'khor sogs kyī rnam kun mchog ldan gyi ston par 'dod la |* (Grub chen K 26a5–26b1, B 20b4f.). As to the gNod 'joms (Brhaṭṭikā) ascribed to Daṃṣṭrāsena, see RUEGG 1969: 61, 325 and 343f.

¹⁴ E.g. RUEGG 1963, 1969, 1973; SHIMODA 1986; YAMAGUCHI 1982a, 1988: 257–263, 1989: 86–93; and HAKAMAYA 1989b, 1992.

¹⁵ Grub chen K 26b3–27a6, B 20b7–21b1. According to RUEGG (1988: 1275) Mi bskyod rdo rje, who had represented the *gžan ston* theory early in his life, has latter followed the *rañ ston* theory.

reality [*don dam par*]) to the negation of all things, the Prāsaṅgika states that all things exist neither ultimately (*don dam par*) nor conventionally (*tha sñad du*). This view is refuted in the Lam rim chen mo.¹⁶ (A2) Some great Buddhist masters (*bstan 'dzin chen po la la*) assert: Ultimate reality is not cognizable.¹⁷ (A3) Some successors of Than sag pa assert: The two kinds of reality (*bden gñis*) cannot be admitted as existent, even though they conventionally exist, since any conventional existence, which is just conceptualized, does not count as a real existence.¹⁸

(B) The theory that the Prāsaṅgika has neither thesis nor doctrinal system of his own and that there exists nothing established by valid cognition – (B1) Byaṅ brtson, rGya dmar etc. assert on the authority of VV 29: The Mādhyamika has neither thesis (*dam bca' = pratijñā*), nor philosophical position (*phyogs = pakṣa*) of his own, nor valid cognition (*tshad ma = pramāṇa*) for proving it; without applying any autonomous (*rañ rgyud = svatantra*) reasoning, he negates others' views through *prasaṅga* by revealing contradictory consequences in their assertions.¹⁹ (B2) Someone asserts, as mentioned in the Lam rim chen mo: The Mādhyamika has no doctrinal system of his own (*rañ*

¹⁶ See Grub chen K 29a4f., B 22b6f.: *yañ thañ sag pa sogs kyis lam rim las dgag bya khyab ches pa bkag pa'i skabs ltar chos thams cad don dam par ma grub ces don dam gyi khyad par sbyor ba rañ rgyud pa'i lugs te | de mi 'thad par bsad pa tha sñad du yañ thams cad med par 'dod pa dañ |*.

¹⁷ See Grub chen K 29a5f., B 22b7f.: *bstan 'dzin chen po la las don dam bden pa yod na rigs ses kyī rñed don dañ | de yin na dpyad bzod du 'gyur sñam nas don dam bden pa ses byar mi 'dod pa dañ |*.

¹⁸ See Grub chen K 29a6f., B 23a1f.: *yañ thañ sag pa'i rjes 'brañ kha cig gis rtog ñor yod pa dañ tha sñad du yod pa don gcig par bsams nas bden gñis tha sñad du yod kyañ des yod go mi chod pas yod par mi 'dod pa*.

¹⁹ See Grub chen K 30a2ff., B 23b1ff.: *yañ byaṅ brtson dañ khañs gñan gañs rgya dmar¹ sogs dbu ma rtsa 'grel la phyogs rgyugs byed pa dag² na re | rtsod zlog las | gal te ñas dam beas 'ga' yod || des na ña la skyon de yod || ña la dam bca' med pas na || ña ni skyon med kho na yin ||³ zes gsuñs pas⁴ dbu ma pa la rañ phyogs khas blañs rgyu'i lta ba ci yañ med ciñ | de ñid kyis sgrub par byed pa'i tshad ma yañ med la gžan gcig tu yod med kyī⁵ mtha' thams cad nañ 'gal thal 'gyur gyis 'gog pa yin zes smra tshul tshig gsal⁶ gyi bsad pa mañ po dañ dbu ma'i ston thun dag' las bsad pa ltar ro ||* ('B sa gñan gañs rgya dmar – ²dbu ma rtsa 'grel la phyogs rgyugs byed pa dag seems to mean "those who give a partial interpretation to the basic text [= the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā] and the explication of the Madhyamaka". RUEGG [1983: 230] gives *phyogs bed pa* instead, and translates this phrase "rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus – who had only a partial familiarity with the basic text and the explication of the Madhyamaka"; WILLIAMS [1985: 206] translates the same phrase by "insufficient knowledge of the root-text and commentary on the Madhyamaka" – ³VV 29 – ⁴B gsuñs – ⁵B yod med kyis – ⁶the PP – ⁷It is the text ascribed to rMa bya Byaṅ brtson; see KUIJP 1983: 300 n. 268 and WILLIAMS 1985: 207).

lugs = *svamata*).²⁰ (B3) Someone asserts, as mentioned in the *Lam rim chen mo*: There exists nothing established by valid cognition.²¹ (B4) Those who follow the Tarkamudgara assert: Neither designation nor meaning (*miñ don*) of valid cognition is to be admitted.²²

As 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa himself states that theories A1, B2 and B3 are explained in the *Lam rim chen mo*, it is evident that these descriptions are partly due to Tsoñ kha pa's discussions.

Theory A1 (ascribed to Thaṅ sag pa) is that which was rejected in the section called "Refutation of an ascertainment of an object of negation that is too broad" (*dgag bya ños 'dzin ha cañ khyab ches pa dgag pa*) of the *Lam rim chen mo* (LR 347a6–386a6). This is regarded as too broad because it results in the negation of causal relations even as convention by a reasoning that negates origination (*skye ba*) in ultimate reality. Tsoñ kha pa attributes this view²³ to his contemporaries, saying "[this is the opinion of] the majority of those claiming at present to expound the meaning of the Madhyamaka" (*da lta dbu ma'i don smra bar 'dod pa phal mo che* [LR 347a6f.]). According to them, he says, one should consequently negate also that origination is conventionally established by valid cognition (*tshad ma*)²⁴. Therefore it can be understood that theory A concurs with B.

²⁰ See Grub chen K 30a4f., B 23b3: *bar skabs kyi rañ lugs med par 'dod pa lam rim las bśad pa*. The expression *bar skabs* may indicate that this assertion appeared at an interval of some centuries after Byaṅs brtson and rGya dmar since it corresponds to the view of Tsoñ kha pa's contemporaries described in the *Lam rim chen mo* (view c) as will be seen later.

²¹ See Grub chen K 30a5, B 23b3f.: *bar skabs kyi rañ lugs med par 'dod pa lam rim las bśad pa dan' tshad grub med par 'dod pa yañ* ('K om.; I took this assertion B3 separate from B2 according to the reading of Grub chen B).

²² See Grub chen K 30a5, B 23b4: *rtog ge tho ba rtsa 'grel la brten nas tshad ma'i miñ don sogs gañ yañ mi 'thad par 'dod pa*. 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa admits both designation (*tha sñad*) and meaning (*don*) of *tshad ma* in his *Tshig gsal ston thun* (2b5).

²³ Described by him as follows: *skye ba la sogs pa de kho na ñid du grub ma grub dpyod pa'i rigs pas ni gzugs nas rnām mkhyen gyi bar gyi chos thams cad khegs pa yin te | ... gal te skye ba sogs 'dod na de la de ñid dpyod pa'i rigs pas dpyad bzod dam mi bzod | bzod na ni rigs pas dpyad bzod kyi dños po yod pas bden dños su 'gyur ro || dpyad mi bzod na ni rigs pas khegs pa'i don yod pa ji ltar 'thad | ... gal te skye ba khas len na don dam par mi 'dod pas kun rdzob tu 'dod dgos na de ni mi rigs te ... de'i phyir skye ba 'gog pa la don dam pa'i khyad par yañ sbyar bar mi bya ste | ...* (LR 347b1–348a5, discussed in MATSUMOTO 1989: 239–241 = 1990: 28f. and NAPPER 1989: 101–122).

²⁴ *de bžin du skye ba la sogs pa yod par 'dod na tshad mas grub bam ma grub | dan po ltar na de kho na ñid gzigs pa'i ye śes kyis ni skye ba med par gzigs pas des grub par mi 'thad la | tha sñad du mig gi śes pa la sogs pas grub par 'dod na ni de dag tshad ma yin pa bkag pa'i phyir | de dag sgrub byed kyi tshad mar mi 'thad de ...* (LR 347b5f.).

B was also rejected by Tsoñ kha pa, when he refuted the following four interpretations of *prasāṅga* method (LR 404b3–419a1):

“(a) Jayānanda seems to assert: if one sets forth [a reasoning] through a logical reason (*rtaḡs* = *līṅga*) of which the three characteristics (*tshul gsum* = *trirūpa*) are established by valid cognition (*tshad ma* = *pramāṇa*), it is an autonomous (*rañ brgyud* = *svatantra*) [reasoning]; if one sets forth [a reasoning] only through [a logical reason of which] the three characteristics are [established] in consequence of [worldly] acceptance (*khas blaṅs kyi mthar thug pa*), it is a *prasāṅga*.²⁵

“(b) A translator who was a disciple of Jayānanda and others seem to assert: [The Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika] has no philosophical position (*phyogs* = *pakṣa*) of his own to be proven, but only negates others’ positions (*gžan phyogs*); he has an opinion (*’dod pa*), but no thesis [of his own] (*dam bca’* = *pratijñā*). That he has no position of his own (*rañ phyogs*) refers, moreover, to his setting forth no thesis such as ‘[things are] non-substantial’ (*rañ bžin med pa*) when investigating ultimate reality (*don dam bden pa*); but he does not maintain that every assertion (*khas len* = *abhyupagama*) does not exist. Therefore, when investigating ultimate reality it is a Svātantrika who admits such [a thesis] to be proven as ‘[things are] non-substantial’ and proves it as his own system, whereas it is a Prāsaṅgika who only negates others’ assertions without admitting [any thesis].²⁶

“(c) Those who claim at present to be Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika [assert]: There is no assertion (*khas len*) with regard to either ultimate [reality] or conventional [reality] even as convention (*tha sñad du yañ*) in our own system. If there were any such thesis (*dam bca’*), it would be necessary to also admit the example and logical reason for proving it. Then, we would become Svātantrika. Therefore the Prāsaṅgika has no system of his own.²⁷

²⁵ *dis ni tshul gsum tshad mas grub pa’i rtaḡs kyis byed na rañ rgyud dan tshul gsum khas blaṅs kyi mthar thug pa tsam gyis byed na thal ’gyur du ’dod par snañ ño* || (LR 405b6f.). As to the whole explanation of the theory, see LR 404b5–406a1. Tsoñ kha pa presents it with a citation of Jayānanda’s own statements from the *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā*; cf. RUEGG 1983: 228.

²⁶ *’dis ni rañ la phyogs bsgrub rgyu med kyañ gžan phyogs ’gog pa tsam dan ’dod pa yod kyañ dam bca’ med pa dan rañ phyogs med pa yañ don dam pa la dpyod pa’i skabs su rañ bžin med pa la sogs pa’i dam bca’ mi ’jog pa la byed kyi khas len gañ yin thams cad med par ni mi ’dod pas don dam pa la dpyod pa’i skabs su rañ bžin med pa’i bsgrub bya khas blaṅs nas de rañ lugs su bsgrub pa ni rañ rgyud pa dan de ltar khas mi len par gžan gyi ’dod pa ’gog pa tsam byed pa ni thal ’gyur bar byed par snañ ño* || (LR 406b6ff.) As to the whole explanation of the theory, see LR 406a1–407a2; cf. RUEGG 1983: 228.

²⁷ *da lta dbu ma thal ’gyur bar ’dod pa dag ni don dam pa dan tha sñad pa gan la brtsams pa’i khas len ni tha sñad du yañ rañ lugs la med de gal te de ’dra*

“(d) Some early Tibetan Mādhyamika scholars in Tibet who followed Candrakīrti refute such assertions as that the Mādhyamika has neither philosophical position of his own system nor valid cognition to prove it. Their own system is [as follows]: [The Mādhyamika] refutes both perception and inference that are objectively gained (*dños po stobs žugs* = *vastubalapraṇṛtta*) valid cognition, [which is consisting in the system where] one accepts the establishment of valid cognition and its object (*gžal bya* = *prameya*) as real existence (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis*) that has been investigated by right reasoning (*rigs pa*). Then he accepts on the conventional level valid cognition and its object that have not been investigated [by right reasoning] and that are acknowledged in the world (*’jig rten grags pa*).²⁸”

The idea of **c** corresponds to **B** in the Grub mtha’ chen mo that the Mādhyamika even conventionally has neither a thesis of his own nor a valid cognition to prove it. View **b**, which partly corresponds to **B**, rejects a thesis and valid cognition only for investigating ultimate reality (*don dam bden pa*), whereas **c** rejects them even for investigating conventional reality. In this manner, the “false interpretations” of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka represented as **A** and **B** are in fact outlined and criticized in the Lam rim chen mo.

Tsoñ kha pa’s attribution of **a** to Jayānanda, based on the latter’s own statement, is acceptable. Concerning **b**, ’Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa in his note to the Lam rim chen mo (LRmchan 237a4) comments on the very same lines of Tsoñ kha pa that “a translator who was a disciple of Jayānanda” is identical with Khu lo tsā ba mDo sde ’bar (*alias* mDo sde dpal [11th c.])²⁹. This is also probably right since the same view is ascribed to him by Go ram pa in his dBu ma’i spyi ston³⁰.

ba’i dam bca’ yod na de sgrub byed kyi dpe dañ rtags kyañ ’dod dgos la de lta na rañ rgyud par ’gyur ro || des na thal ’gyur ba la rañ lugs gañ yañ med de | (LR 407a2ff.). As to the whole explanation of the theory, see LR 407a2–407b6. This is discussed in MATSUMOTO 1989: 246ff. = 1990: 34ff.

²⁸ *sñon gyi dbu ma pa slob dpon zla ba’i rjes su ’brañ ba’i bod kyi mkhas pa kha cig ni de ltar dbu ma pa la rañ lugs kyi phyogs dañ de dag sgrub byed kyi tshad ma med par ’dod pa’i lugs rnam legs par sun phyuñ nas rañ gi lugs ni | rigs pas rnam par dpyad pa’i rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis gžal bya dañ tshad ma’i rnam gžag khas len pa’i dños po stobs žugs kyi tshad ma mñon rjes gñis ka bkag nas tha sñad du ma dpyad pa’i ’jig rten grags pa’i tshad ma dañ gžal bya khas blañs nas ... ||* (LR 407b6–408a3); cf. RUEGG 1983: 229.

²⁹ It is indicated in RUEGG 1983: 228, 229 n. 65.

³⁰ dBu ma’i spyi ston 98a6–99a4: *sñon gyi thal ’gyur ba chen po khu lo tsā ba mdo sde dpal gyis bžed pa ni dbu ma pa la rañ ’dod kyi dam bca’ med ces pa ’aṅ don dam bden pa las brtsams te rañ bžin med pa ’am skye ba med pa la sogs pa’i dam bca’ cir yañ khas mi len pa yin gyi spyir rañ ’dod kyi dam bca’ med pa*

Furthermore, it has been attested by WILLIAMS that **d** is rMa bya Byañ brtson's own view, as 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa himself has indicated correctly in his note on the LR (LRmchan 240b5), and that **B1** is his *pūrvapakṣa* refuted in the 'Thad pa'i rgyan³¹. Accordingly, **B1** is wrongly ascribed to rMa bya Byañ brtson by 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa in the Grub mtha' chen mo³². WILLIAMS (1985: 211f.) has suggested that **B1** is in reality the view of rMa bya Byañ chub ye śes, who was one of the four great sons of Pa tshab Ņi ma grags (1055-? [Deb sñon cha 8a2, BA 343]), based on Go ram pa's attribution to rMa bya Byañ ye of the *pūrvapakṣa* refuted in the 'Thad pa'i rgyan that the Mādhyamika does not even have a thesis for negation (*dgag pa'i dam bca'*)³³. The attribution of **A** and **B1** to the lineage of Thaṅ sag monastery and rGya dmar respectively also remains questionable: Žan Thaṅ sag pa Ye śes 'byun gnas (11th c.), who was also one of the four great disciples of sPa tshab as well as a great contributor to the development of Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka³⁴, is mentioned by Roṅ

ma yin te | tha sñad kyī de kho na dpyod pa'i tshe raṅ 'dod kyī dam bca' yod pas so ||. Go ram pa's refutation of this view is slightly different from that of Tson kha pa; cf. dBu ma'i spyi ston 103b5 and LR 409a2–410a2.

³¹ 'Thad pa'i rgyan 21a6–b5. This *pūrvapakṣa* is verbally almost identical with **B1**; both quote VV 29: *yadī kā cana pratīñā, syān me tata eṣa me bhaved doṣaḥ | nāsti ca mama pratīñā, tasmān naivāsti me doṣaḥ ||* (JOHNSTON – KUNST 61: *gal te nas dam bcas 'ga' yod || des na ṅa la skyon de yod || ṅa la dam bca' med pas na || ṅa ni skyon med kho na yin ||* [D 28a1, P 32a1 f.]). WILLIAMS (1985: 208) has suggested that 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa is presumably quoting this account directly from Byañ brtson, either from his commentary on PP, the dBu ma'i ston thun, or from the 'Thad pa'i rgyan.

³² According to WILLIAMS this erroneous attribution of **B1** to rMa bya Byañ brtson may have been intentional, in other words, 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa may have intended to discredit Byañ brtson, for whom the later Sa skya pas seem to have had great esteem. Although I am also inclined to suppose that 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa's attributions were based on some specific intention, I can hardly believe that it indeed brought discredit on the Sa skya pa, for Byañ brtson's argument against **B1** seems to have been very familiar to that of the later Sa skya pa masters.

³³ 'Thad pa'i rgyan 24b5: *yaṅ kha cig rnam bcad dgag pa'i dam bca' yaṅ pha rol gyi loq rtog dgag par 'dod nas de'i nor byas pa yin gyi | dbu ma pa raṅ la dgag pa'i dam bca' tsam yaṅ med do žes zer ro ||*; cf. Yaṅ dag 'od zer 14b4f.

³⁴ Cf. Deb sñon cha 8a2f., BA 343f. According to gŽon nu dpal (1392–1481), “Žan Thaṅ sag pa founded Thaṅ sag monastery and lectured extensively on the Madhyamaka system; he composed commentaries on the Madhyamakāvatāra, Yuktīśaṣṭikā, Catuḥśataka, Ratnāvalī and other texts. Owing to him, the teaching of the Madhyamaka has continued uninterruptedly up to the present [i.e. at the time of gŽon nu dpal] at Thaṅ sag; [this teaching] spread through many excellent scholars from dBus and gTsaṅ, which is of great benefit for the Madhyamaka” (Deb sñon cha 8a5–7, BA 343f.: *žaṅ thaṅ*

ston and Go ram pa, according to whom he does not seem to have had such a nihilistic view as **A** or **B**³⁵. rGya mar pa Byañ chub grags *alias* sTod luñs rGya mar ba (12th c.) rather seems to have been a Svātantrika master³⁶.

sag pas ni | thañ sag btab nas dbu ma'i chad ñan legs par mdzad de | khog gis mdzad pa'i 'jug pa'i tī ka | rigs pa drug bcu pa'i tī ka | rin chen phreñ ba'i tī ka rnam mthoñ ste | de dag las gžan pa yan mdzad pa 'dra'o || thañ sag tu ni diñ sañ gi bar du khoñ la brten nas dbu ma'i bsad pa rgyun ma chad par byuñ || dbus gtsañ gi dge bśes bzañ po mañ pos kyañ dar gtugs te | dbu ma la phan pa che'o ||). The Deb ther sñon po further enumerates ten names of Thañ sag pa's successors (Deb sñon *cha* 8a7–8b3). They are said to have held the PP and the Madhyamakāvatāra as most authoritative (Deb sñon *cha* 8b3).

³⁵ Cf. Rigs lam kun gsal 11b4, where Žañ Thañ sag pa is said to have admitted that there are right reasonings to investigate ultimate and conventional realities respectively (*kun rdzob dañ don dam dpyad gžir bzuñ nas de la dpyad pa'i rigs pa la 'dod do*); dBu ma'i spyi ston 105a1, where Žañ Thañ sag pa's statement is cited that "there is no contradiction if one applies an autonomous reasoning since it is not the case to investigate ultimate reality" (*don dam dpyod pa'i skabs min pas || rañ rgyud byas kyañ 'gal ba med ||*). – As known from the Deb ther sñon po, the Thañ sag monastery was one of the centres of Madhyamaka study in the 15th century. Roñ ston Śes bya kun rig learned Madhyamaka from gŽon nu rgyal mtshan there (cf. JACKSON 1988: iii) and admired Thañ sag pa calling him "a new Candrakīrti" (*zla grags gsar ma*) in the colophon of his Rigs lam kun gsal (68b5). Within the dGe lugs pas, however, the tradition of Thañ sag monastery does not seem to have been so highly esteemed. Thu'u bkwan Blo bzañ chos kyi ñi ma (1737–1802) has written: "It is owing to Red mda' ba that at present everybody, sage and fool, says 'dBu ma, dBu ma' [i.e. the Madhyamaka is very popular]; before [Red mda' ba] had had been nothing other than a corpse of dBu ma in Thañ sag" (*deñ sañ mkhas rmoñs kun kha dbu ma sna dbu ma zer ba 'di red mda' ba'i drin yin | de'i goñ thañ sag na dbu ma śi ro gcig las gžan med zer ||* [Śel gyi me loñ, Sa skya pa 10a5]).

³⁶ rGya dmar seems to have belonged to the intellectual lineage of rÑog Blo ldan śes rab (1059–1109) because the teachers of rGya dmar such as Gañs po Śe'u Blo grus byañ chub and 'Khyuñ Rin chen grags pa (Deb sñon *cha* 3a7, BA 332) are placed among the disciples of rÑog (Deb sñon *cha* 38a2f., BA 326). The famous Phya pa Chos kyi señ ge (1108–1169) learned from rGya dmar, and rGya dmar himself composed many commentaries on and summaries of the Pramānaviniścaya, Satyadvayavibhaṅga, etc. (Deb sñon *ca* 3b1f., BA 332). Besides, the Deb ther sñon po tells us that Karma pa Dus gsum mkhyen pa (1110–1193), a disciple of sGam po pa, learned the (five) teachings of Maitreya (*byams chos*, i.e. the Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra, the Madhyantavibhāga, the Ratnagotravibhāga, the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga and the Abhisamayālamkāra) and the three eastern Madhyamakaprajñāpāramitā teachings (*dbu ma śer* [= *śar*] *gsum*, i.e. the Satyadvayavibhaṅga of Jñānagarbha, the Madhyamakālamkāra of Śāntarakṣita and the Madhyamakāloka of Kamalaśīla) from dGya dmar and Phya pa (Deb sñon *na* 32a7–32b1, BA 475). Thus he was rather a Rañ rgyud pa master. In Śākya mchog ldan's dBu ma'i byuñ tshul, his name appears after Khyuñ rin chen grags in the

that of the Kashmirian Jayānanda, who is the author of the *Madhyamakāvātārāṭīkā* as well as of the *Tarkamudgara*. In fact, rMa bya Byaṅ brtson had a close relation to Jayānanda as well as to Khu lo tsā ba mDo sde 'bar³⁸. The *Tarkamudgara*, a short work consisting of 20 verses, definitely expresses an opposition to the logicians following Dharmakīrti who assert that ultimate reality is possible to be understood by means of objectively gained (*yl dños stobs kyis žugs pa* = *viśayavastubalapravṛtta*) valid cognition (st. 1). rMa bya Byaṅ brtson as well has negated such a valid cognition in his 'Thad pa'i rgyan (21a4ff.). He, however, negates **B** too (ib. 21a6ff.) and concludes that "the Mādhyamika conventionally understands objects of positive proof as well as of negation (*dgag sgrub kyī don*) by means of the four kinds of valid cognition acknowledged in the world (*'jig rten la grags pa'i tshad ma*), viz. perception, inference, authoritative statement and comparison; the Mādhyamika has no thesis in ultimate reality, but conventionally sets forth a thesis for negating [others' positions] in the case of [investigating ultimate reality] and a thesis for positively proving [conventional reality] in general"³⁹. This conclusion

Tson kha pa – ... (Gaṅga'i chu rgyun 25b6–26a5; JACKSON 1985: 31 n. 33). Tson kha pa has recorded in his own gSan yig the lineages for the study of Nāgārjuna's works that also came down from Pa tshab through rMa bya Byaṅ ye and rMa bya Byaṅ brtson (gSan yig 30b3–31a1; JACKSON 1985: 31 n. 33). The name of Red mda' ba, however, never occurs there. Śākya mchog ldan has enumerated rMa bya Byaṅ brtson and Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa among the four direct disciples of Pa tshab (dBu ma'i byuñ tshul 13a5ff.).

³⁸ The Deb ther sñon po tells us that rMa bya Byaṅ brtson was a disciple of not only Phya pa Chos kyī seṅ ge (1109–1169), but also of Pa tshab, Khu lo tsā ba and Jayānanda (Deb sñon *cha* 8a3f., BA 343). He is reported to have composed a commentary on the *Tarkamudgara* besides many other commentaries on and summaries of the Madhyamaka teaching (Deb sñon *cha* 8a4f., BA 343); he relied more upon the theory of Jayānanda, i.e. of the Prāsāngika, than that of his teacher Phya pa, i.e. of the Svātantrika, as did his colleague gTsañ nag pa (Deb sñon *cha* 4a6f., BA 334). The *Tarkamudgara*, which is found in verse form in the Tibetan canon (D 3869, P 5270), was translated by Jayānanda himself in collaboration with Khu lo tsā ba. Both masters as well as Pa tshab also cooperated in translating the *Mahāyānasūtrasamuccaya* (D 3961, P 8358) ascribed to Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (Atiśa [Deb sñon *ca* 15a3f., BA 272]).

³⁹ 'Thad pa'i rgyan 21b5ff.: *de ltar dños po stobs žugs kyī tshad ma kun rdzob tu 'aṅ mi 'thad ciñ | pha rol 'am 'jig rten la grags pa'i tshad ma tsam las ma blaṅs na kun rdzob tsam du dgag sgrub kyī rnam gžag gaṅ yaṅ mi 'grub pas | mñon sum daṅ | rjes su dpag pa daṅ | luṅ daṅ | ñer 'jal ba žes bya ba 'jig rten la grags pa'i tshad ma bzis tha sñad tsam du phyogs gñis dgag sgrub kyī don rtogs par rnam par 'jog pa yin no ||*; ib. 25a2f.: *dbu ma pa'i tshul la don dam par dgag sgrub kyī dam bca' gaṅ yaṅ med mod kyī | kho bo cag gis kyaṅ don dam par dgag*

seems to be more positive for logical method than view **b** ascribed to Khu lo tsā ba in the Lam rim chen mo.

Thus considered, 'Jam dbyaṅs bṣad pa's attribution of the "false interpretations" of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka theory to the early Madhyamaka masters related to Pa tshab and Jayānanda is by no means reliable. One may even suspect him of having intentionally discredited them, as WILLIAMS has suggested (see n. 32). It is at least proper to understand that at the time of 'Jam dbyaṅs bṣad pa these masters were not highly respected by the dGe lugs pas⁴⁰. Tsoṅ kha pa, on the other hand, has attributed both theories **A** and **B** to his contemporaries, whose names are however not specified⁴¹. One

sgrub kyi dam bca' gaṅ yaṅ byas pa med la | kun rdzob tsaṃ du 'dir skabs su bab pa rnam bcaḍ dgag pa'i dam bca' tsaṃ daṅ | spyir yoṅs gcod bsgrub pa'i dam bca' yaṅ byas mod kyi |

⁴⁰ Within the Sa skya pa, on the other hand, these masters have been regarded as advocates of the "theory of freedom of extremes as the middle view" (*mtha' bral la dbu mar smra ba*), which is presented by Go ram pa as a rightful interpretation of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka theory. According to him, rNog Blo Idan śes rab, Mar pa, Mi la ras pa, Pa tshab Ṇi ma grags, Than sag pa, rMa bya Byaṅ brtson as well as the Sa skya pa masters up to Red mda' ba belonged to the tradition of this theory (lTa ba'i śan 'byed 2b3 and 5a4ff., indicated in MATSUMOTO 1982b: 164, 1989: 233 and 1990: 24). In this regard, it should be noted that 'Jam dbyaṅs bṣad pa does not include Pa tshab Ṇi ma grags in the advocates of the "false Madhyamaka theories". On the contrary, he defends Pa tshab's position by expressly remarking that the opinion of Pa tshab is not the same as Than sag pa etc. (Grub chen K 30a1, B 23a7, indicated in RUEGG 1983: 228).

⁴¹ It is known that Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507–1554) maintained **B** as well and admired the four great sons of Pa tshab and their followers such as Red mda' ba (Dwags brgyud 75af., indicated in WILLIAMS 1983: 126 and 1985: 212, 222 n. 23f.). Red mda' ba is particularly approved of by Mi bskyod rdo rje. This important teacher of Tsoṅ kha pa claims with a quote of VV 29 in his dBu 'jug 'grel chen that the Mādhyamika has no philosophical position (*phyogs*), therefore he is never disproved by others, and that the theses that refute four kinds of origination [propounded at the beginning of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā by Nāgārjuna] are theses solely for opponents who propound any of the four kinds of origination, but they are not the system (*raṅ lugs*) of the Mādhyamika (dBu 'jug 'grel chen 44b6ff.: *dbu ma pa la ni phyogs gaṅ yaṅ med pa'i phyir gzan gyis ci 'aṅ brgal du med pa yin no || ... 'di dag ni mtha' bzi las skye bar smra ba dag dgag pa'i phyir de dag gi ṅor dam bcas pa tsaṃ yin gyi | dbu ma pa raṅ gi lugs ma yin te |*). Although WILLIAMS has implied the possibility that Red mda' ba is referred to by Tsoṅ kha pa as one of those who are said to have "claimed to be Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika" in the Lam rim chen mo, at the moment one should just note that in Tsoṅ kha pa's own gSan yig the name of Red mda' ba is recorded in the lineages neither for the study of Nāgārjuna's Rigs tshogs, Ratnāvalī and eulogies, nor for the study of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā with the PP (see n. 37).

certain thing is that the “false interpretations” of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka theory have existed and been discussed since the time of rMa bya Byaṅ brtson. In other words, Tsoṅ kha pa or the dGe lugs pas were neither the first nor the only critics of these “false interpretations”.

III. The “False Interpretations” of the Theory of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka in Early Tibetan Madhyamaka Tradition

MATSUMOTO (1989/1990) has identified **A** and **B** criticized by Tsoṅ kha pa in his Lam rim chen mo with the “theory of freedom from extremes as the middle view” (*mtha’ bral la dbu ma smra ba*) or the “view of neither existence nor non-existence” (*yod min med min gyi lta ba*) propounded by Go ram pa. He (1990: 28f. and 34) quotes the passages where the “false interpretations” attributed to Tsoṅ kha pa’s contemporaries are described (see n. 23f. and 27) and explains that “It is our understanding that the views of both of these groups of objectors are basically the same, that is to say, the ‘theory of freedom from extremes as the middle view.’ This theory is here presented quite simply as the view that would hold that the Mādhyamika (Thal-’gyur-ba) school makes no assertions whatsoever of its own . . .” (ib. 35). He even states: “Our conclusion is that all Mādhyamika thought in Tibet up until the appearance of Tsong-kha-pa may be considered to have been basically forms of the ‘theory of freedom from extremes as the middle view,’ for prior to Tsong-kha-pa there is to be found no logical criticism whatsoever of this theory” (ib. 26).

This interpretation, however, apparently contradicts the fact that **B** has already been criticized by rMa bya Byaṅ brtson in the 12th century, and it was even criticized by Go ram pa himself. In his dBu ma’i spyi ston (32b2f.), for instance, Go ram pa criticizes the following four interpretations of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka theory propounded by “those who pride themselves of being Mādhyamikas” (*dbu mar rlom pa*), (1) to maintain that all the conventional is [established] in accord with the world (*kun rdzob thams cad ’jig rten pa’i lugs su ’dod pa*), (2) to maintain that the two kinds of reality are [established] in accord with ordinary people and saints respectively (*bden gñis skye ’phags so so’i lugs su ’dod pa*), (3) to maintain that the conventional is neither existent nor non-existent (*kun rdzob yod min med min du ’dod pa*), and (4) to maintain that the designation that there is no object of designation is existent (*btags don med pa’i btags pa yod pa*). Among them, (1) is none other than **B**, i.e. the opinion that “the Madhyamika has nothing to assert as his own system even

on the conventional level" (*dbu ma pa la rañ lugs kyi khas blañs ci yañ med* [ib. 32b3f.]); (2) concurs with **A**, for it is the opinion that "There is no establishment of the two kinds of reality in his own system" (*rañ lugs kyi bden gñis kyi rnam gžag med* [ib. 34b2]); (3) is to assert the "theory of freedom from extremes as the middle view" on the conventional level (cf. ib. 35b1f.); (4) seems to be Tsoñ kha pa's position, since the same theory is attributed to Tsoñ kha pa elsewhere (ib. 108a5). Roñ ston, one of the contemporaries of Tsoñ kha pa, also extensively refutes in his *Ñes don rnam ñes A* and *B*⁴². In this way, it is clear that **A** and **B** were regarded as false by Tsoñ kha pa as well as his *Sa skya pa* opponents in the 15th century. Therefore one must distinguish these "false theories" refuted in the *Lam rim chen mo* from *Go ram pa*'s own *Madhyamaka* theory, i.e. the "theory of freedom from extremes as the middle way" or the "view of neither existence nor non-existence", which is concerned solely with ultimate reality⁴³.

⁴² 33a1–36a3 he sets forth his opponent's theory to be refuted: "The *Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika* has no thesis even conventionally; ... he accepts neither valid cognition to prove it ... nor establishment of the conventional" (*'ga' žig dbu ma tha' gyur ba la | tha sñad du yañ rañ lugs kyi dam bca' med de | ... dam bca' med pas de sgrub byed kyi tshad ma 'añ khas mi len žiñ | ... kun rdzob kyañ gžan nor 'jig rten gžug pa'i don du khas blañs par zad kyi rañ lugs la ni ma yin no žes smra bar byed do ||*). He also uses the expression *dbu ma par rlom pa* for his opponent (ib. 34a3).

⁴³ The view that is criticized by Tsoñ kha pa in his *LR* and that is identified by *Go ram pa* as the "view of neither existence nor non-existence" is concerned with the question whether the ultimate reality as the middle view (*dbu ma*) is "non-existence of own-being" (*rañ bžin med pa*) or "neither existence of own-being nor non-existence of own-being" (*rañ bžin yod min med min*). Tsoñ kha pa states: "... if one negates even the non-existence of own-being that is the object of discriminative knowledge, one negates the [correct] view of the *Mādhyamika*, since one negates the object of the discriminative knowledge through which one understands that all things have no own-being. Those who assert that [it is the middle view] to negate both existence of own-being and non-existence of own-being should be asked to explain how to negate the non-existence of own-being [of the aggregates], which is the object of the discriminative knowledge through which it has been ascertained that the aggregates have no own-being" (... *śes rab de'i yul ran bžin med pa de yañ 'gog na ni dbu ma pa'i lta ba'sun 'byin pa yin te chos rñams rañ bžin med par rtogs pa'i śes rab kyi yul sun 'byin pa'i phyir ro || rañ bžin yod med gñis ka sun 'byin par 'dod pa de la 'di dri bar bya ste phruñ po la rañ bžin med do sñam du ñes pa'i śes rab kyi yul rañ bžin med pa de ji ltar byas pas sun 'byin pa smos śig ||* [LR 383a3ff.]); "By means of that which only negates own-being why should it be necessary to negate the object [itself, i.e. the understanding that there is no own-being]? ... If, regarding even this kind of understanding as a

It is known from these discussions of theory **B** that the most crucial question for the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika is how to interpret Nāgārjuna's statement of VV 29 "I have no thesis of my own" (see n. 19). The advocates of **B** are exclusively arguing on the authority of this statement. That is to say, it is quite conceivable that a similar discussion thereof might have occurred in Tibet earlier than the introduction of Candrakīrti's works by Pa tshab. The same can be said

fault, one negates both good conception and bad conception, it is evident that one wishes to plant the theory of the Chinese master Hva śaṅ" (*rañ bzin rnam par bcad pa tsam gyis yul de sun dbyuñ yañ ci dgos te . . . 'di 'dra ba'i rtog pa la 'aṅ skyon du bltas nas bzañ rtog dan ñan rtog gañ yin kyañ 'gog na ni rgya nag gi mkhan po hva śaṅ gi gzuñ 'dzugs 'dod par gsal pa yin no* || [LR 386a4ff., tr. MATSUMOTO 1990: 20 (1)]). This view criticized here is obviously the "view of neither existence nor non-existence". In his lTa ba'i śaṅ 'byed, Go ram pa in turn attacks Tsoñ kha pa demonstrating a difference between the "view of neither existence nor non-existence" and Hva śaṅ's theory (lTa ba'i śaṅ 'byed 17a2ff., tr. MATSUMOTO 1990: 24 [4]). It is, however, by no means the same view as **A** or **B**, which negate even establishment of conventional things. – One important argument of MATSUMOTO for his interpretation is presented in MATSUMOTO 1982b. There he has indicated Go ram pa's identification of the "view of neither existence nor non-existence" with the theory that the Mādhyamika has no assertion of his own with regard to a biographical account of Tsoñ kha pa. mKhas grub rje, the author of the secret biography of Tsoñ kha pa, describes a dialogue between Tsoñ kha pa and Mañjuśrī: "Then [Tsoñ kha pa] asked [Mañjuśrī through Bla ma dBu ma pa:] 'Which is the view that now I have [in my mind], Prāsaṅgika or Svātantrika?'. [Mañjuśrī] answered: 'Neither [Prāsaṅgika] nor [Svātantrika]'. At that time, also this master (Tsoñ kha pa) had in his mind only (1) the easy view that [the Mādhyamika] has neither assertion nor something to grasp [as his own system] (*de dus ñed kyi lta ba 'di thal rañ gañ yin zus pas | gañ yañ min gsuñs | de dus rje 'di'i thugs la yañ khas len ci yañ med ciñ | gañ du 'aṅ bzuñ mi ñan par lta ba de thugs la bde ba tsam yod par 'dug go* || [gSaṅ ba'i rnam thar 3a3, tr. MATSUMOTO 1982b: 168]). Go ram pa comments on this account as follows: "Here the author of this biography seems to describe that Mañjuśrī presumably answered in this way because at that time this master (Tsoñ kha pa) had in his mind (2) the 'view of neither existence nor non-existence' that had been descended from Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa" (*de la rnam thar rtsom pa po na re | de'i tshe rje 'di ñid kyi thugs rgyud la žaṅ thaṅ sag pa nas brgyud pa'i yod min med min gyi lta ba de yod pas de skad du gsuñs pa yin par 'dud ces bris snañ no* || [lTa ba'i śaṅ 'byed 17b3f., tr. MATSUMOTO 1982b: 167]). Here Go ram pa's interpretation of mKhas grub rje's description (1) as (2) the "view of neither existence nor non-existence" should also be understood as relating solely to ultimate reality. Besides, I assume that Go ram pa had his own reason for this reading: From the viewpoint of Go ram pa, Tsoñ kha pa's Madhyamaka view before the meeting with Mañjuśrī must have been a "genuine" one because he had learned it from such a teacher as Red mda' ba, who belonged to the good lineage of the "view of neither existence nor non-existence" descended from Pa tshab Ñi ma grags. Go ram pa refers Tsoñ kha pa's "special" Madhya-

about A too⁴⁴. The theory of the two kinds of reality as well as the logical method to prove the truth of emptiness must have been most important subjects of debate for Mādhyamika masters transmitted from India to Tibet. Śākya mehog ldan says: “Although when Atiśa came into Tibet there was in fact no translation of Candrakīrti’s own works. [Atiśa] composed some minor explanatory treatises [of that tradition] such as the ‘Elucidation of the Two Kinds of Reality’”⁴⁵ and “Although at the time of rñog lo tsā ba chen po there was no translation of Prāsaṅgika treatises, [he refuted the Prāsaṅgika] depending on [his experience of] hearing the teachings of [Prāsaṅgika masters] in India or Tibet . . . He explains as his own position that the Madhyamaka system of Nāgārjuna should be known relying on the reasoning of [Dharmakīrti] who composed the *Pramāṇavārttika*”⁴⁶. This transmission suggests the possibility that the Prāsaṅgika theory had been known to Tibetans and discussed by them before Candrakīrti’s works were introduced. Actually, Atiśa, who was not in favor

maka to Mañjuśrī’s teaching: “The second theory [i.e. Tsoṅ kha pa’s special theory of the extreme of annihilation as the middle view] did not arise [in his mind] during the time when the master Tsoṅ kha pa was studying the meaning of the [Madhyamaka] teachings under a great teacher [i.e. Red mda’ ba?]. But later, after having met with Mañjuśrī who had been invited from mDo khams, [Tsoṅ kha pa] created both such special tenets concerning the essence of the Madhyamaka and an extremely great number of special systems concerning the essence of Mantravajrayāna” (*lugs gn̄is pa ’di ni rje tsoṅ kha pa śnar yon̄s ’dzin dam pa la brten nas gsuñ rab kyi don la sbyaṅs pa byas pa’i dus su ma byuñ la | mdo khams nas gdan draṅs pa’i ’jam dbyaṅs dañ mjal phyin chad dbu ma’i gnad la yañ thun moñ ma yin pa’i dam bca’ ’di tsam dañ | gsañ śnags rdo rje theg pa’i gnad la yañ | thun moñ ma yin pa’i grub mtha’ rab tu mañ po bcas pa yin la | [lTa ba’i śan ’byed 35b6ff., tr. MATSUMOTO 1990: 25 (5)]*). For mKhas grub rje, on the other hand, Tsoṅ kha pa’s view before his conversion through Mañjuśrī must have been a “false” one. Therefore he seems to have simply attributed to young Tsoṅ kha pa the easily understandable theory that the Mādhyamika has no assertion of his own, which was indeed asserted by many other “Mādhyamikas” at that time.

⁴⁴ It is well-known that the discussion of the qualification “ultimately” (*don dam par = paramārthatas*) to the negation of all things is found in PP 25–30.

⁴⁵ dBu ma’i byuñ tshul 13a1 f.: *jo bo a ti śa bod yul du byon pa de’i tshe | zla ba ñid kyi gzuñ dños su ma ’gyur kyañ | bden pa gn̄is kyi rab tu byed pa sogs dgoṅs ’grel gyi bstan bcos thor bu dag mdzad |*.

⁴⁶ dBu ma’i byuñ tshul 13b7–14a4: *rñog lo tsā ba chen po’i dus su ni | thal ’gyur pa’i gzuñ ma ’gyur yañ | ’phags yul du ’am bod du de dag gi gsuñ ’gros gsañ pa la brten nas | tshul gsum pa can gyi rags la ma rten par dbu ma’i don rtogs pa yod par ’dod pa la | ji skad du | . . . źes thal ’gyur ba la dan | . . . źes dgag pa mdzad nas | rañ lugs ni | klu sgrub źabs kyi dbu ma rnam ’grel mdzad pa’i rig[s] pa la rten nas źes dgos par ’chad do ||*.

of logic in all contexts (cf. n. 36), has been reputed to be a Prāsaṅgika master in general⁴⁷. In order to understand the entire picture of the early Tibetan Madhyamaka presented by Atiśa, rÑog lo tsā ba, etc., all the details of the Madhyamaka system called “Great Madhyamaka” (*dbu ma chen po*) should be clarified⁴⁸.

Yet even now there is reason to think that theory **B** had been criticized even in the pre-Pa tshab period. In his dBu ma'i spyi ston (94a3–105b1), Go ram pa discusses **B** in great detail, introducing and criticizing various views of such early masters as Klu mes, Phya pa, Khu lo tsā ba, gTsañ nag pa and rMa bya Byañ brtson, before he enters into his refutation of Tsoñ kha pa's theory. The view to be refuted with regard to the Prāsaṅgika system is described as follows: “When ascertaining the ultimate truth, a logical reason of an autonomous reasoning is not acceptable; it is proper to apply solely the *prasaṅga* method, since the Mādhyamika has no positive assertion of his own”⁴⁹. Against this position, Go ram pa introduces the opinion of Klu mes at first. Klu mes Tshul khrims śes rab (10th c.) is reported to have built temples and contributed to the reestablishment of Buddhism in Tibet during the sixty-four years preceding Atiśa's coming into Tibet (1042 [Deb sñon ka 28a1 ff., kha 6a3, BA 61, 74]). According to Go ram pa, Klu mes and others have criticized the previous view (**B**) by stating that “The assertions are not right that [the Prāsaṅgika] has no thesis of his own and that the topic [of reasoning] (*chos can*) has no common appearance (*mtshun snañ*) [to both

⁴⁷ Tsoñ kha pa, for instance, states that “Following the way of Atiśa who seems to have mainly followed Candrakīrti's system, the great early [Madhyamaka] masters of this instruction mainly relied on this system” (*jo bo chen po slob dpon zla ba grags pa'i lugs la gtso bor mdzad par snañ ba'i rjes su 'brans nas gdams ñag 'di'i bla ma goñ ma chen po rnams kyañ lugs de la gtso bor 'dzin pa yin no* | [LR 343a5]). It may be possible to read here Tsoñ kha pa's slight doubt about Atiśa's position as Prāsaṅgika in his use of the word “seems” (*snañ ba*), or it may simply show us a general opinion of his time. Modern scholars such as YAMAGUCHI (1988: 225–230) and HAKAMAYA (1989a: 131 ff.), however, have considered Atiśa as a proponent of the theories (1) and (2) rather than as a Prāsaṅgika master. Atiśa himself refers to Candrakīrti's teaching of the two kinds of reality in his Satyadvayaavatāra (D 3902, 72b7f.; cf. RUEGG 1988: 1254 n. 13 and 1276).

⁴⁸ For the “Great Madhyamaka”, refer e.g. to KULJP 1983: 34–45. – Atiśa also used this appellation in his Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā (D 3948, 280a4 ff., 280a7, 281a2 ff., and 282b6 f., as indicated in HAKAMAYA 1992: 69 f.; cf. also RUEGG 1969: 61 n. 2).

⁴⁹ dBu ma'i spyi ston 94b4: *de kho na ñid gtan la 'bebs pa'i tshe rañ rgyud kyī rtags mi 'thad par thal ba tsam 'ba' zig bya bar rigs te* | *dbu ma pa rañ ñid la že 'dod kyī khas len cuñ zad kyañ med pa'i phyir te* |.

parties of debate]”⁵⁰. Go ram pa, who is not content with this argument of Klu mes, presents his own criticism of the same view later (ib. 102b3–103a4). If this information of Go ram pa is accurate, it can be said that theory **B** was criticized even before Atiśa.

In conclusion, it may be said that the “false interpretations” of the theory of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka have existed and been examined since the time of Atiśa or even earlier. It has probably been transmitted through the main lineage of Tibetan Prāsaṅgika to both the Sa skya pa and the dGe lugs pa. In this respect, the “false Madhyamaka theories” expounded by ’Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa in his Grub mtha’ chen mo – i.e. (1) the Hva śaṅ’s *rdzogs chen*, (2) the Jo naṅ pa’s theory of “emptiness-of-other”, and (3A/B) – may have become a kind of traditional group of heretical Madhyamaka doctrines for the later dGe lugs pas, and for some Sa skya pas, too.

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dBu ’jug ’grel chen	Red mda’ ba gZon nu blo gros: dBu ma la ’jug pa’i rnam bśad de kho na ṅid gsal ba’i sgron ma. Red-mda’-ba: dBu ’jug ’grel chen. Delhi.
dBu ma gžan ston	Karma Mi bskyod rdo rje: dBu ma gžan ston smra ba’i srol Legs par phyé ba’i sgron me. Rumtek 1972.
dBu ma’i byuṅ tshul	gSer mdog paṅ chen Śākya mehog ldan: dBu ma’i byuṅ tshul rnam bśad pa’i gdam yid bžin lhun po. [CW 4]. Thimphu 1975.
dBu ma’i spyi ston	Go ram pa bSod nams seṅ ge: rGyal ba thams cad kyi thugs kyi dgoṅs pa zab mo dBu ma’i de kho na ṅid spyi’i nag gis ston pa Nes don rab gsal. [CWS 12]. Tokyo 1969.
CW	The Collected Works or Complete Works.
CWS	The Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa skya Sect of Tibetan Buddhism, ed. BSOD NAMS RGYA MTSHO. Toyo Bunko 1968–1969.

⁵⁰ dBu ma’i spyi ston 95b4: *sñon gyi mkhas pa klu mes la sogs pa’i gsuṅ nas de thal ’gyur ba’i lugs yin kyaṅ raṅ la dam bca’ med pa daṅ | chos can la mthun snaṅ med par ’dod pa de mi rigs las . . .*].

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ANZEIGEN

Epic and Purāṇic Bibliography (up to 1985) annotated and with indexes. Compiled under the chairmanship of Heinrich von Stietencron by P. Flamm, H. v. Stietencron, J. L. Brockington, A. Malinar, P. Schreiner, K.-P. Gietz, A. Kollmann, S. Dietrich, R. Söhnen-Thieme, A. S. Pfeiffer et al. Edd. H. v. STIETENCRON – K.-P. GIETZ – A. MALINAR – A. KOLLMANN – P. SCHREINER – M. BROCKINGTON. Pt. I: A-R. Pt. II: S-Z, Indexes. [Purāṇa Research Publications Tübingen, Vol. 3, I-II]. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1992. LX + 2116 p. DM 358,-.

Die vorliegende Bibliographie ist neben L. ROCHERS *The Purāṇas* (Wiesbaden 1986) eines der wichtigsten neueren Hilfsmittel für die Purāṇa-Forschung und darüber hinaus für die damit eng verbundene Erforschung des indischen Epos. Folgende Literaturbereiche wurden darin bibliographisch erfaßt:

a) Primärliteratur, i.e. Texte, Übersetzungen, Auszüge, Rekonstruktionen, Anthologien usw. des Mahābhārata und Rāmāyaṇa, der Mahā-, Upa- und Sthalapurāṇas sowie der sogenannten „Kasten-Purāṇas“ (wie z. B. des Mallapurāṇa). Manuskripte blieben im allgemeinen unberücksichtigt; einige Handschriftentkataloge wurden jedoch miteinbezogen. Die *Bhagavadgītā* ist zwar ausführlich eingearbeitet, im Hinblick auf die Spezial-Bibliographien von J. C. KAPOOR und W. M. CALLEWAERT – SH. HEMRAJ aber nur in beschränktem Umfang.

b) Sekundärliteratur, hauptsächlich in Englisch, Französisch, Deutsch, Italienisch und Holländisch. Wissenszweige wie Ikonographie und Kunstgeschichte, Mythologie, Ritual und Religionsgeschichte wurden nur dann berücksichtigt, wenn ein direkter Bezug auf die Epen bzw. Purāṇas gegeben war.

Im einzelnen umfaßt das zweibändige Werk eine Einleitung (p. VII–XXV), ein Abkürzungsverzeichnis (p. XXVII–LX) mit einer umfassenden „List of Journals“ (p. XXXIII ff.) sowie – als Kernstück – die Bibliographie (p. 1–1364), die mit ihren 8168 (!) nach den Verfasseramen alphabetisch angeordneten Einträgen nicht nur die jeweils relevanten Daten sorgfältig erfaßt, sondern auch über deren Inhalte (einschließlich der behandelten Textstellen) gediegen und verläßlich informiert. Erschlossen wird die schier unübertreffliche Fülle der in dieser Bibliographie zusammengestellten Daten durch vier Indizes:

1. ein Namensverzeichnis, das die zitierten Namen als Verfasser, Herausgeber, Kommentatoren, Übersetzer, Rezensenten usw. kennzeichnet (p. 1365–1458),
2. einen Sachindex, der die einzelnen Inhalte und Sachgebiete mit oft außerordentlich reichhaltig untergliederten Lemmata (so bietet das Lemma „*Bhagavadgītā*“ mit seinen 22 Spalten [p. 1491b–1502a] ca. 40 Stichwörter pro Spalte [!]) detailliert aufschlüsselt (p. 1459–1896),
3. einen Werkindex mit Auflistung aller in der Bibliographie nachgewiesenen Stellenzitate (p. 1897–2076) und schließlich
4. einen Quellenindex, in dem jede einzelne bibliographische Eintragung nachgewiesen ist (p. 2077–2116).

Den Herausgebern und Mitarbeitern, die mit dieser Bibliographie eine seit langem bestehende Lücke auf dem Gebiet der Epos- und Purāṇa-Forschung in hervorragender Weise geschlossen haben, gebühren größter Dank und Anerkennung für ihre effiziente und in hohem Grade nutzbringende Arbeit.

U. Podzeit

Kalyāṇamitrārāgaṇam. Essays in Honour of Nils Simonsson. Edited by Eivind Kahrs. [Instituttet for sammenlignende kulturforskning, Series B: Skrifter LXX]. Oslo: The Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture – Norwegian University Press (– Oxford University Press), 1986. xiii + 312 p., 1 photo. £ 30.–

Diese würdige Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Nils Simonsson enthält eine Bibliographie des Jubilars (p. ix–xiii) und 18 hauptsächlich indologische und buddhismuskundliche Aufsätze skandinavischer Schüler und Kollegen. Auf einige sei näher verwiesen:

P. AALTO („From Sanskrit into Mongolian“ [p. 1–11]) zeichnet die Hauptlinien des Entstehens der mongolischen Übersetzungen des ‚Mahāyāna-Kanons‘ nach und verweist – am Beispiel der alten mongolischen Übersetzung der Mahāśāhasapramardanī – nachdrücklich auf die Bedeutung dieser Fassungen für die Erkenntnis von Varianten im Falle anzunehmender verschiedener Fassungen. P.-A. BERGLIE und C. SUNESON („Arhatschaft und Selbstmord – zur buddhistischen Interpretation von *cetanābhabba* / *cetanā-dharman* und *attasamcetanā* / *ātmasamcetanā*“ [p. 13–47]) untersuchen zwei Begriffspaare aus dem Feld der buddhistischen Anthropologie, indem sie die wichtigste Literatur vorlegen und eine Bedeutungsänderung konstatieren, aber leider nicht zu erklären suchen (vgl. p. 47 n. 94). E. AF EDHOLM („The Crystal and the Hibiscus Flower“ [p. 57–77]) verfolgt das Beispiel vom Kristall (*spāṭhikamānī*) und roten Hibiskus (*japākusuma*) für Irrtum und falsche Erkenntnis besonders am Sāṅkhya-Yoga mit Seitenblicken auf die Verwendung im Advaita und bei Bhartṛhari. G. GRÉN-EKLUND („The Cots are Crying“ [p. 79–97]) bietet einen guten Überblick über die indischen Ansichten von der sprachlichen Metapher im Vergleich mit der aristotelischen Definition. P. KVÆRNE („The ‘Water-Miracle’ in Tibet“ [p. 159–164]) weist das mithraische „Wasser-Wunder“ im gZi brjid, der Biographie des sTon pa gŠen rab, nach. CH. LINDTNER („Materials for the Study of Bhavya“ [p. 179–202]) bietet drei verschiedene Stücke, die er dem älteren Bhavya zuordnet: eine Übersetzung der Kritik des Śrāvaka-yāna aus dem Madhyamakaratna-pradīpa III, eine kritische Textausgabe der Yogācāra-Kritik aus dem IV. Kapitel dieses Werkes und die Edition eines knappen Texts zur Rolle der Logik im Madhyamaka aus dem Schluß des Prajñā-pradīpa. G. VON SIMSON („R̥ṣyaśṛṅga: Ursprung und Hintergrund“ [p. 203–228]) versucht diese Asketen-Geschichte in einer sorgfältigen Analyse aus dem Hintergrund von Regen- und Mondmythen zu deuten. P. O. SKJÆRVØ („Khotanese Fragments of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra“ [p. 229–260]) legt eine Ausgabe und Übersetzung der bisher bekannten 9 Fragmente des khotanesischen Sūtra zusammen mit der diesem sehr nahe kommenden tibetischen Wiedergabe und den Fotos aller Blätter und Blattstücke vor.

Ferner sind in dem Band enthalten: J. BRAARVIG, Development of Mental Complexity as Suffering in Sāṅkhya and Buddhism (p. 49–56); H. HENDRIKSEN, Vowel-Sequences in Two Himachali Dialects (p. 99–103); J. HILMARSSON, East Tocharian *klop* ‘Misfortune, Suffering, Pain’ (p. 105–114); E. KAHRs, Durga on *bhāva* (p. 115–144); K. KRISTIANSEN, A Kāfir on the Kāfir Life Cycle (p. 145–158); G. LIEBERT, Über eine indische Handschriftensammlung der gothenburgischen Universitätsbibliothek (p. 165–178); W. L.

SMITH, Explaining the Inexplicable: Uses of the Curse in Rāma Literature (p. 261–276); F. THORDARSON, An Ossetic Miscellany. Lexical Marginalia (p. 277–286); B. UTAS, *Jang u āštī*: War and Peace in Iran (p. 287–302); R. WALLDÉN, The Presentation of Sāṃkhya in the Maṇimēkalai (p. 303–312).

E. Steinkellner

Sieg, Emil: *Kleine Schriften*. Herausgegeben von Klaus Ludwig Janert. [Glasenapp-Stiftung, Bd. 31]. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1991. 10 + 459 p. DM 110,-.

Die Kleinen Schriften dieser Reihe verfolgten bislang drei Ziele: es sollte neben einem vollständigen Schriftenverzeichnis das Wichtigste und das Entlegene im Nachdruck gesammelt zugänglich gemacht werden; die behandelten Stellen und Themen sollten dann über diverse Indizes erfaßt sein und eine Biographie konnte drittens Leben und Werk würdigen (beispielhaft z. B. F. WILHELM über Otto Stein [s. WZKS 33 (1989) 217] oder M. WITZEL über Willem Caland [s. WZKS 35 (1991) 203–205]). Alle genannten Ziele wurden im vorliegenden Band verfehlt.

Die Pionierleistung S.s in der Tocharologie wird weder erwähnt noch findet sich auch nur ein einziger Titel nachgedruckt. Schon aus Gründen der Wissenschaftsgeschichte ist dies weder verständlich noch gerecht. Die Arbeiten zur vedischen Mythologie sind hingegen vollständig vertreten. Das Wichtigste davon, „Die Sagenstoffe des Rgveda und die indische Itihâsâtradition“ (Stuttgart 1902), war allerdings schon 1969 neu aufgelegt worden. Der Titel der *editio princeps* der „Bhâradvâjaçikshâ“ (cum versione latina, excerptis ex commentario, adnotationibus criticis edidit E. S. Berlin 1892 [= p. 1–83]) wird von J. (p. 6) mit einem „[sic]“ quittiert. Es empfiehlt sich die Lektüre von H. LÜDERS' Dissertation „Die Vyâsa-Çikshâ“ (Göttingen 1894), p. 1 n. 1.

Im Gegensatz zum Vorwort ist die Materie in den Registern ganz und gar nicht „übersichtlich erschlossen“ (p. 6): statt eines Index locorum muß man deren zweie durchsuchen (p. 79–82 und 457f.); statt eines Index verborum hat man es mit dreien zu tun (p. 83, 238f. und 459); ein Sachindex ist nicht vorhanden. An mangelndem Platz wird es nicht gelegen haben, wenn stattdessen beide naturgemäß sehr ähnliche Nachrufe auf K. F. Geldner berücksichtigt werden konnten (p. 441–451).

Fehlt noch Punkt drei, die Biographie. Sie fehlt, und dies, obwohl J. schon 1983 in seiner Vorbemerkung zum Nachdruck von F. KIELHORNS Grammatik der Sanskritsprache (Wiesbaden 1983), dem als Anhang (p. 239–244) die mit p. 7–10 des Vorspanns der Kleinen Schriften bis auf die Seitenverweise identische „Bibliographie der Schriften von Emil Sieg“ beigegeben ist, in damals vielbeachteten Worten offenbar auch in Sachen E. S. der Indologie eine „lichtere Zukunft“ wünschte. Für S. ist sie gekommen, für die Glasenapp-Serie erhofft man sich die Vergangenheit zurück.

H. Falk

Ludwig Alsdorf and Indian Studies, edd. K. BRUHN – M. DUCKWITZ – A. WEZLER. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1990. xii + 102 p., 2 photos. Rs. 150,-.

Am 25.3. 1988 jährte sich der Todestag von Ludwig Alsdorf, der sich als vielseitiger Philologe und profunder Kenner auch des heutigen Indien mit seinem gewaltigen Oeuvre (über 160 Publikationen, davon 14 Bücher und 84 Artikel) unsterbliche Verdienste um die Erforschung der indischen Sprach-

und Literaturgeschichte erworben hat, zum zehnten Mal, und am 8. 8. 1989 hätte dieser begnadete Schüler Walther Schubrings seinen 85. Geburtstag gefeiert. Vielleicht bildeten diese beiden runden Jahrestage für Alsdorfs Nachfolger auf dem Hamburger Lehrstuhl Prof. Albrecht Wezler, den Hrsg. von A.s Kleinen Schriften (Glasenapp-Stiftung, Bd. 10. Wiesbaden 1974 [s. WZKS 22 (1978) 183]), und seine Schüler Magdalene Duckwitz und em. Prof. Klaus Bruhn (Berlin), der zusammen mit A. Wezler die in Wiesbaden 1981 unter dem Titel „Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus“ erschienene Gedenkschrift für seinen Lehrer (s. WZKS 30 [1986] 193) edierte, den Anlaß, den vorliegenden *lepidus libellus* zusammenzustellen, der der Würdigung von und der Information über A.s Werk und Wirken gewidmet ist. Letzterer dient W.s umfassende Bibliographie seiner Schriften (p. 15–32 = Kleine Schriften, p. V–XVIII + 18 Addenda, davon 6 Nachrufe), deren Chronologie (1928–1980) B.s tabellarischer Überblick (p. 33f.) erschließt, und – als Novum – ein von R. P. Das erstelltes Verzeichnis der Rezensionen von 15 von A. verfaßten oder edierten selbständigen Publikationen (p. 35–44). 12 dieser Besprechungen (u. a. von C. CAILLAT [JA 256 (1968) 145–149 (= p. 46–51)], J. C. HEESTERMAN [IJJ 9 (1965–1966) 147–149 (= p. 54–58)], O. v. HINÜBER [Bemerkungen zum Critical Pāli Dictionary II. KZ 94 (1980) 10–31, p. 10–12 (= p. 58–61)], J. W. DE JONG [IJJ 13 (1972) 207–212 (= p. 61–68)], K. R. NORMAN [OLZ 74 (1979) 391–394 und 493–495 (= p. 71–77)] und L. RENOU [Erasmus 5 (1952) 362–365 (= p. 77–81)]) finden sich p. 45–82 nachgedruckt. Mit ihnen wird ebenso wie mit D.s „In Memoriam Prof. Dr. Ludwig Alsdorf“ (1978 [p. 1–3]), B.s von A. Tomson ins Englische übertragene Nachruf (ZDMG 129 [1979] 1–7 [p. 5–13]) und vier originären Beiträgen, deren Verfasser P. Thieme, A. Mette und K. R. Norman A.s Leistungen für die Vedistik (p. 83f.), Jainologie (p. 85–97) resp. die Erforschung der Asoka-Inschriften (p. 95–97) und des Pāli-Kanons (p. 99–102) nachzeichnen, der zweiten Aufgabe dieses Bandes, dessen Güte der eine oder andere Druckfehler keinerlei Abbruch tut, in exzellenter Weise entsprochen: der Würdigung des unermüdlischen Schaffens einer der ganz großen Forscherpersönlichkeiten der Indologie.

Ch. H. Werba

Mayrhofer, Manfred: *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindoarischen (EWAia)*. I. Band, Lieferungen 5–10. [Indogermanische Bibliothek, II. Reihe: Wörterbücher]. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1989–1992. LXIV + 496 p. (= p. 317–812). DM 260,-.

In my review of the first four fascicles (WZKS 33 [1989] 215f.) I wrote: “Within two years four fascicles have been published covering *a* up to *KART*. So the progress is hopeful”. The progress is still amazing. The first volume (*EWAia* I. Heidelberg [1985–]1992. LXIV + 812p. DM 424,-) now is completed and already the first two fascicles of the second volume (II. Band, Lieferung 11–12. Heidelberg 1992. 160p., *ná* – *pft*-) have been published.

The first volume ends with *dhvāntá*, the second opens with *ná*. Lieferung 10 looks like a double fascicle. Actually its size is determined by „Nachträge und Berichtigungen“ (p. 804–812) and especially by an introduction containing „Vorbemerkungen“ (repr. from fasc. 1 [1985] with a supplement written 1991 [p. IX–XV]) and a voluminous list of abbreviations (p. XVI–LXIV), replacing the „Vorläufiges Abkürzungsverzeichnis“ of fasc. 1.

The dictionary has already obtained a solid reputation and every Indologist knows to what the abbreviation *EWAia* refers. In daily practice scholars use the designation “the New Mayrhofer”. The reviews were positive. The most critical remarks were made in F. B. J. KUIPER's review article (IJJ 34

[1991] 105–120). After observing that “This new dictionary . . . is excellent and it will for a long time to come remain one of the most authoritative among the etymological dictionaries of Indo-European languages” (op. cit., p. 109) KUIPER discusses the fundamental issue of borrowing from a foreign source in the Rigveda. M. is almost unwilling to accept non-Indo-Aryan words in the Rigveda, whereas KUIPER firmly believes that traces of Dravidian and Munda are visible in the oldest Vedic text. M. does not ignore non-Aryan etymologies proposed by KUIPER, but hardly takes them seriously.

The problem with loanwords is that they fit in badly with the traditional approach of the etymologists in the field of Indo-European studies. “What we are confronted with in this field is not ‘natural’ phonetic developments but transformations which foreign words have undergone to conform to the structural laws of Sanskrit words” (KUIPER, op. cit., p. 113). The lack of strict laws in borrowing words makes every proposed etymology as suspicious as Indo-European etymologies made before the establishment of comparative Indo-European linguistics. Scepticism on the reliability or plausibility of some Dravidian or Munda etymologies, however, should not induce us to adopt an attitude of bias and to try to force an Indo-European etymology at all costs. The fact that the Rigveda contains a (relatively considerable) number of non-Indo-Aryan words cannot be denied, if one takes into account some linguistic criteria and accepts the inevitability of acculturation between Aryans and non-Aryans already for the earliest Vedic period.

In the same year 1991 KUIPER’S booklet “Aryans in the Rigveda” was published. In this monograph “etymology is of no direct importance” (p. 1). The main aim is a critical discussion of morphological and phonetic problems connected with obvious loanwords. Still its implications and conclusions interfere with the reviewed dictionary. At the end of this study KUIPER lists 383 words from the Rigveda, which “have little or no chance of being of Indo-European origin” (p. 89).

I have checked the 206 words which might occur in *EWaia* I. Actually 8 are not treated in this volume (they concern compounds of which only the second part will be discussed later, but there are also some omissions). Reading the remaining 198 words one is almost under the impression of being confronted with a language which looks unfamiliar even after many years of studying Sanskrit. Of course many of these words do not occur regularly. Still the outward appearance is often striking.

143 are classified as uncertain in the *EWaia*, 31 as of Indo-European (at least Indo-Iranian) origin, 9 as onomatopoeic etc., 2 as Prakritisms. Only 13 terms are (often hesitatingly or even reluctantly) accepted as loanwords. These 13 contain 4 names of adversaries of Indra (some of these demons), 1 name of a non-Aryan people, 1 name of a dynasty (the Ikṣvākus), the name (?) *emuśā* (“Benennung oder Beiwort eines Ebers”), 3 terms from the vegetable kingdom (*akṣā* – “Trotz vedischen Alters ist fremder Ursprung dieser Benennung von Baumfrüchten nicht auszuschließen” [p. 42], *aśvatthā* – “Trotz früher Bezeugung kann der Baumname . . . Lehnwort sein” [p. 140], *urvārukā*), 2 terms from the category ‘food and drinks’ (*odanā* and *kīlāla*) and the word *ākhaṇḍala*, if it would mean “Zerbrecher” and should be connected with the root *khaṇḍ* which is “sicher nicht ererbt-aia., sondern volkssprachlicher (oder nicht-idg.?) Herkunft” (p. 444).

It is quite obvious that M. is rather minimalist in his approach of loanwords. The 143 items which I have classified as “uncertain” (in the dictionary expressed with various terms or just implied) refer to many terms which have been interpreted as non-Aryan by scholars. M. duly mentions these views, but apparently does not accept them or even explicitly rejects

them. His comment on *ulūkhalā*: "Problematisch. . . . Eine indoar. Deutung des ved. Wortes wäre prinzipiell vorzuziehen" (p. 231) is illustrative. I suppose that the argumentation is not based on linguistic principles, but on the preconceived idea that the mortar (often combined with the pestle in the compound *ulūkhālamusalāni*) is an implement in Vedic ritual and as such should be Aryan, i.e. Indo-European. I am afraid that the acculturation of the Aryans and the autochthonous population has resulted in more loanwords than accepted by M. Anyhow linguistic arguments in favour of a non-Indo-Aryan interpretation (whatever may be the value of the proposed etymology; the etymology may even be entirely lacking) should not be overruled by bias about what should be Aryan.

The name *itāt* occurring in RV X 171,1a does not look quite Aryan. M. observes: "Die Frage nach einem 'Etymon' des Namens ist wenig sinnvoll" (p. 187). However, names of Indra's adversaries like *ārbuda*, *ilībiśa*, *cāmuri* and *dṛbhīka* are accepted as "Fremdnamen". The fact that the apparently Aryanized *itāt*, who is helped by Indra, has a non-Indo-Aryan name is undoubtedly relevant for an Indologist who is looking for "Fremdnamen" in the so-called Aryan society [but cf. CH. H. WERBA, WZKS 36 (1992) 16].

In the mentioned monograph KUIPER tries to systematize the criteria for accepting Sanskrit words found in the oldest text as loanwords. In doing so he also criticizes some linguistic laws applied by Indo-Europeanists (including M.). It is evident that this publication asks for a critical reaction (not to say a defence) by M. and that simply ignoring the evidence and referring to it without further comment would detract from the value of this excellent dictionary.

The following notes refer to the meaning rather than to the etymology of a few words:

kīla: s. L. A. VAN DAALEN, The Particle *kīla/kira* in Sanskrit, Prakrit and the Pali Jātakas. IIJ 31 (1988) 111–137

kukṣī: s. HENK W. BODEWITZ, Belly, Pelvis, Buttocks or Cheeks? Vedic *kukṣī* (dual). IIJ 35 (1992) 20–31

daṁṣā (s.v. *DAKṢ*): s. id., The Jyotiṣoma Ritual. Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa I, 66–364. Introduction, translation and commentary. Leiden 1990, p. 256 n. 17 (a ghostword)

²*dhā* (= *DHAY*¹): s. ib., p. 318 n. 2 (*ad* VI.5).

H. W. Bodewitz

Slaje, Walter: *Georg Bühlers Leitfaden für den Elementarkursus des Sanskrit*. Schlüssel zu den Übungsstücken. Wichtrach (Schweiz): Dr. Peter Thomi (Institut für Indologie), 1986. 45 p. + 1 Blatt Corrigenda. sFr. 12,-.

Die Nützlichkeit dieses kleinen Bändchens liegt auf der Hand. Denn BÜHLERS Leitfaden hat sich mehr als hundert Jahre (Erstpublikation in Wien 1883) als äußerst brauchbare Einführung in das Sanskritstudium bewährt. Daß seine zweite, von J. NOBEL durchgesehene Auflage (Wien 1927) erst 1988 wieder von der Wissenschaftlichen Buchgesellschaft in Darmstadt nachgedruckt wurde (die 5. Auflage insgesamt), bezeugt, daß dieses Lehrbuch immer noch großes Ansehen bei den Sanskrit-Liebhhabern genießt.

Der von S. sorgfältig ausgearbeitete Schlüssel stellt eine Bereicherung und eine Erleichterung insbesondere für diejenigen dar, die sich das Sanskrit im Selbststudium aneignen möchten. Auf einem Corrigenda-Blatt finden sich einige Druckfehler verzeichnet; zu ergänzen wäre diese Liste etwa durch *pāpakarmakṛtas* st. *°tās* und *arthayate* st. *°ti* in Lektion XXXIV (p. 34).

R. Mesquita

Scharfe, Hartmut: *The State in Indian Tradition*. [Handbuch der Orientalistik, 2. Abteilung: Indien, 3. Bd.: Geschichte, 2. Abschnitt]. Leiden – New York – København – Köln: E. J. Brill, 1989. IX + 265 p. Hfl. 129,-.

Im Gegensatz zum klassischen Altertum hat sich ein Staatsdenken, das verschiedene Formen der Staatslenkung in der Theorie durchdenkt und in die Praxis umsetzt, im alten Indien nicht entwickelt, sodaß sich ein Buch wie etwa E. MEYERS *Römischer Staat und Staatsgedanke* (Zürich 1948) nicht schreiben ließe. Denn im Mittelpunkt einer Darstellung der altindischen Verhältnisse muß allein eine Staatsform, das Königtum, stehen, da sich von den sog. Republiken, die durch einen *gana* oder *saṅgha* gelenkt werden, allenfalls schattenhafte Vorstellungen gewinnen lassen. Folgerichtig findet man im Index nur 4 Belegstellen für „republics“, und ein Stichwort „democracy“ fehlt zu Recht völlig.

Das Werk beginnt mit einer allgemeinen Einleitung, in der auch die Quellen vorgestellt werden. Hier nimmt neben den Rechtstexten das Arthaśāstra nach seiner Bedeutung – und nach den Neigungen des Verf. – eine herausragende Stellung ein. Im Buch selbst, in dem die vier großen Themenkreise: der König und sein Hof, die Staatsverwaltung, die Streitkräfte sowie die Politik vorgestellt werden und das mit einem Überblick über die Entwicklung des Staates über die Gupta-Zeit hinaus mit Ausblicken in die spätere Epoche der Moghulen schließt, werden jedoch auch buddhistische und jainistische Texte ausgewertet sowie Inschriften und selbst die einschlägige Literatur in dravidischen Sprachen und in Persisch gebührend berücksichtigt.

Da der Verf. sich mit Erfolg bemüht, aus dem umfangreichen Quellenmaterial und aus der weit verzweigten Sekundärliteratur sachkundig alles zusammenzustellen, was sich über den altindischen Staat ermitteln läßt, sind vielleicht auch einige kleinere Ergänzungen von Nutzen:

p. 83f. – Eine Parallele zum mehrfachen *abhiseka* eines Königs zur Sicherung seiner Legitimität bildet die wiederholte Mönchsweihe (*upasampadā*) der Buddhisten; s. F. BIZOT, *Les traditions de la pabbajjā en Asie du Sud-Est*. Göttingen 1988.

p. 84 – Das gemeinsame Sitzen auf dem Thron kann auf eine Teilung der Herrschaft hinweisen; s. Viśākhadattas *Mudrārākṣasa*, ed. A. HILLEBRANDT (Breslau 1912), p. 53,7. Im *Māndhātāvādāna* teilt Indra seinen Thron mit dem König *Mandhātā* (Faksimile-Ed. 1443,6).

p. 85 – Zum Motiv des zerplatzenden Kopfes s. M. WITZEL, *The Case of the Shattered Head*. *StII* 13/14 (1987) 363–415 und St. INSLER, *The Shattered Head Split and the Epic Tale of Śakuntalā*. *BEI* 7–8 (1989–1990) 97–139.

p. 86 – Zum *simhāsana* s. F. BERTHIER, *Le voyage des motifs. I. Le trône aux lions et la porte aux lions*. *Arts asiatiques* 45 (1990) 114–123.

p. 119 – Besondere, wohl nur im Nordwesten Indiens gebräuchliche Titel von Königinnen finden sich in Rez., *The Paṭola Śāhis of Gilgit – A Forgotten Dynasty*. *JOIB* 36 (1986–87) 221–229, bes. p. 226f.

p. 146 – Münzen treten in Indien erst nach dem 6. Jh. v. Chr. auf; s. J. CRIBB, *Dating India's Earliest Coins*. In: *South Asian Archaeology*, edd. J. SCHOTSMANS – M. TADDEI. Vol. 2. Naples 1985, p. 535–554.

p. 184 – Zum ‚Grasessen‘ als Zeichen der Unterwerfung vgl. ferner J. L. BROCKINGTON, *Guarded by Grass. A Rāmāyaṇa Motif and Some Western Parallels*. *IndT* 13 (1985–86) 15–28.

D. TIWARYS *The Concept of State in the Mahābhārata* (Delhi 1990) wurde erst nach Erscheinen des Buches veröffentlicht.

Im ganzen hat der Verf. aufgrund einer verwaltungstheoretischen Literatur das Bild eines Staates entworfen, der sich nur in seltenen Glücksfällen der Überlieferungslage durch Verweis auf ein historisches Gemeinwesen

mit Leben erfüllen läßt. Zudem sind die Quellen, die hier weiterführen können, wie Inschriften oder Landschenkungsurkunden bei weitem noch nicht ausgeschöpft. Dieser unbefriedigende Stand der Forschung ist jedoch nicht dem Verf. anzulasten. Denn Vorarbeiten wie z. B. S. K. PANDAS *Herrschaft und Verwaltung im östlichen Indien unter den späten Gaṅgas* (Stuttgart 1986) liegen längst noch nicht in genügender Anzahl vor.

Manche Probleme wie die „mysterious relation“ von *brahman* und *ksatra* können in einer Gesamtdarstellung allenfalls als „deep secret of the ancient Indian state“ (p. 102) angedeutet, aber nicht weiterverfolgt werden. So ist ein Buch entstanden, das seiner Anlage nach ein Kompendium im besten Sinne ist, seiner Bestimmung nach ein kenntnisreich erarbeitetes Handbuch, dessen Schwerpunkt deutlich auf dem alten Indien liegt. Ein weiterer Band, der den indo-muslimischen, aber auch den späteren hinduistischen Staat wie Vijayanagara darstellt, bleibt ein Desiderat. Wertvolle Ansätze dazu finden sich bei BURTON STEIN, *Vijayanagara. The New Cambridge History of India I-2* (Cambridge 1989) und in dem von J. POUCHEPADASS und H. STERN hrsg. Sammelband *De la royauté à l'état. Anthropologie et histoire du politique dans le monde indien* (Paris 1991). Zugleich werden vor dem Hintergrund dieser Arbeiten gelegentlich Mängel des besprochenen Werkes bei der theoretischen Durchdringung des Materials und bei der Nachzeichnung historischer Entwicklungslinien deutlich. Dies weist in die Richtung künftiger Forschung, die von dem vorliegenden umfassenden Handbuch ihren Ausgang nehmen muß.

O. v. Hinüber

The Sacred Centre as the Focus of Political Interest. Proceedings of the symposium held on the occasion of the 375th anniversary of the University of Groningen, 5-8 March 1989, ed. H. BAKKER. [Groningen Oriental Studies VI]. Groningen: Egbert Forsten, 1992. ix + 268 p. Hfl. 75,-.

This book is a collection of thirteen essays which were presented at the symposium held on the occasion of the 375th anniversary of the University of Groningen, 1989. It deals with the "intrinsic social patterns which knit together secular and sacred authority, providing opportunities both to acquire prestige and to commit pious deception" (p. vii). Specimens of interaction between political and religious structures are taken from Christian, Islamic, Hindu and Buddhist traditions, though the emphasis is on the Hindu world. In all four traditions sacred centres are instrumental in the legitimization and sanction of political power.

C. J. FULLER focuses on "The Political and Economic Position of the Mīnāksī Temple Priests in the 1980s" (p. 205-218), where the aspiration for the position of patrons which is slowly shifting from the traditional aristocracy to the mercantile elites, is conditioned by economic interests. L. P. VAN DEN BOSCH's example of "the origin of recent *satī* temples in India" (p. 143-160) also highlights the interplay of socio-economic factors with religious motives.

A few studies presented here illustrate the interest of secular authorities in the domain of the sacred in order to promote their prestige or to justify their political power: A. PALMER presents a study of how the political aims of "King Abgar of Edessa" were promoted by a fake letter supposedly written by Jesus Christ (p. 3-29); G. OBEYESEKERE (p. 219-233) analyses a similar process at work "in modern Sri Lanka, in which myth is historicized and history mythologized" (p. vii); D. SHULMAN - V. NARAYANA RAO (p. 179-203) and H. BAKKER (p. 83-100) deal with instances of Indian rulers who depict themselves as gods on earth through fabricated genealogies and sophisticated dance dramas.

The conclusions reached through these studies are clear, namely that the efforts of political leaders bring sacred space into their domain to further their own interests. Religious imagination encroaches upon political ideology and as a result the royal court emulates the court of gods. It is also true that political stability and cohesion emerges out of such fusions. This has happened practically in all cultures down the centuries, and such efforts are to be seen even at present where democratic forms of power structure are accepted as relatively the best ones, and where there is growing awareness that secular and religious powers must be kept apart. But on the other hand this distinction is not always clearly perceived. Religious dimension brings in cohesion and stability to the 'secular' power, and at times the religious authority itself needs a viable structure in the form of secular power for its stability. In history one can find such examples in all cultures.

But the question is whether, in spite of perceiving the clear distinction of powers, it is possible to keep them apart, and whether the factors that induce such encroachments are always within one's control to check the violations. This study provides scope for further speculations in this direction, even if such questions may not fall within the domain of the disciplines under which these examples are analyzed.

A. Amaladass

Mantras et diagrammes rituels dans l'hindouisme. Table Ronde, Paris 21–22 juin 1984. Éd. par A. PADOUX. [Centre national de la recherche scientifique. Équipe de recherche n° 249: «L'Hindouisme – textes, doctrines, pratiques»]. Paris: Éditions du CNRS, 1986. XI + 230 p.

Der vorliegende Band präsentiert für den Druck überarbeitete Beiträge von zehn Teilnehmern an einer „table ronde“ mit dem Thema „Mantras et diagrammes rituels dans l'hindouisme“, die in Paris organisiert worden war. Der zentralen Funktion des Rituals im Hinduismus gemäß ist jede ernsthafte, wissenschaftliche Auseinandersetzung mit diesem Thema höchst begrüßenswert. Einer solchen Herausforderung nachgekommen zu sein und Teile dieses noch unzureichend erforschten Gebietes dem richtigen Verständnis nähergebracht zu haben ist das Verdienst der Mitarbeiter dieses Bandes: B. BÄUMER, H. BRUNNER, F. CHENET, G. COLAS, C. CONIO, T. GOUDRIAAN, T. MICHAEL, A. PADOUX, A. ROÇU, A. SANDERSON und A. VERGATI. Daß damit zugleich auch neue Probleme für die weitere Forschung aufgeworfen werden, liegt bei einem derart umfangreichen Gegenstand, dessen Textgrundlagen noch weitgehend unediert sind (vgl. etwa A. SANDERSONS *Maṇḍala and Āgamic Identity in the Trika of Kashmir*, p. 169–207), wobei das Quellenmaterial aufgrund der Erschließung durch z. B. das Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project unaufhörlich wächst, in der Natur der Sache. Die Untersuchung des hinduistischen / tantrischen Rituals, in seiner phonetischen Ausprägung als *mantra*, in seiner geometrischen als *maṇḍala*, *yantra* oder *cakra* bekannt geworden und popularisiert, läßt – und dies zeigen die Arbeiten in diesem Band in aller Deutlichkeit – für die Zukunft durchaus noch tiefere Einsichten erhoffen.

Die Beigabe der Diskussionsbeiträge erhellt in oft belebender und realistischer Weise ungeahnte Problematiken, die sich hinter den einzelnen Themen verbergen und durch diese Beiträge zumindest in Ansätzen sichtbar gemacht werden. Die „Résumés – Summaries“ der Arbeiten (p. 215–225) erleichtern in wünschenswerter Weise die erste Orientierung. Derlei sollte für die Herausgabe von Vielverfasserwerken grundsätzlich zur verbindlichen Norm werden.

W. Slaje

Padoux, André: *Vāc. The Concept of the Word in Selected Hindu Tantras*. Translated by Jacques Gontier. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990. xv + 460 p. \$ 18,95.

This is the English Version of P.'s French doctoral thesis "*Recherches sur la symbolique et l'énergie de la Parole dans certains textes tantriques*", which first appeared in 1963 and in a 2nd improved edition in 1975 (Paris: Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, fasc. 21 [referred to below as "R."]). The book may be considered the most thorough study available on the development of mystical-theological speculation about the Word from Vedic to early Tantric literature. It is divided into seven chapters which deal with, resp., the early (Vedic) speculations, generalities on Tantrism and early Tantric literature (with the emphasis on nondualistic Kashmir Śaivism), manifestation of sound, the four levels of the Word (*parā*, *paśyantī*, etc.), the fiftyfold phonemic emanation, the sixfold course (*adhvan*), and the theory of *mantra*. There are also a short introduction and conclusion. In the latter we find the final formulations of a few main themes of the book, such as the identity of the Word (in highest sense) with the "vibration (*spanda*) that is the essence of the Absolute" and the metaphysical primacy of silence, "... that wherefrom the Word arises, which is a Beyond beyond the Word, a still, silent area, a pure transcendence ..." (p. 12).

The appearance of this English version is a matter of great satisfaction. As a book "*Vāc*" is definitely more attractive than its French original. The printed letter is clear and not too small, the paper does not irritate the eye by dazzling whiteness. An artistic design adorns the frontispiece. Much more important: the translation itself is, as far as I can judge, satisfactory. The idiomatic (and sometimes rather difficult) French of R. has been metamorphosed into a perfectly natural English text. Only very seldom I have my doubts about the faithfulness of the English version: thus on p. 80 "reflected" (*pratibimba*), better (but still a bit strange) in R.: "réflétée en l'énergie", or on p. 6 "destined to be remarkable" (R.: "dont le destin sera remarquable"). In several other cases there are subtle differences such as on p. 78: "(*Vāc* is) the life of consciousness" (R.: "... la conscience vivante"). But it is always possible that such small differences go back to a revision by the author himself, as we shall see immediately.

It is very important to note that "*Vāc*" is much more than a mere translation. Before entrusting his text to the translator, P. has revised it in a most detailed and conscientious way, as can be judged from the great number of additions and changes, sometimes of whole pages, sometimes only of details of wording. These procedures have resulted in the unmistakable fact that "*Vāc*" is still better than its original. This is not to say that R. can now safely be forgotten. A few of the additions or reformulations are inspired by unnecessary modesty, as on p. 37 n. 17, where a characterization by M. BIAUDEAU of Tantric speculations about the Word has replaced an in my opinion better formulation by P. himself in R., p. 45. There are other interesting passages in R. which are not found in the English version, such as on the problem of harmonizing old notions of cosmogony, metaphysics and phonetics into a new system of phonic evolution (R., p. 134).

Among the most important additions are the updating of the discussion of the literature of Śaivism in ch. 2 (a mass of new information has become available in recent years thanks to the labours of A. SANDERSON, H. BRUNNER and others), an extended treatment of variations of the Indian alphabetical system such as the Mālinī (p. 162 ff., 320 ff., etc.; but the question concerning the origin of the Mālinī has strangely been suppressed [s. R., p. 255]), more information on the doctrine of a number of texts (e.g. the

Kāmakaḷāvilāsa [p. 112 ff. and 120] and some Vaiṣṇava sources, among them the Lakṣmī Tantra [p. 169 ff., etc.]), and the updating (but also shortening) of the chapter on Mantra (p. 372 ff.).

Smaller additions and changes are found throughout the book, also in the notes. For instance, on p. 83 a thoughtful note has been added on the nature of the relation between *vācaka* and *vācya* in Indian philosophy of language, and, most significant, on p. 347 one reads: “the *haṁsa*, which rises or stops with the *kundalinī*”, as against “*haṁsa* . . . la poussée ascendante de la *kundalinī*” in R., p. 271f. These and many other small operations show that P. has carefully gone through the whole text, adding, removing, correcting, or reformulating where he thought it necessary. Many additions are small clarifications, translations of Sanskrit titles, welcome systematizations, or corrections in detail (as on p. 155, where the name Cāmundā, absent from R., has rightly been inserted in the group of Mothers). P. has become much more cautious in his use of the term Trika which he repeatedly changed into “nondualistic Kashmirian Śaivism” (p. 123) or similar expressions. On the other hand, he has introduced a few new terms such as “Śāktaśaiva”. In general, as already remarked, the number of text-places discussed has increased considerably.

One may, of course, have a different opinion occasionally:

On p. 9 n. 16 it is said that “The Brāhmaṇas identify *virāj* with *śrī*: both are shining and flourishing (ŚBr 8.3.2.13 . . .)”, with a reference to J. GONDA’s Aspects of Early Viṣṇuism, p. 187. But the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa on this place only maintains that “*virāj* is food”; GONDA’s own reference is correct, but seems to have been misunderstood.

According to p. 116 “The Tantrasadbhāva is known to us only through quotations” (cf. p. 64). Fortunately, this important source has come down to us in at least two manuscripts provisionally edited (but not yet published) by Alexis Sanderson. Also in the Bibliography a reference to this text is lacking. The mutual relation between the Prapañcasāra and the Śāradātilaka is not yet entirely clear; cf. P.’s opinion on p. 66 and 75 with my remarks in Hindu Tantric and Śākta Literature, p. 135 n. 14.

A remarkable feature confronts the reader on p. 128 when compared with p. 132: the Tantrasadbhāva describes the *kundalinīśakti* as reclining in the shape of a coiled-up snake around the *bindu* (which is Śiva) in the region of the heart (p. 128); but according to the better known opinion of later sources, the *kundalinī* is present in the *mūlādhāra* at the base of the spine (p. 132). This divergence is not commented upon.

Another problem emerges on p. 278 with respect to the term *kṣobha* which seems to express that the Transcendental assumes a motion “intent on (the appearance of) the outside world” (Jayaratha on Tantrāloka III 136). This would suggest that something exists beside the Transcendental, which is impossible from the point of view of nondualistic Śaivism. A perhaps better formulation can be found in the Tantrāloka itself (III 141cd): *svātmanah svātmani svātmakṣepo vaisargikī sthitiḥ* / “The situation of differential emanation is a thrust of the Self from Itself within Itself”.

There are some minimal lapses such as omissions of diacritical signs: p. 403, l. 7 read *nūyate* for “*nuy*” and cf. my comments in Mantras et diagrammes rituels dans l’hindouisme (Paris 1986), p. 146; p. 99 n. 41 read *anāhata-* for “*Anāha-*”; p. 130 n. 128, l. 8 read *bhrama-* for “*brahma-*” (*lectio facilior*!); p. 374, l. 1 read *dharmatvān* for *dharmavān*. The Navātmamantra is quoted incompletely on p. 354 n. 62: the form prescribed in Abhinavagupta’s Tantrāloka XXX 11 ff. is *RHRKṢMLVYŪM*. For more particulars about the energy of the Absolute on p. 306 we are referred to “supra, p. 000–00”: a case of subtle psychagogic symbolism?

A bibliographical note: p. 5 n. 4 refers to earlier studies about Ṛgvedic speculation on *vāc* without mentioning a study in Dutch by B. ESSERS (Een oudindische symboliek van het geluid. Assen 1952). The Śaṅgāyoga referred to on p. 27 (n. 60) has also been studied by G. GRÖNBOLD in his thesis (München 1969) and some articles (i.a. WZKS 27 [1983] 191–199).

The Index of Sanskrit terms is quite useful, but not entirely complete: among the missing terms are *puruṣa* (p. 328: “soul”) and *kanda* (p. 413). A list of consulted text-places would have been welcomed.

But enough of these trifles! Philologists always want to complain about something. “Vāc” is a most important, reliable, and attractive book which must be consulted by any serious student of Śaiva / Tantric philosophy and Indian linguistic speculation.

T. Goudriaan

Bühnemann, Gudrun: *Forms of Gaṇeśa*. A Study based on the Vidyārṇava-tantra. Wichtrach (Schweiz): Dr. Peter Thomi (Institut für Indologie), 1989. 154 p.

Die hier von B. vorgelegte Arbeit unterrichtet – als erstes unter zahlreichen anderen Werken zum elefantenköpfigen Gott – über die spezifisch tantrischen Aspekte des weit über den indischen Subkontinent hinaus in großen Gebieten Südostasiens und in Nepal, Tibet und Japan verehrten Gaṇeśa. Grundlage der Untersuchung ist das im Untertitel genannte V(idyārṇava-tantra), ein umfangreiches, Vidyāranya Yati zugeschriebenes *mantraśāstra*.

In der Einleitung (p. 1–45) werden verschiedene Reihen von Gaṇapatis erörtert, die – variierenden Traditionen zufolge – 16, 32 oder gar 56 Manifestationen umfassen. Die Formen des V. sind die folgenden vierzehn: (1) Ekākṣara-Gaṇapati, (2) Viri-G., (3) Lakṣmī-G., (4) Śakti-G., (5) Kṣipraprasādana-G., (6) Heramba, (7) Subrahmaṇya-G., (8) Mahā-G., (9) Trailokyamohana-G., (10) Śakti-G., (11) Bhogalola-G., (12) Haridrā-G., (13) Vakratuṇḍa-G. und (14) Ucchiṣṭa-G. Der Hauptteil der Arbeit (p. 46–115) beschreibt mit Ausführlichkeit diese 14 Gaṇeśas sowie die den einzelnen Manifestationen jeweils zugeordneten Mantras, Seher, Metren, Meditationen, Yantras, *homa*-Opfer und andere Riten.

B.s in vielen Belangen höchst aufschlußreiches und daher wichtiges Buch ist mit 11 Tafeln, einer Liste der Illustrationen (p. 129), einer Bibliographie (p. 130 ff.) und außerordentlich wertvollen Indizes (A) der Namen von Gottheiten und Sehern (p. 137 ff.), (B) der Sanskrit-Termini und *bījas* (p. 143 ff.), (C) der Attribute und Farben (p. 146 f.) sowie (D) der Materialien, Riten und (der mit den speziellen Arten der Gaṇeśa-Verehrung verknüpften) Erwartungen (p. 148–154) ausgestattet.

S. Lienhard

Bäumer, Bettina: *Abhinavagupta. Wege ins Licht*. Texte des tantrischen Śivaismus aus Kaschmir. Ausgewählt, aus dem Sanskrit übersetzt und eingeleitet. [Klassiker der östlichen Meditation. Spiritualität Indiens]. Zürich: Benziger, 1992. 237 p. sFr./DM 32.–.

Mit dem vorliegenden Buch erfüllt B. gleich zwei Desiderata: zum einen ein wertvolles Buch zum tantrischen Śivaismus, welches an die allgemeine deutschsprachige Leserschaft gerichtet ist, und zum anderen die erste Darstellung der Heilslehre und Frömmigkeit des A(bhinavagupta) in deutscher Übersetzung überhaupt (sieht man von B.s Beitrag „Die Unvermitteltheit der höchsten Erfahrung bei Abhinavagupta“ zu G. OBERHAMMERS Transzendenzerfahrung, Vollzugshorizont des Heils [Wien 1978, p. 61–79]

einmal ab). B. tritt damit einem beklagenswerten Informationsdefizit entgegen, wenngleich auch nur in einem ersten Schritt. So blieben aus dem überreichen Werk dieses vielseitigen Meisters, der von ca. 950 n. Chr. „bis ins 11. Jh. hinein“ (p. 31) in Kaschmir lebte und zu Recht als „einer der bedeutendsten Geister, die Indien je hervorgebracht hat“ (ib.) vorgestellt wird, seine überragenden Leistungen insbesondere auf den Gebieten der philosophischen Argumentation und der Ästhetik ununtersucht. Es handelt sich hier also keineswegs um eine Darstellung des Gesamtwerks von A.

B. konzentriert sich sinnvollerweise auf zwei sich ergänzende Teilgebiete seines Schaffens, nml. die Heilslehre (I. Teil [p. 55–140]) und die Hymnen (II. Teil [p. 141–221]). Jeweils mit erklärender Einführung und Übersetzung aus dem Sanskrit versehen bietet B. damit zunächst anhand von Ausschnitten aus dem Tantrasāra die Lehren über die zwei Arten der Erkenntnis, die Lichtnatur des eigenen Wesens, die vier Heilswege und die Gnade – die sich als theoretischer Hintergrund für das Folgende eignen –, darauf alle Hymnen A.s (mit Ausnahme des längeren Kramastotra) inklusive zweier Fragmente, die A. im Gītārthasamgraha zitiert. Diese gelungene Textauswahl wird ergänzt durch eine sorgfältige Einleitung (p. 13–53), ein Glossar (p. 223–234) und ein kurz gehaltenes Literaturverzeichnis (p. 235–237).

Die Einleitung enthält neben wesentlichen geschichtlichen und begrifflichen Erklärungen auch „einige Brückenpfeiler“ (p. 47) in Form von vorstellbaren Parallelen aus dem Christentum (bes. der christlichen Mystik), die dem Leser den Zugang erleichtern sollen. Dies kommt dem Anliegen des Verlegers entgegen, der mit seiner Reihe „auch die vielfältigen Bezüge zum christlichen Glauben“ (so im Umschlagtext) dargestellt wissen möchte. Eine Ungenauigkeit besteht in der Zuschreibung der Beurteilung der Lehre als „neuer, leichter Weg“ (p. 25): dies wird so nicht von Somanāda behauptet, sondern von Utpaladeva (Īśvarapratyabhijñārikā IV 2,1).

Das Buch ist sachverständig wie auch einfühlsam geschrieben und liest sich flüssig. Besonderes Verdienst erwirbt sich B. durch die Berichtigung der weitverbreiteten mißbräuchlichen Verwendung des Begriffs Tantrismus (p. 17–24).

B. Mayer-König

Leggett, Trevor: *The Complete Commentary by Śaṅkara on the Yoga Sūtra-s*. A Full Translation of the Newly Discovered Text. London ≈ New York: Kegan Paul International, 1990. xvi + 418 p. £ 65,-.

Die vorliegende Übersetzung ist die erste vollständige englische Übertragung des ältesten überlieferten Kommentars zu Vyāsa's Yogabhāṣya, i.e. des Pātañjalayogaśāstravivarāṇa, das Śaṅkara zugeschrieben wird. Sie umfaßt auch die Yogasūtras und das Yogabhāṣya. Die Übersetzung der ersten zwei Pādas, die nun in überarbeiteter Form vorliegen, hatte L. bereits 1981/2 veröffentlicht.

Die Publikation enthält zwei Einleitungen. Die erste (p. 1–16) spricht einen allgemeinen Leserkreis an. L. gibt darin den Inhalt aller vier Bücher wieder und legt die vedāntische Ausrichtung des Vivarāṇa in einer allgemein verständlichen Sprache dar. Die zweite „Technical introduction“ (p. 17–48) ist für Indologen bestimmt. Hier wird versucht Antworten auf wichtige Fragen – etwa nach der Verfasserschaft des Vivarāṇa und seinem besonderen Gehalt – zu geben. L. macht darauf aufmerksam, daß das Vivarāṇa des öfteren den Rahmen des Sūtra- und Bhāṣya-Textes sprengt, um advaitische Gedanken vorzutragen. Somit erwiese sich dieser Kommentar nicht als Werk eines orthodoxen Anhängers der Yoga-Schule, sondern eher als das eines Advaitins, und der wäre Śaṅkara, wie L. mit anderen (s. bes. P. HACKER,

Kleine Schriften. Wiesbaden 1978, p. 41 ff.) meint. Im Anschluß an und unter Verwendung der in P. HACKERS Eigentümlichkeiten der Lehre und Terminologie Śaṅkaras (a.a. O., p. 69 ff.) entwickelten Kriterien versucht er die Echtheit des Vivaraṇa zu beweisen, ohne sich allerdings mit dem diesbezüglichen aktuellen Stand der Forschung auseinanderzusetzen: weder die von A. WEZLER (IJ 25 [1983] 17 ff. und IndT 12 [1984] 289 ff.) noch die von W. HALBFASS (Studies in Kumārila and Śaṅkara. Reinbek 1983, p. 106 ff.) geäußerten Zweifel an dieser Verfasserschaft werden berücksichtigt, und die Feststellung A. WEZLERS (B. R. Sharma Fel. Vol. Tirupati 1986, p. 173), daß im Vivaraṇa eine Reihe von Zitaten vorkommt, die aus der Zeit nach Śaṅkara zu stammen scheinen, findet keine Erwähnung.

Die Übersetzung ist leicht lesbar und "accessible to non-specialists, even at occasional cost to precision" (p. 15). Das führt aber dazu, daß L. den textlichen Schwierigkeiten ausweicht und meistens nur den allgemeinen, nicht aber den wörtlichen Sinn des Textes wiedergibt. Die vielen unsicheren Stellen werden einfach übergangen – ohne jeden Hinweis auf ihre philologische Problematik. Nicht einmal die von WEZLER im IJ (a.a. O., p. 19 f.) mit Hilfe eines Trivandrum-Ms. vorgenommenen Korrekturen des edierten Textes wurden berücksichtigt. Damit weist die Übersetzung Mängel auf, die von HALBFASS (a.a. O., p. 130 f.) schon für L.s „Śaṅkara on the Yoga-sūtra-s I“ (London 1981) aufgezeigt worden sind. Es ist jedoch anzumerken, daß es sich hier um einen sehr schwierigen Text handelt, der fast ausschließlich auf Grund einer einzigen Handschrift ohne besondere textkritische Sorgfalt ediert wurde. So bleibt die Übersetzung L.s trotz der genannten Mängel ein unentbehrliches Hilfsmittel zum Studium dieses wichtigen Textes und muß daher allen Indologie-Studenten zur kritischen Lektüre empfohlen werden.

R. Mesquita

Raphael (Āśram Vidyā Order): *Self and Non-Self. The Drigdrīśyaviveka*. Attributed to Śaṅkara. Translated from the Sanskrit with a Commentary. Foreword by A. J. ALSTON. London – New York: Kegan Paul International, 1990. 97 p. £ 15,-.

Die hier anzuzeigende Publikation ist keine wissenschaftliche Arbeit. Sie soll eher mit Hilfe des kleinen advaitischen Sanskrit-Werkes Drigdrīśyaviveka eine Einführung für einen „spiritual enquirer“ (p. 2) zur Meditation und Kontemplation liefern. Die Publikation enthält eine Einführung (p. 3–15), eine zwischen „literal translation“ und „traditional interpretation“ (p. 78) schwankende Wiedergabe des Begründers des Āśram Vidyā Order namens Raphael (p. 17–69 [mit vielen Parallelen aus Plotin und Augustinus]), den transkribierten Sanskrit-Text (p. 71–76) und eine zwar umfangreiche, aber keineswegs vollständige Bibliographie (p. 77–97).

R. Mesquita

Stark, Sylvia: *Vātsya Varadagurus Tattvanirṇaya*. Teil 1: Kritische Textedition – Teil 2: Übersetzung und Anmerkungen. [SbÖAW 570 = Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens 4]. Wien: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1990. 135 + 151 p. öS 700,-.

Einer am indologischen Institut der Universität Wien gepflogenen Tradition der Erschließung von Texten des Viśiṣṭādvaitavedānta (s. G. OBERHAMMER, Materialien zur Geschichte der Rāmānuja-Schule I [1979] und R. MESQUITA, Yāmunācāryas Samvitsiddhi [1988] bzw. Yāmunācāryas Philosophie der Erkenntnis [1990]) folgend legt S. ihre Bearbeitung eines theologischen Traktates (Tattvanirṇaya [TN]) von insgesamt wenigstens vier (i.e.

Tattvasāra, Prameyamālā, TN und Prapannapārijāta [1/27]) von demselben Śrīvaiṣṇava-Exponenten Varadaguru (13. Jh.) stammenden Werken in zwei Bänden vor. Der 1. Band umfaßt eine Einführung in Leben und Werk des Autors (p. 23–32) und eine „Einleitung zur kritischen Textedition“ (p. 33–58), gefolgt von der eigentlichen „Textedition“ (p. 59–121). Drei Indizes, die (1.) Namen und Werke von Einführung und „Einleitung“, (2.) die im TN genannten Quellen sowie (3.) die im TN erscheinenden Textzitate aufschlüsseln, beschließen diesen ersten Teil. Band 2 enthält eine Analyse des edierten Textes (p. 17–48), eine deutsche Übersetzung desselben (p. 49–137) sowie drei weitere Indizes, nml. (1.) einen zu den in der Übersetzung herangezogenen Quellentexten, (2.) einen Index der darin genannten Autoren sowie (3.) einen den zweiten Band insgesamt abschließenden „Sach- und Namensindex“.

Die Edition beruht auf 13 aus Südindien stammenden Handschriften, die p. 34–44 beschrieben werden und – der Schilderung von S. zufolge – auf eine stark kontaminierte Überlieferung weisen. In diesem Zusammenhang wäre die Frage aufzuwerfen, weshalb auf die Heranziehung einschlägig textkritischer Literatur verzichtet wurde, die doch hätte helfen können, Kriterien für eine Kritik am vorliegenden Text zu gewinnen, um daraus schließlich Prinzipien für eine Konstituierung desselben abzuleiten. Denn ohne die Nennung verlässlicher Kriterien ist es, um ein Beispiel zu geben, nicht unproblematisch, „eine relativ große Anzahl von Lesevarianten“ (der Mss. T₃ und My₁) einfach „eindeutig als sekundäre Lesungen“ (p. 47) oder (p. 48) sogenannte „Einfügungen“ als „echte Interpolationen“ bestimmen zu wollen, besonders wenn „die Interpolationen nicht mehr vollständig entziffert und mögliche weitreichende Übereinstimmungen mit anderen ... Mss nicht mehr festgestellt werden können“. Ist dies nicht ein wenig zu kühn? Vor allem dann, wenn die „Interpolation“ nach eigener Aussage gar nicht vollständig entziffert und daher noch weniger verstanden worden sein konnte? Und wenn (p. 49) die „Eigenständigkeit“ des „Codex My₂ ... durch Kontamination nicht erklärbar sind“, dann wäre doch der daraus gezogene Schluß auf „hypothetisch anzunehmende Codices“ dahingehend zu erklären, welches andere Phänomen als das der Kontamination denn dann insgesamt vorliegen solle, da doch für alle dazwischenliegenden Abschriften prinzipiell mit einer Plurigenese zu rechnen ist!

Zu den von S. innerhalb der „Einleitung“ formulierten Prinzipien der Textherstellung zählt, daß die Entscheidung für die Wahl einer Variante sich am „Sachlichen“ (p. 55) orientiere. Der des weiteren vertretenen grundsätzlichen Bevorzugung des Zeugnisses „der Mehrheit“ (ib.) der Überlieferung wird man nicht zustimmen können; widerspricht sie doch dem Konstituierungsprinzip, jene Lesung als primär zu bewerten, „auf die sich genetisch alle anderen zurückführen“ (s. S. A. SRINIVASAN, Vācaspatimīśras Tattvakauṃudī. Hamburg 1967, p. 29 [§1.4.3.]) lassen, wonach „auch Minderheits- und Sonderlesungen primär sein können“ (ib., p. 8).

Als unbestreitbare Verdienste der besprochenen Arbeit sind demgegenüber die gewissenhafte, gründlich annotierte Übersetzung dieser Edition des TN ebenso hervorzuheben wie die detaillierte Textanalyse und der wohl besorgte und gut durchdachte Satz. Er ermöglicht es, beide aufgrund der einheitlich gehaltenen Notation der Textanalyse aufeinander bezogene Bände parallel zu benützen und läßt somit an Übersichtlichkeit und Praktikabilität nichts zu wünschen übrig.

Mit berechtigter Erwartung sieht man nun der von S. (1/10) angekündigten Studie entgegen, die auf der Basis des bisher Geleisteten in Aussicht stellt, die Problematik des TN in einem größeren Zusammenhang behandeln zu wollen. Inwieweit nämlich der von ihr bearbeitete Autor einen bedeutenden Platz in der philosophisch-theologischen Spekulation – zunächst

einmal nur innerhalb seiner eigenen Tradition besehen – beanspruchen darf, und ob er sich auch durch denkerische oder hermeneutische Originalität auszeichnet – all dies kann man von einer Einleitung in Edition und Übersetzung ja noch nicht unbedingt ausführlich behandelt erwarten. Die Beantwortung dieser wichtigen Frage dürfte sich gleichwohl für die künftige wissenschaftliche Auseinandersetzung mit dem Kreis der Viśiṣṭādvaita-Autoren derselben, von S. als vernachlässigt angesehenen Epoche als von durchaus entscheidendem Interesse erweisen. Denn ob die als Mangel betrachtete Vernachlässigung zugunsten einer gründlicheren Beschäftigung mit Yāmuna, Rāmānuja oder Venkaṭanātha nicht etwa doch auch einen sachlichen, aus einer ideengeschichtlich bedeutenderen Position der genannten Autoren abzuleitenden Grund gehabt haben könnte – eine diesbezügliche Entscheidung hat S. durch ihre umfassende Auseinandersetzung mit Varadaguru nun in dankenswerter Weise in eine nunmehr auch tatsächlich verwirklichtbare Nähe gerückt.

W. Slaje

Redington, James D.: *Vallabhācārya on the Love Games of Kṛṣṇa*. Delhi – Varanasi – Patna: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983. x + 492 p. Rs. 140,-.

R.s. verdienstvolles Buch füllt eine wichtige Lücke in der sonst so reichen Literatur zur kṛṣṇaitischen Gottesliebe. Die Seiten 48–354 liefern eine englische Übersetzung der Kapitel 29–33 und 35 des X. Buches des Bhāgavatapurāṇa sowie – diesen Grundtext begleitend – eine solche des als Subodhinī bekannten Kommentars von Vallabhācārya (einschließlich der Interpolationen seines Sohnes Viṭṭhala), wozu p. 357–480 der Originaltext in Devanāgarī geboten wird. Der für diesen Nachdruck neu gesetzte Text folgt der Ausgabe von M. T. TELIVALA und D. V. SANKALIA (Bombay 1924); doch hat R. auch Band 5 der Śrī Subodhinī Granthamālā (Jodhpur 1971) benutzt, der – wenn auch mit zahlreichen Fehlern – denselben Text wiedergibt und – ein Vorzug gerade dieser Ausgabe – auch eine Hindi-Übersetzung (von Fatechand Vasu) enthält.

Wie schon der Titel des Werkes zeigt, beschreiben die Kapitel 29–35 (Kap. 34 ist, weil weniger wichtig, in R.s. Studie unberücksichtigt geblieben) Kṛṣṇas Liebespiele mit den Hirtenfrauen von Braj – ein zentrales Thema kṛṣṇaitischer Liebesmystik, deren tiefgreifende Einwirkungen auf die indische Dichtung und bildende Kunst heute ja weithin bekannt sind. R.s. Übersetzung ist bestens lesbar und, soweit ich feststellen konnte, verlässlich und gründlich. Große Sachkenntnis und Einfühlungsgabe weist auch die Einleitung (p. 1–47) auf, die geschickt in die wichtigsten Fragen des Gedankensystems Vallabhācāryas und des Vallabhasampradāya einführt und, was besonders erwähnt werden muß, die *kṛṣṇatīlā* zurecht als eine Erfüllung der *rasa*-Lehre der klassischen indischen Poetik erkennt.

S. Lienhard

Meisig, Konrad: *Das Sūtra von den vier Ständen*. Das Aggañña-Sutta im Licht seiner chinesischen Parallelen. [Freiburger Beiträge zur Indologie, Bd. 20]. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1988. IX + 249 p. DM 44,-.

Das Aggaññasutta, das im Titel des Buches nach einer späten chinesischen Tradition benannt wird, ist im Pāli und in drei chinesischen Fassungen im Dīrghāgama, Madhyamāgama und als freies Sūtra überliefert. Der Text, der bereits mehrfach das Interesse der Forschung auf sich gezogen hat (zuletzt von G. v. SIMSON in *Studia Indogermanica et Slavica*. Festgabe für Werner Thomas. München 1988, p. 87–98 und R. GOMBRICH, *IJ* 35 [1992] 159–178 bzw. *JPTS* 17 [1992] 213f.), wird hier mit dem Ziel bearbeitet, eine

gemeinsame Grundlage der vier erreichbaren Versionen zu erschließen. Als methodischer Ansatz dienen dabei die von der klassischen Philologie für die Feststellung von Abhängigkeitsverhältnissen von Handschriften entwickelten und von P. MAAS in seiner klassischen Schrift dargelegten Prinzipien, deren Anwendbarkeit auf die oft andersartige indische Handschriftenüberlieferung nicht ohne Schwierigkeiten ist (s. Rez., Remarks on the Problems of Textual Criticism in Editing Anonymous Sanskrit Literature. In: Proceedings of the First Symposium of Nepali and German Sanskritists 1978. Kathmandu 1980, p. 28–40), und die nun auf ein völlig anderes Geschehen übertragen werden. Folgerichtig sind daher auch redaktionelle Veränderungen, die sich in zwei oder mehr Fassungen nachweisen lassen, terminologisch wenig glücklich als „gemeinsame Fehler“ bezeichnet, wodurch die Nachlässigkeit eines Abschreibers mit der schöpferischen Gestaltung eines Textes auf dieselbe Stufe gestellt wird. Wie weit diese beiden grundlegend verschiedenen Vorgänge auseinanderliegen, zeigt sich daran, daß sich Fehler recht genau greifen und im allgemeinen auch nachvollziehen lassen, während die Neufassung eines Wortlautes zwar sichtbar, doch nur in Ausnahmen einmal begründbar sind, wenn man nicht subjektive und damit nicht nachprüfbare Begründungen liefern will. Diese aber sind unumgänglich, wenn man bei dem gewählten Verfahren zwischen Frühem und Spätem oder auch Entlehntem und Originärem entscheiden will. Trotz der durchaus zitierten Warnungen von E. FRAUWALLNER und zuletzt auch H. BECHERT vor derartig subjektiven Ergebnissen läßt sich M. nicht abschrecken, wenn er wie oft, so beispielsweise p. 24f. den Zusatz in der Pāli-Fassung *micchādīthiko micchādīthikammasamādanāhetu* (DN III/96,17f.) beurteilt: „... dieser Zusatz, für den es im Textzusammenhang weder Anlaß noch Rechtfertigung gibt ...“ (p. 25). Ein Theravādin könnte dies mit ganz anderen Augen sehen und mit der Ausgabe der Pāli Text Society (!) auf DN I/82,29–34 hinweisen, wo im selben Sinnzusammenhang eben der getadelte Zusatz steht, und auf Visuddhimagga 423,11–427,26, wo eben dieser Abschnitt ausführlich besprochen ist. Innerhalb dieser Schule, die in dergleichen Fällen der alleinige Maßstab sein muß, war also der gesamte Wortlaut wohl bekannt und als zusammenhängender Text gerechtfertigt.

Zugleich wird dieser Einschub neben anderen als Zeugnis für die gemeinsame Quelle der Pāli-Fassung (DN) und des freien Sūtra (E) gewertet. Doch steht in E hier nur eine Entsprechung zu *micchādīthiko*, während die beiden anderen Fassungen nichts haben. Dieser Befund muß jedoch bekanntermaßen keineswegs so ausgelegt werden, daß beide Versionen aus derselben Wurzel erwachsen sind, wobei sich DN weiter entwickelt hat als E. Mindestens ebenso wahrscheinlich ist es, daß beide Texte im Laufe ihrer Entwicklung in Berührung gekommen sind, wobei eine Übernahme – hier vermutlich von DN zu E – stattgefunden haben kann. Welche Möglichkeit die richtige ist, dürfte wie im Regelfall unentscheidbar sein. Mit guten Gründen rechnet man meist mit Kontaminationen und gibt gleichsam horizontal verlaufenden Entlehnungen den Vorzug vor einer vertikalen Abstammung. Es handelt sich also um Angleichungs- oder Differenzierungsvorgänge, die sich im Laufe meist unbekannter, d. h. historisch weder belegbarer noch rekonstruierbarer Zeitabläufe in nicht näher definierbaren geographischen Räumen vollzogen haben. Vergleichsweise glücklich ist allein die Lage hinsichtlich der Pāli-Überlieferung, da in ihr durch die Missionierung Ceylons unter Aśoka, die schriftliche Aufzeichnung des Tipiṭaka im 1. Jh. v. Chr. auf der Insel, die Kommentierung durch Buddhaghosa im 5. Jh. n. Chr., die Subkommentare, die unter Parākamabbāhu I. im 12. Jh. verfaßt wurden, und die im 15. Jh. beginnende Handschriftenüberlieferung wenigstens sehr ungefähre zeitliche und räumliche Eckwerte bekannt sind. Über die Vorgeschichte der wegen ihrer Datierbarkeit wichtigen chinesischen Fassungen, in denen jedoch allein schon durch

die Übersetzung die wertvollen sprachlichen Hinweise, aus denen sich in den Originalen so viel ableiten läßt, bis auf wenige Transkriptionen einzelner Wörter verschüttet sind, weiß man wie hier über das Schicksal von E vor seiner Übersetzung um das Jahr 1000 (p. 10) nichts. Es scheint demnach doch einigermaßen kühn zu sein, mit so klaren Entwicklungslinien zu rechnen, wie sie im „Stemma“ (p. 35) angedeutet sind, vor allem wenn zudem Befunde, die sich nicht einpassen lassen und daher als störend empfunden werden, als „bloße Gemeinsamkeiten“ (ib.) beiseite geschoben werden.

Der „Archetypus“, von dem alle überlieferten Fassungen ihren Ausgang nehmen sollen, und der ja nur darum überhaupt rekonstruierbar ist, steht nach der Ansicht von M. bereits am Ende einer Überlieferungskette, die mit dem „Urtext“ einsetzt. Dieser wiederum durchlief zur Zeit der mündlichen Tradition eine Entwicklung, die zu einer unentwirrbaren Kontamination führte (ib.). Dieser Zeitabschnitt liegt vor Aśoka, als der Wortlaut der Sūtra-Texte noch wenig festgelegt und die Berührung zwischen den einzelnen „Ortsgruppen“ des Buddhismus noch fest und andauernd war, da sich die neue Religion noch auf Nordindien beschränkte (!) und eben darum auch die Gemeinden noch „eng beisammen“ lagen (p. 3). Wunderbarerweise erhebt sich aus diesem Wirrwarr dann der „Archetypus“, wobei jedoch „der Gedankengang der Urfassung durch Interpolationen und Umstellungen zerstört ist“ (p. 48). Dabei bleibt es das Geheimnis der Buddhisten, warum sie diesen gar so zerstörten Text denn weitergaben und offenbar keinen Anstoß nahmen – vielleicht weil der „Archetypus ... an Unterhaltungswert ... gewonnen“ hatte (ib.)? Denn die Urfassung war „eine ernste, ethische Predigt“ vor gläubigen Zuhörern, die nicht mehr überzeugt zu werden brauchten, während sich der „aufgelockerte Archetypus“ nun „so unterhaltsam“ zeigt, daß man mit ihm auch Mission treiben kann (ib.). Dies scheint nicht nur die historischen Verhältnisse auf den Kopf zu stellen. Auch die Buddhisten haben es anders gesehen, da nach der Einleitung der Buddha den Text den beiden Brahmanen Vāsetṭha und Bhāradvāja vorträgt, um sie für seine Lehre zu gewinnen. Ob man das Sūtra im 3. Jh. v. Chr. zur Zeit des vermuteten „Archetypus“ wirklich in der Mission verwendete oder ihn nur noch zur Erbauung rezitierte, ist eine offene Frage.

Die vielen Vorbehalte, die es hier anzumelden gilt, zeigen, daß diese Art der Materialaufbereitung kaum geeignet ist die Grundlage für religionsgeschichtliche Schlußfolgerungen zu legen, was letztlich ihr Ziel ist (p. 42 ff.). Wie man sich dagegen dem Gedankengut des frühen Buddhismus erfolgreich nähern kann, zeigt die exemplarische Untersuchung von T. VETTER, *The Ideas and Meditative Practices of Early Buddhism* (s. WZKS 36 [1992] 237–239).

Wenn somit die Einleitung (p. 1–71), die als erstes Drittel des Buches die eigentliche Untersuchung ausmacht, nicht als gelungen angesehen werden kann, so wird man doch die synoptische Darbietung der Textfassungen (p. 73–169) und das Chinesisch – Pāli / Sanskrit – Deutsche Glossar (p. 171–239) als hochwillkommene Arbeitsinstrumente dankbar verwenden.

O. v. Hinüber

MacQueen, Graeme: *A Study of the Śrāmaṇyaphala-Sūtra*. [Freiburger Beiträge zur Indologie, Bd. 21]. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1988. VII + 307 p. DM 68,-.

Dieses Buch enthält eine gänzlich unveränderte Dissertation, die bereits 1978 (!) in Harvard eingereicht worden ist, was man allein aus einem bearbeiteten Teilvorabdruck unter dem Titel „The Doctrines of the Six Heretics According to the *Śrāmaṇyaphala Sūtra*“ (IJ 27 [1984] 291–307, p. 305 n. 1)

entnehmen kann. Denn weder der Verf. noch der Hrsg. der Reihe halten diese wichtige Tatsache für mitteilenswert, durch deren Verschweigen dem Leser erst allmählich bewußt wird, daß er einen längst veralteten Text vor Augen hat. Denn die Grundlage der ganzen Arbeit, die Darstellung der Textgeschichte, in der die wichtige Sanskrit-Parallele im *Śaṅghabhedavastu* (ed. R. GNOLI 1978) nicht berücksichtigt werden konnte, ist inzwischen völlig überholt durch die wesentlich umfangreichere Bearbeitung von K. MEISIG (*Das Śrāmaṇyaphala-Sūtra*. Wiesbaden 1987 [rez. von K. WILLE in ZDMG 139 (1989) 263]), die in derselben Reihe (!) erschienen ist. Zugleich ist notgedrungen die ergebnisreiche, in der jüngeren Vergangenheit geführte Diskussion um die Schulzuordnung buddhistischer Texte an der Untersuchung vorbeigegangen. Es liegt auf der Hand, daß all dies für das Hauptanliegen, die Textgeschichte, nicht ohne Folgen bleibt. Dieser Teil (p. 104–290), der durchaus wertvolle Einzelbeobachtungen enthält, hätte in überarbeiteter Form einen weiterführenden Aufsatz abgeben, mit dem die Forschung sich hätte auseinandersetzen können. Dadurch aber, daß diese tüchtige Dissertation ein Jahrzehnt zu spät erschien, ist nicht nur diese Möglichkeit vertan, sondern auch die Veröffentlichung sinnlos geworden. Abschließend sei das Buch von N. VANDIER-NICOLAS: *Śāriputra et les six maîtres d'erreur* (Paris 1954) in Erinnerung gerufen und darauf hingewiesen, daß sich kürzlich K. WATANABE (Some Notes on the Expression *sabba-vāṛi- / sava-vāraṃ*. BEI 5 [1987] 375–386) zum *Śrāmaṇyaphalasūtra* geäußert hat.

O.v. Hinüber

Lopez, Donald S., Jr.: *A Study of Svātantrika*. Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 1987. 483 p. \$ 19,95.

Der vorliegende Band ist die geringfügig überarbeitete Version der Dissertation des Autors (University of Virginia 1982).

Der erste Teil (p. 37–227) besteht in einer Darstellung („Exposition“) des *Madhyamaka* im allgemeinen und der *Svātantrika*-Schule im besonderen, primär gestützt auf die Darstellungen von 'Jam dbyaṅs bṣad pa'i rdo rje und lCaṅ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje sowie auf die mündlichen Instruktionen namhafter lebender dGe lugs pa-Gelehrter, wie etwa des damaligen (1979) Abtes von 'Bras spuṅs sGo maṅ, 'Nag dbaṅ ṅi ma, und des Exabtes von 'Bras spuṅs Blo gsal glin, Ye šes thub brten, u. a. (s. p. 9f.).

Der zweite Teil (p. 227–386) ist eine Übersetzung des *Svātantrika*-Kapitels des von lCaṅ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje verfaßten *Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bṣag pa gsal bar bṣad pa thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan* (Sarnath: The Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1970, Kap. Na, p. 278–407).

Ziel der Arbeit ist es, als Ausgangspunkt für das Studium dieser indischen Schule „some of the major concerns of the *Svātantrika* school as understood by the *Ge-luk doxographers*“ (p. 33) zu präsentieren.

lCaṅ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje (1717–1786) ist nicht nur ein sehr produktiver, sondern auch ein in der dGe lugs pa-Tradition des tibetischen Buddhismus hoch angesehener Autor. Sein großes doxographisches Werk enthält sicherlich eine der – neben 'Jam dbyaṅs bṣad pas *Grub mtha'* chen mo – detailliertesten und genauesten Darstellungen des *Madhyamaka*-Systems in der gesamten tibetischen *Grub mtha'*-Literatur. Daher ist die vorliegende Übersetzung eines Kapitels dieses Werkes auf das herzlichste zu begrüßen; unter Berücksichtigung der in der „Introduction“ (p. 13–35) genannten Einschränkung stellt sie einen wertvollen Beitrag zur systematischen Erforschung des *Madhyamaka*, im speziellen der *Svātantrika*-Schule, dar.

Leider weist die Arbeit aber einige Unzulänglichkeiten auf, die ihre Benützbarkeit erschweren und beeinträchtigen. Diese sind z. T. nicht spezi-

fisch für die vorliegende Arbeit oder deren Autor, sondern auch anderen buddhismuskundlichen Arbeiten aus dem Umfeld der University of Virginia gemein. Darauf soll hier aber nicht in einzelnen eingegangen werden. Zu nennen ist etwa die Tatsache, daß die Übersetzung keinerlei Referenzen zum übersetzten Text enthält. Der Dissertation war wenigstens das Original in Fotokopie beigelegt, worauf in der publizierten Version jedoch verzichtet wurde.

Wie p. 241 erwähnt und aus einem – ebenfalls nur in der Diss. enthaltenen – kritischen Apparat ersichtlich, wurde neben der als Basis für die Übersetzung dienenden Ausgabe von Sarnath auch jene von LOKESH CHANDRA (Delhi 1977) verwendet. Diese beiden Ausgaben sind nahezu identisch und weisen lediglich orthographische Varianten auf. Die Lesarten der zahlreichen zitierten Texte, sowohl der kanonischen als auch jener von Tson kha pa und mKhas grub, blieben jedoch unberücksichtigt; großteils wurden sie auch nicht identifiziert. In vielen Fällen mag diese Tatsache von untergeordneter Bedeutung sein; gelegentlich bietet sie jedoch Anlaß zu Mißinterpretationen. Als Beispiel mag hier Satyadvayavibhaṅga (SDV) 4ab dienen, der im Text (p. 353.19) *bslu ba med pa'i rigs pa ni / don dam yin te* zitiert und mit „a non-deceptive reasoning [consciousness] is called an ultimate“ (p. 326f.) übersetzt ist, in den kanonischen Editionen von SDV und SDV-Vrtti (Derge) bzw. -Pañjikā (Peking, Derge) sowie in einem Zitat in Lam rim chuñ ñu (Peking, bKra sis lhun po) jedoch übereinstimmend *bslu ba med pa's rigs pa ni / don dam yin te*, weil sie untrügerisch ist, ist logische Argumentation *paramārtha* laut, was auch aufgrund der Kommentare (etwa SDVV, D 3882.4a4f.) die vorzuziehende Lesart ist.

Auch die Übersetzung selbst ist in einigen Punkten ungenau oder sogar irreführend. Einige – willkürlich und ohne Rücksicht auf ihre Bedeutung für das Verständnis des Textes ausgewählte – Beispiele aus den Kapiteln 9 („The Meaning of Ultimate Existence“) und 11 („The Two Truths“) mögen zur Illustration genügen:

don dam par na (paramāṛthatah), hier in einem Zitat von Madhyamakahrdaya III 26 (Text p. 342.16) heißt auch „literally“ nicht „for the highest (*parama*, *dam pa*) object (*artha*, *don*)“ (p. 314), sondern „dem höchsten Ding / Gegenstand / Sinn nach“. Wie das im einzelnen „wörtlich“ zu verstehen ist, erklärt Bhāvaviveka in nachfolgend zitierter Tarkajvālā-Stelle:

“To what does the *paramārtha* which is to be refuted in this context ... refer?” (p. 315) übersetzt ‘o na skabs ‘di’i ‘gog rgyu’i *don dam pa de gañ la byed ce na*. ‘gog rgyu ist aber nicht dasselbe wie *dgag bya (prati/nīśedhya)*, sondern eher im Sinn von „das, was der Widerlegung als Bezugspunkt zu Grunde liegt / was sie ‚in Bewegung setzt“ (**prati/nīśedhacārin/ika* [?]) zu verstehen. Nicht *paramārtha* soll hier (Madhyamakahrdaya III 26) negiert werden, sondern ein *paramāṛthatah*-Existieren.

Mit „actual ultimate(s) / ultimate truth(s)“ übersetzt L. (p. 326 ff.) gewöhnlich *don dam (bden pa) dños (aparyāyaparamārtha[satya])* als Gegenüberstellung zu „concordant ultimate(s) / ultimate truth(s)“ (*mtshun pa'i don dam [bden pa], paryāyaparamārtha[satya]*). Dementsprechend suggeriert die Übersetzung „actual conventionality“ (p. 328) ein *kun rdzob dños* als Gegenüberstellung zu einem *mtshun pa'i kun rdzob*, ähnlich dem *rnam grañs-* und *rnam grañs ma yin pa'i kun rdzob* (**paryāya-* und *aparyāyasamvrti*), das laut Sakya Pañditas Thub pa'i dgoñs gsal (Sakya bKa' bum, vol. 5) 31–3–4f. von den Svātantrikas gelehrt wird, m. W. aber in dGe lugs pa-Texten nicht erwähnt ist. Hier ist aber *kun rdzob mtshan ñid pa* ([p. 355.1] wörtlich: ‚versehen mit dem Merkmal von *samvrti*‘) übersetzt, was über *don dam pa'i skye ba sogs ... bkag pa* „negation of ultimate production“ ausgesagt ist. Dieses Merkmal besteht – z. B. nach rTsa śes ñik chen (P 6153) 361b5f. – darin, daß das

Objekt dem Erkenner in dualistischer Weise erscheint. Nach der Erklärung von Tsoñ kha pa – der weder im vorliegenden noch in einem anderen mir bekannten dGe lugs pa-Text widersprochen wird – bedeutet das in diesem Fall aber nicht, daß es *saṃvṛti* ist, und ‚versehen mit dem Merkmal von *saṃvṛti*‘ stellt, da es sich um eine *pariyudāsa*-Negation handelt, keinen Widerspruch zu *paramārthasatya* dar (Lam rim chuñ ñu [P 6002] 311b5f./8f.). In ähnlicher Weise ist „... that both selflessness are actual ultimates“ (p. 329) die Übersetzung von *bdag med gñis ka don dam pa mtshan ñid par* ... (p. 355,19f.).

Madhyamakāloka (D 3887) 233a2f., mit geringfügigen Abweichungen zitiert als *chos dañ gañ zag la bdag med pa'i mtshan ñid kyi [ño bo] de kho na ñid ni rigs pa dañ ldan pas dam pa yin* ... *ye śes dam pa phyin ci ma log pa'i don te | yul yin pa'i phyir | don dam pa źes bya'o* | (p. 355,8ff.), ist übersetzt als: „The suchnesses which have the character of the selflessness of phenomena and persons, because of possessing reason are highest ... Also they are the meanings, that is, the objects, of the unmistakable highest exalted wisdom. Thus, [for those two reasons] they are called the highest objects“ (p. 328). Hier ist aber nur eine „suchness“ (*tathatā*) anzunehmen, die das Merkmal von *dharma*- und *pudgalanāirātmya* hat. *rigs pa dañ ldan pa (yuktimat* [?]) bedeutet wohl ‚basierend auf logischer Überlegung‘, wie etwa Madhyamakāloka 148b7f. zeigt. Für die Übersetzung „meaning“ für *don*, das mit „Objekt“ (*yul*) paraphrasiert ist, sehe ich keine Veranlassung.

Kurz erwähnt seien einige fragwürdige Übersetzungstermini wie etwa „the same reverse“ (p. 325 u. a.) für *ldog pa gcig* (**ekavyatireka*) ‚dieselbe [besondere, bestimmende] Verschiedenheit‘, „an uninterrupted path“ (p. 329) für *bar chad med lam* (*ānantaryamārga*) ‚der Pfad, der ein unmittelbares Resultat bewirkt‘ (es handelt sich dabei um einen Teil des *darśanamārga*), „the principal“ (p. 362) für *gtso bo* (*pradhāna*) ‚Urmaterie‘ (im Sāṅkhya-Kontext) oder auch „entityness“ (p. 445 n. 12) für *ño bo ñid* (*svabhāva, rūpatva*) ‚Natur, [Eigen-]Wesen‘.

Das Englisch-Sanskrit-Tibetisch „Glossary“ (p. 387–404) leistet – obwohl einige wichtige Termini wie etwa „actual/concordant ultimate truth“ nicht berücksichtigt sind – wertvolle Dienste bei der Identifizierung der Übersetzungstermini. Für die Verwendbarkeit des Werkes im Rahmen eines konkreten Studiums wäre aber ein Index der originalsprachlichen Termini wesentlich wünschenswerter.

Abschließend soll aber noch einmal betont sein, daß die vorliegende Arbeit trotz der genannten Schwächen als Präsentation einer späten dGe lugs pa-Darstellung der Svāntantrika-Schule einen höchst willkommenen, wertvollen und – unter Berücksichtigung ihrer Unzulänglichkeiten – nützlichen Beitrag zur Erforschung des Madhyamaka darstellt.

H. Tauscher

Indian Art and Archaeology, edd. E. M. RAVEN – K. R. VAN KOOIJ. [Panels of the VIIth World Sanskrit Conference, Vol. X]. Leiden – New York – København – Köln: E. J. Brill, 1992. 135 p., 63 figs. Hfl. 120,-.

Despite the small size of this well edited volume the seven contributions range in time from the article by E. C. L. DURING CASPERS on the Indus Script (p. 54–67) to J. BAUTZE's Kota Painting (p. 78–93). The emphasis of most of the contributions is on Northeast-Indian art and in particular its connections with the art of Southeast-Asia. Despite the fact that all of these articles were originally presented as short papers at the VIIth World Sanskrit Conference in Leiden (August 23–29, 1987), in the present format they are accompanied by often lengthy bibliographies. Also noteworthy is the publica-

tion of less known sculptures, many of them in public collections in the Netherlands. Particularly interesting are the relationships drawn between Pāla-Sena sculptures (E. M. RAVEN and K. R. VAN KOOIJ [p. 94–128]) and material form Southeast-Asia (P. L. SCHEURLER [p. 35–39]) as well as the detailed article by C. BAUTZE-PICRON on “The ‘Stele’ in Bihar and Bengal” (p. 3–34), related to her dissertation dealing with the same topic. The plates have the usual high quality we have come to associate with Brill publications. This, combined with a clear layout and detailed information for each illustration, makes this volume a useful publication.

D. Klimburg-Salter

Shastric Traditions in Indian Arts. Ed. by Anna Libera Dallapiccola in collaboration with CH. WALTER-MENDY – ST. ZINGEL-AVÉ LALLEMANT. Vol. 1: Texts – Vol. 2: References and Documentation. [Beiträge zur Südasiensforschung, Bd. 125]. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1989. xvii + 491p., vii + 135 p., 104 pl. DM 148,-.

This collection of 41 essays represents the proceedings of a conference (year unspecified) held at Heidelberg University and convened by Prof. A. L. Dallapiccola. The first three papers serve as a general introduction to the topic from different perspectives. Then follow seven sections on iconography, architecture, town planning, literature, ritual, performing arts, and tradition & modernity.

In the second section each essay considers a particular iconographic problem on the basis of or in contrast to the shastric literature. Although mostly dealing with Hindu but also Jain topics, there is also an interesting article by C. BAUTZE-PICRON on the relationship between Buddhist iconography and *sādhanas* (I/35–50). A particularly interesting article by D. DESAI (“The location of sculptures in the architectural scheme of the Kaṇḍāriya Mahādeva Temple of Khajuraho. Śāstra and practice” [I/155–165]) forms a bridge between this section and the following one on architecture. The emphasis here is on Hindu temples. But we found also references to Buddhist architecture, and one article by R. NATH (I/187–201) discusses medieval Islamic mosque architecture in relation to Indian texts on non-religious architecture and – most importantly – excerpts from a fragmentary Sanskrit text named *Rehamānaprāsāda* on mosque architecture written in the 15th c. in the Māru-Gurjara region, i.e. parts of Rajasthan and Gujarat. NATH proposes that the Śāstra was written by a “Brāhmaṇa ācārya” for the Hindu artisans who “would worship the *Vāstu-Puruṣa* at the time of laying the foundation of the mosque as they would normally do in case of the temple, . . .” (p. 200).

The application of shastric literature to town planning also has a wide range of cultural variables. It is, for instance, interesting to compare the articles on Puri and Bhaktapur by O. M. STARZA-MAJEWSKI (I/253–259) and A. VERGATI (I/261–268) respectively: the concept of a sacred geography with the king located at the center and the use of rituals and ceremonies meant to activate the dynamic relationship between the king and the various deities and sacred locals.

The articles proceed through a kaleidoscope of problems in literature, music, dance, court and folk arts up to the 20th c. This wide diversity is at once a strength and a weakness: on the one hand there is something for everyone in these volumes, and on the other there is very little common ground upon which to evolve a dialogue. Although most of the participants adhered to the topic, their methods and definitions were so diverse as to create divergent, rather than convergent points of reference. This problem

was also noted by both T. S. MAXWELL and D. It was, however, correctly pointed out that the present stage of inquiry may well demand the "case history" approach as a first step. More important – it would seem – would be critical editions and translations of Śāstras such as the excellent studies by B. DAGENS: *Mayamata. Traité Sanskrit d'architecture. Édition critique, traduction et notes* (2 vols. Pondichéry 1970–1976 [tr. into English New Delhi 1985]) and *Les enseignements architecturaux de l'Ajitāgama et du Rauravāgama* (Pondichéry 1977 [English tr. New Delhi 1984]); cf. his contribution "Iconography in Śaivāgamas: description or prescription?" (I/151–153).

Given the complexity and breadth of the theme of this volume, it is no wonder that the most provocative articles (with regard to the nature and function of the shāstric traditions) were provided by those scholars who have previously concerned themselves with this problem. Thus one could extrapolate a dialogue between B. DAGENS (p. 151), A. J. GAIL (p. 112f.), T. S. MAXWELL (p. 14f.), K. VATSYAYAN (p. 2f.), and SH. POLLOCK (p. 18ff.), to take just a few examples. One can well imagine that the opportunity to exchange and elaborate on these ideas might have provided "the sparkle of traditional art historical debate" (p. 5) missed by MAXWELL. It is true that in the age of the peripatetic academic it is difficult to persist in a truly small conference, but it is probable that within such strictly confined parameters one would be more likely to arrive at meaningful discourse. However, the wide range of interesting problems raised by these articles leaves no doubt that this topic could be profitably pursued. For instance, an aspect of the topic which a future conference might consider is the history of shāstric studies within the discipline of art history. A stimulating beginning in this direction was advanced by MAXWELL and – from another perspective – by VATSYAYAN.

The second volume includes the index, bibliography, biographies of the authors and lists of drawings and photos related to the articles. We can be grateful to Prof. Dallapiccola for having conceived of and produced these interesting volumes.

D. Klimburg-Salter

Kreisel, Gerd: *Die Śiva-Bildwerke der Mathurā-Kunst*. Ein Beitrag zur frühhinduistischen Ikonographie. [Monographien zur indischen Archäologie, Kunst und Philologie, Bd. 5]. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1986. 289 p., 273 Abb. DM 168,–.

Bekanntlich hat Mathurā eine der bedeutendsten Schulen indischer Bildhauerkunst hervorgebracht, deren Blüte in die Herrschaftszeit der Kuṣāṇas und Guptas fällt. Der Untersuchung eines begrenzten Teiles dieses reichhaltigen Kunstschaßens, nml. den skulpturellen Darstellungen Śivas in anthropomorpher Gestalt und in den Liṅga-Bildwerken, ist das vorliegende Buch, hervorgegangen aus einer Berliner Dissertation, zugeordnet. Sein Ziel besteht nach den Worten des Verf. darin, „die überlieferten Bildwerke des Śivaismus in Mathura möglichst vollzählig zusammenzutragen, ikonographisch zu klassifizieren und entwicklungsgeschichtlich abzuhandeln“ (p. 11).

Hinter dem Titel des Buches verbirgt sich jedoch mehr als nur eine rein ikonographische Studie. Sein Verf. macht deutlich, daß es ihm darauf ankommt, die kunst- und religionsgeschichtlichen Entwicklungen bis zur Gupta-Zeit „in ein chronologisch fixiertes Bezugssystem zu stellen, um die ihnen zugrundeliegenden kulturellen Interaktionen und politischen Zusammenhänge durchschaubar zu machen“ (p. 30). Dieser Leitlinie entsprechend enthält die Arbeit einen umfassenden theoretischen Teil, der sich in den

Kapiteln I–V (p. 13–171) zunächst mit den Grundlagen des śivaitischen Bilderkultus befaßt (Kap. I [p. 13–23]) und einen Überblick über die kulturelle Entwicklung Mathurās gibt (Kap. II [p. 24–39]). Dabei v.a. Stil- und Datierungsfragen der Mathurā-Kunst nachgehend, gelingt es K. nicht nur ein der Kṣatrapa-Zeit eigenes künstlerisches Idiom, das er als „Emanzipation des Volumens“ (p. 31) bezeichnet, zu erkennen, sondern auch bisherige Auffassungen über die Datierung der Regierungszeit der Kṣatrapas zu korrigieren: von der sog. Āmohinī-Tafel mit dem inschriftlich genannten Jahr 72 unter Śodāsa als dem Repräsentanten der mittleren Phase des Kṣatrapa-Kunststils ausgehend, kommt er zu dem Schluß, daß weder die Vikrama- noch die Śaka-Ära als Basis für die Mathurā-Chronologie dienen können, sondern „daß die Kṣatrapas von Mathura ... eine lokal oder dynastisch begrenzte eigene Zeitrechnung verwendet haben, deren Beginn in das Ende des 1. Jh. v. Chr.“ fällt (p. 35).

Das insgesamt 126 Darstellungen umfassende Bildmaterial untergliedert K. zunächst in einem Überblick (Kap. III [p. 40–43]) in zwei Hauptkategorien: 1. das Līṅga (mit weiterer Differenzierung in die Kategorien [a] Līṅga ohne figürliche Darstellungen und [b] Līṅga mit Symbolfiguren sowie die verschiedenen Formen des Mukhaliṅga) und 2. die Śiva-Figur (ebenfalls weiter unterschieden in: stehende bzw. sitzende Einzelfigur, Śiva und Umā, Ardhanaṛiśvara, Haryardha Śiva, Lakulīśa und Trisūla-Kultsäule mit Daṇḍa). Eine quantitative und chronologische Klassifizierung dieser Bildkategorien führt K. zu dem Schluß, daß die Līṅga-Bildwerke in der Kuṣāṇa-Zeit ein gewisses Übergewicht haben, während in der Gupta-Zeit zunehmend die persönliche Götterdarstellung in den Vordergrund zu treten scheint (p. 42).

Die Kapitel IV (p. 44–86) und V (p. 87–171) sind dann unter Heranziehung und Auswertung des Bildmaterials der Besprechung der gestalterischen Entwicklung der beiden Hauptbildkategorien und ihrer Unterarten in den verschiedenen Epochen gewidmet, wobei der Verf. auch archäologische, numismatische und v.a. literarische Befunde, letztere häufig aus der Purāṇa-Literatur, heranzieht. Für die Entwicklung der Bildkategorie des Caturmukhaliṅga erweist sich ein Bildwerk von zentraler Bedeutung, das nicht aus Mathurā stammt: der fünfköpfige, nicht phallische Pañcavaktra-Śiva von Bhītā (Distr. Allahabad), der zu den ältesten mehrfigurigen Darstellungen in Indien überhaupt zählt (datierbar in die letzten Jahrzehnte des 1. Jh. v. Chr.) und den K. als Anthropomorphisierung der philosophischen Konzeption des Allgottes Śiva, d. h. als bildliche Umsetzung seiner fünf Aspekte: *sadyojāta-uṣṇīṣin*, *vāmadeva-brahmacārin*, *aghora*, *tatpuruṣa-saumya* und *iśāna-yogin*, bestimmt. K. kann zeigen, daß diese Skulptur prototypisch am Anfang der Caturmukhaliṅgas (wie auch der mehrköpfigen Śiva-Figuren) steht, indem vier dieser Aspekte auf die Caturmukhaliṅga-Konzeption übertragen wurden (zu der p. 54n. 168 als Parallele zum Pañcavaktra-Śiva angezogenen vierköpfigen Doppelfigur s. – neben den von K. zitierten Arbeiten von N. P. JOSHI und D. M. SRINIVASAN – auch A. GAIL, *On the Symbolism of Three and Four-Faced Viṣṇu Images: A Reconsideration of Evidence*. *Artibus Asiae* 44 [1983] 297–304). Dies hatte zur Folge, daß es zu Unstimmigkeiten zwischen der Bildgestaltung einerseits und der Abfolge der fünf Namen in den entsprechenden ikonographischen Purāṇa-Texten andererseits kam. Indem K. diese Unterschiede überzeugend herausarbeitet und erklärt, unterscheidet sich seine Arbeit positiv von vielen anderen ikonographischen Studien, die die Bildwerke, die sie untersuchen, auf eine Illustration der Texte und die Texte auf bloße Erläuterungen der Bilder reduzieren (vgl. M. TADDEIS in *E&W* 33 [1983] 297–299 erschienene Rezension von N. KRISHNAS *The Art and Iconography of Vishnu-Narayana* [Bombay 1980] und R. CHAMPAKALAKSHMIS *Vaiṣṇava Iconography in the Tamil Country* [New Delhi 1981]).

Das V. Kapitel, das der zweiten der beiden Hauptbildkategorien, der Śiva-Figur und ihren verschiedenen Ausformungen, gilt, behandelt den ikonographischen Grundtyp, die verschiedenen bildnerischen Elemente und Attribute, die für die Darstellung Śivas charakteristisch sind (z. B. *ūrdhvaṅga*, Symboltier, Bekleidungsformen, Haartrachten, Schmuck), einzelne Köpfe und Skulpturfragmente sowie alle weiteren in Kap. III im Überblick vorgestellten Kategorien.

Kap. VI (p. 172–252) umfaßt den Katalogteil des Buches mit einer detaillierten Beschreibung der 126 Bildwerke. Jede Bildbeschreibung schließt die Angabe von bisher zu einem Bildwerk erschienener Sekundärliteratur ein. Eine reichhaltige Bibliographie (Kap. VII [p. 253–274]), „Abbildungsverzeichnis und Bildnachweis“ (Kap. VIII [p. 275–282]), ein Index (Kap. IX [p. 283–289]) und zwei Abbildungsteile (Kap. X [Abb. 1–126] und Kap. XI [Abb. A1–A30], dessen Abbildungen zum Vergleich herangezogene Objekte zeigen, die nicht aus Mathurā stammen oder keine Śiva-Bildwerke sind) beschließen das Buch.

A. Bock-Raming

Seltmann, Friedrich: *Schattenspiel in Kerala*. Sakrales Theater in Südindien.

Mit Summary und einem Anhang: Sequence of scenes of the Kambā-Rāmāyaṇak-Kūttu. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1986. 134 p., 44 Tafeln. DM 148,-.

Mit diesem hübsch ausgestatteten Werk legt S., der bereits 1985 eine Arbeit über das Schatten- und Marionettenspiel in Śāvantvādi (Süd-Mahārāṣṭra) herausgebracht hat, eine reich dokumentierte Beschreibung des Schattentheaters in Kerala vor. Während das erste Kapitel (p. 9–12) eine kurze Einleitung in das Schattentheater Indiens und die bisherige Forschung vermittelt, stellen die folgenden fünf Teile des Buchs (Kapitel II–VI) Keralas Schattenspieler (p. 13–22), die zahlreichen Spielfiguren, ihre Herstellung, Bewegungstechnik, Posen usw. (p. 23–38), „Bühne und Bühnenhaus“ (p. 39–44) sowie den „Aufführungsverlauf eines Schattenspiels“ (p. 45–84) dar. Zentrum dieser – heutzutage stark im Rückzug befindlichen – Kunst ist der Pālghāt-Distrikt und dessen Umgebung, während die Aufführungen selbst in hauptsächlich zwei Arten eingeteilt werden können: (1) solche, die im Rahmen des großen Jahresfestes bestimmter, den Göttinnen Bhagavatī und Bhadrakālī geweihter Tempel stattfinden (s. p. 79ff.), und (2) Schattenspiele, die von Privatpersonen oder privaten Organisationen veranstaltet werden.

Die religiös-magische Funktion des Schattenspiels beleuchtet u. a. die wichtige Rolle, die dem Orakelpriester (s. p. 80ff.) in den einleitenden Ritualen zukommt, wie auch die Tatsache, daß Schattenspiele zu Ehren der Regengöttin Māri Amman auch zum Zweck der Regenbeschwörung aufgeführt werden können. Für diese Gattung des Schattenspiels unerlässlich sind weibliche Gestalten: Göttinnen oder Figuren aus den beiden Epen wie Umā, Draupadī, Sāvitrī und – am allerwichtigsten – Sītā, die kraft ihrer Keuschheit und Unschuld den ausgebliebenen Regen gewissermaßen herbeizwingen können.

Den Inhalt des Werks illustrieren 44 Tafeln mit jeweils 4 Fotos, die ersten 16 in Farbe. Unter den „Literaturangaben“ (p. 93–96) vermißt man an jüngeren Werken u. a. K. V. ZVELEBILS *Tamil Literature* (Wiesbaden 1974), in dem als die beiden wahrscheinlichsten Daten Kampans, des Dichters des für das Kerala-Schattenspiel so wichtigen Tamil-Rāmāyaṇa, der Ausgang des 10. Jh. n. Chr. bzw. die Regierungszeit des Vikrama Cola (ca. 1130) angesetzt wird (op. cit., p. 147).

S. Lienhard

Kaufhold, Hubert: *Syrische Handschriften juristischen Inhalts in südindischen Bibliotheken*. [SbÖAW 535 = Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für antike Rechtsgeschichte 5]. Wien: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1989. 56 p. öS 168,- / DM 24,-.

Wie K. einleitend (p. 5) anführt, ist unser Kenntnisstand über die Bestände syrischer Handschriften aus dem Kreis der Thomas-Christen Keralas trotz der von E. R. HAMBYE, D. L. MCCONAUGHY und J. P. M. VAN DER PLOEG geleisteten Vorarbeiten immer noch ungenügend, da die genannten Autoren im allgemeinen nur sehr knappe Beschreibungen mit den nötigsten kodikologischen und inhaltlichen Angaben bieten. Diesem Übelstand abzuhelpen, legt er nun die Ergebnisse eigener Nachforschungen vor Ort aus dem Jahre 1982 vor, die sich, den Intentionen der unterstützenden Institution (Kommission für antike Rechtsgeschichte der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften) folgend, vorwiegend auf Handschriften mit rechtsgeschichtlicher Relevanz richteten.

Das vor diesem Hintergrund entstandene Bändchen gliedert sich in vier Abschnitte, nml. in einen (A) über die Aufbewahrungsorte von west- und ostsyrischen Handschriften, in einen zweiten (B) über die wichtigsten in juristischen Handschriften enthaltenen Texte, ferner (C) in eine Beschreibung der Handschriften sowie (D) in einen Anhang, in dem auf „Historisches aus den Handschriften“ eingegangen wird.

(A [p. 9–12]) Anlässlich des „Überblicks über die Bibliotheken“ wird die Anzahl der dort vorhandenen Stücke z. T. jedoch ganz approximativ eingeschätzt, wobei aber auch Angaben darüber gemacht werden, welche Stücke davon im vorliegenden Werk einer Beschreibung für wert befunden wurden. Ein solches Verfahren gibt allerdings bereits ersten Anlaß zur Besorgnis darüber, ob denn der über die vorhandenen Bestände gewonnene Überblick tatsächlich ausreichend sei. Denn wie läßt sich die von K. vorgebrachte Behauptung sinnvoll vertreten, daß etwa im syrisch-orthodoxen Seminar in Kottayam (p. 10 [I.6]) keine juristischen Hss. vorhanden seien, wenn er unter Bezugnahme auf dieselbe Sammlung meint „etwa 50 Handschriften gesehen zu haben“ (ib.)! Von einer genaueren Überprüfung dürfte dann – angesichts der offenkundigen Unklarheit über die Größe des Bestandes – doch wohl Abstand genommen worden sein. In der Sammlung der Karmeliten in Mannanam (p. 11 [II.3]) „sollen sich [Hss. juristischen Inhalts] . . . nicht befinden“; die Bestände des syro-malabarischen Bistums von Trichur (p. 11 f. [II.4]) werden bewertet „nach den Auskünften, die wir erhalten haben“ (p. 11); im Mar Thomas Apostolic Seminary (p. 12 [II.5]) „werden jedenfalls etwa zehn syrische Handschriften . . . aufbewahrt, zusammen mit ungefähr 15 weiteren . . .“; das Seminar in Alwaye (p. 12 [II.7]) „soll keine syrischen Handschriften besitzen“. Dieser offenkundige Verzicht auf eine Autopsierung der vorhandenen Materialien bleibt völlig unverständlich, da K. ganz auf den Spuren VAN DER PLOEGS zu wandeln scheint, der – wie p. 12 abschließend angemerkt wird – für „die übrigen Bibliotheken“, die er besucht hat, „keine juristischen Handschriften angibt“. Es wäre doch zum mindesten zu fordern, daß ein bereits einmal beackertes Feld von den Nachfolgern eine vertiefte Untersuchung – und sei es nur hinsichtlich der genauen Zahl der Bestände – erfahre!

(B [p. 13–25]) Von den 13 behandelten westsyrischen Texten werden 7 (I.6–II. 13) als bisher nicht edierte vorgestellt; von den 7 behandelten ostsyrischen Texten gilt dies für 2 (II.6–7). Über die Kriterien zur Bestimmung dieser Texte als „die wichtigsten in den juristischen Handschriften enthaltenen“ (p. 13) wird geschwiegen. Dies dürfte, folgt man der „Zusammenfassung“ (p. 24) jedenfalls auf Grund seines Alters auf „den ältesten bekannten Zeugen

für den Nomokanon des 'Abdīšō' bar Brīkā" (Hs. Trichur 64, 1291 A. D.) sowie für den Nomokanon des Barhebraeus (Hs. Pampakuda 33, 1290 A. D.) zutreffen.

(C [p. 27–51]) Die Beschreibungen der insgesamt 17 Hss. können sich in 12 Fällen auf bereits vorliegende Beschreibungen der eingangs angeführten Autoren stützen. Demgemäß – und daß die Verwendung dieses Wortes hier keine Unterstellung ist, wird sich sogleich erweisen –, demgemäß also wird das bekannte Material sehr breit auf 22 Seiten abgehandelt. Wie steht es aber mit den wenigen, nml. nur 5, Hss., die in diesem Buche ihre erste Beschreibung erfahren (Thozhiyoor Nr. 1, 33 & 50 [p. 33–36]; Kottayam, Marthomitiches Seminar Nr. A208 [p. 36]; Manjinikara [p. 37])? Alle Neukatalogisierungen zusammengenommen finden auf 4 Seiten Platz, wobei in bloß einem einzigen Fall (Thozhiyoor Nr. 33) überhaupt ein Schlußvermerk der Hs. im Original angegeben wird. Dieses auffällige Mißverhältnis im Umfang der Beschreibungen zwischen bereits behandeltem und noch unbehandeltem Material wird aber erst richtig deutlich, wenn man sich vor Augen führt, daß K. die Hs. Ernakulam L 22 (p. 11 [II.2]), die „bereits ausführlich von HAMBYE 43 und vor allem VAN DER PLOEG beschrieben“ wurde, „der Vollständigkeit halber unten auch noch aufgeführt“ (ib.) hat, ausgedehnt auf über 4 Seiten (p. 48–51 [!]).

Dies ist nun eine in der Tat unerhörte Vorgangsweise: Für die Drittbeschreibung einer einzigen Hs. werden 4 Textseiten in Anspruch genommen; die Erstbeschreibung von 5 Hss. bescheidet sich demgegenüber mit 3½ Seiten! Hätten denn nicht gerade die neu hinzugekommenen, von K. ausdrücklich als wichtig (p. 13) eingestuften Quellen eine weitaus gründlichere Behandlung verdient als die im vorliegenden Band gebotene, und zwar diesfalls berechtigt „der Vollständigkeit halber“? Darüber hinaus wäre doch unbedingt auch eine konsequentere Ausgewogenheit in der Gewichtung der kodikologischen und der inhaltlichen Bestandsaufnahmen, die sich am von J. ASSFALG (Syrische Handschriften. Syrische, karšunische, christlich-palästinische, neusyrische und mandäische Handschriften. [VOHD 5]. Wiesbaden 1963) gebotenen Vorbild hätten orientieren können, einzuhalten gewesen.

Alles in allem zusammengenommen ergibt sich auch bei wohlmeinender Betrachtung der hier angezeigten Arbeit der ungünstige Eindruck, K. habe sich weder die Indienreise noch die daraus hervorgegangene Veröffentlichung schwer werden lassen, ein Eindruck, der nicht zuletzt auch durch das Fehlen jeglicher Register und Konkordanzen seine abschließende Bestätigung findet. Es werden durch diese letztgenannte Unterlassung nicht nur die Beziehungen zwischen besitzenden Institutionen, Handschriften und den durchgeführten Beschreibungen verdunkelt, sondern es verschließt sich auch der Abschnitt D (p. 52–56) dieser Einsparung wegen einer raschen und treffsicheren Orientierung.

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